TOPIC:

In the aftermath of the Roodewal disaster, General De Wet (with Generals Froneman and Olivier) carried outa number of raids on infrastructure in the hands of the enemy in an area to the west of Heilbron. (Refer map previous post) From the available sources it is not always clear where, at any given date, De Wet’s forces were holed up exactly. Belfield’s map however gives a good indication as it seems that Methuen’s forces followed De Wet’s treks, albeit with a delay of a few days. De Wet is known to have bivouacked at Paardekraal farm on June 20, Methuen’s troops arrived there on June 27. Around this time De Wet captured two British officers: Captain A.G. Masters (Army Service Corps) and Major M.W. Bayly (Special Service Officer, New South Wales Contingent)
Among Belfield’s surviving paperwork is a note scribbled by Captain Masters on a page torn from an army notebook. The self-explanatory note is addressed to Belfield. Because the mobile Boer forces usually could not keep prisoners with them Masters was, according to the information on this site, later released. It is interesting to read that one of De Wet’s forces carried the note to Belfield.

During the Boer War 78 Officers and men qualified for the Victoria Cross. Over the same period approximately 1.160 DSO’s (some sources state 1.167) were awarded. One of the recipients of the latter medal was Colonel H.E. Belfield. Below the invitation to him for the award ceremony on the 18th of December 1902. This, possibly rare, survivor was not among his documents but was found in an online auction more than a decade ago.

Smashing thread, thank you EFV.

You ask about certain British officers:
Lieutenant Percy William Norman Fraser, Queens Own Cameron Highlanders, POW nr Ventersburg Rd 03-08-1900

Celliers/Collins correspondence:
Major PRS Churchward 1st Loyal North Lancs
Civil Surgeon GT Collins

Lt-Col WC Anderson DSO bn Cheshire Rgt, OC 5th bn IY

Source: The Register of the Anglo-Boer War

Intercepted message from General Piet Liebenberg to General Koos De La Rey

During the guerilla-phase of the Boer War the communication between Boer Generals in the field heavily relied on dispatch riders. This was a risky endeavor as messengers travelled mostly alone, often at night and often through enemy-held territory. Add the time pressure posed by urgent messages as well as the rider’s awareness that the message was vital to the recipient and potentially disastrous in the hands of the enemy, and we have the perfect profile of a job only suitable to the courageous or foolhardy. That tactically or strategically important messages regularly ended up in the wrong hands is illustrated in my earlier post about General Jannie Smut’s intercepted message.

This post is about an intercepted letter written on September 4, 1901 by General P.J. Liebenberg near Klerksdorp and addressed to General DelaRey. Belfield’s file does unfortunately not contain the original message but the typed translation, with a scathing introduction, did survive. Early September 1901 Belfield was with Methuen at Mafeking, about 170 Kilometers from Klerksdorp. It is not known where the message was intercepted (DelaRey was at the time possibly near Lichtenburg) but without doubt this happened at a significant distance from Methuen’s HQ. Notwithstanding the Boers’ continued effort to wreck the British controlled telegraph infrastructure, it possible that the lines were operational and that the message was conveyed by wire. This could explain the absence of the original.

Liebenberg’s 3-page message is a jumble of operational information interspersed by gossip, hearsay and wishful thinking. It illustrates a.o. the idea prevalent at the time among many Boers that foreign or Devine intervention was about to turn the tide in their favor. It is difficult to ascertain whether this notion was a true conviction or solely a morale booster for the hard-pressed men on commando.








Petrus Johannes (Piet) Liebenberg (1857-1950) was a member of the Volksraad for Klerksdorp when the Boer War broke out. Already a veteran of the first Boer war and various wars against black tribes, Liebenberg was with the Klerksdorp commando involved in the first battle of the war at Kraaipan, the siege of Mafeking, the battles at Modderrivier and, as Kommandant, at Magersfontein. Liebenberg was promoted by Piet Cronjé to the temporary rank of Fighting General in January 1900 and operated with mixed success in the Eastern Cape before being forced back into home territory by troops under Kitchener. In July 1900 he was promoted to General, was put in charge of the Potchefstroom commando, and fought in that capacity right up to the end of the war. Piet Liebenberg is perhaps one of the lesser-known Boer Generals. Based on his impressive track record in numerous important battles (as mentioned above) and in the western Transvaal during the guerilla phase of the war, the man probably deserves a lot more recognition.

Kpl. Hans Du Toit mentioned in the message is possibly J.H. Du Toit of Heilbron, mentioned in the Bloemfontein Museum website as a Joiner.

Great stuff.

Coincidentally my great grandfather was chasing Liebenberg at this time. His diary suggests that the Boer general was camped at Elandslaagte (598), about 10 miles west of Klerksdorp. Brigadier-General Gilbert Hamilton's Column descended on the farm on Saturday 14th September, but discovered that Liebenberg had moved on a few days earlier.



Monday 9th September.
6am as usual – long and monotonous march over dry country to Ventersdorp. Poor old Bulfin taken ill – fever and dysentery. I act in his place.

Tuesday 10th September.
Left ox convoy to proceed direct on Klerksdorp. Remainder of brigade with mule transport and 6 days forage and rations left Ventersdorp at 5 am and marched west to Wildfontein (123) – 18 miles. The Intelligence guide and scouts supported by 15 of 13th Hussars worked wide round the left and captured a Boer outpost and seven other men – also cattle 140 head, and 400 sheep. A squadron and ½ under Tremayne went forward to Leeuwfontein (42) to reconnoitre that place but though engaged with a few Boers dressed in khaki, did not succeed in getting round them. Good water from dam.

Wednesday 11th September.
Marched at 7 am on Syferkuil (42) on Taaibosch spruit – 16 miles. The Provost Marshal and staff captured 280 cattle, 5 prisoners, 4 Cape carts and a wagon near Kaffirs kraal. The brigade marched on a broad front – and towards end of march when near Kaffirs kraal (135) Colonel Smithson was sent forward with 13th Hussars to Lamoenfontein (acting on information received). He there found about 18 Boers with 140 remounts destined for Kemp. Pursuing as far as Geduld he captured all the ponies, five prisoners, five wagons and teams, and 150 head of cattle. Other prisoners were also brought in, making the bag for the day 17 prisoners, or for 10th and 11th – 25 prisoners (4 of whom surrenders), 140 ponies, 500 head of cattle, about 500 sheep, 6 wagons and various Cape carts.

Thursday 12th September.
Halted at Syferkuil to rest. Very excellent water here and plenty of it.

Friday 13th September.
Marched at 7 am to Brakspruit, Schoon spruit – crossed river here and camped near Witpoort. Cavalry and 2 guns left at midnight.

Saturday 14th September.
Marching on Elandslaagte [identified as Elandslaagte 598 by Tremayne] where, it was reported, we should find Liebenberg and his commando. The force arrived near the place just before daylight and extending across a front of about four miles. Advanced at a sharp trot, flanks thrown forward, and thoroughly searched the ground and mine buildings. Nothing was found, Liebenberg having left apparently a few days before.
The force returned to Klerksdorp about noon, joining the ox convoy which had been sent there from Ventersdorp.

Sunday 15th September.
Halted at Klerksdorp.



Below is a section of Jeppe's Map, showing my great grandfather's movements, leaving Ventersdorp on 10th September and arriving at Elandslaagte on 14th. The mine buildings he refers to appear to be those of the Dominion Reef gold mine, just to the west of Elandslaagte (shown as a rectangle at the end of a track). Yellow areas represent proclaimed goldfields.







...

Neville’s great grandfather’s narrative of his trek with Brigadier-General Gilbert Hamilton’s Column in pursuit of Liebenberg's commando nicely illustrates why Generals such as DelaRey and De Wet were reluctant to subject themselves to the British peace terms during the 1902 talks in Klerksdorp and Vereeniging. The Boer commandos in the western Transvaal consisted at that stage mostly of die-hards; highly mobile, operating in terrain they knew like the back of their hands and benefitting from excellent intelligence about position and movements of the enemy. These characteristics made these commandos notoriously difficult to entrap. Methuen’s main column had chased through Klerksdorp in pursuit of Boer forces on at least two occasions in 1901 alone and, notwithstanding the presence of a British garrison there, General Liebenberg thought it safe enough to park his entire commando just a few miles west from the town. Fact of the matter is that, notwithstanding blockhouse lines. scorched earth policies and roving columns, whole swaths of “occupied” territory (especially in the western- and northern Transvaal) were never securely in British hands. Although by May 1902 the situation of the commandos in many parts of the annexed Republics was indeed dire or hopeless, there were areas -such as in parts of the western Transvaal- where the cat-and-mouse game could theoretically have continued for years.