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October 21st 12 years 5 months ago #1279

  • djb
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1899 - Battle of Elandslaagte.


Boer view of the battle


An interpretation of the battle


The advance of the Gordons

The Battle of Elandslaagte

By David and Chris Biggins


On 11th October 1899, Commandant General Joubert received final instructions from the Transvaal Government to advance on the British forces in Natal. Over the next three days, the Transvaal Boers advanced into Natal from various directions and met at Newcastle. The Council of War held there decided to attack Dundee because of its strategic importance. Joubert split his 14,000 men into three columns, one of which under General Kock was tasked with the protection of the right flank of the attack and was to be situated between Ladysmith and Dundee.

Kock’s force consisted of around 1,150 men: 700 men of the Johannesburg Commando under Commandant Ben Viljoen; 150 Free Staters from the Vrede Commando under Field Cornet de Jager; Staats Artillerie under the command of Major Erasmus; the German Commando of 100 men under Colonel Schiel and 150 Hollanders under Commandant Jan Lombard. Kock also had two field guns and two Maxim-Nordenfeld machine guns that had been captured in the Jameson Raid.

Kock’s force left Newcastle on the 18th October and reached the Biggarsberg Pass the next afternoon. They had planned to camp near Sunday’s River as it was a strong position. However, two patrols of about 50 men each pushed further towards Ladysmith. Field Cornet Potgieter of the German Commando captured a train of provisions and 800 cattle at Waschbank on the 19th and decided to advance still further. Both patrols met up at Elandslaagte, just 16 miles (26 km) from Ladysmith. As they debated when to return to Kock’s main force as per their orders, they spotted a train coming in to Elandslaagte station. The two patrols tried to capture the train but the quick thinking of the crew allowed it to complete its journey to Dundee with only minor damage. Now surrounding the station, the Boers were able to capture the next train to arrive. The Boers arrested all the people from the train, including two war correspondents. The telegraph wires were also cut but not before Atkinson (Station Master) had alerted the garrison at Ladysmith to events with the short message “First train escaped, second captured.” Using some of the local labour from the coal mine, the Boers ripped up some of the track to prevent any more traffic. On inspection, the train was found to contain large amounts of alcohol. Some of this was consumed by the raiders but Schiel ordered what remained to be destroyed. At this point, Schiel wanted to return to the main force but Pienaar, the other patrol leader, suggested they move the camp to Elandslaagte. It appeared to be a better location than has been selected by the War Council. Kock did not seek approval for his decision and moved his force to Elandslaagte, arriving there in the evening of the 19th. That evening, a concert was held at the local hotel, the Traveller's Rest.

In the daylight of the 20th, Kock selected locations for his two guns, which had just arrived. He chose a ridge about a mile to the south east of the town as the best place to protect his small force. Kock was challenged about the location, the argument was that it could be outflanked on both sides. However, Kock would not be moved. If he was to stay at Elandslaagte, this was probably the best defensive position he could choose. Whether he should be at Elandslaagte at all, seems not to have been considered.

There was a degree of panic in Ladysmith. The British garrison at Dundee was supplied through Elandslaagte so control of the station was more important to the British. General White needed to know what was going on. How big was the Boer force there? At 11:00 Major General French was ordered by White to make a reconnaissance with a small force towards Elandslaagte. French advanced his cavalry, C squadron of the 5th Lancers and some Natal Carbineers, as far as Modder Spruit, 12 miles (19 km) along the road to Dundee, and halted. The weather was very poor and the reconnaissance party made little further progress. However, the advance guard of the 5th Lancers under Lieutenant Hill succeeded in capturing two Boer patrols which rode into them, thinking they were their own men. It was learnt that Elandslaagte was held by the Boers, but not in great numbers.

The remainder of the 20th passed off quietly. The Boers seems happy to inspect the train, mines and houses, displaying little concern to the 13,600 British troops located only a short distance away in Ladysmith, not to mention the smaller force at Dundee.

On the next morning, the 21st, French was again ordered north. His orders were to "clear the neighbourhood of Elandslaagte of the enemy, and to cover the construction of the railway and telegraph lines.” The force selected consisted of 400 men of the Imperial Light Horse (ILH), Natal Volunteer Field Artillery (NFA) Battery with six seven-pound field guns, Railway and telegraph companies of the Royal Engineers, 400 men of the Manchester Regiment and ancillary troops accompanied including men from the Natal Mounted Rifles and the Newcastle troop of the Natal Carbineers. The rain from the previous day had cleared for now but more rain threatened. French’s force travelled by rail and road and advanced to Modder Spruit and from there to within a mile of Elandslaagte station. The Boers could be seen milling around. Why were they not aware of the British advance? Surely, they must have expected some response from Ladysmith? Taking advantage of their element of surprise, French ordered the NFA into action. The Boer gunners were not slow to respond. They quickly collected themselves and almost immediately found their range with two rounds exploding around the NFA Battery. The NFA guns were no match for the Boer 75mm artillery pieces. Conan Doyle explained how “the six little guns lay back at their extremest angle, and all barked together in impotent fury.” French quickly realised that his small force was inadequate to achieve his objective and he withdrew to where the Krupp guns could not reach him. The Boers were right not to pursue French as they could have been entering a trap and it would have necessitated leaving the comparative safety of the Elandslaagte ridge.

During the artillery duel, a few of the British subjects who had been detained by the Boers at the station managed to escape. They gave French valuable intelligence including the fact that Kock was expecting reinforcements. French telephoned White and asked for reinforcements. White responded “Am sending reinforcements, and coming out in person.” White chose Colonel Ian Hamilton to lead the infantry and gave him the order that the Boer force was to be attacked without delay. The reinforcements consisted of two squadrons of 5th Lancers; one squadron of 5th Dragoon Guards; 21st and 42nd batteries of Royal Field Artillery (RFA); seven companies of the 1st Devonshire Regiment; five companies of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders; Natal Volunteer Ambulance Corps and other ancillary troops. The reinforcements started to arrive from 11:00.

While French waited for all the reinforcements to arrive, there was skirmishing between the two forces. A potential attempt by the Boers to cut the railway line behind the train was thwarted by the ILH and 5th Lancers. The German Commando pushed towards Modder Spruit only to be opposed by the 5th Dragoon Guards and 42nd RFA.

Major Gore, in command of the cavalry, pressed forward in an attempt to turn the Boer’s right flank. The Krupp guns were turned on this force from a distance of around 1,800 yards (1,650 m) and this led Gore to take his small force to a location near the station from where he was safe from artillery fire but also from where he could observe the reverse slope of the Boer position.

Now in a position to move with his entire force against the Boer position, French initiated operations. It was now 15:00. The troops moved a mile further along the railway line and were ready to be deployed. Storm clouds gathered above anticipating and echoing the fight that was about to begin. At this point White arrived to see the battle for himself. He was fortunate that the Boer artillery that was directed towards him caused no more than a slight splattering of mud on him and his party.

The plan was for a frontal attack by the Devons across the open veldt, directly against the front of the Boer position, where Kock had now concentrated his force. A larger force of Manchesters and Gordons was to work round to the right on to the enemy's left flank. After this flanking movement, the Devons would continue their attack from the centre. Once within rifle range, the Devons were to hold the enemy while the flank attack forced its way along the summit of the ridge towards the enemy's artillery positions. When the right moment came both attacks were to be driven home simultaneously. The infantry advance was to be supported by the 21st and 42nd Batteries that were to move into ever closer range in line with the movement of the men. The 5th Dragoon Guards were to protect the British left flank while the 5th Lancers and ILH undertook this responsibility on the right.

Hamilton spoke to the infantry before they deployed. He ended his exposition of the plan of attack with the assertion that they would “shift the Boers from their hills before sunset”, and that “The newsboys in the streets of London would be calling out news of the victory next morning”. Suitably motivated, the men cheered “We’ll do it, sir! We'll do it!”

The Boers had watched as Hamilton made his speech. Commandant Ben Viljoen pleaded with General Kock to open fire on the infantry but Kock refused.

Facing the ridge occupied by the Boers, the 21st Battery came into action in the open against the Boer artillery at 4,400 yards (4,020 m). For six minutes the enemy returned the fire, aiming their guns with great accuracy on the battery in action, but as soon as the 42nd Battery galloped up and unlimbered the enemy ceased firing. But the positions of the Boer guns were known and the artillery preparation for the attack now began with shrapnel fire against the ridge. After 30 minutes of artillery barrage, French gave the order for Hamilton to advance the infantry. It was late for the start of an infantry assault and, as the afternoon drew on, the weather worsened. Thunder clouds formed overhead as the sun was setting.

The Devons advanced across the open plain and Hamilton ordered the troops into an extended formation which gave them a depth of about a mile. The Boer guns started to fire Awere just three casualties.

When the Devons had advanced to about 1,200 yards (1,100 m) from the position, Major Park stopped his men and opened fire. The Devons now came under a severe rifle fire. After a few volleys of their own they advanced. By 17:00 the Devons were within 800 yards (730 m) of the summit of the hill and here they now waited for the flanking attack to develop.

On the attacker’s right flank, the Manchesters had advanced past the batteries, which now limbered-up and moved straight to their front to a range of 3,200 yards (2,925 m) to shell the Boer artillery again. Colonel Scott-Chisholme wanted more involvement for his regiment, the ILH and French acceded to his request and the dismounted they joined the Manchesters and Gordons. As the flanking troops moved forward, they were subjected to a fierce fire from Pienaar's men. As the infantry reached the foot of the ridge, the storm burst over their heads. The rain was short-lived but provided sufficient cover to allow the men to take the crest of the ridge.

Over to the left, near the station, Gore’s cavalry continued to watch and wait. The station building was searched and found to be empty except for some Boer hospital orderlies and a few prisoners who were quickly freed.

Back on the right of the attack, the men had attained a good position. In front of them was a short stretch of level grass, bereft of any shelter and filled with the fire from the Boer defenders. Encouraged by their officers, the men ran forward. As they passed the dip, they were faced with a distance of 800 yards (730 m) to the ridge. The area was open and criss-crossed with barbed wire fences. The far summit of the ridge commanded it from end to end and, while no Boers could be seen, the air was thick with bullets. Many officers and men were hit as they queued to pass through the gaps cut in the wire fences.

Colonel Schiel and his men attempted a flanking attack of their own. The ILH prevented this manoeuvre but the diversion emboldened the spirit of the defenders whose position was looking increasingly dire. The attacking force was taking mounting casualties. Colonel Dick-Cunyngham, commanding the Gordons, suffered two wounds and over half the Gordon’s officers were also casualties.

The troops made slow advance towards the Boer lines using short rushes. As one set of men advanced, another would provide covering fire for them. The only words of command that were needed were ‘Cease fire’ and ‘Advance’. Hamilton came across from the Devons and up into the firing line on the right with a strong reinforcement of men and gave new heart to the men. He ordered a bugler to sound the ‘Charge!’ Every bugle took up the call as did the pipers. Waves of men now commenced their charge with Hamilton at their head. With this, the Boers' resolve gave way and many now began to stream away. A few determined Boers still clung onto the final kopje but with another sound of the bugles, the kopje was taken. The Boer artillery, with tremendous courage, continued to fire their guns until the very last moment. The time was now 17:10.

In the main Boer laager, a white flag of surrender was seen. Hamilton ordered the ‘cease fire’ to be sounded and for a moment there was a complete lull in the fighting. The lull was short lived for there came a lone shot followed by a torrent of rifle fire as some 60 Boers, who had lain unseen below the rear of the crest, dashed up the steep slope on the right and fired into the men massed on the summit with General Kock himself at their head. Confusion spread amongst the attackers in an instance and the men fell back. The Boer guns were released by the retreating troops and started to fire once more. Hamilton praised the resolve of the Burghers “During the most intense moment of the counter-attack, the Boers had fought with an enthusiasm of fury, and of utter contempt of death which I never saw them equal again during the campaign.”

It seemed as though the position was about to be abandoned. It was Hamilton who, at this moment of indecision, seized the initiative and shouted encouragement to his men. Lieutenant Meiklejohn, of the Gordons, rushed to the front rallying the men but he was hit in six places. The men of the now mixed unit collected themselves and pressed home a final charge. Captains Johnston and Mullins (both of whom received the VC) and Lieutenant Brabant led the charge. They fought at close quarters with bayonet and clubbed rifle and, at times, hand-to-hand. As they advanced, Lieutenant Field, at the head of a company of the Devons, charged the Boer battery also at the point of the bayonet.

The cease fire was again sounded. It was 17:45. It was all over for the Boers. Now those who remained needed to make good their escape if they could and as many as were able mounted their ponies and headed in the direction of Newcastle.

With what little light remained, Gore observed the retreat of the Boers. His orders has been to ‘pursue with vigour when you see Boers beginning to fall back .. press the enemy with the lance if you can’. Gore ordered his two squadrons to advance. As the troops topped the rise, which had concealed them, they found themselves across the Boers’ line of retreat. About 300 yards (275 m) in front of them was a group of mounted Boers, moving at a leisurely trot from the field of battle. Major Gore gave the order to “Gallop!”

With lances levelled and sabres bared the two squadrons galloped forward across the stony ground and rode over and through the Boers. As soon as the Boers heard the sound of approaching horses and the cries of the troopers, they opened out and tried to save themselves by flight. But with so small a start their little ponies were no match for the big cavalry horses, and the squadrons reached them almost before they realised that they were being pursued. The cavalry charged across the Boer lines twice. Many Boers were killed in the two charges and others were taken prisoner. Trumpeter Shurlock, aged 14, shot three Boers during the charge and the surviving Boers retained a simmering hatred of Lancers after this event, vowing the kill any which fell into their hands.

The small amount of remaining light saved many of the Boers that night. They were able to ride away and evade the cavalry who would have charged again had they been able to see. The darkness ended the charge and, with it, the battle of Elandslaagte. As Steevens then concluded “It was over – twelve hours of march, of reconnaissance, of waiting, of preparation, and half an hour of attack. But half an hour crammed with the life of half a lifetime.”

White withdrew his forces from Elandslaagte on the next day and concentrated them in Ladysmith where the majority of them participated in the siege of Ladysmith. The force at Dundee made its way back to Ladysmith taking a route that avoided passing through Elandslaagte.

The Battle of Elandslaagte followed a day after the engagement at Talana Hill and both were the precursors to events which would unfold in Natal during the campaign. In the battle, the Boers displayed courage and good field sense. The British infantry under Ian Hamilton showed no lack of pluck or resolve and this battle blooded and endorsed the prowess of the newly formed ILH.

Casualties: Officers - Killed 6, wounded 31. NCOs and men - killed 52, wounded 174. The Boers losses were stated in White’s despatch to be “100 killed, 108 wounded and 188 prisoners.”

Honours and awards: Four VCs were awarded for Elandslaagte: Captain C H Mullins, ILH; Captain R Johnson, ILH; Captain M F M Meiklejohn, Gordons; Sergeant Major W Robertson, Gordons. In addition, several awards of the DCM were also made as were MIDs.

According to the published medal roll, there were 3,304 QSAs issued with the clasp ‘Elandslaagte’.
Dr David Biggins
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Re: October 21st 12 years 5 months ago #1283

  • Brett Hendey
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Hi David

Whenever I read about the Battle of Elandslaagte I feel inspired by the events of that day. I have been looking at your book again and at the small number of medals in my collection that were awarded to men who fought in the battle. Thank you for the reminder.

Regards
Brett

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Re: October 21st 12 years 5 months ago #1287

  • djb
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Brett,

I know what you mean. There is something special about that engagement. Perhaps it was the involvement of the ILH, the courage of the soldiers or the thought of General Kock in a frock coat?

Best wishes
David
Dr David Biggins

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Re: October 21st 12 years 5 months ago #1291

  • Brett Hendey
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David

It is indeed the ILH's part in the Battle of Elandslaagte that interests me the most. A month earlier the men of the ILH had been civilians and yet they linked with seasoned Gordon Highlanders and matched them in courage and determination during the battle. The bond between these two regiments was to be fostered by the proximity of their camps in Ladysmith, and strengthened further during the bloody Battle of Wagon Hill on 6/1/1900 when they again fought side by side.

There are many anecdotes about the ILH during the Boer War, but one that particularly appeals to me was recounted by G F Gibson in his book 'The Story of the Imperial Light Horse'. On pages 39 and 40 he wrote:

"Any soldier will appreciate the illuminating significance of the following incident, but, for the benefit of those not initiated, let it be said that, to the lovable Tommy Atkins of that period, Beer was an Article of Faith, and of all in his bright calender none was more devoutly worshipped than Saint John-Barleycorn. On the day after the battle the I.L.H. reached camp weary and worn and dismounted alongside the Gordons' lines as that Regiment was on the point of drawing a beer ration. Spontaneously as each Gordon received his measure he carried it across and gave it to a comrade in the I.L.H. - a generous self-denying tribute from a great fighting regiment to its younger brother-in-arms."

Regards
Brett

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Re: October 21st 12 years 5 months ago #1293

  • Mark Wilkie
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Brett Hendey wrote: "...let it be said that, to the lovable Tommy Atkins of that period, Beer was an Article of Faith,..."


Certainly hadn't changed when I did my service eighty odd years later.

To the Gordons and the ILH!

:Cheers:

Mark

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October 21st 10 years 5 months ago #14942

  • djb
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Another key anniversary day for the Boer War

Dr David Biggins
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