The subjoined document is printed in the form in which it was supplied to the author by a journalist, to whom it had been given as a fair statement of the case. The marginal remarks are the notes made by a member of the Reform Committee to whom it was shown.
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE EXPEDITION THAT LEFT THE PROTECTORATE AT THE URGENT REQUEST OF THE LEADING CITIZENS OF JOHANNESBURG WITH THE OBJECT OF STANDING BY THEM AND MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER WHILST THEY WERE DEMANDING JUSTICE FROM THE TRANSVAAL AUTHORITIES. By SIR JOHN C. WILLOUGHBY, BART., Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Dr. Jameson's Forces.
[After they had dated the 'urgent' letter, and had wired to Dr. Harris (December 27): 'We will make our own notation by the aid of the letter which I shall publish.']
On Saturday, December 28, 1895, Dr. Jameson received a Reuter's telegram showing that the situation at Johannesburg had become acute. At the same time reliable information was received that the Boers in the Zeerust and Lichtenburg districts were assembling, and had been summoned to march on Johannesburg.
[The same time as he got the telegrams from Johannesburg and messages by Heany and Holden on no account to move.]
Preparations were at once made to act on the terms of the letter dated December 20, and already published, and also in accordance with verbal arrangements with the signatories of that letter—viz., that should Dr. Jameson hear that the Boers were collecting, and that the intentions of the Johannesburg people had become generally known, he was at once to come to the aid of the latter with whatever force he had available, and without further reference to them, the object being that such force should reach Johannesburg without any conflict.
[Twaddle—in the face of Hammond's, Phillips's and Sam Jameson's wire not to move]
At 3 p.m. on Sunday afternoon, December 29, everything was in readiness at Pitsani Camp.
The troops were paraded, and Dr. Jameson read the letter of invitation from Johannesburg.
He then explained to the force (a) that no hostilities were intended; (b) that we should only fight if forced to do so in self-defence; (c) that neither the persons nor property of inhabitants of the Transvaal were to be molested; (d) that our sole object was to help our fellow-men in their extremity, and to ensure their obtaining attention to their just demands.
Dr. Jameson's speech was received with the greatest enthusiasm by the men, who cheered most heartily.
The above programme was strictly adhered to until the column was fired upon on the night of the 31st.
Many Boers, singly and in small parties, were encountered on the line of march; to one and all of these the pacific nature of the expedition was carefully explained.
Start from Pitsani.
The force left Pitsani Camp at 6.30 p.m., December 29, and marched through the night.
At 5.15 a.m. on the morning of the 30th the column reached the village of Malmani (39 miles distant from Pitsani).
Junction effected at Malmani with B.B.P.
Precisely at the same moment the advanced guard of the Mafeking Column (under Colonel Grey) reached the village, and the junction was effected between the two bodies.
For details of the composition of the combined force, as also for general particulars of the march to Krugersdorp, see sketch of the route and schedule attached (marked A. and B. respectively).
Defile at lead-mines passed.
From Malmani I pushed on as rapidly as possible in order to cross in daylight the very dangerous defile at Lead Mines. This place, distant 71 miles from Pitsani, was passed at 5.30 p.m., December 30.
I was subsequently informed that a force of several hundred Boers, sent from Lichtenburg to intercept the force at this point, missed doing so by three hours only.
Letter from Commandant-General.
At our next 'off-saddle' Dr. Jameson received a letter from the Commandant-General of the Transvaal demanding to know the reason of our advance, and ordering us to return immediately. A reply was sent to this, explaining Dr. Jameson's reasons in the same terms as those used to the force at Pitsani.
Letter from High Commissioner.
At Doornport (91 miles from Pitsani), during an 'off-saddle' early on Tuesday morning, December 31, a mounted messenger overtook us, and presented a letter from the High Commissioner, which contained an order to Dr. Jameson and myself to return at once to Mafeking and Pitsani.
Reasons for not retreating.
A retreat by now was out of the question, and to comply with these instructions an impossibility. In the first place, there was absolutely no food for men or horses along the road which we had recently followed; secondly, three days at least would be necessary for our horses, jaded with forced marching, to return; on the road ahead we were sure of finding, at all events, some food for man and beast. Furthermore, we had by now traversed almost two-thirds of the total distance; a large force of Boers was known to be intercepting our retreat, and we were convinced that any retrograde movement would bring on an attack of Boers from all sides.
It was felt, therefore, that to ensure the safety of our little force, no alternative remained but to push on to Krugersdorp to our friends, who we were confident would be awaiting our arrival there.
Apart from the above considerations, even had it been possible to effect a retreat from Doornport, we knew that Johannesburg had risen, and felt that by turning back we should be shamefully deserting those coming to meet us.
[They could not possibly know it, because the rising—i.e. the public arming and moving of men—only began at the very hour they claim to have known it, and because the first news from Johannesburg only reached them 24 hours later by the two cyclists 'Oh what a tangled web we weave, when—']
Finally, it appeared to us impossible to turn back, in view of the fact that we had been urgently called in to avert a massacre, which we had been assured would be imminent in the event of a crisis such as had now occurred.
[Vide the telegrams and messages to stop! How noble!]
Boer scouts.
Near Boon's store, on the evening of the 31st, an advanced patrol fell in with Lieutenant Eloff, of the Krugersdorp Volunteers. This officer, in charge of a party of 15 scouts, had come out to gain intelligence of our movements. He was detained whilst our intentions were fully explained to him, and then released at Dr. Jameson's request.
First skirmish New Year's Eve.
At midnight (New Year's Eve), while the advanced scouts were crossing a rocky wooded ridge at right angles to and barring the line of advance, they were fired on by a party of 40 Boers, who had posted themselves in this position. The scouts, reinforced by the advanced guard, under Inspector Straker, drove off their assailants after a short skirmish, during which one trooper of the M.M.P. was wounded.
At Van Oudtshoorn's, early on the following morning (January 1), Dr. Jameson received a second letter from the High Commissioner, to which he replied in writing.
At 9.30 a.m. the march was resumed in the usual day formation. After marching two miles, the column got clear of the hills and emerged into open country.
10.15 a.m.
About this time Inspector Drury, in command of the rearguard, sent word that a force of about 100 Boers was following him about one mile in rear. I thereupon reinforced the rearguard, hitherto consisting of a troop and one Maxim, by an additional half-troop and another Maxim.
11 a.m.
About 5 miles beyond Van Oudtshoorn's store the column was met by two cyclists bearing letters from several leaders of the Johannesburg Reform Committee. These letters expressed the liveliest approval and delight at our speedy approach, and finally contained a renewal of their promise to meet the column with a force at Krugersdorp.{55} The messengers also reported that only 300 armed Boers were in the town.
This news was communicated to the troops, who received it with loud cheers.
When within two miles of Hind's store, the column was delayed by extensive wire-fencing, which ran for one and a half miles on either side of the road, and practically constituted a defile.
While the column was halted and the wire being cut, the country for some distance on both sides was carefully scouted.
By this means it was ascertained that there was a considerable force of Boers (1) on the left front, (2) in the immediate front (retreating hastily on Krugersdorp), (3) a third party on the right flank.
The force which had been following the column from Van Oudtshoorn's continued to hover in the rear.
Lieutenant-Colonel White, in command of the advanced guard, sent back a request for guns to be pushed forward as a precaution in case of an attack from the Boers in front. By the time these guns reached the advanced guard, the Boers were still retreating some two miles off. A few rounds were then fired in their direction. Had Colonel White, in the first instance, opened fire with his Maxims on the Boers, whom he surprised watering their horses close to Hind's store, considerable loss would have been inflicted; but this was not our object, for with the exception of the small skirmish on the previous night, the Boers had not as yet molested the column, whose sole aim was to reach Johannesburg if possible without fighting.
1.30 p.m.
At this hour Hind's store was reached.
Here the troops rested for one and a half hours.
Unfortunately, hardly any provisions for men and horses were available.
3 p.m.
An officers' patrol, consisting of Major Villiers (Royal Horse Guards) and Lieutenant Grenfell (1st Life Guards) and six men, moved off for the purpose of reconnoitring the left flank of the Boer position, while Captain Lindsell, with his permanent force of advanced scouts, pushed on as usual to reconnoitre the approach by the main road. At the same time I forwarded a note to the Commandant of the forces in Krugersdorp to the effect that, in the event of my friendly force meeting with opposition on its approach, I should be forced to shell the town, and that therefore I gave him this warning in order that the women and children might be moved out of danger.
[Friendly!]
To this note, which was despatched by a Boer who had been detained at Van Oudtshoorn, I received no reply.
At Hind's store we were informed that the force in our front had increased during the forenoon to about 800 men, of whom a large number were entrenched on the hillside.
4.30 p.m.
Four miles beyond Hind's store, the column following the scouts, which met with no opposition, ascended a steep rise of some 400 feet, and came full in view of the Boer position on the opposite side of a deep valley, traversed by a broad "sluit" or muddy water course.
Standing on the plateau or spur, on which our force was forming up for action, the view to our front was as follows:
Passing through our position to the west ran the Hind's store—Krugersdorp Road traversing the valley and the Boer position almost at right angles to both lines.
Immediately to the north of this road, at the point where it disappeared over the sky-line on the opposite slope, lay the Queen's Battery House and earthworks, completely commanding the valley on all sides and distant 1,900 yards from our standpoint.
Some 1,000 yards down the valley to the north stood a farmhouse, surrounded by a dense plantation, which flanked the valley.
Half-way up the opposite slope, and adjacent to the road, stood an iron house which commanded the drift where the road crossed the above-mentioned watercourse.
On the south side of the road, and immediately opposite the last-named iron house, an extensive rectangular stone wall enclosure with high trees formed an excellent advanced central defensive position. Further up the slope, some 500 yards to the south of this enclosure, stretched a line of rifle-pits, which were again flanked to the south by 'prospecting' trenches. On the sky-line numbers of Boers were apparent to our front and right front.
Before reaching the plateau we had observed small parties of Boers hurrying towards Krugersdorp, and immediately on reaching the high ground the rearguard was attacked by the Boer force which had followed the column during the whole morning.
I therefore had no further hesitation in opening fire on the Krugersdorp position.
4.30 p.m.
The two seven-pounders and the 12-1/2 pounder opened on the Boer line, making good practice under Captain Kincaid-Smith and Captain Gosling at 1,900 yards.
[It must have been here that the waggon-loads of dead Boers weren't found.]
5 p.m.
This fire was kept up until 5 p.m. The Boers made practically no reply, but lay quiet in the trenches and battery.
Scouts having reported that most of the trenches were evacuated, the first line consisting of the advanced guard (a troop of 100 men), under Colonel White advanced. Two Maxims accompanied this force; a strong troop with a Maxim formed the right and left supports on either flank.
Lieutenant-Colonel Grey, with one troop B.B.P. and one Maxim, had been previously detailed to move round and attack the Boers' left.
The remaining two troops, with three Maxims, formed the reserve and rearguard.
The first line advance continued unopposed to within 200 yards of the watercourse, when it was checked by an exceedingly heavy cross-fire from all points of the defence.
Colonel White then pushed his skirmishers forward into and beyond the watercourse.
The left support under Inspector Dykes then advanced to prolong the first line to the left, but, diverging too much to his left this officer experienced a very hot flanking fire from the farmhouse and plantation, and was driven back with some loss.
Colonel Grey meanwhile had pushed round on the extreme right and come into action.
5.30 p.m.
About this time Major Villiers' patrol returned and reported that the country to our right was open, and that we could easily move round in that direction.
It was now evident that the Boers were in great force, and intended holding their position.
Without the arrival of the Johannesburg force in rear of the Boers—an event which I had been momentarily expecting—I did not feel justified in pushing a general attack, which would have certainly entailed heavy losses on my small force.
[When Celliers and Rowlands left them at 11 a.m. they had not expected anyone. Vide Cellier's report and Colonel H.E. White's letter.]
6.15 p.m.
I accordingly left Inspector Drury with one troop and one Maxim to keep in check the Boers who were now lining the edge of the plateau to our left, and placed Colonel Grey with two troops B.B.P., one 12-1/2 pounder, and one Maxim to cover our left flank and continue firing on the battery and trenches south of the road.
I then made a general flank movement to the right with the remaining troops.
Colonel Grey succeeded in shelling the Boers out of their advanced position during the next half-hour, and blew up the battery house.
Flank movement.
Under this cover the column moved off as far as the first houses of the Randfontein group of mines, the Boers making no attempt to intercept the movement.
Night was now fast approaching, and still there were no signs of the promised help from Johannesburg. I determined, therefore, to push on with all speed in the direction of that town, trusting in the darkness to slip through any intervening opposition.
Two guides were obtained, the column formed in the prescribed night order of march, and we started off along a road leading direct to Johannesburg.
At this moment heavy rifle and Maxim fire was suddenly heard from the direction of Krugersdorp, which lay 1-1/2 miles to the left rear.
We at once concluded that this could only be the arrival of the long-awaited reinforcements, for we knew that Johannesburg had Maxims, and that the Staats'-Artillerie were not expected to arrive until the following morning. To leave our supposed friends in the lurch was out of the question. I determined at once to move to their support.
[Long awaited! Why, this was only 6 hours since the cyclists left.]
Leaving the carts escorted by one troop on the road I advanced rapidly across the plateau towards Krugersdorp in the direction of the firing, in the formation shown in the accompanying sketch.
After advancing thus for nearly a mile the firing ceased, and we perceived the Boers moving in great force to meet the column. The flankers on the right reported another force threatening that flank.
Fearing that an attempt would be made to cut us off from the ammunition carts, I ordered a retreat on them.
It was now clear that the firing, whatever might have been the cause thereof, was not occasioned by the arrival of any force from Johannesburg.
[This is really magnificent!]
Precious moments had been lost in the attempt to stand by our friends at all costs, under the mistaken supposition that they could not fail to carry out their repeated promises,{56} renewed to us by letter so lately as 11 a.m. this same day. It was now very nearly dark. In the dusk the Boers could be seen closing in on three sides—viz., north, east, and south. The road to Johannesburg appeared completely barred, and the last opportunity of slipping through, which had presented itself an hour ago when the renewed firing was heard, was gone not to return.
Bivouac, January 1.
Nothing remained but to bivouac in the best position available.
But for the unfortunate circumstance of the firing, which we afterwards heard was due to the exultation of the Boers at the arrival of large reinforcements from Potchefstroom, the column would have been by this time (7 p.m.) at least four or five miles further on the road to Johannesburg, with an excellent chance of reaching that town without further opposition.
I moved the column to the edge of a wide vley to the right of the road, and formed the horses in quarter-column under cover of the slope. The carts were formed up in rear and on both flanks, and five Maxims were placed along the front so as to sweep the plateau.
The other three Maxims and the heavy guns were posted on the rear and flank faces.
The men were then directed to lie down between the guns and on the side; sentries and cossack posts were posted on each face. Meantime the Boers had occupied the numerous prospecting trenches and cuttings on the plateau at distances from 400 to 800 yards.
9 p.m.
At 9 p.m. a heavy fire was opened on the bivouac, and a storm of bullets swept over and around us, apparently directed from all sides except the south-west.
The troops were protected by their position on the slope below the level of the plateau, so that the total loss from this fire, which lasted about twenty minutes, was very inconsiderable.
The men behaved with admirable coolness, and were as cheery as possible, although very tired and hungry and without water.
We were then left unmolested for two or three hours.
Midnight.
About midnight another shower of bullets was poured into the camp, but the firing was not kept up for long.
Somewhat later a Maxim gun opened on the bivouac, but failed to get our range.
Thursday, January 2.
At 3.30 a.m. patrols were pushed out on all sides, while the force as silently and rapidly as possible was got ready to move off.
At 4 a.m. a heavy fire was opened by the Boers on the column, and the patrols driven in from the north and east sides.
Under the direction of Major R. White (assisted by Lieutenant Jesser-Coope) the column was formed under cover of the slope.
Soon after this the patrols which had been sent out to the south returned, and reported that the ground was clear of the Boers in that direction.
The growing light enabled us to ascertain that the Boers in force were occupying pits to our left and lining the railway embankment for a distance of one and a half miles right across the direct road to Johannesburg.
I covered the movements of the main body with the B.B.P. and two Maxims under Colonel Grey along the original left front of the bivouac, and two troops M.M.P., under Major K. White on the right front.
During all this time the firing was excessively heavy; however the main body was partially sheltered by the slope.
Colonel White then led the advance for a mile across the vley without casualty, but on reaching the opposite rise near the Oceanic Mine, was subjected to a very heavy long-range fire. Colonel White hereupon very judiciously threw out one troop to the left to cover the further advance of the main body.
This was somewhat delayed, after crossing the rise, by the disappearance of our volunteer guide of the previous night.
Some little time elapsed before another guide could be obtained.
In the meantime, Lieutenant-Colonel Grey withdrew his force and the covering Maxims out of action under the protection of the M.M.P. covering troops, and rejoined the main body.
5 a.m.
At this juncture Colonel Grey was shot in the foot, but most gallantly insisted on carrying on his duties until the close of the action.
Sub-Inspector Cazalet was also wounded here, but continued in action until he was shot again in the chest at Doornkop.
While crossing the ridge the column was subjected to a very heavy fire, and several men and horses were lost here.
I detailed a rearguard of one troop and two Maxims, under Major R. White, to cover our rear and left flank, and move the remainder of the troops in the ordinary day formation as rapidly forward as possible.
In this formation a running rear and flank guard fight was kept up for ten miles. Wherever the features of the ground admitted, a stand was made by various small detachments of the rear and flank guard. In this manner the Boers were successfully kept a distance of 500 yards, and repulsed in all their efforts to reach the rear and flank of the main body.
In passing through the various mines and the village of Randfontein we met with hearty expressions of goodwill from the mining population, who professed a desire to help if only they had arms.
8 a.m.
Ten miles from the start I received intelligence from Colonel Grey, at the head of the column, that Doornkop, a hill near the Speitfontein mine, was held by 400 Boers, directly barring our line of advance.
I repaired immediately to the front, Colonel White remaining with the rear-guard.
On arriving at the head of the column, I found the guns shelling a ridge which our guide stated was Doornkop.
The excellent dispositions for the attack made by Colonel Grey were then carried out.
The B.B.P., under Major Coventry, who I regret to say was severely wounded and lost several of his men, attacked and cleared the ridge in most gallant style and pushed on beyond it.
About this time Inspector Barry received the wound which we have learnt with grief has subsequently proved fatal.
Chief-Inspector Bodle at the same time, with two troops M.M.P., charged, and drove off the field a large force of Boers threatening our left flank.
The guide had informed us that the road to the right of the hill was impassable, and that there was open and easy country to the left.
This information was misleading. I afterwards ascertained that without storming the Boer position there was no road open to Johannesburg except by a wide detour of many miles to the right.
8.30 a.m.
At this moment Dr. Jameson received a letter from the High Commissioner again ordering us to desist in our advance. Dr. Jameson informed me at the same time of the most disheartening news, viz., that he had received a message stating that Johannesburg would not or could not come to our assistance, and that we must fight our way through unaided.
Thinking that the first ridge now in our hands was Doornkop, we again pushed rapidly on, only to find that in rear of the ridge another steep and stony kopje, some 400 feet in height, was held by hundreds of Boers completely covered from our fire.
This kopje effectually flanked the road over which the column must advance at a distance of 400 yards. Scouting showed that there was no way of getting round this hill.
Surrounded on all sides by the Boers, men and horses wearied out, outnumbered by at least six to one, our friends having failed to keep their promises to meet us, and my force reduced numerically by one-fourth, I no longer considered that I was justified in sacrificing any more of the lives of the men under me.
[Wonderfully considerate! seeing how they deliberately risked the lives of thousands in Johannesburg when they started.]
As previously explained, our object in coming had been to render assistance, without bloodshed if possible, to the inhabitants of Johannesburg. This object would in no way be furthered by a hopeless attempt to cut our way through overwhelming numbers, an attempt, moreover which must without any doubt have entailed heavy and useless slaughter.
9.15 a.m.
With Dr. Jameson's permission, I therefore sent word to the Commandant that we would surrender provided that he would give a guarantee of safe conduct out of the country to every member of the force.
To this Commandant Cronjé replied by a guarantee of the lives of all, provided that we would lay down our arms and pay all expenses.
In spite of this guarantee of the lives of all, Commandant Malan subsequently repudiated the guarantee in so far as to say that he would not answer for the lives of the leaders, but this was not until our arms had been given up and the force at the mercy of the Boers.
I attribute our failure to reach Johannesburg in a great measure to loss of time from the following causes:
(1) The delay occasioned by the demonstration in front of Krugersdorp, which had been assigned as the place of junction with the Johannesburg force.
(2) The non-arrival of that force at Krugersdorp or of the guides to the Krugersdorp-Johannesburg section of the road, as previously promised by Johannesburg.
(3) The delay consequent on moving to the firing of the supposed Johannesburg column just before dark on Wednesday evening.
[How is it that nothing was said of this to Celliers and Rowland; nothing in the Letter of Colonel White and Dr. Jameson which they wrote at 11 a.m. Wednesday; nothing in the message sent by Bugler Vallé, who was despatched on Thursday before daybreak after the Krugersdorp light? How is it that if the forces were to meet at Krugersdorp Dr. Jameson telegraphed to Dr. Wolff to meet him en route, so as to decide whether to turn off 20 miles before reaching Krugersdorp and march direct on Pretoria or go into Johannesburg first?]
I append (1) a sketch-map of the route from Pitsani to Krugersdorp, marked A. This distance (154 miles) was covered in just under 70 hours, the horses having been off-saddled ten times. The 169 miles between Pitsani and Doornkop occupied 86 hours, during 17 of which the men were engaged with the Boers, and were practically without food or water, having had their last meal at 8 a.m. on the morning of the 1st January at Van Oudtshoorn's, 17 miles from Krugersdorp.
The average weight carried by each horse was 16 stone.
(2) List of officers engaged in the expedition and composition of the force marked B. From this it will be seen that there was a total of 494 men and officers (exclusive of staff).
(3) Plans of engagements at Krugersdorp and Doornkop, and of the bivouac on the night of January 1st.
I cannot close this narrative without testifying to the very great gallantry and endurance of all officers, non-commissioned officers, and troopers under my command in the field and on the march under most trying circumstances.
COMPOSITION OF FORCE.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Willoughby, Royal
Horse Guards Commanding.
Major Hon. Robert White, Royal Welsh
Fusiliers Senior Staff Officer.
Major C. Hyde Villiers, Royal Horse Guards Staff Officer.
Captain Kincaid-Smith, Royal Artillery Artillery Staff Officer.
Captain Kennedy, B.S.A.C.'s Service Quartermaster.
Captain E. Holden, Derbyshire Yeomanry Assistant Quarter-Master.
Surgeon Captain Farmer, B.S.A. Co. }
Surgeon Captain Seaton Hamilton, late 1st Life } Medical Officers.
Guards }
Lieutenant Grenfell, 1st Life Guards Remount Officer.
Lieutenant Jesser-Coope, B.S.A. Co. Transport Officer.
Captain Lindsell, late Royal Scots Fusiliers In charge Scouts.
Major J.B. Stracey, Scots Guards }
Major Heany, B.S.A. Co. } Officers temporarily
Captain Foley } attached to Staff.
Lieutenant Harry R. Holden, late Grenadier }
Guards }
OFFICERS OF MASHONALAND MOUNTED POLICE.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. H.F. White, Grenadier
Guards Commanding.
Inspector Bodle (late 6th Dragoons) 2nd in command.
Inspector Straker, commanding A Troop.
Inspector Dykes, commanding B Troop.
Inspector Barry, commanding C Troop.
Inspector Drury, commanding D Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Scott and Cashel, A Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Tomlinson and Chawner, B Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Cazalet and Williams, C Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Murray and Constable, D Troop.
Artillery Troop—Inspector Bowden and Sub-Inspector Spain.
Regimental Sergeant—Major Abbott.
BECHUANALAND BORDER POLICE.
Lieutenant-Colonel Raleigh Grey, 6th Dragoons Commanding.
Major Hon. Charles Coventry 2nd in command.
Captain Gosling, commanding G Troop.
Sub-Lieutenants Hoare and Wood, commanding G Troop.
Captain Munroe, commanding K Troop.
Sub-Lieutenant McQueen, commanding K Troop.
Medical Officer Surgeon Garraway.
Veterinary Surgeon Lakie.
M.M. Police officers and men 372 Pitsani
Staff 13 camp.
Colony boys (leading horses, etc.) 65
Horses 480
Mules 128
One 12-1/2-pounder, 6 Maxims, 6 Scotch carts, 1 Cape cart,
2 grain waggons.
B.B. Police officers and men 122 Mafeking
Staff 1 column.
Drivers and leaders 10
Horses 160
Mules 30
Two 7-pounders, 2 Maxims, 2 Scotch carts, 2 Cape carts.
Officers and men 494 Totals.
Staff 14
Drivers, leaders, etc. 75
Horses 640
Mules 158
M.H. Maxims 8
12-1/2-pounder 1
7-pounder 2
Scotch carts 8
Cape carts 3
AMMUNITION.
Rounds.
Carried by men and natives 50,000 Lee-Met.
Carried in Scotch carts and Cape carts 54,000 rifle.
-------
Total 104,000
=======
On the guns 17,000 Maxim.
In carts 28,000
-------
Total 45,000
=======
On limber 44 12-1/2
On one Scotch cart 80 pounders.
-------
Total 124
=======
On limbers 70 7-pounders.
In Scotch carts 172
-------
Total 242
=======
The rifle ammunition used was that supplied by the Maxim firm for their guns and also pellet powder.
The powder used with the 12-1/2-pounder was that known as 'ballistite.' Rocket signals and limelights were carried, but not used.
EQUIPMENT CARRIED.
- On the Person.
- (a) Rifle (10 rounds).
- (b) Bandolier (60 rounds).
- (c) Haversack (1/2 day's ration).
- (d) Water-bottle filled.
- On the Saddle.
- (a) Nosebag (5 lb. grain).
- (b) Cloak on wallet.
- (c) Rifle bucket.
- (d) Patrol tin (with grocery ration).
- (e) Leather axe-holder (every fourth man).
Near-side wallet, 30 rounds and 1/2 day's rations.
Off-side wallet, 20 rounds, tin dubbin, hold-all, and towel.
Average weight carried by horse = 16 stone.
Average weight carried by Scotch carts = 1,600 lb.
Footnotes for Appendix H
{55} The letters are published in their proper place, and readers can satisfy themselves as to whether they justify the above inference.
{56} Note. July, 1899. In the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons (No. 311 of 1897), page 298, are the following:—
Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman: "Did you understand that you were to meet a considerable force at Krugersdorp coming from Johannesburg?"
Sir John Willoughby: Not when we started from Pitsani, but certainly after the letters received from the cyclists.
