ADVANCE ON NEWCASTLE
[See Q15464 and !15467]
During the three following weeks I remained on the defensive, in compliance with my instructions. On the 2nd May Lord Roberts telegraphed (No. 1,419) that he was advancing, and that he wished me to occupy the enemy’s attention in the Biggarsberg. I replied (No. 252) that I would start on the 7th, which I did, but I turned northward on the 8th, and on the 9th halted to await an expected attack from the enemy. They came in some force, but did not attack. On the 10th we had concentrated at Sunday River; on the 11th we reached Waschbank; on the 12th Vermaaks Kraal. On the 13th, with the assistance of a force which joined us from Greytown, we assaulted and took the Helpmakaar position, and drove the enemy’s force to Dundee. We halted there on the l0th, and moved on the 16th to Glencoe, on the 17th to Dannhauser, and on the 18th to Newcastle. We were just coming up with the flying enemy at Laing’s Nek, When we were stopped by some commandoes which had been hurriedly brought up by train from the west.
My advance on Newcastle was made in echelon from the right. Simultaneously with the advance of the main column through Helpmakaar, Dundee, and Dannhauser to Newcastle, General Hildyard pushed up the railway and pass of Glencoe, while General Lyttelton, with the reorganised garrison of Ladysmith, moved up on Hildyard’s left, along the old Ladysmith-Newcastle road, through the passes of Biggarsberg. On arrival at Dundee, on the 14th, I received Lord Roberts’ telegram (018 - not a full number) of the 11th May, informing me that the Drakensberg Passes must in his opinion be very weakly held; while there could not be any large force in the Biggarsberg, and directing me to push on to the Transvaal. In reply, I informed him that I ought to reach Newcastle by the 19th at latest.
CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD ROBERTS AS TO FUTURE POLICY
[See Q15467 and 15468]
Acknowledging this, he telegraphed (1915) on the 15th May, saying that he imagined that an advance by Laing’s Nek would be out of the question, and asking me if I could force my way through the passes west of Newcastle, and march through Vrede on Stander ton. I replied on the 16th that my movements after Newcastle must depend upon the time that would be needed to repair the railway to that place. I asked him for how many days he would require me to supply myself after I left my railhead before I drew from his magazines. I added that, as my only route into the Free State was by Botha’s Pass, I thought it would be a much simpler operation to move by that pass and turn Laing’s Nek than to advance on Vrede.
Lord Roberts replied on the 17th by a telegram (No. 1,660), with which I could not agree. I replied on the 18th that I thought it would be far easier for me to force Laing’s Nek than to send a detached force by Botha’s Pass, and that I hoped in any event to be in a position threatening Standerton by the 30th. On the 20th I informed Lord Roberts that this would be impossible on account of the great damage done to the railway.
On the 23rd May Lord Roberts directed me to defer any attack on Laing’s Nek until he reached Johannesburg. At this time it seemed to me that Lord Roberts was entirely misinformed as to the nature of the country in which I was operating, and had no idea of the difficulties of the Drakensberg Passes.
On the 25th May we heard of the relief of Mafeking.
On the 26th Lord Roberts informed me that it was quite unnecessary that I should run any undue risk, and that he was arranging to occupy all the principal places in the north-east Orange Free State, including Vrede.
On the 28th, as there was no hurry for an advance, I moved two columns, under General Hildyard and General Lyttelton, across the Buffalo in the direction of Utrecht. My object was to clear my right flank, drive back the few scattered Boers, who were threatening the Natal border, ascertain the feelings of the inhabitants of Utrecht, and mislead the defenders of Laing’s Nek. These columns met with no opposition, and during their absence I occupied the old Mount Prospect position with General Clery’s division.
On the 30th May, hearing from Lord Roberts that he had occupied Elandsfontein, thus cutting the Pretoria and Laing’s Nek railway, I sent a message to the Boer commandant at Laing’s Nek. I suggested to him that as Lord Roberts was now at Johannesburg, and the occupation of Pretoria was only a matter of days, while his own railway communication with that town was permanently interrupted, it would be better for him to quit Laing’s Nek and cease to prolong a useless combat. When passing Dundee I had detached a column to Zululand, with orders to hold an indaba of natives, and inform them that the Boers had been driven out of Natal. The commander performed his duty satisfactorily, but while trying a short cut on his way back was ambushed, and lost the greater portion of one squadron.
On the 30th May Lord Roberts instructed me to push on to Ermelo and Belfast as soon as I had got possession of Laing’s Nek. On the 2nd June I was invited by Chris Botha, the Boer commandant, to meet him under Laing’s Nek to discuss the possibility of peace. He wished for terms, but finding that Lord Roberts insisted on unconditional surrender, he declined to negotiate further.
PASSING OF THE DRAKENSBERG—ADVANCE ON STANDERTON
[See Q15464 and Q15470]
On the 4th June I reported that I should be ready on the 6th to try to take Laing’s Nek. Lord Roberts replied on the 5th that it was scarcely necessary to take it, as he was in possession of Pretoria, but that I might see what sort of opposition I was likely to meet with. On the 6th I moved, captured Botha’s Pass on the 8th, Gansvlei on the 10th, and forced Alleman’s Nek after a smart action on the 11th, cutting the Laing’s Nek-Standerton -road about four miles north-west of Volksrust.
On the 12th I received a telegram (No. 2019) from Lord Roberts, dated the 10th, saying that he now learnt that Laing’s Nek was to be held in strength. He suggested that, as his communications were cut, I should leave Laing’s Nek in the possession of the enemy, and move towards Standerton. In a second telegram of the same date he said that his communications were occupied by the enemy and asked me what I could do. In reply, I informed him that Laing’s Nek was in my possession, and that the enemy who had occupied it had fled out of touch. I added that I proposed to move forward as soon as I could get my supplies up the pass. On the 14th June the Landrost formally surrendered to General Lyttelton the town and district of Wakkerstrom, and on that day I informed Lord Roberts that I expected to be at Standerton on the 23rd. I actually occupied it on the 22nd June.
