TOPIC:

Buller's despatch after Colenso makes interesting reading. He says his relieving force of 20,000 have yet to see a dead Boer.

I have often wondered if the Battle of Colenso might have had a different outcome had the British high command had greater faith in the knowledge and abilities of the Colonial troops in their army.

There had been a reconnaissance in strength towards Colenso by the mainly Colonial Composite Regiment on 28/11/1899, which had clearly demonstrated the dangers of a frontal attack on the Tugela line at Colenso. Although this recce took place before Buller took command of the British Army in Natal, its outcome must have been common knowledge amongst brigade and battalion commanders. In addition, one of the participants of the recce, Inspector Fairlie, Natal Police, commanded the NP troop that formed Buller's Bodyguard, and he must have had the ear of the General.

The story of this recce has been told by one of its participants.

Brett

The 28/11/1899 reconnaissance towards Colenso by the Mounted Brigade
Extract from an article by Assistant Commissioner G S Mardall*, Natal Police, published in ‘The Nongqai’, Volume III, No. 19, September 1911.
* At the time, the then Inspector Mardall commanded the Estcourt District Police.

“On November 28th, a column under the command of Lord Dundonald, consisting of 1,200 cavalry, which included 50 Police under Inspector Fairlie, and a Battery of field guns advanced from the Frere camp at 4 a.m. A small force of the enemy were found to be occupying the hills about Chieveley, falling back on Colenso before the fire of our advance parties.

About three miles from the Colenso village our column was halted under cover of a kopje. I was then directed by Lord Dundonald to take a small body of Police who knew the place and go on to the village in advance of the cavalry. Inspector Fairlie, with Police, the K.R.R., the I.L.H., and Carbineers to follow in support.

Taking with me Sergeant Fisher and a dozen men, and extending them to cover a front of half a mile, we approached the village at a smart pace as no cover was to be got. Natives at some kraals I passed rushed out, waved white flags vigorously, and on being questioned said the enemy was occupying the village. I afterwards learned that the Natives had been told by the Boers to wave white flags on the approach of a British force, as doing so would warn them (the Boers) of the advance of troops, and also protect the kraals from our fire.

On nearing the village of Colenso the enemy opened with rifle fire on my party, and immediately followed with their big guns from a commanding position across the Tugela.

The gunfire was principally directed at the K.R.R. and Police advancing in support of my men. A considerable part of the column had then come over the ridge into view.

The Field Battery accompanying our force at once came into action, and for about 20 minutes a smart artillery duel ensued. The Boers quickly demonstrated the superiority of their guns, and had our range to a nicety.

Shells fell thick and fast among our cavalry, who were then ordered to retire, seeing which I drew off my party, and all got back without casualties, a marvellous thing.”

Notes:
1. The “K.R.R.” was the 2nd King’s Royal Rifles Mounted Infantry.
2. All the units referred to, except the artillery, formed the Composite Regiment of the Mounted Brigade.

Brett,

I cannot understand why more use was not made of the local troops who would have known the area very well. Do you think that stories of guides becoming lost when leading troops in night marches diminished trust in such men?

David

Colonial scouts and guides did indeed make mistakes! Some men of No. 5 (Estcourt-Weenen) Squadron, Natal Carbineers, are a case in point. While escorting someone from Weenen to Estcourt they missed the turning to the latter town and proceeded onwards towards Colenso. Fortunately, they corrected their error before reaching Colenso, which was then held by the Boers. (I have looked in vain for the source of this story - it is unlikely to feature prominently in Colonial records - but I will resume the search later.)

The point I wanted to make about the 28/11/1899 recce to Colenso is that the operation was carried out largely by Colonials, so their worth in recces such as this was clearly understood by the high command who ordered it. However, a few weeks later, heavily-defended Colenso was the focus of Buller's attack on 15/12/1899. Only after having a hard reminder of the Colonial's experience on 28/11/1899 did Buller turn his attentions first to the west, and then back east to focus instead on the highground (Hlangwane etc) south of the Tugela, rather than on Colenso itself.

While on his western adventure, which ended in the defeats at Spioenkop and Vaalkrans, the Colonials in his army offered Buller another way through to Ladysmith with their successful skirmish at Acton Homes. The failure to exploit a western entrance to Ladysmith was entirely due the pique felt by the British high command towards an unconventional alternative to their master plan.

Regards
Brett

I am re-animating this thread to ask if anyone can help me?
I am busy writing about the fighting on the Upper Tugela. I am seeking any contemporary descriptions of General Hart, who was a controversial and flamboyant man. I am interested in what was said of Hart at the time or shortly afterwards. What was his leadership style like? Can you give examples of his courage? What did his brother commanders and his junior officers say and write about him? What did the private soldiers think of him? I am not really interested in what later commentators (1960s onwards) have to say, as I want to base my opinion on eyewitnesses.
many thanks if anyone has a letter etc to share with me.
Rob