TOPIC:

Extract from the regiment's record of service for the Anglo-Boer War.



Battalion arrived at Estcourt at 6 a.m., December 6th, and encamped there.

December 7th camp was struck at 4.40 a.m., and battalion left for Frere at 6 a.m., in company with two batteries of artillery and three companies 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers by march route.

Arrived at Frere at about 2 p.m., and joined 5th Brigade, commanded by Major-General Fitzroy Hart, C.B. The other battalions in the brigade comprised the 1st R. Inniskilling Fusiliers, 1st Border Regiment, and 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

The brigade was in the division commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Clery, K.C.B. Brigade remained in camp at Frere until December 13th, when the first advance was made towards Ladysmith for the purpose of relieving the garrison.

The advance was made by two divisions.

Brigade encamped at a spot two miles beyond Chieveley, and nearer the Tugela River. The enemy was said to be in position on the high hills on the further side of this river.

On December 14th the Brigade did not leave camp, while the enemy's supposed position was bombarded by artillery.

On the evening of the 14th December, 1899, at Chieveley Camp, Major-General Hart assembled the senior officers of the brigade, and informed them of the intention of the General Commanding the Forces to endeavour to force the passage of the Tugela next morning. General Hilliard's Brigade had been directed to attack the bridge at Colenso; the 5th Brigade to attempt a passage at a bridle drift said to be near the junction of the Blaukrantz Spruit and the Tugela. Having passed the river it was intended that the brigade should move to the right, shut the enemy into the loop of the Tugela, and cut off his retreat.

The leading battalion of the Fifth Brigade had orders to line the bank, while the Connaught Rangers crossed the river. Orders and directions would be issued on arrival at the river. General Lyttleton's brigade had orders to support either of these brigades as found necessary; and General Barton's brigade was instructed to occupy a position below Colenso to prevent a turning movement on the right.

At 4 a.m., on the 15th December, the brigade had assembled on parade in the following order: –

1st. – The Dublin Fusiliers.
2nd. – The Connaught Rangers.
3rd. – The Inniskilling Fusiliers.
4th. – The Border Regiment.

Half-an-hour afterwards it moved off in mass of "quarter columns'.' As day dawned (about 5 o'clock) the Naval guns opened fire on the enemy and dropped shells here and there, though very little could be seen. There was no reply, and the column moved on, making only a few short halts until within a couple of hundred yards of the river, when a halt was called. Almost immediately the first shot was fired from one of the enemy's guns, and the shell burst in close proximity. The mass at once deployed to the left as shell after shell burst all around with increasing accuracy. The battalion advanced to the bank of the river, but found it deep, broad, and quite impassable. The enemy's position presented a most formidable aspect. The ground beyond the river rose rapidly into a line of hills becoming steep, rugged, and apparently inaccessible towards the summit. The lower slopes were seamed with shelter trenches, and dotted with gun pits; the heavy artillery was overhead, but all were carefully concealed from view. The ground in the centre behind Colenso was lower and more accessible, but the approaches were defended by Fort Wylie, which had formerly been constructed by our own Engineers.

The river to the right of the spot occupied by the Rangers made a sharp bend back towards the enemy's position, and it now appeared that, if ford there were, it must be in the re-entering angle. The battalion lying along the bank of the river was exposed, not only to a frontal artillery fire, but also to a heavy enfilade rifle fire from the right, and suffered heavily. Meanwhile, the battalions in rear were pushed forward, and being unable to proceed, lay down on the right in extended order, obtaining shelter, where possible, wherever the ground was in the least uneven. Unfortunately, it was for the most part as level as a billiard table; only antheaps gave shelter from view. Shortly afterwards a staff officer said that the drift was lower down the river, and directed Colonel Brooke to advance in that direction. The companies in obeying this order were compelled to pass through the other battalions, and these advancing also at the same moment, the whole brigade became inextricably mixed together; officers of one battalion commanding men of another. Sorting themselves as best they could, wave after wave of men advanced towards the enemy's shelter-trenches, the exact position of which could only be guessed by the direction from which the bullets were coming. They were exposed all the time to a scorching fire from front and flank.

The first advance was almost entirely unsupported by artillery, for the Naval guns had been scattering their shells over the whole position, and the Field Batteries had not had time to come into action. Moreover, the enemy's positions were so completely screened that it was almost impossible to find an objective against which to direct the fire of the infantry. Very few of the men saw even a sign of the enemy, and they only knew of his presence by the shrieking of the shrapnel, the whistling of the bullets, and the dropping of their comrades. A few volleys were fired, but comparatively little ammunition was expended.

The advance was carried on for about three-quarters of a mile, when it was found that the shelter-trenches from which we were suffering so severely were placed on the far bank, and that it was owing to the bend in the river that they were able to bring a flank fire on our first position. No ford was discovered and, as we were caught in the loop of the river, no further advance was possible; nor, indeed, were any orders received; consequently the troops lay where they were in successive lines.

At this time the front was about four hundred yards from the enemy and the men lay thus exposed to the shrapnel and rifle fire until 10 o'clock – a period of nearly five hours. The Field Batteries had come into action during this period and shelled the enemy's shelter trenches below the bend, over the heads of the Brigade. At first the shells fell short, and among our men, but not much damage was done, and this short range was soon rectified. Our leading troops appear to have been mistaken for Boers by those in rear. There seemed to have been a Boer gun somewhere beyond the bend, as many shells came from that quarter.

General Sir Redvers Buller, who had been in another part of the field, came on the ground at that hour and saw at once the desperate position of the brigade, and the futile sacrifice of life that had been going on for so many hours. He at once ordered a retirement.

General Hart asked for a volunteer to carry the news to the front, and Lieutenant Conry, Acting Adjutant of the battalion, volunteered and carried a written order to the leading troops to retire. He was thanked by the General for this service.

"B" Company, under Major Moore, was in the furthest advance with a company of the Dublin Fusiliers.

The whole brigade retired in successive lines and passed through the ranks of General Lyttleton's brigade which had been sent forward to cover the retreat.
Major O'Grady who, after the fall of Colonel Brooke, had assumed the command, reformed the battalion, but it was not until about twelve o'clock that the Rangers were out of action.

They had lost four officers and 150 N.C.O.'s and men killed, wounded and missing.

The total loss of the Fifth brigade was about 550 men.

The army moved back to Chieveley camp at 3.30 p.m., after nearly eleven hours' fighting, the total loss being 1,200 men.

Colonel Brooke, who in spite of serious illness and contrary to the doctor's advice had insisted on accompanying the battalion into action, was one of the first wounded.
He was hit by a piece of a shell in the side, and was hit again while being carried out of action. Lieutenant Brooke was seriously wounded by three bullets, and had altogether seven bullet marks on him. When the order for the retirement was sent to the front there were some detached parties from all the battalions of the brigade on the extreme right and left who did not hear the order. Among these were Major Barton, Captains Bell and Ford-Hutchinson, D.S.O., and 2nd Lieutenant Jones.

They retained their positions and kept up a fire on the enemy for three hours after the first retirement, and until the ambulance wagons came on the field.

Captain Bell returned safely, but the others were taken prisoners by the Boers, who had for some time been in possession of the field without their knowledge.
Major Barton was released on parole, but the other officers were taken to Pretoria.


Among the individual acts of heroism that deserve to be recorded are the
following: –

FROM O.C., "E" COMPANY.

SIR, – I have the honour to favourably mention the conduct 0£ 3,691 Private Tubridy, "E" company, 1st Connaught Rangers, who was wounded during the action on the 15th December, 1899, at the Tugela River. He was one of the first men of the battalion shot, wounded in the foot. He removed his boot himself, applied first-dressing, and immediately afterwards joined the firing line. – I have, etc.,

(Signed) J. F. ROBERTSON, Capt.,
O.C., "E " Company,
Connaught Rangers.
Frere Camp, 20th Decr., 1899.


FROM O.C.., "B" COMPANY,
FROM LIEUTENANT FITZGERALD, BEDFORD REGIMENT,
To O.C., "B " COMPANY,

SIR, – I have the honour to report that on Friday, the 15th inst., about 10 a.m., I was with the advance line at the Kaffir kraal. A man was wounded a short distance outside. No. 2,602 Private Naughton, "B" Company, 1st Connaught Rangers, immediately sprang out saying, "I am going to fetch him in, bullets or no bullets". I followed him and we brought him in together. – I have, etc.,

(Signed) G. E. FITZGERALD, Lieutenant,
Bedford _Regiment.
Frere Camp, 20th Decr., 1899.


TO ADJUTANT, CONNAUGHT RANGERS.
Forwarded for information of C.O. Battalion. I was in the kraal at the time; the position was close to the enemy, under a very hot fire, and considerable danger was incurred.

(Signed) M. G. MOORE, Major,
Connaught Rangers.


FROM O.C., "D '' COMPANY.

SIR, – have the honour to bring to the notice of the C.O. the gallant conduct of No. 2,826 Private Livingstone, of the company under my command in the action on Tugela River on 15th inst. He was removing Colonel Brooke, who was severely wounded and again struck whilst on the ground, and was himself struck in the neck by a bullet. Colonel Brooke said, "Who is hit, let me down". Private Livingstone still held on saying, "It is only through my neck, and I am well able to take you, sir, till you are safe". Eventually Colonel Brooke was put in a depression some two hundred yards to the rear.

{Signed) N. BARTON, Major,
Commanding "D" Company, 1st Connaught Rangers.
Frere Camp, 20th Decr., 1899.


Certified that the three preceding letters are true Copies of the Originals.

J. L. J. CONRY, Lieutenant Acting Adjutant,
1st Connaught Rangers.
3rd Jan., 1900.


Extract from letter received from Captain Ford-Hutchinson, D.S.O., dated Pretoria, 24th December, 1899.

Lance-Corporal Parslow of my company did a plucky thing. I saw him run out from cover to help in Private Murphy, "C'' company (wounded). He had just raised himself to go out again to help another men, when he was shot through the back. He was not killed and he is doing well.

(Signed) G. H. FORD-HUTCHINSON, Captain,
The Connaught Rangers.

Certified true Extract.

J. L. J. CONRY, Lieutenant Acting Adjutant,
1st Connaught Rangers.
Camp, Pretorious Farm,
12th Jan.; 1900.


Major Barton states: – At about 1 p.m., being in ignorance that the Brigade had retired, and the fire from the enemy having slackened, I left the right flank where I had been with Major Hicks (R.D.F.) and Captain Bell (C.R.) and made my way to the left, where I expected to find the Brigade. I passed over the ground over which the advance had taken place in the morning, and eventually struck the river. Two wounded men near the bank asked me to get them water. I went down into the bed to fill their bottles. At this time there were neither Boers nor men of the Brigade to be seen. Having filled the bottles, I climbed the bank, and suddenly saw about 25 mounted Boers coming from the direction of the drift. On catching sight of me they broke into a canter, and when within 20 yards the leading man raised his rifle. I shouted, "Don't be a fool", or some such words, and he put it down. They then gathered round me and asked me many questions – who was I? – was I a fighting or medical officer? – why were the men on the right (my party) still firing? They then said I must give my parole to fight no more or be their prisoner. This I did. We then moved on together towards where the bearers were coming from the ambulances. It could be seen that bullets fired at the party still in action were falling amongst them. One of the Boers told me that I must stop my men firing as the ambulance were on the ground. I suggested that he, being mounted, should do so with a white flag. He went off with a handkerchief tied to his rifle, and I saw him no more. The others then moved on, and I made my way to camp. The full force of my promise, or rather the possible interpretation of it, did not strike me at the time. I believed then, and I do still, that he referred to the fighting then going on. I told my story to Major O'Grady on arrival in camp, who brought me before Major-General Hart.

Captain Ford-Hutchinson, 2nd Lieutenant Jones, and the dozen men taken prisoners with them, had in the attack reached the river bank at the most northern point of its re-entering bend. They had actually hit off Bridle Drift itself, and there, unsupported, most of them wounded, and within 100 yards of the Boer trenches, had lain in a small depression in the ground, in which they were only screened from Boer view by some high grass. It was impossible to advance and equally impossible to retire. Eventually, after our retirement had taken place, the Boers crossed the river and took them prisoners.

Many of our men were with Colonel Thackeray, of the lnniskilling Fusiliers, when late in the day a party of Boers came towards them under the Red Cross and ordered them to lay down their arms. The Colonel explained that he was engaged in retiring, and not under the Red Cross, but that, for the time being, to please the Boers he would lay down his arms. They then engaged in conversation for some time, and at length Colonel Thackeray said that he and his men must be going. The Boer Commandant said that he did not know about that, as he regarded them all as his prisoners. "Not at all", said the Colonel, "if you will go back to where you came from we will start it all over again, as we need not have allowed you to come here at all ". The Boer of course objected, but after a good deal of chaff on both sides, he said", Well, I have got no orders. I will turn my back and not look. You can do as you like". Colonel Thackeray and our men retired accordingly, with their arms.


CASUALTIES OF BATTALION IN THE BATTLE OF COLENSO, DECEMBER 15, 1899 .

Officers Wounded.

Colonel L. G. Brooke, in chest and finger.
Lieutenant G. F. Brooke, in seven places, the most severe being his chest and knee.

Officers Missing.
Captain G. H. Ford-Hutchinson, D.S.O.
2nd Lieutenant E. V. Jones.

On December 24th, 1899, news was to hand via "Reuter's Special Message" in Natal Times, that these two officers were prisoners in the hands of the Boers, Pretoria. Captain Ford-Hutchinson had been wounded in the leg, and 2nd Lieutenant Jones bruised in the neck by a shell splinter.


December 16th a Court of inquiry was held at Camp Chieveley to inquire into the manner in which Major Barton became a prisoner in the hands of the Boers. The Court recorded the following opinion: –

"The Court, having considered the evidence, are of opinion that Major N. A. D. Barton, the Connaught Rangers, was taken prisoner by the Boers on the 15th December, 1899, by reason of the chances of war, and not through neglect or misconduct on his part".

(Signed) L. S. PELLY, Major,
1st Border Regiment.
(President.)

H. T. HICKS, Major,
1st R.D.F.

F. A. SAUNDERS, Major,
1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
(Members).


At 12 midnight (16th) the brigade paraded and proceeded by march route to Frere, which was reached at 6 a.m. on the morning of December 17th, and there the brigade encamped. December 24th Major Barton proceeded to Durban to take over the duties of Assistant Commandant and Supply Officer, owing to his having been placed on his parole on December 15th, 1899.








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Battalion Orders for the 1st Connaught Rangers, covering the period 14th to 17th December 1899.

Orders for the engagement of 15th December were "published verbally".



















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Fascinating! I'd love to read a transcript of the handwritten orders you have, too.
It is interesting to see how long range rifle fire led to a low proportion of killed (28 KIA or DOW, 20%) versus wounded (112, 80%).
I attach a photo of a wounded Inniskilling Fusilier being bandaged at Colenso.