Welcome,
Guest
|
TOPIC:
Medals to the Imperial Yeomanry 7 months 3 days ago #95173
|
Picture courtesy of Spink Egypt (2) The Nile 1884-85, Suakin 1885 (41/1806. Pte. J. Moody. 1/Berks. R.); QSA (5) Cape Colony, Orange Free State, Transvaal, South Africa 1901, South Africa 1902 (31701 Pte. J. Moody. 62nd Coy Imp: Yeo:); Khedive's Star 1884 One of only 5 men of the Berkshire Regiment to win clasps for both The Nile 1884-85 and Suakin 1885. Joseph William Moody was born at 10 Willaim Street, St. Peters Parish, East Islington, the son of William and Emma Moody. Attesting for the 49th Foot at St. Georges Barracks, he was posted to them at Dover on 2 September 1879. After several overseas postings he arrived in Egypt and was present with the British forces at Kafr-ed-Daur. Here they screened the British beachhead at Alexandria from Egyptian troops and engaged them on several occasions in August 1882. Leaving Egypt after the Anglo-Egyptian War in May 1883 the Regiment was stationed at Gibraltar, they soon returned however as public pressure forced the formation of a Khartoum relief expedition. Moody is listed upon the roll as serving with the Headquarters Staff south of Korosko on 7 March 1885 and it was for this that he qualified for the Nile bar. After the failure of the expedition, he joined the Regimental Reserve Depot at Suakin, returning to Britain on 7 July 1885. Moody joined the Army Reserve on 29 August 1885 and served on untiled 28 August 1895 when he was discharged at Reading. Attesting with the Imperial Yeomanry at Pall Mall Deposit, Carlton Street, London and listing his job as cabdriver, he was posted to the 62nd Company (Middlesex), Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa on 23 March 1901. Stationed at Rhenosterspruit on 30 November 1901 Moody was slightly wounded in the right hip in action. Recovering at Pretoria Convalescent Camp he was back with his unit in January 1902 and served until 4 August 1902. Moody was discharged on 11 August 1902. Dr David Biggins
|
Please Log in or Create an account to join the conversation. |
Medals to the Imperial Yeomanry 6 months 3 weeks ago #95257
|
Picture courtesy of Noonan's Afghanistan (0) (Lieut. A. G. Holland, 15th Hussrs.); Egypt, undated reverse (1) The Nile 1884-85 (Capt: A. G. Holland. 15/Husrs.); QSA (3) Cape Colony, Orange Free State, Transvaal (Lt. Colonel A. G. Holland. 13/Impl. Yeo.) officially engraved naming; Khedive’s Star, dated 1884-6 Arthur Gambier Holland was born on 10 September 1848, at Springfield, St. Helens, Ryde, Isle of Wight. The son of George Henry and Charlotte Holland, he was first appointed Cornet in 1869, and commissioned 2nd Lieutenant on 24 July 1869, spending 27 years with the regiment. He was raised Lieutenant on 18 October 1871; Captain on 29 April 1879; Major on 12 June 1889; and Lieutenant-Colonel (half pay) on 10 September 1896. Holland first served in Afghanistan with the Quetta and Kandahar Field Forces, taking part in the advance on and occupation of Kandahar and Khelat-i-Ghilzai; operations in Yarkistan; action near Takht-i-Pul (with the Thul Chottiali Field Force), gaining a Mention in Despatches at Takht-i-Pul, when his squadron, on 4 January 1879, surprised and defeated a superior force of some 400 enemy cavalry (Despatches 7 November 1879); and the relief of Kandahar. During the second part of the campaign, he served with the 15th Hussars in General Phayre's Division. Subsequently, he saw service in the Transvaal campaign during the first Boer War of 1881, for which no medal was ever issued. During the Nile expedition of 1884-5, Captain Holland commanded the detachment of 2 Officers and 42 men of the 15th Hussars which formed part of the Light Camel Regiment, taking part in the operations with the Desert Column, including the engagement at Abu Klea Wells on 16-17 February 1885. However, he and his men were not entitled to the clasp for the action at Abu Klea on 17 January as they were just outside the area of operations for which the clasp was awarded. Holland came out of retirement and volunteered for Boer War service, being appointed Lieutenant-Colonel, 13th Imperial Yeomanry on 21 February 1900. The 13th Battalion consisted of 45th (Dublin Hunt), 46th (Belfast), 47th (Duke of Cambridge's Own or Lord Donoughmore's) and 54th (Belfast) Companies. The Battalion was known by Roberts as the 'Irish Yeomanry’; however, the 47th Company, formed by Lord Donoughmore, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Army for 39 years to 1895, was made up of 'men of gentle birth and wealth', who, in order to join the Company, had been required to pay £130 towards the cost of a horse, their own equipment and passage to South Africa, and to donate their pay to the Imperial War Fund for the Widows and Orphans of Soldiers. The 13th Battalion embarked for South Africa in February 1900 and was ordered to join Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Colville's 9th Division at Ventersburg as mounted infantry reinforcements. However, the unit was delayed waiting for forage and Colville left Ventersburg on 24 May 1900 without them. The Battalion was then ordered to Kroonstad and later redirected to Lindley, where on arrival on 27 May 1900, was soon engaged, coming under fire from parties of Boers around the town. Colonel Spragge, the Commanding Officer, withdrew a short distance from Lindley to the point at which he had left his baggage, established a defensive position atop a group of hills and immediately sent a messenger to Colville, requesting assistance. Colville, considering that his force was too weak to be divided, pressed on with his advance and ordered Colonel Spragge to retire to Kroonstad. Colonel Spragge had also sent requests for assistance to Lieutenant General Rundle, some 40 miles south of Lindley, and he immediately set about relieving the pressure on Spragge's force, but was held up at Senekal. Meanwhile, on 28 May 1900, the Boers began their assault on Spragge's position and for the next two days the 13th Battalion concentrated on maintaining its ground. However, on the evening of 29 May 1900, Piet de Wet arrived with reinforcements, bringing the Boer force surrounding the 13th Battalion up to some 2,500 men and most importantly, also brought with him four artillery guns, which were to effectively seal the fate of the Yeomanry Battalion. Colonel Spragge, finding that the grazing for his horses was becoming restricted, ordered Lieutenant Hugh Montgomery and 16 men of the 46th Belfast Company to seize a kopje 2,000 yards to the west of their position, from which Boer marksmen were causing problems. The sortie was a failure and Lieutenant Montgomery and his men were taken prisoner. The next morning, Lord Longford and 40 men of the 45th Dublin Company were sent to take the same kopje and following a bayonet charge, they succeeded. At this point, however, the Boers brought their artillery into action and Colonel Spragge's position began to deteriorate. On 31 May 1900, the Boers attacked the kopje and the Yeomanry began to fall back. Colonel Spragge sent reinforcements to this line, but stated that ‘an irresponsible Corporal raised a white flag and in the confusion the kopje fell’. On seeing the white flag Captain Robin ordered a cease-fire, and as the Yeomanry position was now overlooked and their Colt gun had been put out of action, Colonel Sprage decided to surrender to avoid unnecessary loss of life. Roberts in the meantime had ordered Methuen and Colville to relieve the Yeomanry, but they arrived two days too late on 2 June 1900. Colonel Spragge, Lieutenant-Colonel Holland and the surviving members of the 13th Battalion were taken Prisoner of War; the casualties suffered by the Battalion at Lindley amounted to one officer and 15 men killed in action, 5 officers and 37 men wounded, and 21 officers and 440 men taken Prisoner of War. Holland was second in command of the battalion under Colonel B. Spragge, who was subsequently cleared of blame at the enquiry which followed some months later at Barberton on 25 September 1900. Lieutenant-Colonel Holland, who had been released from captivity, went on half pay on 21 October 1900. Lord Roberts said of the disaster: ‘I consider General Colville mainly responsible for the surrender of the Irish Yeomanry and would not let him retain his command.’ Subsequently, in December 1900, Broderick, the new Secretary of State for War, announced that he agreed with Roberts that Colville was ultimately responsible for the surrender at Lindley. Colville was consequently removed from command at Gibraltar and when he would not retire he was made to do so. Dr David Biggins
The following user(s) said Thank You: azyeoman
|
Please Log in or Create an account to join the conversation. |
Medals to the Imperial Yeomanry 6 months 2 weeks ago #95297
|
|
Please Log in or Create an account to join the conversation. |
Medals to the Imperial Yeomanry 6 months 2 weeks ago #95302
|
Morning John,
Couple of comments - in my experience one can never find attestation papers and service records for officers who served in the ABW. Last night I began to wonder if your man was William Murray Cardwell Greaves Bagshawe but as his May 1901 death at sea did not accord with somebody still at Stellenbosch in June 1901 and my brain cells had shut down I switched my computer off and went to bed. However, I now see you have reactivated Berenice's post regarding the gentleman in question. So, when I have sorted it out I will post what I have discovered about him there - the 1901 accounts of his disappearance at sea do not altogether tally with the 1905 account Berenice found and definitely no mention of Canadian ladies. Personally I think he may well have committed suicide but the stiff lipped British of 1901 would not accuse one of their fellows of such an un-christian and illegal act unless there was definite proof. Not good form y'know. Regards, David.
The following user(s) said Thank You: azyeoman
|
Please Log in or Create an account to join the conversation. |
Medals to the Imperial Yeomanry 6 months 2 weeks ago #95307
|
Good morning David, Thanks for the quick reply and I look forward to reading the other thread. Suicide crossed my mind, and you’re absolutely right that it would have been a stain on the family et al. On to the other thread. Thanks again and all the best, John |
Please Log in or Create an account to join the conversation. |
Medals to the Imperial Yeomanry 6 months 3 days ago #95484
|
Picture courtesy of Noonan's QSA (3) Cape Colony, Orange Free State, Transvaal (14182 Tpr: E. H. Goschen, 47th Coy. 13th Impl: Yeo:) fitted with silver ribbon brooch; Italy, Kingdom, Order of the Crown, 4th Class breast badge with rosette, gold and enamels, blue enamel chipped in obverse centre; Ottoman Empire, Order of the Medjidie, 3rd Class neck badge, silver, gold and enamels, with full neck cravat; Egypt, Sultanate, Order of the Nile, 3rd Class neck badge, silver, silver-gilt and enamels, with full neck cravat, white enamel flaked on lower arm Edward Henry Goschen was born on 9 March 1876, the eldest son of the Right Honourable Sir William Goschen, who became the British Ambassador to Berlin, and was in that appointment on the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. Goschen was also the great-grandson of George Joachim Goschen, the famous publisher of Leipzig, and a grandson of William Henry Goschen, who founded the banking firm of Fruhling and Goschen in London in 1815. He was nephew of the first Viscount Goschen, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Chancellor of the University of Oxford, and a first cousin of Sir Harry Goschen, Baronet, of Goschens and Cunliffe. Edward Henry Goschen was educated at Eton, which he joined in 1889 as a member of Mr R. A. H. Mitchell’s House, where he acquired his lifelong love of cricket. He then followed his father into the Diplomatic Service, and in 1897 was appointed an honorary attaché to the Embassy in Saint Petersburg. However, when the Boer War in South Africa broke out, he then volunteered his services and attested for one year’s service as a Trooper (No. 22) with the Special Corps of Imperial Yeomanry on 7 February 1900, before his unit was retitled, and he then continued in the service as a Trooper (No. 14182) with the 47th Duke of Cambridge’s Own Company, a unit of the 13th Battalion of Imperial Yeomanry, bound for service in South Africa, and as such embarking on 17 February 1900. He was then present on operations in the Cape Colony, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal, being one of 140 men of his company present on operations. The Battalion to which the 47th Duke of Cambridge’s Own Company joined out in South Africa, the 13th Battalion, was, as one writer put it, ‘the Imperial Yeomanry dream’; Wyndham, the creator of the Yeomanry, had wanted it to represent the cream of British manhood and the ‘13th Battalion took his scheme to its ultimate extreme’. The 45th Company from Dublin had Masters of Foxhounds and the sons of much of Ireland’s legal establishment in its ranks. The 47th Company, as mentioned, came from some of England’s wealthiest families, and the 46th and 54th from Belfast represented Ulster Unionism’s commitment to the Imperial cause. The battalion’s officers included Lord Longford, Lord Ennismore, the Earl of Leitrim, James Craig, later Lord Craigavon, and Sir John Power of the Irish whiskey distilling family. Politics, money, patriotism and class, the combination was irresistible to the press and public, some of whom dubbed the battalion the ‘Millionaires’ Own’. On arrival in South Africa, the 47th Duke of Cambridge’s Own Company, well connected as well as well heeled, only spent a week in the unpleasant surroundings of the Imperial Yeomanry camp at Maitland. Admittedly their reward was weeks of training on the edge of the Karoo Desert north of Cape Town, but life there was eased by the arrival of the Dublin men to keep them company and of a spectacular array of food, drink and other luxuries which had been sent out from England. On 15 May the two companies arrived in Bloemfontein to meet the Ulstermen, who had come straight from Maitland, and just a week later the newly assembled battalion was given its first orders for active service. The 13th Battalion then joined General Colvile’s 9th Division, which was short of mounted troops, and as such the yeomanry was detailed to link up with Colvile at Ventersburg, south of Kroonstad. But, because they were delayed waiting for forage, they did not arrive in time, and Colvile had by then begun his march east to Lindley and then north to Heilbron, taking the right flank during Robert’s march on Johannesburg. The 13th Battalion Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Basil Spragge, was an experienced regular infantry officer, and he was then handed a telegram, the origins of which are still a mystery. The telegram essentially ordered Spragge to join Colvile at Lindley. Colvile later denied all knowledge of this telegram, and there is speculation that the Boers had tapped the telegraph lines and sent a bogus message to lure the yeomanry to destruction. It was still a risky deception, as Colvile himself was heading to Lindley with the 9th Division, and if he had done so, and then lingered long enough, the yeomanry would have caught up with him, providing much needed strength to the 9th Division. Colvile’s intelligence officer later confirmed that Colvile did not give this order, but despite the speculation it does not seem likely that the Boers did send the order, and more than likely it was just down to bad staff work at British headquarters who had issued the orders to Spragge, and failed to inform Colvile. Nevertheless it played right into the hands of the Boers. The 13th Battalion marched for Lindley at daybreak on 26 May, and that afternoon met a party of armed Boers who claimed to be going to Kroonstad to surrender, and Spragge naively disarmed them, invited them to lunch and then allowed them to go. The Boers promptly returned to Lindley with much valuable information. As Private Maurice Fitzgibbon of the Dublin company, son of one of Ireland’s most senior judges, recalled: ‘The scouts of the Boer commandos at Lindley had been permitted to enter our lines to find out our numbers, our armaments and the amount of our supplies, had even had lunch with us and all this information and hospitality at the expense of a few out-of-date rifles and a few perjured oaths.’ The Boers now knew of the yeomanry’s approach, but Colvile did not. When the yeomanry rode into Lindley the following afternoon, it quickly became apparent that all was not well. Colvile was gone, and no letter or message of any sort left, the town being ominously deserted and the people too frightened to give any information. Within an hour of the yeomanry’s arrival, the Boers opened fire from some of the houses, and the yeomanry were ordered to evacuate the town, which was commanded by hills and difficult to defend, and then retreat to where they had left their baggage some three miles to the west on the Kroonstad Road. After fighting a rear guard action they regrouped on the northern bank of the Valsh River. Spragge now made the most crucial decision of the entire Lindley affair. He could either make a run for it, or set up his defences and send for help. His decision to do the latter was later heavily criticised, but in reality Spragge could not have ordered a move that night, although there was a window of opportunity, albeit a brief and highly risky one, the following morning. By the time the entire Battalion had regrouped outside Lindley it was 5pm; the men were tired, and so were the horses, which had come 87 miles in three days. If Spragge had abandoned the baggage and tried to escape the Boer noose that night, the 13th Battalion would have probably met with disaster. These were inexperienced troops, still soft from too much good living in Britain and unfamiliar with the country; to expect them to make a successful night march on exhausted horses was unrealistic. The only time Spragge might have successfully withdrawn was early the following morning, when his horses and men had got some rest, and before the Boers had gathered about him in large numbers. But even then, if he had abandoned his baggage and ridden as fast as possible towards safety, it was a desperately dangerous course of action. The Boers loved nothing more than sweeping down on vulnerable British columns and the 13th Battalion, which had never fired a shot in anger before it rode into Lindley, would have been easy prey for the Commandos. Furthermore, Cragge knew that Rundle’s 8th Division was in the area as well as Colvile, and so his expectations of help were not unreasonable. His decision to stay where he was may have lacked the dash and drama of a gallop for safety, but it was based on sound military common sense. The position which Spragge had chosen was not a bad one, although the need to incorporate grazing for the horses and for a flock of sheep which the battalion had commandeered meant that it was rather extended. Its centre was a 500-yard-wide valley running south from the Kroonstad Road to the Valsh River. On the eastern side were two stong kopjes, the keys to the entire position, which were defended by the 47th Duke of Cambridge’s Own Company under Captain Clive Keith, a former officer in the 3rd Dragoon Guards. The valley was bounded to the north-west by a low plateau rising to a ridge with two conical kopjes. Soon after sunrise on 28 May, the yeomen heard the crack of the first Boer rifle shots. The ground was mostly too hard to dig trenches and they lacked the right tools, but the British had managed to build a number of stone shelters during the night which provided some cover. Gradually the fire increased in intensity, and as one man of the 47th recalled: ‘The men on the kopjes under Captain Keith were having a hot time of it. They signalled that there was a heavy fire on them from three different points but they had managed to build breastworks and were keeping the Boers at a distance. It was evident that the Boers outnumbered us and were increasing in strength.’ That afternoon Captain Keith, the DCO’s popular commander, was killed by a bullet through the head. But despite some casualties and gnawing hunger, on 28-29 May the British were not under serious pressure from the Boers. However on the evening of 29 May, Piet De Wet arrived with reinforcements bringing the Boer forces up to about 2,500 men. More crucially, he brought with him four artillery pieces which were to seal the fate of the defenders. On 30 May the Boers drew the circle in more tightly and Spragge found that the grazing for his animals was becoming restricted. By the morning of 31 May the writing was on the wall for the defenders, who had acquitted themselves well despite their lack of experience. During the night the Boers had brought three guns into position south of the Valsch and the fourth onto a flat-topped kopje about a mile north of the DCOs. Crouching in their positions, the latter heard a boom followed by what one observed as ‘a peculiar shrieking in the air immediately above out heads’ as the first shell came in. The DCOs on the two crucial kopjes took the brunt of the artillery fire. The 47th man observed: ‘Another distant boom and a few moments of expectation. Someone had left a helmet and a greatcoat on a ledge of rock on the summit of the kopje a few yards in front. A few moments after the last boom there was a deafening crash and the piece of rock and the coat and helmet disappeared in a confused volcano of smoke and dust. They had got the range and our minutes were numbered.’ As more and more shells his the DCOs’ position, under cover of this fire the Boers galloped up and ensconced themselves among some boulders on the southernmost of the two stony kopjes. The DCOs abandoned the position from the southern kopje, and as they retreated towards the northern kopje, a white flag was raised by one of their men manning a picquet between the two hills, he being immediately shot in the thigh by one of his comrades. This, however, caused confusion, and others began to surrender, and also on the northern kopje, making Spragge’s position untenable, and shortly after 2.30 pm he ordered his force to surrender. The casualty list was a long one: Captain Keith and 16 other ranks were killed, and later Sir John Power and 3 men died of their wounds, and 4 officers and 28 men had been wounded. Another 15 officers and 367 men were captured unwounded, bringing the total Boer bag of prisoners to more then 400. In Britain, news of the disaster was received with stunned incredulity. Questions were asked in the House of Commons and The Times called the surrender a humiliating episode. Goschen is confirmed as having been present in action at Lindley throughout the engagement, and was amongst those men taken prisoner, being subsequently released, and then sent home on 26 September 1900. A photograph exists of Goschen as a Prisoner of War, taken in a POW Camp standing in the centre of the image with a cap on his head. His is identified as ‘E.H. Goschen, son of the (then) 1st Lord of the Admiralty’. On his arrival back in Britain, Goschen once again took up his position with the Diplomatic Service, and was then appointed an honorary attaché to the Legation at Tangier. After three years he was sent to Egypt as private secretary to Sir W. E. Garstin at the Ministry of Public Works, and in 1908 joined the staff of the Egyptian Foreign Office, and was later appointed Controller of the Secretariat in the Ministry of Finance, a post which he held for a long period. Goschen was appointed an Officer of the Order of the Crown of Italy in the London Gazette for 2 July 1909, and then appointed by His Highness the Khedive of Egypt to receive the Order of the Medjidieh 3rd Class in the London Gazette for 15 September 1911, and eventually received on the recommendation of His Highness the Sultan of Egypt the Order of the Nile 3rd Class in the London Gazette for 29 December 1916. Goschen was a good-looking man of great personal charm and a very kindly disposition. Socially he became extremely popular in Cairo, and was a good sportsman with a special affection for cricket. In 1929 he succeeded to the Baronetcy on the death of his father, and three months afterwards he was admitted as a Partner in the well-known stockbroking firm of Joseph Sebag and Co. In the city, as in Cairo, his personal gifts and lovable character attracted all who were brought into relations with him, and he became one of the Trustees of the Stock Exchange Benevolent Fund. Goschen had married Countess Marie Danneskjold Samsoe of Denmark in 1908; together they had two sons and two daughters. Sir Edward Goschen, Baronet, of Ardington House, Wantage, died in a nursing home in Oxford in 1933. Sold for a hammer price of GBP 1,590. Totals: GBP 2,048. R 45,530. AUD 3,740. NZD 4,080. CAD 3,410. USD 2,500. EUR 2,300. Dr David Biggins
The following user(s) said Thank You: azyeoman
|
Please Log in or Create an account to join the conversation. |
- You are here:
- ABW home page
- Forum
- Anglo Boer War (1899-1902)
- Medals and awards
- Medals to the Imperial Yeomanry