TOPIC:

I have just finished cleaning up this wonderfully atmospheric photograph of General Clery and Staff on Shooter's Hill, taken during the preparatory bombardment of the Colenso positions, on 14 Dec 1899.

After four days of work, I feel like I was there myself. The atmosphere is dark and foreboding, which is apt considering how things were to unfold the following day.

General Clery cuts a lonely figure on the extreme right, turned away from his objective and seemingly contemplating his tactics for the following day. In the centre stands the great Bennett Burleigh (in the pale jacket) with, I believe, two other correspondents. Immediately to the left of Burleigh is Captain Jones, commander of the Naval guns, which are just out of view on the left. The trail of one of the 4.7s is visible behind Jones's "Stowasser" leggings.

In the middle distance, between the two "correspondents" on the right, can be seen William Dickson's Biograph camera, with its bicycle-wheel contraption, which operated bellows that forced air against the film as it passed through the shutter gate. This ensured that the film was always flat against the aperture window, and that the image remained in focus.

The presence of Dickson and Burleigh in the same shot indicates that this photograph was taken in the afternoon or evening. According to Dickson, the correspondents had been barred from leaving camp until the middle of the day, though he himself seems to have ignored these instructions, as he was filming on Shooter's Hill from early in the morning. I suspect Dickson and his colleagues are amongst the group in the distance on the far left. The figure with the bowler hat appears in several photographs of the Biograph in operation. The Naval Brigade, and in particular Captain Jones, took Dickson under their wing, allowing him to accompany them during the Colenso offensive. Together with a special pass issued to him by Buller, this allowed Dickson to film aspects of the opperations that the main press corps was barred from seeing. Dickson wrote "being so far ahead we congratulate ourselves on our good luck in the two days' gunning, when no one was permitted to pass the picket or outposts".












This second photograph was taken by Middlebrook from exactly the same spot (see the rock on the far right), but turned slightly to the left (north), and shows the 4.7-inch gun facing Colenso. Note that the sailors are stood down, suggesting that both photographs were taken late in the day, after the bombardment had finished. In this photograph General Clery has turned and is now looking towards the Boer positions.








Map showing positions at 8 a.m. on the 15th December. By this time the Naval 4.7-inch guns had been moved 2,000 yards north, from Shooter's Hill to Naval Gun Hill (Official History, Vol 1, Map 15).




Bennett Burleigh, The Natal Campaign, pp. 190 – 194

Thursday [14 Dec] broke raw and cold. The weather has made more than fervent tropical amends since. Never, with the usual exaggeration of oldest inhabitants, has there been such sweltering weather during December in Natal. The pastures and rivers are as dried up as in June.

It was difficult to locate the more elaborate and strongly occupied works of the Boers. We had given them a taste of our gunmetal on Wednesday, but for Thursday was reserved an ample banquet served up by the two 4.7-inch and the 12-pounder naval guns. As soon as the light was good enough the bombardment was begun.

General Buller had signalled to General White that his attack upon Colenso lines should be the prelude to the advance upon Ladysmith. Captain Jones, of her Majesty's ship Forte, with part of the naval contingent, began shelling Commandant Botha's, the Boer leader's, works. The air crackled with the stunning roar of guns and exploding shells. Heavy and steady was the cannonade of the sailors. The enemy had made no attempt to check our advance or the pitching of the tents for our new camp, although we were well within the range of their Krupp and big Creusot cannon. The Boers "lay" low. Not a word or shot did they return us. A few of our scouts, who, in the early morning, had ridden close to the Tugela, had been fired upon by their riflemen. When the bombardment started numbers of our men watched and criticised the effect of our shells as the lyddite missiles struck rock or work with resounding impact. They threw up enormous columns of smoke and dust. Not more than three shots had been fired from the big guns when the Boers promptly suspended all trenching operations, hurrying off towards the hills or burrowing in their most secure cover.

At noon our bombardment was stopped until 3 p.m. From that hour it went forward in a slow, intermittent fashion, until nightfall. With more guns, a heavy and systematic searching by lyddite fire could – and, perhaps, should – have been made of the Boer ground in front. During the cannonade the enemy were seen to be trying to place a large cannon near Fort Wylie, which is the nearest foothill across the Tugela bridge. A shell or two led to the total suspension of that operation. Nearly 140 shells were pitched on Thursday by the naval guns at the Boer lines. We learned that same day that over five of the enemy's bridge guards had been killed on Wednesday by one of our lyddite shells. The heavier bombardment of Thursday must have accounted for many more, but not a shot in reply did the wily Boers vouchsafe us. They took their punishment, biding their opportunity. One thing proximity disclosed was that the Boers' favourite position for placing their cannon is in or near a dip or neck between hills. They also arrange to shift to and fro with their lighter guns. Another trick of theirs, to prevent their heads being seen above the skyline, is to have their trenches in front of the earth thrown out in digging.



Dickson, The Biograph in Battle, pp. 70 – 75

December 13th, at 7.10, we open fire on the enemy, our Terrible men doing marvellously good shooting, planting each shell just where it was needed, Boers flying right and left. On my way up to the guns early in the morning, as I was passing General Barton's tent he popped out, and seeing me stared for a moment, then said, "What are you? – Where did you come from?" I explained, and with a smile he replied, "Oh, that's it, is it?" and passed on. Another danger averted. I have actually got to the point of dreading a recall or an idiotic set-back more than the enemy's shells. After the morning's bombardment, Captain Jones greeted me pleasantly and remarked, "Now are you happy?" "Yes," I replied, "the more I can get of the real thing the happier I shall be."

"Well, you'll get plenty more," he added. Strange how coolly we took the whole thing, considering the destruction it involved.

December 14th. – Not getting any reply from our neighbours, we decided to move on nearer, and leaving some guns behind, we took most of them with us to a hillock some 2,500 yards nearer to Colenso.
At early dawn we commence work again, and, as usual, stick to the guns, and being so far ahead we congratulate ourselves on our good luck in the two days' gunning, when no one was permitted to pass the picket or outposts. After the shooting was all over and things comparatively safe, a stream of war correspondents could be seen making their way towards us from Frere Camp, that we had been forbidden to leave even after having General Buller's permission.

Never shall I forget the sensation of being within range of the Colenso guns while standing beside my naval friends, who are firing shell and lyddite in rapid succession into the fortification. After, getting our pictures we left to return to Chieveley for food, six miles from the front, our Cape cart and grey horses offering a splendid mark for the enemy as we drove along. We soon discovered that nothing had come, and starvation stared us in the face. The stationmaster, however, took pity on us, and wired repeatedly to Frere for our grub to be sent on while we waited. Meanwhile we shared some black tea with the soldiers, and finished our meal at the stationmaster's dismantled and looted house, where we found a good ham bone, bread, and jam. What a feast! Being worn out mentally and physically I lay down on a bed, covering my face with a meat safe dish-cover to keep off the swarm of flies, and fell asleep for five minutes. My companion then coming in, announced the arrival of our grub and other gear.

One half of this we soon packed, leaving the other half at the station; then pushed our way back again to the guns. We pass through camp after camp on our way, practically all Frere Camp having moved up that morning, commencing at daylight. Miles and miles of troops and transport waggons could be seen wending their way across the twelve miles of field; indeed, as far as my eye could reach, every hill and dale was covered with troops. Just as we got back, General Buller and some officers made their appearance on the hill. As the General was walking away from his horse he was snapped, standing and riding. We could get only one Biograph of all this, though magnificently effective, owing to the cloud of dust caused by the recoil and concussion. I was obliged to ignore the kindly advice to stay on the opposite hill and take it from there by the telephoto; but not being very sure of this new lens, I preferred to use my 8-inch Bausch and Lomb, and get within fifty feet instead of 1,500 yards or 2,500 yards. As soon, however, as we had taken the view, I had the machine dismantled and carried behind huge boulders for protection. Our horses, trembling and jumping at every shot, behaved splendidly, however, never moving from the spot, but scared out of their wits. My companions used cotton-wool in their ears to prevent the tremendous concussion, but as I wished to hear which way the shells were coming I preferred to drop the jaw at the word "Fire," a trick I learned at Sandy Hook, U.S., at the firing of the 10in., which answered the purpose very well.

It was a grand sight to watch the neat way our gunners dislodged the Boers, whom we could see running hither and thither, jumping on their horses and galloping off. Clouds of dust from many horsemen was all we wanted for guide as to where to shoot, and quickly our guns spoke in rapid succession with lyddite or ordinary shell, which must have demoralised them horribly. The shock caused by the terrific lyddite explosive will kill within a radius of a hundred feet by the mere concussion of air, and we could see the fortifications being blown sky-high in huge yellow columns of earth, stones, and men.

When all was over for the day, and our men had retired to rest, I went to the hill with Captain Jones and Commander Limpus to look at the Boer position through the large telescope. It was just getting dark, but it was still light enough to see the Boers creeping along round a hillock. The order was given, and quick as lightning our fine chaps jumped to their guns, raising clouds of dust as the shells exploded among the enemy.

We have made every effort to get a photograph of the Boer position, and the effect of the shots, by means of the telephoto, but we were forced to give it up owing to the haze and indistinctness which made it impossible to focus properly. There are many other difficulties besides, all of which I hope to overcome in time. I shall then focus on the fortification and start our machine immediately after the shot has been fired, so as to see the effect.

It is getting dark and our tent is not yet up, so we all pitch in, and are soon comfortably settled for the night, after rather a better supper than usual, having been fortunate enough to obtain some canned tomatoes to mix with our bully meat.



Jeans, Naval Brigades in the South African War

December 13. — Orders were received to move forward another 2,000 yards, to a kopje nearer the Boer position, but a dense fog postponed this movement. Later on it cleared away, and at 7 A.M. the 4.7 guns opened fire, for the first time, on the Colenso trenches, and kept it going till 9.30, when the tremendous heat and mirage made satisfactory shooting at long ranges (7,000 to 11,000 yards) impossible. The guns and their mountings worked admirably and very good shooting was made, but there was no reply, and the Boers could be seen in the evening still busily digging.

General Buller came on from Frere with Ogilvy's six 12-pounders, so there were now two 4.7s and twelve 12-pounders with the Naval Brigade. Till the General's arrival most people were under the impression that only a feint was to be made at Colenso, and that there would be a big flanking movement in the direction of Potgieter's Drift.

At 7.30 next morning [14 December] camp was shifted to the previously mentioned kopje. 2,000 yards nearer the Boer trenches. It afterwards was known as Shooter's Hill. The 4.7's opened fire at 9 A.M. and carried on intermittently during the day. There was no reply and the enemy would not be tempted to unmask his guns, though we were well within range. Later on this day orders were received for the morrow. Two 12-pounders were to remain on Gun Hill, four to advance with the 4.7's to a more advantageous position, and six were to attach themselves to Colonel Long's batteries. (Two 12-pounders were still at Estcourt, two at Mooi River, and two at Frere).







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Another photograph of Dickson's Biograph camera, set up in front of two Naval 4.7s. These are the guns that first bombarded Colenso from Gun Hill on 13 December, moved to Shooter's Hill on the 14th and then to Naval Gun Hill for the main battle on the 15th (see map above). The caption for a photograph of the pair parked up at Frere names them the "Leviathan Twins".

The Boigraph's bicycle wheel and bellows, as described in the previous post, are hidden under the cameraman's black cape. However, the air hose, connecting the bellows to the camera, can be seen hanging vertically in the centre of the tripod. This air-pressure system was required because Dickson's camera did not have sprockets and used unperforated film. Sprockets kept the film taught, meaning that the focus remained constant as the celluloid travelled through the camera.




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Below are four sequential stills from footage captured by Dickson during the bombardment. Frame two shows the moment of discharge, with the recoil buffer fully compressed. The high elevation of the barrel indicates that the target was a considerable distance away, probably placing this 4.7 on Gun Hill, the first position from which the Naval guns opened fire (on 13 Dec), and over 4 miles from Colenso.

Note the standard Naval telescope, which has been repurposed for use with the 4.7 while ashore. I believe this is Lieutenant England's "No 1 Gun", in which case the telescope shown now resides in the collection of the National Maritime Museum, London. The telescope belonged to Lieutenant James Stuart Wilde, who commanded two of the 12-pdrs that accompanied Lieut. England's 4.7. For more on this, see: Lieutenant Wilde's telescope 1 & 2.










.Courtesy of The British Film Institute






. NATIONAL MARITIME MUSEUM


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Many photographs and sketches were taken or made of the Boer positions north of the Tugela during Redvers Buller's protracted efforts to cross the river. Photographs of the view from the Boer positions occur much less frequently. This photograph was reproduced as a post card.

Two further photographs of H.M.S. Terrible's 4.7-inch guns in action during the bombardment. The first depicts Lieutenant England's No. 1 Gun, and the second, Lieutenant Hunt's No. 2 Gun.













.The route of the 4.7s during the Relief of Ladysmith operations (Jeans, Naval Brigades in the South African War, map facing p. 234).

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Three more accounts of the bombardment of Colenso.


Burne, Lieut. C.R.N., With the Naval Brigade in Natal, pp. 14 – 15

In the evening [11th Dec] orders suddenly came for Limpus' battery of 4·7's, my two 12-pounders, and Richards' four 12-pounders to advance the next morning (12th) at 4 a.m. to Chieveley, some seven miles from the Boer lines; and here again I was in luck's way as being one of the fortunates ordered to the front. All was now bustle and hurry to get away, and eventually the line of Naval guns, some two miles long with ammunition and baggage wagons, moved out in the grey of morning over the hills, with an escort of Irish Fusiliers, who looked very smart, "wearin' of the green" in their helmets.

We reached Chieveley at 8 p.m. (12th), after a long, dusty march, and got into position next morning on a small kopje about two miles to its front, called afterwards "Gun Hill". Guns were unlimbered and shell pits dug, while the wagons were all placed under cover; we received orders on arrival for immediate action, and at 9.30 a.m. [13th Dec] we commenced shelling the enemy at a range of 9,500 yards. The 4·7 guns on the right fired the first shot, my two 12-pounders followed quickly, and a desultory shell fire went on for some hours. At my position we dug pits for the gun trails in order to get a greater elevation, and we plumped one or two shots on the trenches near the Colenso Bridge. The shooting of the 4"7's, with their telescopic sights and easy ranging, was beautiful; shell after shell, many of them lyddite, burst in the Boer trenches, and we soon saw streams of Boer wagons trekking up the valley beyond, while at the same time one of the Boer camps, 10,000 yards off, was completely demolished.

All this time our Biograph friends from home were gaily taking views of us, and they took two of myself and my guns while firing. Of course, the anxious officers of batteries had to lay the guns personally at this early stage, and every shot was a difficult matter, as at the extreme range we were firing, with the lengthening pieces on, the sighting was rather guesswork, and we had to judge mainly by the explosion at a distance of five and a half miles. We were all done up after our exertions under a broiling sun, and hence were not used any more that day. Behind us we saw miles of troops and transport on the march onwards, which gave us the idea, and also probably the Boers, that Buller was planning a forward attack; and indeed, late at night on the 13th, the 4·7 Battery was told to move on to a kopje two miles in advance; my own guns, with the Irish Fusiliers being left to protect the ground on which we were then camped.

Orders came shortly afterwards for a general advance to the Tugela, and Captain Jones told me that I had been given the rear and left to defend from all flank attacks, and that I was to move on at daybreak of the 15th to an advanced kopje and place myself under Colonel Reeves of the Irish Fusiliers. All was now excitement; the first great fight was at length to come off and our fellows were full of confidence.


Crowe, The Commission of H.M.S. Terrible, pp. 96 – 103

On December 12th Barton's Infantry Brigade moved from Frere and occupied Gun Hill, just beyond Chieveley station. Captain Jones, Commander Limpus, and the naval staff, with the two 4·7 guns and 12-pounder units of Lieutenants Richards, Burns, and Wilde, accompanied the advance.

Next day the naval guns heavily bombarded the Colenso positions at ranges varying from 7000 yards upwards to nearly double that distance. Much visible damage was done to the enemy's works, but little sign did the enemy vouchsafe that they were in strong tenancy of those rugged hills, among which the relief force was destined to wage so many a bitterly contested fight.

On the 14th the naval guns, protected by a strong escort, moved forward to a low kopje (Shooters Hill) west of the railway, about 2000 yards nearer the enemy's central positions. Fort Wylie, a kopje terraced with intrenchments and honeycombed safety shelters in its rear, was especially singled out for shell practice. This position stood conspicuously forth as effectually commanding the railway and road bridges over the Tugela, the village of Colenso, and also overlooked the stretch of veldt country between the river and Chieveley. Although the 4·7 guns sent scores of shell crashing with thunderous force into their boulderous breastworks, and searched with lyddite all located trenches for quite two hours, the enemy maintained the exasperating equanimity of yesterday. The firing, however, was not altogether a futile expenditure of ammunition, for much verification of ranges, besides the location of hitherto unknown trenches and positions resulted, and the knowledge so obtained proved invaluable on the morrow.
The eve of battle had arrived. Towards the close of day the main body of the relief army had marched over from Frere camp. Lieutenant Ogilvy arrived with six 12-pounders, two having been left behind under Lieutenant Melville to support the military force remaining to guard Frere and the large reserve of military supplies collected there. That evening the General Orders were issued to the respective brigadiers and commanding officers of detached units for the planned attack on Colenso, which was to take place on the early morrow.

Assembling the brigade, Commander Limpus informed them of the main instructions received from headquarters and of the proposed methods for executing them, impressing on the officers and responsible individual the necessity for implicitly following the orders he had carefully explained.

Later, after dark, the guns were withdrawn from the top of the kopje, and, together with all our impedimenta, got ready for moving off at the appointed hour next morning, a few hours' rest occupying the brief space of time which intervened betwixt the calm of the camp and the storm of to-morrow's battle.

Six guns, two 4·7 and four 12-pounders (termed the central battery), under Commander Limpus, were to move forward at 3.30 A.M. and take up a position on a slight eminence about 3000 yards from the river, and some 800 yards west of the railway. These guns were to do all possible harm to the enemy's men and matériel, to engage any guns which disclosed themselves, and to follow the infantry, if successful, across the river. The unit commanders and captains of guns of this battery were: – Lieutenant England and C.P.O. Bate, No. 1 4·7; Lieutenant Hunt and C.P.O. Stephens, No. 2 4·7; Lieutenant Richards, P.O. Jeffrey and Sergeant Roper two 12-pounders; Lieutenant Wilde and P.O.s H. Mitchell and Metcalfe, two 12-pounders. Lieutenants Anderton and Chiazarri, and the naval volunteer detachment, were equally divided for duty with the 4·7 guns. Mr Cole, gunner, and Chief Gunnery Instructor Baldwin were attached to the battery for general duties; the remainder of the naval staff, under Captain Jones, also took station at this position.

Ogilvy's 12-pounder battery was assigned to Colonel Long's command.

It had been announced in orders that the Commander-in-Chief would be found near the 4·7 guns. The arrival there of Generals Buller and Clery with their staffs indicated that the respective brigades, whose advance the generals had supervised, had sufficiently progressed to warrant the preparative artillery sweeping to be commenced. The battle of Colenso begun at 5.30 A.M. with a salvo of shells from the naval guns. Up to this time no sign was elicited of the enemy's intention to resist the advance, save the sudden dashes here and there of a few horsemen evidently conveying messages; the tactical silence prevailing giving rise to all sorts of fanciful conjectures. Lyddite and shrapnel shell again searched trenches, dongas, and the fringe of the river bank with a murderous examination. Common shell crashed into all visible positions and defensive works, producing volcanic results, scattering debris skywards, and rending huge openings with nearly every round; the explosions reverberating among the encircling hills giving forth a weird continuity of roar. The firing, as such, was indeed a magnificent sight for an artillerist to witness, as, the ranges being known, the shells burst with fine precision. For upwards of forty-five minutes a vigorous bombardment proceeded, the field batteries adding their quota of destructiveness upon arriving at their allotted stations. But not a single reply was drawn until the attacking brigades had got well within the enemy's zone of rifle fire. Then then the alluring calm of subtle silence suddenly gave place to an assailing storm of shell and rifle fire that swept with disastrous effect into the advancing brigades from the whole arc of defence.














The next account is a little confused, in that it describes four days of bombardment, whereas the barrage lasted only three days (13th, 14th & 15th December).

Hereford Journal, 3rd February 1900

A HEREFORDSHIRE MAN’S GRAPHIC DESCRIPTION.

The following has been received from Mr T.J. Britten, brother of Mr W.E. Britten, of Hereford, and will, we are sure, be read with great interest: –
Chieveley Camp, December 18th, 1899.

Days of weary waiting for us were those at Frere, which more than ever convinced us that the General-in-Chief would not be hurried, and meant to make a thorough success of his march to the relief of Ladysmith.

With the arrival of every new regiment the camp was assuming large proportions till it covered an area of quite two square miles. Gradually it became apparent that a much larger force was concentrating at this point that was generally supposed. Four brigades of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, our mounted infantry corps, five batteries of field artillery, and the Naval Brigade brought up our fighting strength to over 20,000 men, which left little doubt in anybody’s mind as to the result of their mission.

At last, before daybreak on the 12th, General Barton’s Brigade, with a squadron of Bethune’s M.I., struck camp and advanced to the side of a ridge one mile beyond Chieveley Station; the Naval Brigade, under the command of Captain Jones, of the “Forte”, and Commander Limpus, of the “Terrible”, with their two 4.7in guns and ten 12 pounders, joined up and took up a position on the ridge three miles from Colenso, facing Grobelaar’s Kloof, Fort Wylie, and Colenso Bridge. This move was the first indication of an advance. It was largely supposed that while the main column would engage the enemy in the front, our cavalry, supported by artillery, would make a flank attack to the right and left with a view to turning the Boers’ position, which led to some uncertainty in the minds of correspondents as to the columns they should attach themselves to.
On the morning of the 12th [sic – 13th] our naval guns commenced shelling the ridge overlooking Colenso in search of the Boer position. Shells burst with astonishing precision among the krantzes on the ridges of the hills. For Wylie was subjected to sharp shell fire without, however, drawing the enemy. Boers were seen galloping in small parties from the main Boer position near Grobelaar’s Kloof down to the river, but beyond these nothing of the wily Boer could be seen.

Shortly before noon fire ceased without beating the Boer position. The following morning shelling was resumed with remarkable accuracy, shell after shell bursting on the entrenched ridges, and disabling one gun, as one of the naval officers told me.

Later in the afternoon 2,000 of Barton’s Brigade advanced in skirmishing order one mile nearer the Tugela and deployed in the direction of Colenso Station.

The naval guns supported the advance and were placed on a ridge, “Gun Hill”, three quarters of a mile onward. Looking back a huge dust cloud revealed the fact that Frere Camp was being broken up. In one unbroken chain for miles back supply, water, ammunition, and field hospital waggons were seen wending their way down the main road in the rear of their respective regiments, which marched along in columns to their new camp, their advance being screened by Barton’s men.

Returning to camp I found that General Buller had given us authority to join the main column, and later in the evening the order went round to strike camp at 4 a.m. [14th Dec]. From one o’clock onwards the rumbling noise of waggons on the move broke our sleep, and as we rose in the grey of dawn, looking across the Drakensburg range, overhung with heavy mist clouds, we found that the camp, which the day before was the centre of bustling activity, looked deserted, smouldering fires alone leaving traces of the recent evacuation. We hurried along and pitched our tent on the spot marked out for correspondents, close to headquarters. Our naval guns were already in action, and thither we went to watch their effect. As before, positions supposed to be occupied by Boers were shelled with shrapnel and lyddite with no better success of determining the Boers’ position than on the two previous occasions. All we could see with the aid of our glasses were some of the laagers of the Boers, away up a kloof beyond the nearer ridges. From behind them coming over a nek the Boers continued to descend in small parties of twos, three, and fives, to a small tin shanty on the banks of the river, from where under cover they could move up and down the river.

In all about 200 Boers were seen waiting for better light. Captain Jones suspended operations till late in the afternoon, when he placed several shells in that spot from which the Boers were seen to immerge hurriedly.

At 4 a.m. next morning, the 15th, our troops were on the move, and one and all felt how much depended on the issue of that day.

From the ridge on which our naval guns were placed the country slopes down to the river, forming a plain one mile wide and two miles long. Opposite the other side of the river is another plain, which is flanked on the left by the Grobelaar’s Hills, on which two Boer guns were placed; behind rose up the Colenso hills in a semi-circle towards Colenso. Hidden in these were the Boer laager. Between these heights and the river a lower series of kopjies rise, stretching from the Ladysmith main road to Fort Wylie. On the ridges of these the Boers had entrenched themselves, and had placed their guns.

Leaving the transport service and convoy this side of a ridge we reached the crest, on which two 4.7in naval guns and three 12 pounders were placed. To the right and left as far as our eye could stretch the country was studded with our troops.

At 6.30 our naval guns opened fire and directed their shells on the entrenched ridges commanded by the enemy.

For some time there was no response, which must have puzzled our naval commanders very considerably. ….

...... Immediately our [field] artillery opened fire Fort Wylie opposite responded with about five guns, and a terrific artillery duel ensued.

Shell after shell went whizzing with a slow vibrating and quickening sound through the air; every shell as it left the muzzle of the gun throwing up a cloud of dust, and the report as it struck the object like a staggering peal of thunder. The lyddite shells explode with a flash enveloped in a thick column of smoke, which, together with the execution of the shell, presents a most realistic effect. The thunder was deafening for a time; our shells set the grass on the hills on fire, which added to the effect. Fort Wylie which at one moment resembled an active crater spitting forth molten lava, smoke, and dust, soon became an object of destruction. The Boer guns replied with well-directed shrieking shells, which buried themselves in the ground near our naval guns, or wherever artillery or a body of men collected. Fortunately, only a few exploded.








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