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1st Battalion

The 1st Battalion was at Glencoe when the war broke out, and fought at the battle of Glencoe or Talana Hill on 20th October 1899 (see 1st Leicestershire Regiment and 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers). The battalion did splendid work in that action, and their losses were very severe. Colonel Gunning and 4 other officers and 13 men being killed, and 6 officers and 75 men wounded.

On 30th October, at Lombard's Kop or Ladysmith, the battalion was with Grimwood (see 1st Liverpool Regiment). Like the rest of his force, they were hard pressed, their losses being 3 officers and 1 man killed, 1 officer and 32 men wounded, besides about 30 taken prisoners. In the appendices to the Report of the War Commission, p 375, it is noted that "this party was sent on in advance at the battle of Lombard's Kop, but were left behind on the general retirement of the force, no order having apparently been given to them to retire". The party endeavoured to retire, but it was too late; they were surrounded, and after a sharp fight surrendered.

In the great attack on Ladysmith on 6th January 1900 (see 1st Devonshire Regiment), the 1st King's Royal Rifles were in the thick of the fight. The usual garrison of Waggon Hill was three companies of the battalion; among other reinforcements, four other companies reached the hill at 7 AM, and all day long the fiercest fighting of the campaign surged about the crest and side of the hill until the final charge by the Devons, shortly after 5 pm, cleared the ground. The losses of the battalion on the 6th were about 10 killed and 20 wounded. Three officers and 5 non-commissioned officers and men were mentioned in Sir George White's despatch of 23rd March 1900.

In Sir Redvers Buller's northern movement the 1st King's Royal Rifles were in the IVth Division under Lieutenant General Lyttelton, and in the 8th Brigade under Major General Howard, — the other regiments of the brigade being the 1st Liverpool, 1st Leicestershire, and 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. Near Amersfoort on 24th and 25th July 1900 there was stiff fighting, in referring to which Lord Roberts says, "On which occasion the 13th and 69th Batteries RFA, the 1st King's Royal Rifles, and the 2nd Gordon Highlanders distinguished themselves, especially the Volunteer company of the latter regiment".

Again at Amersfoort on 7th August, and near Geluk between 21st and 24th August, there was fighting, but the Boers were always driven back till the great position at Bergendal was reached. There a really important battle, opening as it did the way to Koomati Poort, was fought (see 2nd Rifle Brigade). In this action the 1st King's Royal Rifles were not heavily engaged.

After Bergendal the IVth Division went with General Buller to Lydenburg, in which neighbourhood other actions were fought. The force then marched up and down the awful sides of the Mauchberg and other mountains, and afterwards back to the railway. In the operations about Badfontein en route for Lydenburg the Leicesters and 1st King's Royal Rifles were mentioned by Lord Roberts "as dragging the guns of a battery up a steep hill, whence a heavy fire was brought to bear on the Boers". On 9th September the 1st King's Royal Rifles dislodged the enemy from a position on the Mauchberg. In his final despatch of 9th November 1900 General Buller mentioned 7 officers and 5 non-commissioned officers.

The battalion was brought into Pretoria to be present at the proclamation of the annexation on 25th October 1900,—an honour which was deserved as well as appreciated.

In Lord Roberts' final despatch 28 officers and 40 non-commissioned officers and men of the King's Royal Rifle Corps were mentioned. These commendations included the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions.

During the second phase of the war the battalion was employed in the Eastern Transvaal, and afterwards in Cape Colony. During part of 1901 they were doing column work under General Babington, Colonel Campbell, and other commanders. On 16th July 1901 the battalion entrained from Balmoral to De Aar, where they took over the guardianship of seventy miles of railway, building and occupying the blockhouses. They were still on this duty when peace was declared.

At Baakenlaagte on 30th October 1901, when Colonel Benson's rear-guard was destroyed and he himself killed (see 2nd East Kent Regiment), the King's Royal Rifles were represented in the force by the 25th Battalion Mounted Infantry, which did very excellent work. The 25th Mounted Infantry was composed of one company from the 1st Battalion, two companies from the 4th Battalion, and one company from the 3rd Battalion King's Royal Rifles. Three officers and 15 men of the 1st company held out on the gun-ridge until the Boers retired after dark. Two officers, Lieutenants Bircham and R E Crichton, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 1 rifleman were commended for distinguished gallantry. Fourteen men of the regiment were killed, and 3 officers and 24 men wounded. Altogether about 7 officers and 13 non-commissioned officers and men were mentioned in despatches by Lord Kitchener during the campaign, and in his final despatch 11 officers and 16 non-commissioned officers and men were mentioned. Some of these names were stated to belong to the 1st and some to the 3rd Battalion, but in other cases the battalion is not mentioned in the despatches. The 1st could certainly claim the majority.

The VC gained by Lieutenant the Honourable F H S Roberts in the attempt to rescue the guns at Colenso is at least one of the dearly-paid-for trophies secured by the regiment, if it cannot be claimed by the 1st Battalion.

2nd Battalion

The 2nd Battalion was one of the infantry battalions which, between 16th and 30th September 1899, were sent from India to Natal. The battalion was first engaged on 24th October at Rietfontein, outside Ladysmith (see 1st Liverpool Regiment). The 2nd King's Royal Rifles were at first with the baggage, and afterwards half the battalion was in the reserve line. They had no losses.

At the battle of Ladysmith on 30th October the battalion was with Grimwood on the right (see 1st Liverpools) and was hardly pressed all morning. Their losses were approximately 1 officer wounded, 8 men killed, 29 wounded, and some missing. In the great attack of 6th January (see 1st Devons) four companies of the 2nd King's Royal Rifles were sent in the early morning as reinforcements to Waggon Hill, where they took part in the furious fighting. One company under Lieutenant Tod attempted to rush the eastern crest, then held by the Boers, but the attempt failed, Lieutenant Tod being killed. The battalion's losses that day were 4 officers and 7 men killed and about 35 wounded.

Three officers and 6 non-commissioned officers and men were mentioned in Sir George White's despatch for excellent work during the siege. Six officers and 4 non-commissioned officers and men were mentioned in General Buller's final despatch of 9th November 1900, three of these officers having gained their commendations with the Composite Rifle Battalion in the relief operations.

After the relief of Ladysmith the battalion marched north to the Transvaal-Natal border, and in July was ordered to sail for Colombo with prisoners.

The Mounted Infantry company remained in South Africa and saw endless fighting.

Lieutenant L A E Price-Davies was awarded the VC for great gallantry in dashing among the enemy and trying to save the guns at Blood River Poort (Gough's disaster), 17th September 1901.

3rd Battalion

(see also the separate history of the 3rd Battalion).

The 3rd Battalion sailed on the Servia on 4th November 1899, arrived at the Cape about the 24th, and was sent on to Durban. Along with the 2nd Scottish Rifles, 1st Durham Light Infantry, and 1st Rifle Brigade, they formed the 6th Brigade under Major General N G Lyttelton. An account of the work of the brigade is given under the 2nd Scottish Rifles, and of that of the Natal Army generally under the 2nd Queen's.

At Colenso the battalion was not in the thickest, being, along with the 2nd Scottish Rifles, escort to Captain Jones's two 47 naval guns and four 12-pounder guns. They had almost no casualties. Their first heavy fighting was on 24th January 1900. A sketch of the great combat on Spion Kop is given under the 2nd Royal Lancaster, and reference is also made to the 2nd Scottish Rifles, whose task that day was not unlike that of the 3rd King's Royal Rifles. In the Natal Army despatches (Blue-Book, p 79) there is an admirably clear report by Major Bewick-Copley of what the battalion did. Leaving Spearman's Hill at 10 am, they crossed the Tugela and advanced in widely extended order against the Twin Peaks north-east of Spion Kop, the right-half battalion attacking the right hill, called Sugar-Loaf Hill, and the left-half battalion the other hill. Both hills and the nek between them were strongly held. At 4.45 pm the Sugar-Loaf Hill was carried, "the Boers only leaving as the men's swords came over the crest-line". Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan-Riddell was killed as he cheered his men in the final rush. Shortly afterwards the left hill was carried by Major Bewick-Copley's command. "Though still under a galling fire from both flanks, we were able to stop the fire of the machine guns 150 yards to our front, and also to keep down the fire of the Boers, which was being directed on to the right flank of Sir Charles Warren's troops, holding the main ridge of Spion Kop". About 6.30 the battalion received General Lyttelton's order to retire, and "by midnight had recrossed the Tugela practically unmolested". The fact that the hills were so very steep, and that the operation was very skilfully carried out, rendered the casualty list less heavy than was to have been expected. The battalion's losses were approximately 17 killed and 61 wounded, almost precisely the same as that of the Cameronians. Another very good account of this engagement is to be found in the King's Royal Rifle Corps Chronicle for 1901.

The evacuation of Spion Kop has been greatly discussed by those who are in authority and by those who are not, but the evacuation of the Twin Peaks seems to have been criticised by the latter class only. The question has been touched on under the Royal Lancasters. No doubt General Lyttelton had reason to be nervous about the safety of the battalion, but it is a truism that in war big risks must be taken. The Commander-in-Chief was the one to take the risk, and we are forced back to the belief that a greater centralisation of authority in himself and more rigorous use of it, regardless of all susceptibilities, might have made the story of the 24th January less heartrending. This is, of course, the tenor of Lord Roberts' covering despatch of 13th February 1900.

The battalion took part in the storming of Vaal Krantz, where their losses were approximately 1 officer and 20 men wounded. They were also in the work between 13th and 27th February, and after the Tugela was crossed had some very heavy fighting. During the fourteen days' fighting the losses of the King's Royal Rifles, including those of officers and men in the Composite Battalion, were approximately 1 officer and 16 men killed, 5 officers and 84 men wounded.

Three officers and 25 men were mentioned in despatches for work in the relief operations, 3 men being recommended for the distinguished conduct medal.

The 3rd King's Royal Rifles, like the other regiments of the 4th Brigade, were chiefly employed in guarding the railway line and fighting on either side of it after the forces of Lord Roberts and General Buller had joined hands.

In General Buller's final despatch of 9th November 1900, 3 officers and 5 non-commissioned officers and men were mentioned.

On 28th July 1900 Major General Cooper, with the 3rd King's Royal Rifles and 1st Rifle Brigade, took over Heidelberg from Hart, and in this district the home or headquarters of the battalion was long to remain. Garrison duty and column work occupied their energies to the close of the campaign. For about the last eight months of the war the battalion was garrison at Machadodorp.

For note as to commendations by Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener see 1st Battalion.

4th Battalion

The 4th Battalion sailed from England on 9th December 1901, and after the disaster at Tweefontein, 25th December 1901, the battalion, along with the 1st Black Watch, newly arrived from India, were sent to reinforce Rundle's command in the north-east of the Orange River Colony, being employed chiefly about Harrismith till the close of the war (see Lord Kitchener's despatch of 8th January 1902 and King's Royal Rifle Corps Chronicle). During the period they were in this district several very fruitful drives were carried through, the excellent way in which the infantry held the blockhouse lines and posts contributing greatly to the successful results obtained.

 

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(14864 Records)

 Surname   Forename/inits   Regimental no   Rank   Notes 
AbbennettW3147PrivateFrontier Wars. SAGS (1) 1879
AbbeyJ3rd Battalion
Source: QSA and KSA medal rolls
AbbeyJ6821PrivateQSA (3) DoL Tr LN
Provisional list of recipients
Source: Ladysmith Siege Account and Medal Roll
AbbottT H3rd Battalion
Source: QSA and KSA medal rolls
AbbsJ3350PrivateQSA (2)
Source: List of QSAs with the clasp Talana from the Talana book
AbbsJ3350PrivateQSA (2) Tal DoL
Provisional list of recipients
Source: Ladysmith Siege Account and Medal Roll
AbleJ1st Battalion
Source: QSA and KSA medal rolls
AbleJ1st Battalion
Source: QSA and KSA medal rolls
AbrahamsF1st Battalion
Source: QSA and KSA medal rolls
AbrahamsF1st Battalion
Source: QSA and KSA medal rolls
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The following account of the 3rd Battalion is taken from the KRRC Chronicle.

29th November, 1899.—Joined Light Brigade under General Lyttelton at Mooi River.

8th December.—Arrived Frere.

13th December.—Arrived Chieveley.

15th December.—Sir R. Buller's first attack on Colenso. The Battalion, under Major Bewicke-Copley, was ordered to support the main attack, and find the outposts for the night. When the retirement was ordered, the Battalion was deployed 700 yards behind Colonel Long's guns to prevent any attempt of the Boers to capture them, but the position was considered too far forward for the outpost line; the Battalion therefore found the outposts further back.

6th January, 1900.—Heard the firing going on at Ladysmith.

10th January.—Marched from Frere. 12th January.—Reached Mount Alice. 17th January.—Crossed Potgieters Drift and took up a position on the kopjes between the 1st R. B. and 2nd Scottish Rifles.

20th January.—After an officers' reconnaissance to examine the Boer position on Brakfontein, the Battalion was ordered to make a demonstration towards the Boer position at 10.30 a.m.—half Battalion under Lieut-Col. Buchanan-Riddell to Krantz Farm, and half Battalion under Major Bewicke-Copley against the main Boer trench across the Ladysmith road. The Boers showed in force, and we were ordered to retire, the reconnaissance having effected its purpose. We had 3 killed and 13 wounded. The Boers owned to 21 casualties.

22nd January - Recrossed the Tugela at Midnight to Mount Alice.

24th January - Sir Charles Warren's troops at Thabayama being hard pressed, the Battalion was ordered at 10 a.m. to make a diversion on their flank. The Boers were occupying two peaks on the north of Thabayama and the right half Battalion was directed on the right of these under Lieut-Colonel Buchanan-Riddell, and the left half under Major Bewicke-Copley, was directed on the centre peak known as Spion Kop, behind which the Boers had a pom-pom. The river Tugela was forded at midday, and the open space between it and the hills crossed under a heavy fire from the front and both flanks. The climb then began; the leading companies shinned their way up the face of the rocks, covered by the fire of the supporting companies, who kept shooting over their heads during each successive advance, till finally both peaks were captured at the point of the sword soon after 4 p.m. From the top it appeared as if the enemy were in flight, the commando under Schalk Burger and the scouts under Commandant Edwards, who were defending the peaks, having left in a hurry, together with two guns and one pom-pom. The pressure was taken off the right of Sir C. Warren's troops, but they sent over to say that they were retiring; and as we had already received two orders from General Lyttelton to retire, we recrossed the Tugela at midnight. Our casualties were Lieut.-Colonel Buchanan-Riddell, Lieut. Grant, and 2nd Lieut. French Brewster killed; Majors Kays and Thistlethwayte, Captains Briscoe and Beaumont wounded; 24 N.C. Officers and Riflemen killed, 69 wounded. Commandant Edwards was wounded just below the middle peak.

25th January.—General Lyttelton addressed the Battalion, and said that in all his thirty years' experience as a Rifleman he had never seen a better piece of skirmishing or a finer attack.

28th January.—Sir R. Buller addressed the Battalion on parade, and told the men he had never seen or read of a nobler deed than theirs on the 24th, in their attempt to relieve the pressure on their hardly oppressed comrades.

5th February - The Light Brigade crossed the new pontoon bridge over the Tugela and took Vaal Kraantz; the Battalion then held the left flank with four companies under Major Kays, four Companies being in support under Major Bewicke-Copley. The Durham Light Infantry was on our right, then the Scottish Rifles. The R.B. held the right flank.

6th February.—At 3 p.m. the Boers made a feint on the right and a determined attack on the left of the positions. The supports came up cheering with fixed swords, and the Boers could not face it, and retired at 4.30 p.m. Casualties: 1 Officer and 20 N.C. Officers and Riflemen wounded.

11th February.—Camped on the Blaaukrantz stream, about one and a half miles east of Chieveley.

14th February.—3rd Battalion K.R.R., advance guard of Light Brigade, started at daylight and occupied the ridge on the east of Hussar Hill with only 4 casualties, including Lieut. Petre wounded.

15th February.—Reconnaissance towards Cingold. 3rd Battalion K.R.R. advance guard.

17th February.—General Hildyard's Brigade took Cingold, making a flanking movement round the right of the Light Brigade, of which we were advance guard.

18th February.—General Hildyard's Brigade took Monte Christo, and we took the Boer camp between it and Hlangwani, the R.B. leading, the K.R.R. in support.

19th, 20th, and 21st February.—Gradually working our way forward to the Tugela through the scrub.

22nd February.—Crossed the Tugela by the pontoon bridge under Hlangwani, and covered the left flank of General Wynne's Brigade in their advance north. The whole battalion was on outpost duty on a front of two miles. Our picquets were attacked at several points. On the right, A, E, F, and H Companies with fixed swords drove the Ermelo commando out of two sangars, respectively, 100 and 150 yards in front of our line of outposts, and firing continued all night at about 70 yards range. Captain the Hon. R Cathcart was killed and Lieuts Blundell and Maclachlan wounded.

23rd February. A determined attack by the Bethel, Swaziland, Zoutpansburg Commandos, under Christian Botha, but were beaten off. Our doctor, Captain Campbell, went out to try to get to the men who had been wounded, when we charged the Ermelo men in order to take up our outpost line on the night of the 22nd, but he was wounded immediately.

24th February.—The firing all day was too hot for any men to show themselves, and we had to send out food and water to the picquets under cover of darkness each night.

25th February.—During a cessation of hostilities for burying the dead, I noticed the Boer leaders on our left flank giving directions for some movement. We accordingly took the ranges, and when they attacked during the night the maxim did good execution.

26th February.—Very heavy firing on our picquets all day and night.

27th February.—Majuba Day. The Colenso position was forced under cover of the fire of all our guns, by a movement outflanking the Piet Retief Commando, which was on the Boer left, and we all swept forward occupying the trenches so long held by the Boers. F. Potgieter, who had commanded the Middelburghers with such gallantry, repeatedly bringing them back to the trench on Railway Hill under a terrific artillery fire, was found amongst the killed. He was a splendid fellow, about 6ft. 5in. in height.

Total casualties, 24th to 28th February :—17 killed and 54 wounded.

1st March.—3rd Battalion K. R. R advanced guard in the march to Nelthorpe.

3rd March.—Marched through Ladysmith and camped under Surprise Hill.

4th March.—Found some interesting correspondence in Joubert's Laager under Bell's Kopje.

7th March - Marched to Modder Spruit in support of the cavalry, who were under fire all day.

9th March - Marched to Sunday River and camped under Elandslaagte battle field.

10th April - Boers opened fire with five guns from the hills north of our camp, and three from the west. Most of the shells buried themselves in the ground. The camp was moved back to Krigman's Farm during the night. 11th April.—Boers still shelling our outposts. 17th April.—Moved to the west to protect Dundonald's camp.

7th May.—Marched to Vlak Platz.

9th May.—Started to turn the Biggarsburg, via Helpmakaar.

12th May,—Reached the Ibusi Spruit, the Boers harassing our left flank en route.

13th May.—Boers fired a few rounds from two big guns from the heights above Van Tonder's farm.

14th May.—Commandant Ferreira was out-manoeuvred and the passage of the Biggarsburg forced by the Helpmakaar Pass.

16th May.—The force under Major Bewicke-Copley, consisting of 3rd Battalion K. R. R., two squadrons of cavalry under Major Fanshawe, and one battery of artillery under Major Fox, reached Dundee at daybreak, after a hard march all night. Sir Redvers congratulated the men on their good march.

18th May.—Reached Newcastle.

19th May.—Camped at Ingogo, on the ground we occupied in the Ingogo fight in 1881.

28th May.—Marched to Inkwelo. The Boer 94-pounder was firing on us with shrapnel at a range of 11,000 yards; very few men were hit.

29th May to 2nd June.—Artillery duel until the armistice on June 2nd, when the 3rd Battalion K. R. R. put into order the cemetery we had made in 1881 (in which Colley's grave is), at Mount Prospect.

5th June - Armistice ended. The Boers refusing Sir R. Buller's terms.

6th June. Bombardment of Majuba. Laing's Nek reopened.

12th June.—Crossed Laing's Nek.

19th June.—Marched through Volksrust to Joubert's Farm.

20th June.—Marched to Zandspruit. 21st June.—Marched to Paardekop. 22nd June.—Marched to Katbosch. 23rd June.—Marched to Standerton. The 3rd Battalion K.R.R. took over the town from Gough's M.I. were first in.

30th June.—Marched to Vlakplatz. 1st July.—Marched to Wachout Spruit. 2nd July.—Marched to Greylingstad. 5th July.—A force under Lieutenant-Colonel Bewicke-Copley, consisting of half Battalion K.R.R., 50 Strathcona's Horse, and 50 of Thorneycroft's M.I. took over Zuikerbosch Bridge.

11th July.—Returned to Greylingstad.

12th July.—Circular tour, under General Clery, on the north of the Natal Railway, moving every day until the 24th July.

28th July.—Marched to Heidelberg.

29th July to 11th October.—Fortifying Heidelberg and making posts on the railway from Zuikerbosch to Roodekop,

to protect the line and the Nigel Mines.

12th October.—Marched to join General Clery at Vlakfontein.

13th October.—Marched to Eden's Kop.

19th October.—Marched to Mc Hatties Nek.

20th October.—Marched to Greylingstad.

26th October.—Marched to Grootspruit.

27th October.—Marched to Smith's Store.

2nd November - Lieut, Colonel Bewicke-Copley took over command of the mobile column from General Clery, which included the 3rd Battalion K.R.R.

6th to 10th November.—Swept the country north of the railway, bringing in everything. Boers tried to work round our flank, but came under fire of the five-inch gun and could not be induced to face the guns again. Reached Standerton.

12th November.—Started south for the Vaal, and swept everything in between the Klip and Vaal Rivers, and twelve miles into the Orange River Colony over De Langers Drift, with only five casualties.

19th November.—Marched back into Standerton. 21st November.—Swept country as far as the Rooikopjes, south of Greylingstad, sending in everything. On the 24th and 25th the mobile column had two sharp fights, endeavouring to surround Stephanus Buys. The Boers owned to seven killed and twenty-seven wounded. 26th November.—Marched to Eden's Kop. 28th November.—Returned to Heidelberg. Up to the end of the year the 3rd Battalion K.R.R. was engaged in minor operations from Heidelberg and guarding the line.

1901.—The Battalion was employed in building and occupying blockhouses on the Natal line from Botha's Kraal to Roode Kop, and in minor operations until July, when it joined Lieut.-Colonel Bewicke-Copley's column at Springs, which was acting in conjunction with other columns in clearing the country east of Springs. Lieut.-Colonel Bewicke-Copley handed over command of the column on 30th October, and the Battalion returned to Springs on 4th November. The Battalion was under command of Major Henniker till 24th September, when it was taken over by Major Thistlethwayte.

 


 

The Battle or Spion Kop by an Officer (of the KRRC)

On the night of the 22nd January, 1900, the 3rd Battalion K.R.R., who had been bivouacking for about a week with the remainder of the Light Brigade (General The Hon Neville Lyttelton's) on Potgieter's Kopjes, received orders to recross the Tugela and proceed to Mount Alice, to replace, as guard to the Naval guns, a portion of General Talbot Coke's Brigade, who had received orders to reinforce General Sir Charles Warren.

The night of the 23rd, while on outpost duty, we were told there was to be a big battle on Spion Kop on the morrow. At dawn on the 24th we heard a good deal if fring in the direction of Spion Kop, but were able to make out but little owing to a heavy mist which hid the action from us. About 9 a.m. we were relieved by the Royal Scots Fusiliers, and returned to a bivouac on a kopje about half a mile in rear of the Naval guns. Shortly after our relief, Colonel Riddell, of his own initiative, gave the order that the men were to cook their dinners, as we might have to move off at a moment's notice.

Lucky that he did so, for they had just finished when an orderly rode up with the result that the Battalion fell in. About noon we started, not knowing the reason of the movement nor our objective, and wended our way to a ford across the Tugela, lying between Trichard's and Potgieter's drifts. We had a brief halt before crossing, during which we saw the Scottish Rifles cross at this drift and move to the left along the northern bank. We then crossed, the water being up to our knees, and on arrival at the other side took off our rolled great coats by companies and left them under guard, a very wise precaution, as had we not done this we could have never climbed up the slopes we had to. Colonel Riddell then explained to the officers what was to be done. Briefly it was that the Battalion was to be broken up into two Half-Battalions, and to attack the two northern slopes of the Spion Kop, the Right Half-Battalion to take the right spur, the Left Half-Battalion the left. Thabanyama is, I believe, the correct name of the hill we took; Spion Kop was applied to so many features, that I think there was a good deal of diversity of opinion as to which particular hill was Spion Kop. Our Spurs, however, were to the north-east of the Spion Kop range and on the Brakfontein side of the position, they were two very high rocky peaks, and had frequently caught our eyes as nasty places to negotiate during the days of waiting at Potgieter's Kopjes. I think none of us knew the real reason why we were sent; many of us thought out object was to confirm by a flank attack, a frontal success by Sir Charles Warren; any how we all believed we were intended to get to the top, and we meant getting there.

I can only describe the action of the Right Half-Battalion, as we were fully half a mile distant from the Left Half-Battalion, and my account, I fear, is very sketchy, but a company officer with his company extended to ten paces and bullets flying about, has his time too much occupied to take in much of what is going on round him. The order of the two Battalions was :—

Left Half-Battalion

Right Half-Battalion

Major Bewicke Copley

Colonel Buchanan Riddell.

E, F, G & H companies

A, B, C & D companies

We were allowed to move along the valley to the foot of our respective spurs without any notice being taken by the Boers. On our commencing the ascent, however, the enemy were quick to begin business, and we had a very hot frontal and flanking fire poured into us. Little harm was done by this fire, however, until we had gone about one third of the way up the hill. Here there was a plateau about 200 yards in width, and the right company (A) found it impossible to cross, losing heavily in the attempt, owing to a severe flanking fire. B Company on their left, however, were more successful, and, under Major Kays, had the honour of being the first to reach the top after about two hours' hard climbing and fighting. They fixed swords at the top, but could put them to very little use owing to the hasty retirement of the Burghers. D Company were close on B Company's heels, and some of them I fancy reached the top with B Company, while close on their heels were C and A Companies, whom Colonel Riddell had ordered to file to the left and follow in B Company's wake on discovering than an advance across the ground attempted

by A Company would be disastrous. At the top of the hill the Right Half-Battalion gradually collected, and after taking about two hours in the ascent. It may be wondered why they 'gradually collected' and be urged that officers could not have had much hold over their men; but any one who has seen the country will, I hope, bear me out in saying that, apart from the fight altogether, it was no mean mean performance to have got close on 400 men up such a place in the time that was taken.

Again, the necessarily wide extension made the section leader's control over his men a task of considerable difficulty. In many cases men would climb in couples, 0ne holding the rifles while the other swung himself up. But the steepness of the spur had its good point, for the amount of dead ground afforded by this steepness caused our losses to be less than they would have been had our attack been up a gentle slope.

The Boers had not taken the trouble to entrench themselves on the top of the spur, that they had in other places, probably because an attack from the quarter from which we delivered it was deemed improbable; but the great rocks made the position one of enormous natural strength. On the flanks on the other surrounding features they were strongly entrenched. This portion of the position we discovered afterwards to be under Schalk Burgher's command.

On arrival at the top of the hill we found that a few Boers had retired down the further slopes and were making terribly good practice against any of our riflemen who showed theirs heads over the sky line. It was than that Colonel Riddell, who all through the attack had worked wonders by his example, stood up to try and discover where these sharpshooters were located, with the result which has been do much deplored by all who knew him.

There is not much more to tell. Darkness came on, and a sangar was commenced in the expectation that we should recommence work in the morning; however, we received the order to retire on to a pontoon bridge at the foor of Naval Gun Hill, and then to recross the Tugela; the rest of the force on Spion Kop had retired and our position was considered untenable.

It was a disheartening order, as some of us had seen the Boers in evident confusion in the valley beyond Spion Kop. However, down we had to come, feeling a bit humiliated at having to toboggan down the side of the hill on the seats of our breeches, but this was the best, in fact, only mode of progression for a great part of the way. One great consolation we had, however, and that was that next morning the spurs showed just as much wear as our trousers.

As to the success of the attack of the 3rd Battalion K.R.R. on that memorable 24th January, there is no better testimony than an extract from the diary of Commandant Edwards, Chief of the Staff to Botha, which was published in the Manchester Guardian of 24th August, 1901. In it he emphatically declares that our operations against those spurs and the capture of Schalk Burgher's position had defeated Botha; and this statement was confirmed by telescopes in Ladysmith.

I wish I could give an account of the action of the Left Half-Battalion, but beyond the fact of their being successful in capturing a peak higher than that captured by the Right Half-Battalion, I know nothing.

Finally, I must apologise for so poor an account of so great an action, but can only plead the fact of having to write so long after the event as some excuse for the many deficiencies.


 

Uniform
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NCOs of the 2nd Btn
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Officers of the 2nd Btn
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NCOs of the 3rd and 4th Btns
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Officers of the 3rd Btn
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At Dundee
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Pechell, M H K
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Campaign medals of Capt Stirling, KRRC. DNW Sep 13
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Taylor, J
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QSA to Pte H Wheatley, KRRC. DNW May 2017
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Memorial at Talana
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Officers at Spion Kop
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Officers in Ladysmith
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Barnett, R C
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Gunning, R H
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Hambro, J
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Parent Category: Units
Category: Imperial units
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