Arrival at Cape Town.—The Situation
[See Q15099]
At 9.15 on the evening of the 30th October, I arrived at Cape Town. I then learned that the Boers had utilised to the utmost the advantages given to them by their greater readiness for war. The small garrisons of Mafeking and Kimberley were beleaguered, though not apparently surrounded.
[See Q15164]
All the bridges over the Orange. River, except that known as Orange River Bridge on the Western Railway, were in the hands of the enemy. Further, the Boers had already occupied the northern border of Cape Colony with some 3,000 men, while reports from the Dutch districts in Cape Colony pointed to considerable disaffection to British rule. In Natal Sir George White had had several encounters with the enemy, but, though he had on one or two occasions obtained a small advantage, it was evident that he had failed to check their advance. He reported that General Hunter, my Chief of the Staff, whom I had told to join me, was indispensable to him. I was fain to consent, though the loss of his services to me at the moment was very serious.
On the morning of the 31st October, I received three telegrams from Sir George White. The first, dated the 28th October, told me that Natal required the earliest reinforcements possible. The second and third, dated the 30th, 'reported to me the action fought upon that day, and its unsatisfactory issue. I landed, and met the Governor and the Admiral. The Governor pressed me to make the defence of the Cape Peninsula my first care. I lost no time, however, in ordering a brigade-division of artillery, which had just arrived, to strengthen the defences of Orange River Bridge and De Aar. I begged the Admiral to take immediate steps for the protection of Durban, and to prepare it for defence by landing guns and men from the fleet, as I had not at the moment a single soldier that I could send there.
In the afternoon I saw Mr. Schreiner, tho Prime Minister, who undertook to use his influence with President Steyn, to prevent an invasion of the Colony by a force of the Orange Free State. I need hardly say that his efforts were fruitless. In the course of the next few days Mr. Schreiner, at my request, sounded the magistrates of the Dutch districts as to the effect of calling out the local Volunteers. The answer in every case was to the purport that this step would only enlist recruits for the ranks of the enemy. I also pressed Sir Alfred Milner to proclaim martial law; and, since he felt unable to do so, I arranged with the police that the principal Boer agents and spies should he “ shadowed.” I made every arrangement to arrest them simultaneously, place them on board a transport in the harbour, and send them to Lourenco Marques, the captain of the ship being ordered to make the voyage last at least a month. The time for the arrests was fixed, and the transport was lying at anchor with steam up, when at the last moment Sir Alfred Milner decided that the project had better be abandoned.
Meanwhile the only military operations possible with the force at my disposal were to secure Orange River Bridge, and to cover the English-speaking districts south and east of Queenstown during the distribution of arms to every loyal subject in them. I withdrew the two small posts at Naauwpoort and Stormberg as being dangerously exposed and too far advanced to be of value for defence.
On the 1st November, while still imperfectly informed as to Sir George White’s situation, I telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief that in the circumstances I thought I ought to strike straight at Bloemfontein, as the best chance of relieving the pressure on Kimberley and Ladysmith. A few hours later I received a further telegram from Sir George White, saying that he could not withdraw from Ladysmith, and that he had sent a single battalion to guard the bridge at Colenso, as the best step that he could take for the protection of Natal. This was followed by a series of telegrams from Mr. Rhodes and others at Kimberley, all crying out loudly for relief, and one of them hinting at surrender if relief were withheld.
The military situation on the 1st November was as follows:
—On the side of Cape Colony the enemy had invested Mafeking and Kimberley. They had occupied Colesburg and Norvals Pont bridges. They were in force at Bethulie, had crossed the bridge with about 3,000 men, bad destroyed the line, and were marching on Colesburg; 3,000 Orange Free State Boers were reported to be on the Basuto bolder. To meet the invasion I had 3 1/2 battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and three batteries of artillery, which were distributed as follows:—
Kimberley: -—Four companies Loyal North Lancashire.
Orange River Bridge:—9th Lancers, 62nd and half 75th Batteries Royal Field Artillery, four companies Loyal North Lancashire, four companies Royal Munster Fusiliers. De Aar:—18th and half 75th Batteries Royal Field Artillery, 2nd King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, four companies 2nd Royal Berkshire.
Queenstown: —Four companies 2nd Royal Berkshire.
Stellenbosch : —Two companies Royal Munster.
Excluding Army Service Corps and Departmental Corps, there were, therefore, in Cape Colony, of Regulars: —
One regiment cavalry, three batteries Royal Field Artillery, and three battalions and six companies infantry, extended along 340 miles of frontier.
On the side of Natal 12,6OO(correct number? my reading correct?) men, with two months’ supplies, were concentrated at Ladysmith, but unable to withdraw from it. For the protection of Natal I had one mountain battery, one battalion at Colenso, and one at Durban. No reinforcements could arrive from England for a fortnight.
By the 4th November I had formed a sufficiently clear idea of the situation to make my plans and report to the War Office.
On the 8th November, General French arrived from Natal, bearing a letter to me from Sir George White. I had hoped that General White would have been able to send all the cavalry out of Ladysmith, but, though I gave way on this point to his representations, I insisted that General French should be sent out even though the cavalry remained. After perusal of this letter, and several conversations with General French, I was more than ever satisfied that Sir George White’s force was powerless to protect Natal, and I began to think that it would be essential for me to go there myself. As I had foreseen (see my memorandum 24th September), the Boers had advanced upon Natal in force—had, in fact, made it the principal objective of their operations. The whole of the Transvaal army that could be collected at the time, together with the best of the forces of the Orange Free State, had been directed upon it. Already the entire area of the Colony north of the Tugela (excepting the few square miles held by the Ladysmith garrison), had passed into their hands, and had been practically annexed to their dominion. Computing their forces at lowest at 20,000 men, I calculated that not less than one half, 10,000 men, could be spared for the conquest of Natal south of the Tugela. To meet these I had, including local levies, but 2,200 men, and these sadly deficient in mounted men and artillery. Nothing more could be done than to concentrate them at Estcourt, for the position at Colenso would never have been tenable; and I instructed the Commander not to risk prolonged defence either of the place or of Pietermaritzburg, but to make sure, at all sacrifice, of Durban, and to destroy the railway as he retired.
The Government of Natal now of their own motion prepared to evacuate Maritzburg by removing the records, and so forth; and it seemed most probable that the enemy’s advance would only be checked by the sea. My private information led me to believe that if they did reach the sea they would receive aid from some European Power, and that they counted upon such aid. In any case, unless they were met and repelled by our forces, they would enjoy undisputed possession of the Garden Colony, the most English province of South Africa, for at least two months; for, even supposing that an advance upon Bloemfontein would cause them to withdraw, I could not hope to move in force from the frontier of Cape Colony before 22nd December, and while I was certain of the gravest political disadvantage from allowing Natal to pass into the hands of the Boers, I was extremely sceptical as to any strategical profit that might bo gained from it. In fact, from the moment when I knew that the main army of the Transvaal had moved into Natal I felt convinced that something more than an advance on Bloemfontein would be needed to compel it to retire. A new theatre of operations, 1,000 miles distant from that contemplated by the authorities at home, had been opened by the Boer invasion of South Natal, and there was no escaping from the fact. I therefore decided upon every ground that the deliverance of South Natal must be my first object, combined if possible with the rescue of Sir George White’s force for active operations. I should have preferred to have devoted every possible man of my forces to Natal, for in Natal lay my true objective—the principal force of the enemy. Further, since the bulk of the Transvaal Army in that quarter consisted of Easterners of Joubert’s party, and under his command, it was possible that a severe blow struck at them might dishearten them and set them at variance with Kruger’s party.
But at the same time I felt it impossible to ignore Kimberley. That town represented to the native the symbol of British power and property in South Africa, and I feared the effect of its fall upon the native mind in general and upon the Basutos in particular. Moreover, though I felt the fullest confidence in the military commandant, Colonel Kekewich, I did not trust the other powers within the city.
