Cronje's overweening sense of security—Roberts deceives him by feint at Koedesberg while French dashes for Kimberley—De Wet captures British convoy—Cronje surrounded—Escapes through British lines—French wins in race with De Wet for Koedesrand Drift—Cronje caught at Paardeberg—Stubbornly vetoes plan of Ferreira—Repulses attack of Kitchener—De Wet's counter attack—British commandeer Boer hospital service—Accidental death of Chief Commandant Ferreira—De Wet succeeds him—Escapes from cordon—Bombardment of Cronje's laager—Exploit of Theron—Cronje calls kriegsraad—It votes to give up the fight—Cronje surrenders—Roll of surrendered forces and officers.

General Cronje remained virtually inactive for over six weeks following the victory of Magersfontein. He strengthened his positions, elaborated trenches, and took all possible precautions against any repetition of the surprise which failed through his vigilance in December, and then waited for Methuen to move. While waiting for Methuen he forgot Roberts and England's resources.

Villebois-Mareuil records his high praise of Cronje's laagers, trenches, and protected positions, but bears testimony to the overweening sense of false security which concerned itself, almost entirely, with the problematical action of an opponent manifestly held under restraint by the new Commander-in-Chief. Visions of another attack like that led by General Wauchope, and of an even greater defeat of the enemy than on that occasion, occupied Cronje's mind, and obscured a consideration of the obvious fact that other roads led to Kimberley as well as the one by which Methuen had failed to reach that city. There were numerous petty encounters, small fights between patrols, reconnaissances, and various excursions and alarms provided for the Federals by Methuen's tactics, or orders; but there was no opportunity offered for another pitched battle. The next encounter was to be Lord Roberts' show, and Methuen was not to be in it.

Changes had been made in the command of the Free State forces in the west which are interesting to consider now in the light of their possible effect upon the fortunes of the campaign which ended at Paardeberg. Wessels had resigned the Chief Commandantship, and Ignaas Perreira, a very popular officer, was appointed his successor. Villebois-Mareuil strongly urged President Steyn to give the position to General De la Rey. This was not done. He was, instead, transferred from the western commandoes to take charge of the forces operating against French around Colesberg, while Christian De Wet replaced Prinsloo, and was co-i operating with Cronje at the time when Roberts had prepared his plans for an advance against both Cronje and Bloemfontein.

The English, Commander-in-Chief's scheme of operations was skilfully conceived, and ably executed. He succeeded in creating the impression, both in England and among the Boers, that he was to strengthen the British army at the Modder River, and from thence to attack Cronje and cut his way, westward of Scholtznek, to Kimberley. He accordingly ordered General Macdonald to attack the Boer right with the Highland Brigade, in the early days of February, but not to press the fight beyond what might follow from a reconnaissance in force. This was done at Koedesberg on the 7th of February; the Highlanders falling back after the engagement to Methuen's encampment. This tactical action left a conviction in the Boer mind that the English had been engaged in a movement to discover the strength of the Federal right wing, and the difficulties of the ground at and around Koedesberg for an advance in that direction by the whole of Methuen's reenforced army under Roberts' supreme command.

Under cover of this impression Roberts withdrew General French from Colesberg, massed a huge cavalry force between Methuen and the Orange River; where their real destination was not suspected; and, when the plans were complete, let England's best cavalry officer go with his 5,000 horsemen and 30 guns, in a dash for Kimberley. It was the first evidence of real common-sense generalship on the English side during the war.

Nothing could well have been more careless than the scouting for Cronje's little army during the seven days following the light with Macdonald up to the eve of French's advance. News had reached the Federal lines that suspicious movements were going on south of Methuen's encampment, but Cronje would not believe there was anything serious to be expected except by the way of Koedesberg. Roberts had, in fact, secretly withdrawn a great portion of the Modder River army southward to Belmont, for the purposes of his big plan of action; leaving Methuen with the remainder to carry on the tactical deception.

The position in which the Federal generals found themselves when their left was turned by French and Kelly-Kenny was this: Cronje's lines extended for a distance of about twenty-five miles west to east, facing the Riet and Modder rivers; Magersfontein being midway between the two extremes. His headquarters were near Rondavels Drift, on the Modder River, at his extreme left. About a dozen miles east of this the road from Jacobsdal to Kimberley passes over the river at Klip Drift. Some ten miles, still east, another drift takes a road from Jacobsdal to Boshof over the same river, while east of a flat-topped hill, called Paardeberg, rising from the south bank of the Modder, another drift is situated through which a road, branching north from one between Bloemfontein and Jacobsdal, goes from Petrusburg to Koedesrand; this latter " rand " or ridge being north of the river, and commanding the passage of this last drift. The distance from this last drift to Cronje's headquarters, westward on the same river, would be about thirty-five miles.

North of Cronje's lines, behind Magersfontein, Generals Ferreira, Kolbe, and Du Toit were in command of the burghers investing Kimberley. A " Long Tom " which had been erected only a fortnight previously under the direction of Sam Leon and Villebois-Mareuil was at Kampersdam, near the waterworks which supplied the Diamond City.

By a singular coincidence Christian De Wet was at Jacobsdal, about twenty miles due south of Cronje's head laager, on February the 11th, and moved south towards Waterfall Drift, on the Riet River, that night with 500 men; almost at the very time that General French commenced his dash north for Kimberley with his 5,000 horsemen, by the way of the very same drift. De Wet's unerring military instinct took him on this reconnaissance without any definite knowledge of Roberts' design, and without orders from Cronje. He had heard of suspicious movements on the Free State border, west of Koffyfontein, and set out for that place. He reached the drift a few hours only before a patrol ahead of French's flying column arrived on the south side of the river. On the English general learning that the drift was defended he swung to the right to another drift, a few miles eastward, leaving some troops at Waterfall Drift to contain the opposing Boer force, while the main body of the column should cross over the more eastern passage. French took his whole column over here without opposition, and sending patrols ahead to guard against possible attacks on his left flank when passing Jacobsdal, he directed his course towards Klip Drift.

Christian De Wet held the Waterfall Drift on the Riet River successfully, and the detaining body of troops left behind by French retired eastward, after learning of the successful passage of the river by the flying column, and went north in its wake. De Wet understood clearly now what the enemy's movement was, and all which it meant to the Federal forces, and not possessing men enough to attack Roberts' flank on his march to Klip Drift, he resolved to wait and watch for the convoy which was bound to be somewhere in the rear of a huge army moving over a section of a country which could not be reached by railways, for commissariat purposes. He soon saw the English main column, division after division, on its way towards Jacobsdal, and, biding his time, he swooped down upon the huge convoy of near 200 wagons and 1,800 cattle as the long straggling train was split in two by crossing the Riet River, near Blaubarik. He shot the draft oxen, and brought the whole string of vehicles and carts to a standstill. Troops were sent back from the rear of the English divisions to extricate the convoy from its situation, but De Wet had also been reenforced by Andries Cronje, of Potchefstroom, and 200 men with a pom-pom; Cronje having come up from Koffyfontein, and passed in between the tail of French's column and the head of Roberts' force. The 700 Boers under De Wet took positions on some kopjes at Blaubank, and the convoy was therefore at their mercy. After an engagement in which some fifty of the English were killed and wounded, the enemy retired, leaving nearly half a million pounds worth of provisions, ammunition, and necessaries in the hands of 'De Wet's small commando. He appropriated what could be taken away, and left the remainder to the farmers in the locality. He then Wheeled round, and followed in the rear of the British forces to Jacobsdal, drove the small English garrison out of the town which had occupied it the day before, and, believing that Cronje would try and get possession of the drifts eastward on the Modder on finding his left wing turned, he rode as rapidly as tired horses would allow across country towards Paardebreg in the hope of forming a junction with the Magersfontein army south of the river at that place, or north of it, with Ferreira and the burghers from Kimberley.

Cronje had been informed on Monday the 12th of February, that the enemy was in commotion south of Methuen's camp. It was rumor of this news which took De Wet south to Waterfall Drift. Cronje refused to believe in any serious movement of the English otherwise than westward of or along the railway line going to Kimberley. His right wing had been engaged with General Macdonald, and was this not evidence that the advance i of Roberts was to be against his western positions? On Tuesday Commandant Froneman went to Klip Drift with about fifty men, but the general made no move. On Wednesday despatch riders dashed into the head laager with the news that the enemy had seized the two drifts to the east, and that other troops were coming up. " They will be in our possession to-morrow," was the general's reply and comment, and not a move was made. On Thursday, however, when the reality of the situation was forced upon him by the information that a huge cavalry force had swept northwest to Kimberley, while other forces had come up from Jacobsdal and held Klip Drift right between him and Bloemfontein, he began to realize the peril in which he was placed, with his left turned by French, Methuen still in front of his center, and Lord Roberts advancing to throw himself between the Federal forces and the Free State capital.

These two days' fatal delay, and that unfortunate delusion which considered the English movement on his left as the feint and that on his right as the actual intention of the enemy were to cost the two Republics their independence—for a time.

On the evening of Thursday, the 15th of February, with all this deadly menace around his position present to his mind, the old general was found calmly smoking and superintending the greasing of his wagon preparing for the momentous trek through the enemy's lines. He had called in his right wing during the day, limbered up his guns, disposed of a number of his wagons and of needless baggage, and made all ready for a retreat eastward during the night.

At nine o'clock that night the head of the commandoes moved northeast, and passed within three miles of General Kelly-Kenny's headquarters. The extreme right of the Magersfontein army did not reach the place where the head of the column started from until after midnight. The long, straggling line of burghers, wagons, cattle, guns, etc., traveling necessarily at the slow pace of the oxen, must have taken fully five hours to crawl through the gap unaccountably left open for its passage by the English. It was not until about three in the morning of Friday that the rear of the serpentine column was observed and attacked. This rear-guard formed laager at once, sending the cattle and baggage ahead, and from within a square formed by their wagons, in the good old fighting style, not alone held back the attacks of Kitchener's Horse and other mounted troops, but kept the enemy resolutely at bay with considerable loss for hours until the commandoes ahead had time to secure position. Major Albrecht was with the rear-guard, and his single pom-pom played havoc with the horses of the attacking cavalry. Night coming on, the burghers inspanned, and followed after the main column along the river to Paardeberg Drift.

During this Friday three men whose names will occupy a foremost place in the annals of this war were rushing for the hill of Koedesrand, and the drift over the Modder which the hill commands: Cronje, De Wet, and French, and it was the latter who won. After finding that Cronje had passed through Kelly-Kenny's lines French must have been wired to by Kitchener to race from Kimberley with his cavalry force for all they were worth so as to forestall the Federals in the possession of the hill and drift east of Paardeberg. Almost without rest for men or horses, after the long march from Ramdam, this most able officer rode out of Kimberley with a portion of his great column, and in a thirty miles' ride succeeded in reaching the goal of the ridge and drift as Christian De Wet, with his 700 or 800 exhausted horsemen, appeared on the south side of the river, to see the prize in the possession of his British rival.

Cronje, encumbered by baggage, women, and children, had taken the course along the river, and off-saddled on Friday night at Wolfe Spruit, midway between Paardeberg and the drift opposite Koedesrand. French passed him on the north early on Saturday morning, and blocked the way eastward, so that when the old general scanned the veldt ahead at sunrise on the 17th of February he saw the enemy's guns in position, and found himself caught between two divisions of Roberts' army. Cronje's rear-guard had reached Paardeberg on Friday night after the successful fight with some of Kelly-Kenny's cavalry. Commandant Froneman, with some Cape Colony Volunteers and Free Staters, finding that the general had gone ahead, crossed the river with 200 wagons at Paardeberg Drift, insisting that this was the right movement to take in view of the immense forces of the enemy behind, and of the straight line of march leading from there to Bloemfontein. They were right, and succeeded in joining hands with Christian De Wet the following morning on the south of where Cronje was now shut in between French in front, Kitchener, Kelly-Kenny, and Smith-Dorrien behind, and other forces available to block the way through the drift at Paardeberg. The day's delay in starting lost Cronje the position of Koedesrand, and the neglect to pass over the river at Paardeberg Drift closed the last avenue of safe escape for the army of Magersfontein.

Cronje's retreat from Magersfontein left Chief Commandant Ferreira and the forces round Kimberley in a position of peril, with Methuen to the south and French within the city. Ferreira acted with promptness and ability, and extricated his men and guns out of the danger with success. Generals Du Toit and Kolbe were ordered to retire north to Riverton; the former to remain at that point and block the railway from Kimberley to Mafeking; Kolbe and his commando to march round by Boshof, and unite with Cronje, as was expected, at Koedesrand. Ferreira himself, with about 1,000 men, went through the gap between Kelly-Kenny's force and French's cavalry; following the latter for some miles in their race eastward for the possession of Koedesrand Drift and Hill, but remaining south of Boshof and north of Kelly-Kenny's and French's lines, where he was to try in vain to induce Cronje to attempt to join him, and where he met his tragic death on the morning after the defeat of Kitchener in his first attack on Cronje's laager.

On discovering that the enemy held the Koedesrand and the drift opposite, Cronje was compelled to turn back towards another part of the river bank, where the rear of his retreating army was found after its almost continuous fight during Friday's march. The reunited force of some 4,000 men, finding themselves completely surrounded, began to entrench themselves on both sides of the river, but mainly on the north bank; the bed of the stream, which was in shallow condition at the time, being also used for baggage, and the shelter of the women and children.

This work was begun only on Sunday, and had to be continued under a constant fire from the enemy's guns, firing from the northwest and northeast, supplemented by a cavalry attack in the afternoon, which was repulsed by the burghers despite the fatigue of the previous day's fight and arduous night's march. Major Albrecht had placed his few guns on the left of the hastily made entrenchments, and he gave such a good account of himself that the enemy paid heavily for the fruitless attempt to rush that part of the Boer lines.

On that Saturday, after the laager had beaten off two attacks upon its left flank, General Ferreira, wrho was behind the British lines, northwest of Paardeberg, with the burghers who had retreated from around Kimberley, sent a message to Cronje urging him to break through the English line in that direction before all their forces should come up from the south and west, and informing him that the enemy would be attacked from the northwest by Kolbe and himself at the same time; while two other forces east of Paardeberg, one under Commandant De Beer and one commanded by De Wet, would cooperate in a diverting movement. This was a thoroughly sound and practicable plan, but Cronje replied bluntly refusing to act as advised. The plan had the demerit of having been suggested by Chief Commandant Ignaas Ferreira. The victor of Magersfontein had beaten off two assaults of the British that day, and he resolved to hold his ground. Commandant De Beer came in through the British lines late in the night of Saturday, and personally appealed to the general to act in conjunction with Ferreira and the other generals, assuring him that there were reenforeements coming from Bloemfontein under Philip Botha and De la Rey, which would sustain the carrying out of Ferreira's plan, and enable the combined commandoes north and east, with De Wet on the south, to put themselves between Roberts and Bloemfontein. He was told that Villebois-Mareuil also strongly advised this course, and that there was no time to be lost. " I was a general before you were born," was the reply of the fierce old warrior, " and I shall hold my ground against any number of English until stronger forces come up from the east! "

Early on Sunday morning Field Cornets Grobblaar and Douthaite came through the lines with a message from De Wet and Philip Botha that there were enough men to the east, south of the river, to sustain the sortie if Cronje would only leave his baggage, women, and children, sally forth, and fight his way through. The minor officers in the laager, who were made aware of these messages, 'joined in backing up this suggestion, but were turned upon and told: "Are you afraid of the English? If you are, you may go!" Nothing would move him from his resolution to stay where he was.

He had intended moving his right eastward, to a deeper place on the bank, at Makous Drift, but he learned early on that Sunday that the spot had been occupied in an advance westward during the previous night by the enemy. That morning he heard guns directly south, and it was rumored in the laager that De Wet had cut his way through from Petrusburg, and was hastening to their relief. A dust-covered column was seen rapidly advancing from that direction, and they were allowed to take up position southwest of Paardeberg Hill, when, too late, they were discovered to be English. , The circle of foes was now complete. The victors of Magersfontein were enclosed on all sides by a force of fully 40,000 men and 100 guns.

Cronje's courage and determination never wavered. He addressed the burghers at a religious service early that Sunday morning, and urged them to fight resolutely, that God was on their side, and that a relieving force from Bloemfontein would be sure to attack the English in the east, and clear a way out for the entire laager. He then sent men across the river to entrench the south bank, and awaited the attack which was coming. Down in the river bed, and in a hollow or donga to his right, the women, children, and transport were placed, while shelters were being dug in the banks of the river which were to offer better protection than the trenches on the top when the enemy's guns came into action. Nothing that could be done to enable the small force to defend itself was left undone by the indomitable old Boer, on whose fight against odds and fortune combined the whole civilized world was gazing in astonished admiration.

It was on the afternoon of this Sunday (February 18) that Kitchener's famous attack was ordered on what was believed by him to be a force and a position that could not possibly stand before such an absolutely overwhelming body of troops as he commanded. The enemy were conscious of being the masters of Cronje's doom, and it was resolved to lend a dramatic spirit of vengeance to the expected defeat and capture by employing the Highland regiments in the delivery of the main attack, in retaliation for the terrible punishment inflicted upon them at Magersfontein. It was not a spirit worthy of a true soldier, and resembled more that of a hunter who, failing to bring down a lion in his path, succeeds in driving him into a cage, and then takes an unworthy sportsman's pleasure in potting his imprisoned adversary from the vantage ground of safety. It deserved to fail, and did.

After fully fifty guns from all sides had shelled the laager for hours, in such an incessant storm of lyddite and shrapnel as no modern battle-field has ever witnessed, the Highlanders and other regiments were let loose like bloodhounds from the leash upon the cornered quarry from the north, west, east, and south. On they came with bayonets glinting in the sun, in all the confidence of vast numbers and inspired by the belief that it would be a short rush, and then an Elandslaagte of British revenge. But the men in the trenches, tho only a handful in comparison with Kitchener's legions, were not to lend themselves to pig-sticking on that Sunday, so easily as the Kitcheners and Kelly-Kennys believed. The old lion was caged, but he could strike through his bars, and the sun went down that Sabbath day, the 18th of February, after witnessing one of the most unequal battles ever fought; the Highlanders, balked of their vengeance, beaten again, and again demoralized, and the other regiments driven back with almost equal loss, with the enemy magnificently repulsed all along the line. The grim old lion of Potchefstroom had' once again made a South African battle-field run red with the blood of his country's malignant foe. He had sustained the record even of Magersfontein, for his 4,500 Boers had faced, fought, and repulsed on that Sunday seven times their number of English assailants, having twenty guns to the Boers' one.

During the progress of the main battle on the 18th, De Wet had made a furious onslaught upon the troops who had been sent south of the river to carry out Kitchener's plan of an all-round rush upon Cronje. He thus diverted a great deal of the enemy's attention from the laager to himself, and had in the end to sustain a counter attack of a dozen guns upon his position and several attempts by infantry forces to dislodge him. He held his ground until night time, and was thus largely instrumental in helping Cronje successfully to resist Kitchener's movement to crush him by sheer weight of numbers and guns.

The Boers had lost very few in this battle, but a relatively large number had been wounded. For these there were no doctors or ambulance attendance. They were lying in the bed of the river or in the dongas, and this spectacle, with women and children close by, naturally tended to demoralize some of the burghers. Cronje asked Kitchener on Monday morning for an armistice to bury the dead, and to send his wounded to the Boer ambulance at Petrusburg. Joubert had accorded an even more accommodating armistice to General White after Modderspruit. It is believed that Kitchener was inclined to accede to these requests, but that Lord Roberts, who had now arrived on the scene, would not consent to either. This, however, was not the worst side of the English general's actions. His forces had arrested the whole of the Hollander ambulance at Jacobsdal, and had refused to allow the doctors serving under the Bed Cross ensign to pass through the lines to the Boer laager; the British actually using the Federal hospitals and ambulance appliances at Jacobsdal for their own wounded, while denying to their foemen the services of their own medical assistants and nurses! It is true that Lord Roberts offered to take Cronje's wounded over to his own lines for treatment by the English doctors, but no self-respecting foe could 'consent to this in face of such conduct as that at Jacobsdal, and while he still had a resolve to continue the combat. So "the fight went on all Monday; Roberts, however, keeping his troops at a respectful distance from the range of the rifles which had driven back Kitchener's legions the previous day. The enemy turned all his batteries upon the laager by the river, and awaited the double agency of an artillery fire which could not be answered by the Boer guns, and of the horrible conditions under which Cronje had to hold his ground, to effect what frontal attacks and revengeful charges had failed disastrously to achieve.

Early on Monday morning, while General Ferreira was making the rounds of his position outside the enemy's lines, north of Koedesrand, he found one of his sentinels asleep at his post. He prodded him with the butt of his Mauser to rouse him, when the burgher, startled from his slumber, and prompted by the thought that he was attacked by the enemy, seized the general's gun at the breach, when the weapon went off, killing the Commandant-General; the bullet passing through his heart as he was leaning over the frightened burgher. Ferreira was one of the best of men, loved by all who knew him, and his brief head commandant-ship of the western Free State forces in succession to General Wessels, who had resigned, was very popular with all the burghers. His tragic death was a severe blow to the already sorely-tried defenders of Cronje's laager. General Christian De Wet was immediately appointed Chief Commandant of the Free State army, in succession to Ferreira.

On Tuesday Major Albrecht's five guns were rendered useless by the breakdown of the artillery service and the want of ammunition. All the enemy's guns being beyond the range of rifle fire, and there being no further danger from Cronje's single battery, Lord Roberts saw that his opponent's situation was rendered quite hopeless, and he began to push his lines a little nearer.

A message was heliographed to Cronje from Petrusburg on Tuesday afternoon by Commandant Froneman, saying that Christian De Wet and Philip Botha were near, had beaten a portion of the enemy's force, and were in possession of a strong position to the southeast of the laager. They were expecting De la Rey and reenforcements, and would be able to render effective help if the laager would hold out. This intelligence revived the drooping spirits of the men, who, on finding their positions attacked again that afternoon by infantry charges from the northwest, fusilladed the troops back in the best Magersfontein manner. This was virtually the last assault delivered by Roberts. His 100 unanswered guns, the shambles in the bed of the Modder River, and the unnerving presence of women and children within an area where every shell that exploded compelled every one to seek shelter, would do what bayonet charges could not effect.

All this time De Wet was hanging on to the flank of the enemy southeast of the river. He had gained a small kopje, from which a Krupp and a pom-pom enabled him to harass the English on both sides of the river considerably. A huge force was therefore directed against him on Wednesday, with the object of surrounding the hill, and capturing guns and men. Firing his two pieces up to the last moment, he called in his men, some 1,200 strong, sent out two lines of screening horsemen to the right and left, and then, forming his force into a wedge-like column with the guns in between, shot clean through the opening still left between the horns of the closing English circle. Andries Cronje, of Potchefstroom, with only 50 men, riding, firing, and retiring, as sharp-shooters, held back the enemy's horsemen until De Wet and his guns were safe at Poplars Grove.

The following night the same force of burghers, led by their general, rode back again under cover of darkness, lay in wait' until dawn enabled them to see the enemy's location on the hill] which had been vacated on the previous day, and in a spur-gallop over the. intervening ground attempted to retake the kopje. But the troops in position were too strong, and De Wet, losing only a very few men, wheeled back and regained his former ground.

On Thursday the pitiless bombardment of Cronje recommenced with the dawn, and was maintained throughout the whole day. In the evening 100 men left the laager and crossed over to the British to surrender.

Alternate hope and depression came to the trenches during the 23rd. Froneman heliographed from the east to be of good cheer, and to hold out; that 3,000 burghers were about to attack the enemy to Cronje's left. jSTo action followed the sending of the message, however, and a week's continuous combat in one of the most trying and desperate fights ever fought ended with more deaths, wounds, and desertions, as the night of Friday shut out the two forces from each other's view. But the nights did not stop the fighting. The English pushed their trenches from the east nearer and nearer until the British rifles were able to supplement the fire of their batteries with Lee-Metfords against Mausers from shelters which were built under cover of darkness.

Saturday ushered in the fiercest storm of projectiles yet turned upon the unfortunate laager. General Cronje estimated the number of guns at work against him that day at twenty-five batteries, all driving their shells and stinking lyddite into an area of about a mile within which the lines of the small army were now contracted. Not a move could safely be made in the trenches or holes in which the men had to crouch for protection, yet whenever an attempt was made to rush the trenches the Mausers were there with the old death-dealing accuracy of fire. Dead men lay unburied, dead horses floated in the river, the wounded were uncared for, the water of the Modder was no longer drinkable; and it seemed as if no other trials could possibly be added to the sum of indescribable misery under which these few men still faced the fate of inevitable defeat rather than hoist the white flag. This Saturday evening Captain Daanie Theron reached the laager after having passed through the English lines, swimming the river in his journey. He had gone on hands and knees for two miles after leaving his horse, so as to evade the patrols of the enemy before reaching the river's bank, being frequently within a few yards of British sentinels on his perilous mission. He brought messages from De Wet, Froneman, Botha, and Commandant Cronje, of Potchefstroom, in combined command of 4,000 or 5,000 men to the east, begging of General Cronje to attempt to cut his way through in that direction before all was lost. They pointed out that the enemy was commencing to feel the strain of the day and night fighting since the 14th, that their rations were not what would sustain the troops in a combative spirit, and that a dash through the line beyond which De Wet's forces were ready for a responsive attack would stand a good chance of succeeding.

Early the following morning a British patrol south of General French's lines were startled at seeing a nude figure riding like the wind on a dark horse, as if he were the spirit of a soldier on some mission from the dead within the doomed laager. They were too frightened to fire, and Theron thus got safe away after swimming the river on his return journey to De Wet's camp.

Cronje now assented to the proposal which he had hitherto refused to entertain, and the burghers began to build a chain bridge over the swollen river—a rain-storm having helped the British shell-storm to drive the Boers from the shelter of the bed of the Modder—and a sortie to the southeast was to be attempted on Monday night. But fate had determined that the blunders of the previous week should entail their penalty. Some Kaffirs, who had attended to the horses and cattle, deserted to the British on Sunday morning while the Boers were engaged at prayers in the most protected part of the laager. The officers who had been in favor of the sortie all the previous week now seemed inclined to consider the whole situation absolutely hopeless, and to whisper the word " surrender." A prayer supplication to the Almighty was suggested in order to find inspiration as to which course was best, and this was supplemented by an impassioned appeal from the general to the burghers to fight on, and trust in God and in the efforts of their friends. On Sunday night the drooping spirits of the laager had been raised again, and all were ready to stake their last hope on the attempt which was to be made on the following night.

Monday morning, however, dashed this hope to the ground. The Kaffirs had informed the British of the work going on at the point in the river where the chain bridge was being made, and all the enemy's guns were turned upon this spot, making it impossible to carry on the task. Two shells aimed at this place fell among a group of burghers and literally blew the son of Commandant Andries Cronje to pieces, killing eight or ten more at the same time. This, together with the destruction of the chain bridge, deadened the spirit of further resistance in banishing the hope of any successful help from outside, and the burghers clamored to Cronje to hoist the white flag. His men had, at last, lost faith in his power to beat back the English, and he had to consent to the calling of a kriegsraad to decide the question of surrender. As a last resort he heliographed in the direction of Aasvogel Kop, where Theron had told him De Wet and Botha were waiting to help him, that it had been decided at a council of war to surrender on Tuesday if the outside assistance could not cut its way through. No answer came back. The council had voted for surrender, all excepting the general and Commandant Boos. Fate was doubly unkind to Cronje in making him lower the hitherto triumphant Boer flag on the 37th of February, Majuba Day! But so it had occurred.

The morning was beautifully fine, the sun rising bright and clear over the fearful scene which met the gaze of the old hero of Potchefstroom, whose own sun of military renown had set in a halo of glory which a whole world was to salute in boundless admiration for an unparalleled resistance. The white flag was hoisted over the general's tent, and Cronje and his secretary rode over to Lord Roberts and his staff, and gave up the fight.

The total loss of the Federals in all the engagements from Klip Drift to Paardeberg, amounted to no more than 97 killed and 245 wounded.

On Sunday, February 18, when Kitchener ordered his attack by four divisions on as many sides of a position which had been taken up after a thirty miles' march, and put in a state of defense in one night's work, these 4,500 farmers shot down over 1,000 of their enemy, and drove the other assailants back behind their artillery. In the ten days' fighting the British casualties were at least 1,500 men.

This victory of Lord Roberts sent the British Empire into a delirium of exultation. Majuba had at last been avenged. Britain's military might had again asserted itself. But the world, which knew of the disproportion in men and means between the victors and the vanquished, saw no triumph in a battle fought for ten days by 5,000 farmers and five guns against 40,000 trained soldiers and 25 batteries of artillery. And, at last, the English press was compelled to tell the truth about the strength of " the army of 16,000 Boers and of batteries of Long Toms" which had defeated Methuen at Magersfontein. Lord Roberts could count only the men and guns found in the alleged army "of 16,000."

The guns captured were: three 7.5 cm. Krupps; one (old pattern) 12-pounder q.f. Krupp, and one 3.7 cm. Vickers-Maxim (pom-pom)—5 guns.

The men who surrendered numbered 3,919. Adding to these the number killed (97) and wounded (245) in the fighting up to the time of surrender, Cronje's total force on taking up position at Paardeberg was 4,261 men.

He had, however, according to my information, a body of some 500 Cape Colony Volunteers, who were part of the force with which he had beaten Methuen on December 11. There is no account of these in the details, Boer or British, of the men who laid down their arms to Lord Roberts on the 27th of February. They crossed the Modder, to the south, on Saturday night, the 17th, after the rear-guard action with some of Kelly-Kenny's division, and made their way towards Bloemfontein, where they joined De Wet and Philip Botha. Some 200 Free Staters had also left the column on its retreat after passing Klip Drift. They went north towards Boshof, and joined General Ferreira's men on their retreat from the Kimberley investment. Had Cronje taken either of these courses, on finding that French had passed him towards Kimberley, and that Kelly-Kenny and Kitchener were coming up to Klip Drift, he could have easily escaped destruction. If he had followed the burghers who crossed at Paardeberg Drift, and formed a junction with De Wet, Philip Botha, Froneman, and De la Rey, he would soon have had 10,000 men with whom to fight Roberts for the possession of Bloemfontein, and any one who knew of the utterly demoralized plight in which the British army staggered into the Free State capital after its month's marching, fighting, and starving, will not hesitate to say that three such capable generals as De la Rey, Cronje, and De Wet, with one-fourth of Roberts' strength, would have easily smashed him and his 40,000 half-famished troops.

A generous-minded world, lost in admiration at the example of heroic patriotism which was thought to have entirely died out of a materialistic age, overlooked faults of generalship which were redeemed by the virtues of dauntless courage. Tho pride and over-confidence had lost to Cronje opportunities which would otherwise have saved the cause of the two Republics from destruction, critics who are not English, but are fair and just, will say that, if ever error was atoned for in acts that thrill the hearts and fire the imaginations of mankind, the unsurpassed bravery of the " Lion of Potchefstroom " and his 4,000 farmers at the banks of the Modder River will deaden the recollection of the blunders which gave England the material, but the Boers the moral, triumph of Paardeberg.

The Federal officers who surrendered to Lord Roberts after their brilliant resistance during the ten days' battle were: General Cronje, Commandant M. J. Wolmarans, Commandants Roos and J. L. Martins, Assistant Commandants R. Woest, J. P. G. Vorster, and W. L. Jooste; Field Cornets Albert Naude, J. H. L. Bosman, W. A. Lemmer, H. G. Badenhorst, Frills (Scandinavian, D. H. Hattingh, Venter, D. J. Terblanche, P. V. de Villiers, G. J. du Plessis, Assistant Field Cornet P. W. Snyman, War Commissioner Arnoldi, Assistants P. J. Jooste, and A. K. Esselen, Adjutants J. T. A. Wolmarans, A. D. W. Wolmarans, R. A. Ning, G. S. Maree, J. B. Botha, G. H. Grobler, Bomas, and Moodie; Commandants J. P. J. Jordaan, J. K. Kok, J. C. Villiers, R. J. Snyman, L. Meintjes, J. Greyiing; Field Cornets J. Cronje, C. Oosthuizen, C. van Zyl, J. Nieuwenha, N. K. Hick, J. N. van der Walt; Major Albrecht, Commander of the Artillery ; Lieutenants V. Heester, Vondewitz, and Van Angesten.

Chapter XXX - Paardeberg

Cronje's overweening sense of security—Roberts deceives him by feint at Koedesberg while French dashes for Kimberley—De Wet captures British convoy—Cronje surrounded—Escapes through British lines—French wins in race with De Wet for Koedesrand Drift—Cronje caught at Paardeberg—Stubbornly vetoes plan of Ferreira—Repulses attack of Kitchener—De Wet's counter attack—British commandeer Boer hospital service—Accidental death of Chief Commandant Ferreira—De Wet succeeds him—Escapes from cordon—Bombardment of Cronje's laager—Exploit of Theron—Cronje calls kriegsraad—It votes to give up the fight—Cronje surrenders—Roll of surrendered forces and officers.

General Cronje remained virtually inactive for over six weeks following the victory of Magersfontein. He strengthened his positions, elaborated trenches, and took all possible precautions against any repetition of the surprise which failed through his vigilance in December, and then waited for Methuen to move. While waiting for Methuen he forgot Roberts and England's resources.

Villebois-Mareuil records his high praise of Cronje's laagers, trenches, and protected positions, but bears testimony to the overweening sense of false security which concerned itself, almost entirely, with the problematical action of an opponent manifestly held under restraint by the new Commander-in-Chief. Visions of another attack like that led by General Wauchope, and of an even greater defeat of the enemy than on that occasion, occupied Cronje's mind, and obscured a consideration of the obvious fact that other roads led to Kimberley as well as the one by which Methuen had failed to reach that city. There were numerous petty encounters, small fights between patrols, reconnaissances, and various excursions and alarms provided for the Federals by Methuen's tactics, or orders; but there was no opportunity offered for another pitched battle. The next encounter was to be Lord Roberts' show, and Methuen was not to be in it.

Changes had been made in the command of the Free State forces in the west which are interesting to consider now in the light of their possible effect upon the fortunes of the campaign which ended at Paardeberg. Wessels had resigned the Chief Commandantship, and Ignaas Perreira, a very popular officer, was appointed his successor. Villebois-Mareuil strongly urged President Steyn to give the position to General De la Rey. This was not done. He was, instead, transferred from the western commandoes to take charge of the forces operating against French around Colesberg, while Christian De Wet replaced Prinsloo, and was co-i operating with Cronje at the time when Roberts had prepared his plans for an advance against both Cronje and Bloemfontein.

The English, Commander-in-Chief's scheme of operations was skilfully conceived, and ably executed. He succeeded in creating the impression, both in England and among the Boers, that he was to strengthen the British army at the Modder River, and from thence to attack Cronje and cut his way, westward of Scholtznek, to Kimberley. He accordingly ordered General Macdonald to attack the Boer right with the Highland Brigade, in the early days of February, but not to press the fight beyond what might follow from a reconnaissance in force. This was done at Koedesberg on the 7th of February; the Highlanders falling back after the engagement to Methuen's encampment. This tactical action left a conviction in the Boer mind that the English had been engaged in a movement to discover the strength of the Federal right wing, and the difficulties of the ground at and around Koedesberg for an advance in that direction by the whole of Methuen's reenforced army under Roberts' supreme command.

Under cover of this impression Roberts withdrew General French from Colesberg, massed a huge cavalry force between Methuen and the Orange River; where their real destination was not suspected; and, when the plans were complete, let England's best cavalry officer go with his 5,000 horsemen and 30 guns, in a dash for Kimberley. It was the first evidence of real common-sense generalship on the English side during the war.

Nothing could well have been more careless than the scouting for Cronje's little army during the seven days following the light with Macdonald up to the eve of French's advance. News had reached the Federal lines that suspicious movements were going on south of Methuen's encampment, but Cronje would not believe there was anything serious to be expected except by the way of Koedesberg. Roberts had, in fact, secretly withdrawn a great portion of the Modder River army southward to Belmont, for the purposes of his big plan of action; leaving Methuen with the remainder to carry on the tactical deception.

The position in which the Federal generals found themselves when their left was turned by French and Kelly-Kenny was this: Cronje's lines extended for a distance of about twenty-five miles west to east, facing the Riet and Modder rivers; Magersfontein being midway between the two extremes. His headquarters were near Rondavels Drift, on the Modder River, at his extreme left. About a dozen miles east of this the road from Jacobsdal to Kimberley passes over the river at Klip Drift. Some ten miles, still east, another drift takes a road from Jacobsdal to Boshof over the same river, while east of a flat-topped hill, called Paardeberg, rising from the south bank of the Modder, another drift is situated through which a road, branching north from one between Bloemfontein and Jacobsdal, goes from Petrusburg to Koedesrand; this latter " rand " or ridge being north of the river, and commanding the passage of this last drift. The distance from this last drift to Cronje's headquarters, westward on the same river, would be about thirty-five miles.

North of Cronje's lines, behind Magersfontein, Generals Ferreira, Kolbe, and Du Toit were in command of the burghers investing Kimberley. A " Long Tom " which had been erected only a fortnight previously under the direction of Sam Leon and Villebois-Mareuil was at Kampersdam, near the waterworks which supplied the Diamond City.

By a singular coincidence Christian De Wet was at Jacobsdal, about twenty miles due south of Cronje's head laager, on February the 11th, and moved south towards Waterfall Drift, on the Riet River, that night with 500 men; almost at the very time that General French commenced his dash north for Kimberley with his 5,000 horsemen, by the way of the very same drift. De Wet's unerring military instinct took him on this reconnaissance without any definite knowledge of Roberts' design, and without orders from Cronje. He had heard of suspicious movements on the Free State border, west of Koffyfontein, and set out for that place. He reached the drift a few hours only before a patrol ahead of French's flying column arrived on the south side of the river. On the English general learning that the drift was defended he swung to the right to another drift, a few miles eastward, leaving some troops at Waterfall Drift to contain the opposing Boer force, while the main body of the column should cross over the more eastern passage. French took his whole column over here without opposition, and sending patrols ahead to guard against possible attacks on his left flank when passing Jacobsdal, he directed his course towards Klip Drift.

Christian De Wet held the Waterfall Drift on the Riet River successfully, and the detaining body of troops left behind by French retired eastward, after learning of the successful passage of the river by the flying column, and went north in its wake. De Wet understood clearly now what the enemy's movement was, and all which it meant to the Federal forces, and not possessing men enough to attack Roberts' flank on his march to Klip Drift, he resolved to wait and watch for the convoy which was bound to be somewhere in the rear of a huge army moving over a section of a country which could not be reached by railways, for commissariat purposes. He soon saw the English main column, division after division, on its way towards Jacobsdal, and, biding his time, he swooped down upon the huge convoy of near 200 wagons and 1,800 cattle as the long straggling train was split in two by crossing the Riet River, near Blaubarik. He shot the draft oxen, and brought the whole string of vehicles and carts to a standstill. Troops were sent back from the rear of the English divisions to extricate the convoy from its situation, but De Wet had also been reenforced by Andries Cronje, of Potchefstroom, and 200 men with a pom-pom; Cronje having come up from Koffyfontein, and passed in between the tail of French's column and the head of Roberts' force. The 700 Boers under De Wet took positions on some kopjes at Blaubank, and the convoy was therefore at their mercy. After an engagement in which some fifty of the English were killed and wounded, the enemy retired, leaving nearly half a million pounds worth of provisions, ammunition, and necessaries in the hands of 'De Wet's small commando. He appropriated what could be taken away, and left the remainder to the farmers in the locality. He then Wheeled round, and followed in the rear of the British forces to Jacobsdal, drove the small English garrison out of the town which had occupied it the day before, and, believing that Cronje would try and get possession of the drifts eastward on the Modder on finding his left wing turned, he rode as rapidly as tired horses would allow across country towards Paardebreg in the hope of forming a junction with the Magersfontein army south of the river at that place, or north of it, with Ferreira and the burghers from Kimberley.

Cronje had been informed on Monday the 12th of February, that the enemy was in commotion south of Methuen's camp. It was rumor of this news which took De Wet south to Waterfall Drift. Cronje refused to believe in any serious movement of the English otherwise than westward of or along the railway line going to Kimberley. His right wing had been engaged with General Macdonald, and was this not evidence that the advance i of Roberts was to be against his western positions? On Tuesday Commandant Froneman went to Klip Drift with about fifty men, but the general made no move. On Wednesday despatch riders dashed into the head laager with the news that the enemy had seized the two drifts to the east, and that other troops were coming up. " They will be in our possession to-morrow," was the general's reply and comment, and not a move was made. On Thursday, however, when the reality of the situation was forced upon him by the information that a huge cavalry force had swept northwest to Kimberley, while other forces had come up from Jacobsdal and held Klip Drift right between him and Bloemfontein, he began to realize the peril in which he was placed, with his left turned by French, Methuen still in front of his center, and Lord Roberts advancing to throw himself between the Federal forces and the Free State capital.

These two days' fatal delay, and that unfortunate delusion which considered the English movement on his left as the feint and that on his right as the actual intention of the enemy were to cost the two Republics their independence—for a time.

On the evening of Thursday, the 15th of February, with all this deadly menace around his position present to his mind, the old general was found calmly smoking and superintending the greasing of his wagon preparing for the momentous trek through the enemy's lines. He had called in his right wing during the day, limbered up his guns, disposed of a number of his wagons and of needless baggage, and made all ready for a retreat eastward during the night.

At nine o'clock that night the head of the commandoes moved northeast, and passed within three miles of General Kelly-Kenny's headquarters. The extreme right of the Magersfontein army did not reach the place where the head of the column started from until after midnight. The long, straggling line of burghers, wagons, cattle, guns, etc., traveling necessarily at the slow pace of the oxen, must have taken fully five hours to crawl through the gap unaccountably left open for its passage by the English. It was not until about three in the morning of Friday that the rear of the serpentine column was observed and attacked. This rear-guard formed laager at once, sending the cattle and baggage ahead, and from within a square formed by their wagons, in the good old fighting style, not alone held back the attacks of Kitchener's Horse and other mounted troops, but kept the enemy resolutely at bay with considerable loss for hours until the commandoes ahead had time to secure position. Major Albrecht was with the rear-guard, and his single pom-pom played havoc with the horses of the attacking cavalry. Night coming on, the burghers inspanned, and followed after the main column along the river to Paardeberg Drift.

During this Friday three men whose names will occupy a foremost place in the annals of this war were rushing for the hill of Koedesrand, and the drift over the Modder which the hill commands: Cronje, De Wet, and French, and it was the latter who won. After finding that Cronje had passed through Kelly-Kenny's lines French must have been wired to by Kitchener to race from Kimberley with his cavalry force for all they were worth so as to forestall the Federals in the possession of the hill and drift east of Paardeberg. Almost without rest for men or horses, after the long march from Ramdam, this most able officer rode out of Kimberley with a portion of his great column, and in a thirty miles' ride succeeded in reaching the goal of the ridge and drift as Christian De Wet, with his 700 or 800 exhausted horsemen, appeared on the south side of the river, to see the prize in the possession of his British rival.

Cronje, encumbered by baggage, women, and children, had taken the course along the river, and off-saddled on Friday night at Wolfe Spruit, midway between Paardeberg and the drift opposite Koedesrand. French passed him on the north early on Saturday morning, and blocked the way eastward, so that when the old general scanned the veldt ahead at sunrise on the 17th of February he saw the enemy's guns in position, and found himself caught between two divisions of Roberts' army. Cronje's rear-guard had reached Paardeberg on Friday night after the successful fight with some of Kelly-Kenny's cavalry. Commandant Froneman, with some Cape Colony Volunteers and Free Staters, finding that the general had gone ahead, crossed the river with 200 wagons at Paardeberg Drift, insisting that this was the right movement to take in view of the immense forces of the enemy behind, and of the straight line of march leading from there to Bloemfontein. They were right, and succeeded in joining hands with Christian De Wet the following morning on the south of where Cronje was now shut in between French in front, Kitchener, Kelly-Kenny, and Smith-Dorrien behind, and other forces available to block the way through the drift at Paardeberg. The day's delay in starting lost Cronje the position of Koedesrand, and the neglect to pass over the river at Paardeberg Drift closed the last avenue of safe escape for the army of Magersfontein.

Cronje's retreat from Magersfontein left Chief Commandant Ferreira and the forces round Kimberley in a position of peril, with Methuen to the south and French within the city. Ferreira acted with promptness and ability, and extricated his men and guns out of the danger with success. Generals Du Toit and Kolbe were ordered to retire north to Riverton; the former to remain at that point and block the railway from Kimberley to Mafeking; Kolbe and his commando to march round by Boshof, and unite with Cronje, as was expected, at Koedesrand. Ferreira himself, with about 1,000 men, went through the gap between Kelly-Kenny's force and French's cavalry; following the latter for some miles in their race eastward for the possession of Koedesrand Drift and Hill, but remaining south of Boshof and north of Kelly-Kenny's and French's lines, where he was to try in vain to induce Cronje to attempt to join him, and where he met his tragic death on the morning after the defeat of Kitchener in his first attack on Cronje's laager.

On discovering that the enemy held the Koedesrand and the drift opposite, Cronje was compelled to turn back towards another part of the river bank, where the rear of his retreating army was found after its almost continuous fight during Friday's march. The reunited force of some 4,000 men, finding themselves completely surrounded, began to entrench themselves on both sides of the river, but mainly on the north bank; the bed of the stream, which was in shallow condition at the time, being also used for baggage, and the shelter of the women and children.

This work was begun only on Sunday, and had to be continued under a constant fire from the enemy's guns, firing from the northwest and northeast, supplemented by a cavalry attack in the afternoon, which was repulsed by the burghers despite the fatigue of the previous day's fight and arduous night's march. Major Albrecht had placed his few guns on the left of the hastily made entrenchments, and he gave such a good account of himself that the enemy paid heavily for the fruitless attempt to rush that part of the Boer lines.

On that Saturday, after the laager had beaten off two attacks upon its left flank, General Ferreira, wrho was behind the British lines, northwest of Paardeberg, with the burghers who had retreated from around Kimberley, sent a message to Cronje urging him to break through the English line in that direction before all their forces should come up from the south and west, and informing him that the enemy would be attacked from the northwest by Kolbe and himself at the same time; while two other forces east of Paardeberg, one under Commandant De Beer and one commanded by De Wet, would cooperate in a diverting movement. This was a thoroughly sound and practicable plan, but Cronje replied bluntly refusing to act as advised. The plan had the demerit of having been suggested by Chief Commandant Ignaas Ferreira. The victor of Magersfontein had beaten off two assaults of the British that day, and he resolved to hold his ground. Commandant De Beer came in through the British lines late in the night of Saturday, and personally appealed to the general to act in conjunction with Ferreira and the other generals, assuring him that there were reenforeements coming from Bloemfontein under Philip Botha and De la Rey, which would sustain the carrying out of Ferreira's plan, and enable the combined commandoes north and east, with De Wet on the south, to put themselves between Roberts and Bloemfontein. He was told that Villebois-Mareuil also strongly advised this course, and that there was no time to be lost. " I was a general before you were born," was the reply of the fierce old warrior, " and I shall hold my ground against any number of English until stronger forces come up from the east! "

Early on Sunday morning Field Cornets Grobblaar and Douthaite came through the lines with a message from De Wet and Philip Botha that there were enough men to the east, south of the river, to sustain the sortie if Cronje would only leave his baggage, women, and children, sally forth, and fight his way through. The minor officers in the laager, who were made aware of these messages, 'joined in backing up this suggestion, but were turned upon and told: "Are you afraid of the English? If you are, you may go!" Nothing would move him from his resolution to stay where he was.

He had intended moving his right eastward, to a deeper place on the bank, at Makous Drift, but he learned early on that Sunday that the spot had been occupied in an advance westward during the previous night by the enemy. That morning he heard guns directly south, and it was rumored in the laager that De Wet had cut his way through from Petrusburg, and was hastening to their relief. A dust-covered column was seen rapidly advancing from that direction, and they were allowed to take up position southwest of Paardeberg Hill, when, too late, they were discovered to be English. , The circle of foes was now complete. The victors of Magersfontein were enclosed on all sides by a force of fully 40,000 men and 100 guns.

Cronje's courage and determination never wavered. He addressed the burghers at a religious service early that Sunday morning, and urged them to fight resolutely, that God was on their side, and that a relieving force from Bloemfontein would be sure to attack the English in the east, and clear a way out for the entire laager. He then sent men across the river to entrench the south bank, and awaited the attack which was coming. Down in the river bed, and in a hollow or donga to his right, the women, children, and transport were placed, while shelters were being dug in the banks of the river which were to offer better protection than the trenches on the top when the enemy's guns came into action. Nothing that could be done to enable the small force to defend itself was left undone by the indomitable old Boer, on whose fight against odds and fortune combined the whole civilized world was gazing in astonished admiration.

It was on the afternoon of this Sunday (February 18) that Kitchener's famous attack was ordered on what was believed by him to be a force and a position that could not possibly stand before such an absolutely overwhelming body of troops as he commanded. The enemy were conscious of being the masters of Cronje's doom, and it was resolved to lend a dramatic spirit of vengeance to the expected defeat and capture by employing the Highland regiments in the delivery of the main attack, in retaliation for the terrible punishment inflicted upon them at Magersfontein. It was not a spirit worthy of a true soldier, and resembled more that of a hunter who, failing to bring down a lion in his path, succeeds in driving him into a cage, and then takes an unworthy sportsman's pleasure in potting his imprisoned adversary from the vantage ground of safety. It deserved to fail, and did.

After fully fifty guns from all sides had shelled the laager for hours, in such an incessant storm of lyddite and shrapnel as no modern battle-field has ever witnessed, the Highlanders and other regiments were let loose like bloodhounds from the leash upon the cornered quarry from the north, west, east, and south. On they came with bayonets glinting in the sun, in all the confidence of vast numbers and inspired by the belief that it would be a short rush, and then an Elandslaagte of British revenge. But the men in the trenches, tho only a handful in comparison with Kitchener's legions, were not to lend themselves to pig-sticking on that Sunday, so easily as the Kitcheners and Kelly-Kennys believed. The old lion was caged, but he could strike through his bars, and the sun went down that Sabbath day, the 18th of February, after witnessing one of the most unequal battles ever fought; the Highlanders, balked of their vengeance, beaten again, and again demoralized, and the other regiments driven back with almost equal loss, with the enemy magnificently repulsed all along the line. The grim old lion of Potchefstroom had' once again made a South African battle-field run red with the blood of his country's malignant foe. He had sustained the record even of Magersfontein, for his 4,500 Boers had faced, fought, and repulsed on that Sunday seven times their number of English assailants, having twenty guns to the Boers' one.

During the progress of the main battle on the 18th, De Wet had made a furious onslaught upon the troops who had been sent south of the river to carry out Kitchener's plan of an all-round rush upon Cronje. He thus diverted a great deal of the enemy's attention from the laager to himself, and had in the end to sustain a counter attack of a dozen guns upon his position and several attempts by infantry forces to dislodge him. He held his ground until night time, and was thus largely instrumental in helping Cronje successfully to resist Kitchener's movement to crush him by sheer weight of numbers and guns.

The Boers had lost very few in this battle, but a relatively large number had been wounded. For these there were no doctors or ambulance attendance. They were lying in the bed of the river or in the dongas, and this spectacle, with women and children close by, naturally tended to demoralize some of the burghers. Cronje asked Kitchener on Monday morning for an armistice to bury the dead, and to send his wounded to the Boer ambulance at Petrusburg. Joubert had accorded an even more accommodating armistice to General White after Modderspruit. It is believed that Kitchener was inclined to accede to these requests, but that Lord Roberts, who had now arrived on the scene, would not consent to either. This, however, was not the worst side of the English general's actions. His forces had arrested the whole of the Hollander ambulance at Jacobsdal, and had refused to allow the doctors serving under the Bed Cross ensign to pass through the lines to the Boer laager; the British actually using the Federal hospitals and ambulance appliances at Jacobsdal for their own wounded, while denying to their foemen the services of their own medical assistants and nurses! It is true that Lord Roberts offered to take Cronje's wounded over to his own lines for treatment by the English doctors, but no self-respecting foe could 'consent to this in face of such conduct as that at Jacobsdal, and while he still had a resolve to continue the combat. So "the fight went on all Monday; Roberts, however, keeping his troops at a respectful distance from the range of the rifles which had driven back Kitchener's legions the previous day. The enemy turned all his batteries upon the laager by the river, and awaited the double agency of an artillery fire which could not be answered by the Boer guns, and of the horrible conditions under which Cronje had to hold his ground, to effect what frontal attacks and revengeful charges had failed disastrously to achieve.

Early on Monday morning, while General Ferreira was making the rounds of his position outside the enemy's lines, north of Koedesrand, he found one of his sentinels asleep at his post. He prodded him with the butt of his Mauser to rouse him, when the burgher, startled from his slumber, and prompted by the thought that he was attacked by the enemy, seized the general's gun at the breach, when the weapon went off, killing the Commandant-General; the bullet passing through his heart as he was leaning over the frightened burgher. Ferreira was one of the best of men, loved by all who knew him, and his brief head commandant-ship of the western Free State forces in succession to General Wessels, who had resigned, was very popular with all the burghers. His tragic death was a severe blow to the already sorely-tried defenders of Cronje's laager. General Christian De Wet was immediately appointed Chief Commandant of the Free State army, in succession to Ferreira.

On Tuesday Major Albrecht's five guns were rendered useless by the breakdown of the artillery service and the want of ammunition. All the enemy's guns being beyond the range of rifle fire, and there being no further danger from Cronje's single battery, Lord Roberts saw that his opponent's situation was rendered quite hopeless, and he began to push his lines a little nearer.

A message was heliographed to Cronje from Petrusburg on Tuesday afternoon by Commandant Froneman, saying that Christian De Wet and Philip Botha were near, had beaten a portion of the enemy's force, and were in possession of a strong position to the southeast of the laager. They were expecting De la Rey and reenforcements, and would be able to render effective help if the laager would hold out. This intelligence revived the drooping spirits of the men, who, on finding their positions attacked again that afternoon by infantry charges from the northwest, fusilladed the troops back in the best Magersfontein manner. This was virtually the last assault delivered by Roberts. His 100 unanswered guns, the shambles in the bed of the Modder River, and the unnerving presence of women and children within an area where every shell that exploded compelled every one to seek shelter, would do what bayonet charges could not effect.

All this time De Wet was hanging on to the flank of the enemy southeast of the river. He had gained a small kopje, from which a Krupp and a pom-pom enabled him to harass the English on both sides of the river considerably. A huge force was therefore directed against him on Wednesday, with the object of surrounding the hill, and capturing guns and men. Firing his two pieces up to the last moment, he called in his men, some 1,200 strong, sent out two lines of screening horsemen to the right and left, and then, forming his force into a wedge-like column with the guns in between, shot clean through the opening still left between the horns of the closing English circle. Andries Cronje, of Potchefstroom, with only 50 men, riding, firing, and retiring, as sharp-shooters, held back the enemy's horsemen until De Wet and his guns were safe at Poplars Grove.

The following night the same force of burghers, led by their general, rode back again under cover of darkness, lay in wait' until dawn enabled them to see the enemy's location on the hill] which had been vacated on the previous day, and in a spur-gallop over the. intervening ground attempted to retake the kopje. But the troops in position were too strong, and De Wet, losing only a very few men, wheeled back and regained his former ground.

On Thursday the pitiless bombardment of Cronje recommenced with the dawn, and was maintained throughout the whole day. In the evening 100 men left the laager and crossed over to the British to surrender.

Alternate hope and depression came to the trenches during the 23rd. Froneman heliographed from the east to be of good cheer, and to hold out; that 3,000 burghers were about to attack the enemy to Cronje's left. jSTo action followed the sending of the message, however, and a week's continuous combat in one of the most trying and desperate fights ever fought ended with more deaths, wounds, and desertions, as the night of Friday shut out the two forces from each other's view. But the nights did not stop the fighting. The English pushed their trenches from the east nearer and nearer until the British rifles were able to supplement the fire of their batteries with Lee-Metfords against Mausers from shelters which were built under cover of darkness.

Saturday ushered in the fiercest storm of projectiles yet turned upon the unfortunate laager. General Cronje estimated the number of guns at work against him that day at twenty-five batteries, all driving their shells and stinking lyddite into an area of about a mile within which the lines of the small army were now contracted. Not a move could safely be made in the trenches or holes in which the men had to crouch for protection, yet whenever an attempt was made to rush the trenches the Mausers were there with the old death-dealing accuracy of fire. Dead men lay unburied, dead horses floated in the river, the wounded were uncared for, the water of the Modder was no longer drinkable; and it seemed as if no other trials could possibly be added to the sum of indescribable misery under which these few men still faced the fate of inevitable defeat rather than hoist the white flag. This Saturday evening Captain Daanie Theron reached the laager after having passed through the English lines, swimming the river in his journey. He had gone on hands and knees for two miles after leaving his horse, so as to evade the patrols of the enemy before reaching the river's bank, being frequently within a few yards of British sentinels on his perilous mission. He brought messages from De Wet, Froneman, Botha, and Commandant Cronje, of Potchefstroom, in combined command of 4,000 or 5,000 men to the east, begging of General Cronje to attempt to cut his way through in that direction before all was lost. They pointed out that the enemy was commencing to feel the strain of the day and night fighting since the 14th, that their rations were not what would sustain the troops in a combative spirit, and that a dash through the line beyond which De Wet's forces were ready for a responsive attack would stand a good chance of succeeding.

Early the following morning a British patrol south of General French's lines were startled at seeing a nude figure riding like the wind on a dark horse, as if he were the spirit of a soldier on some mission from the dead within the doomed laager. They were too frightened to fire, and Theron thus got safe away after swimming the river on his return journey to De Wet's camp.

Cronje now assented to the proposal which he had hitherto refused to entertain, and the burghers began to build a chain bridge over the swollen river—a rain-storm having helped the British shell-storm to drive the Boers from the shelter of the bed of the Modder—and a sortie to the southeast was to be attempted on Monday night. But fate had determined that the blunders of the previous week should entail their penalty. Some Kaffirs, who had attended to the horses and cattle, deserted to the British on Sunday morning while the Boers were engaged at prayers in the most protected part of the laager. The officers who had been in favor of the sortie all the previous week now seemed inclined to consider the whole situation absolutely hopeless, and to whisper the word " surrender." A prayer supplication to the Almighty was suggested in order to find inspiration as to which course was best, and this was supplemented by an impassioned appeal from the general to the burghers to fight on, and trust in God and in the efforts of their friends. On Sunday night the drooping spirits of the laager had been raised again, and all were ready to stake their last hope on the attempt which was to be made on the following night.

Monday morning, however, dashed this hope to the ground. The Kaffirs had informed the British of the work going on at the point in the river where the chain bridge was being made, and all the enemy's guns were turned upon this spot, making it impossible to carry on the task. Two shells aimed at this place fell among a group of burghers and literally blew the son of Commandant Andries Cronje to pieces, killing eight or ten more at the same time. This, together with the destruction of the chain bridge, deadened the spirit of further resistance in banishing the hope of any successful help from outside, and the burghers clamored to Cronje to hoist the white flag. His men had, at last, lost faith in his power to beat back the English, and he had to consent to the calling of a kriegsraad to decide the question of surrender. As a last resort he heliographed in the direction of Aasvogel Kop, where Theron had told him De Wet and Botha were waiting to help him, that it had been decided at a council of war to surrender on Tuesday if the outside assistance could not cut its way through. No answer came back. The council had voted for surrender, all excepting the general and Commandant Boos. Fate was doubly unkind to Cronje in making him lower the hitherto triumphant Boer flag on the 37th of February, Majuba Day! But so it had occurred.

The morning was beautifully fine, the sun rising bright and clear over the fearful scene which met the gaze of the old hero of Potchefstroom, whose own sun of military renown had set in a halo of glory which a whole world was to salute in boundless admiration for an unparalleled resistance. The white flag was hoisted over the general's tent, and Cronje and his secretary rode over to Lord Roberts and his staff, and gave up the fight.

The total loss of the Federals in all the engagements from Klip Drift to Paardeberg, amounted to no more than 97 killed and 245 wounded.

On Sunday, February 18, when Kitchener ordered his attack by four divisions on as many sides of a position which had been taken up after a thirty miles' march, and put in a state of defense in one night's work, these 4,500 farmers shot down over 1,000 of their enemy, and drove the other assailants back behind their artillery. In the ten days' fighting the British casualties were at least 1,500 men.

This victory of Lord Roberts sent the British Empire into a delirium of exultation. Majuba had at last been avenged. Britain's military might had again asserted itself. But the world, which knew of the disproportion in men and means between the victors and the vanquished, saw no triumph in a battle fought for ten days by 5,000 farmers and five guns against 40,000 trained soldiers and 25 batteries of artillery. And, at last, the English press was compelled to tell the truth about the strength of " the army of 16,000 Boers and of batteries of Long Toms" which had defeated Methuen at Magersfontein. Lord Roberts could count only the men and guns found in the alleged army "of 16,000."

The guns captured were: three 7.5 cm. Krupps; one (old pattern) 12-pounder q.f. Krupp, and one 3.7 cm. Vickers-Maxim (pom-pom)—5 guns.

The men who surrendered numbered 3,919. Adding to these the number killed (97) and wounded (245) in the fighting up to the time of surrender, Cronje's total force on taking up position at Paardeberg was 4,261 men.

He had, however, according to my information, a body of some 500 Cape Colony Volunteers, who were part of the force with which he had beaten Methuen on December 11. There is no account of these in the details, Boer or British, of the men who laid down their arms to Lord Roberts on the 27th of February. They crossed the Modder, to the south, on Saturday night, the 17th, after the rear-guard action with some of Kelly-Kenny's division, and made their way towards Bloemfontein, where they joined De Wet and Philip Botha. Some 200 Free Staters had also left the column on its retreat after passing Klip Drift. They went north towards Boshof, and joined General Ferreira's men on their retreat from the Kimberley investment. Had Cronje taken either of these courses, on finding that French had passed him towards Kimberley, and that Kelly-Kenny and Kitchener were coming up to Klip Drift, he could have easily escaped destruction. If he had followed the burghers who crossed at Paardeberg Drift, and formed a junction with De Wet, Philip Botha, Froneman, and De la Rey, he would soon have had 10,000 men with whom to fight Roberts for the possession of Bloemfontein, and any one who knew of the utterly demoralized plight in which the British army staggered into the Free State capital after its month's marching, fighting, and starving, will not hesitate to say that three such capable generals as De la Rey, Cronje, and De Wet, with one-fourth of Roberts' strength, would have easily smashed him and his 40,000 half-famished troops.

A generous-minded world, lost in admiration at the example of heroic patriotism which was thought to have entirely died out of a materialistic age, overlooked faults of generalship which were redeemed by the virtues of dauntless courage. Tho pride and over-confidence had lost to Cronje opportunities which would otherwise have saved the cause of the two Republics from destruction, critics who are not English, but are fair and just, will say that, if ever error was atoned for in acts that thrill the hearts and fire the imaginations of mankind, the unsurpassed bravery of the " Lion of Potchefstroom " and his 4,000 farmers at the banks of the Modder River will deaden the recollection of the blunders which gave England the material, but the Boers the moral, triumph of Paardeberg.

The Federal officers who surrendered to Lord Roberts after their brilliant resistance during the ten days' battle were: General Cronje, Commandant M. J. Wolmarans, Commandants Roos and J. L. Martins, Assistant Commandants R. Woest, J. P. G. Vorster, and W. L. Jooste; Field Cornets Albert Naude, J. H. L. Bosman, W. A. Lemmer, H. G. Badenhorst, Frills (Scandinavian, D. H. Hattingh, Venter, D. J. Terblanche, P. V. de Villiers, G. J. du Plessis, Assistant Field Cornet P. W. Snyman, War Commissioner Arnoldi, Assistants P. J. Jooste, and A. K. Esselen, Adjutants J. T. A. Wolmarans, A. D. W. Wolmarans, R. A. Ning, G. S. Maree, J. B. Botha, G. H. Grobler, Bomas, and Moodie; Commandants J. P. J. Jordaan, J. K. Kok, J. C. Villiers, R. J. Snyman, L. Meintjes, J. Greyiing; Field Cornets J. Cronje, C. Oosthuizen, C. van Zyl, J. Nieuwenha, N. K. Hick, J. N. van der Walt; Major Albrecht, Commander of the Artillery ; Lieutenants V. Heester, Vondewitz, and Van Angesten.