During the period of, say, twenty-five years after the inception of the Afrikaner Bond, and while its organization and development were secretly kept at full pace with occurring events, the British Government consistently and openly pursued the policy of bringing about the unification of South Africa. Mr. Froude, a speaker of rare gifts, was sent to lecture upon the topic: this was in about 1873. The Colonial Governor, Sir Bartle Frere, strenuously advocated that union. The lines suggested were a general federation under one protective flag, self-government in the Colonies, and the continuance of uncurtailed autonomic independence in the two Republics. The benefits which such a coalition promised to all concerned in South Africa are obvious. It would guarantee harmony between the two white races without involving the least sacrifice of liberty with any party—it simply meant coincident peace, prosperity and security, and would relieve England of a considerable burden of anxiety. The scheme promised to find all-round acceptance, but, unaccountably, except to Bond men, its greatest opponents were the Cape Colonial Boers. It was, however, confidently hoped that, with patience, opposition and indifference would be overcome, and in view of this no opportunity was lost to prove England's loyal sincerity by genial treatment, by conciliating the various interests, and gratifying the wishes of the Boer communities, and so to ensure the desideratum of complete rapprochement between the white races.
Conferences were convened with the objects of coming to agreements for the establishment of a general South African Customs Union, and for adjusting railway tariffs upon fair bases and a more reliable permanency of rates suggesting reciprocal terms advantageous to the Republics. These efforts also proved fruitless through similar opposition.
The Afrikaner Bond party, as the reader will understand, had ranged itself against all such attempts, whilst successfully masking its own object all the time.
Other differences, which, with a friendly and united spirit, were capable of easy adjustment, were welcomed by that party as grist to its mill in order to widen the gulf and to increase the tension.
Besides the chagrin over the failure of its peace policy, the British Cabinet had finally to admit itself confronted with a very real and ominous national peril, face to face with the South African Medusa, Afrikanerdom, defying Great Britain in preconcerted aggression and revolt. That apparition was all the more startlingly disquieting because of the suddenness with which the magnitude of the menace and its wide perspectives had begun to expand into clearer view. It was interesting to note how the English ministry responded to the call upon its fortitude; the terrifying apparition did not seem to petrify that body of men, despite the galling handicapping consequences through the opposition of part of the nation, which was indeed tantamount to encouraging South African rebels and usurpers.
