Dilatoriness of the Government--Full notice to the
enemy--Mobilisation begins--Small proportion of
cavalry--Loyal action of the Colonies--The greatest
Expeditionary Force ever sent over seas--Embarkation
of the troops--Food supplies--The voyage out--The plan
of campaign--Character of the country--New tactics
required--Despatch of the Fifth and Sixth Divisions.
[Sidenote: Dilatoriness of the Government.]
The first reinforcements for the British army in South Africa to
leave England after the tension became acute were three batteries of
artillery, which had been ordered out as far back as September 8.
Their despatch had been talked of for some months before, but such was
the irresolution and timidity of the Cabinet that delay after delay
had occurred. Even now, though these guns were most urgently needed,
they were not sent out in the fastest procurable transports, but,
with a strange neglect of military necessities, were placed on board
two comparatively slow ships--the Zibenghla and Zayathla. Both
cleared on September 25, but instead of being able at once to proceed,
were detained by defects in boilers or by heating of the coal in the
bunkers. The Zibenghla did not leave the Mersey until October 7;
the Zayathla, a little more fortunate, got away from Queenstown on
September 29. This ill-omened delay is significant in view of later
events. Finally the Zayathla reached Capetown on October 25 and the
Zibenghla on the 30th, having occupied, in one way and another, 30
to 35 days on a voyage which could have been accomplished with ease
by vessels of moderate speed in 20 or 21 days. It is quite clear that
those responsible for providing funds--cheapness was alleged as an
excuse for selecting such slow vessels--had completely misapprehended
the gravity of the crisis, and forgotten Nelson's great saying,
Five minutes make the difference between victory and defeat. It is
impossible with our British system of administration to discover who
exactly was to blame, but clearly someone made a very serious mistake.
[Illustration: RESERVISTS AT SOUTHAMPTON DOCKS READING THE LATEST NEWS
FROM THE FRONT.
The alacrity with which the Reservists answered to the call to the
colours has already been mentioned (p. 17).]
[Illustration:
[Photo by Gregory.
EMBARKATION OF THE NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS AT SOUTHAMPTON.]
[Sidenote: [OCT.-NOV. 1899.]
[Sidenote: Full notice to the enemy.]
The British army had been so organised and prepared by the War Office
and successive Cabinets that no considerable body of men was ready to
take the field on immediate notice. An elaborate process had to be
gone through before any considerable number of squadrons, batteries,
and battalions could leave our shores. The immature boys and raw
recruits had to be weeded out and replaced by reservists who had left
the colours. To call up the reservists the consent of Parliament was
necessary, and to convene Parliament some notice would of course have
to be given. The whole system was admirably adapted to ensure our
enemies having the very fullest notice and the very fullest warning
of our intentions; and, as has been seen already, the Boers were not
slow to take advantage of our ineptitude. How we should have fared in
like circumstances against a European enemy must be left to conjecture.
There would have been no such lethargy as the Boers displayed in the
first week of war.
[Illustration:
[Photo by Gregory.
OFF!
S.S. German with 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade leaving Southampton.]
Had the mobilisation been completed, as many urged, in May or June, the
Boers could not have gained a month's start, since in May and June the
grass upon the veldt is too scanty to permit of extensive movements.
They could not well open their campaign until October, when the first
heavy rains fall. Yet in the end it may be that the Boers were defeated
by our own unsuspiciousness. Had our Army Corps been sent out in May
or June the Republics would have "climbed down," Britain would have
once more gone to sleep, and Mr. Kruger would have waited till we were
entangled in hostilities with some great power, and then have struck us
with terrible effect.
[Illustration: Rt. Hon. G. J. Goschen. Marquis of Lansdowne.
Marquis of Salisbury. Duke of Devonshire. Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.]
[Sidenote: OCT.-NOV. 1899.] Strength of the Army Corps.]
[Sidenote: Mobilisation begins.]
The order to mobilise was issued on October 7, but the mobilisation did
not officially begin till the 9th. There was--indeed there could be--no
hurry over the operation, for transports were not ready, but had to be
prepared as rapidly as possible. The total force which it was decided
to despatch was as follows:--
Nom. Fighting
strength. strength. Guns.
1 Cavalry Division 5,500 4,820 12
3 Infantry Divisions 30,000 26,430 54
Corps Troops 5,000 3,450 48
Line of Communications and Reserves 11,000 11,000 --
------- ------- ---
51,500 45,700 114
[Illustration:
[Photo by the Stereoscopic Co.
FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K.P., &c.; COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE
ARMY.
Born in 1833, son of Major Garnet Joseph Wolseley; is of Irish birth.
Entered the Army 1852; Captain, 1855; Major, 1858; Lt.-Colonel, 1859;
Colonel, 1865; Governor of Natal, 1875; Lt.-General and Governor of
Cyprus, 1878; Commander of Forces in Ireland, 1890-95; General, 1882;
Field-Marshal, 1894. Served in Burmah, the Crimea, at Lucknow, in China
and Canada; commanded the Red River Expedition, 1870, the Ashantee
Expedition, 1873; the Egyptian Expedition, 1882, and the Gordon Relief
Expedition, 1884. As Commander-in-Chief at home he shares with Lord
Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for War, the responsibility for the
number and equipment of the troops sent out.]
The "fighting force," it should be explained, includes only cavalry,
artillery, and infantry, and excludes engineers, army service corps,
and ammunition columns. Thus the total strength of these three arms
despatched to South Africa was under 46,000 men. In many of the
published estimates the "troops on the line of communications" were
placed at 10,000, but they were actually much under 10,000, being only
seven battalions strong. To these, 4,000 "reserves at base" had to be
added. Thus it would appear that from the first the Army Corps was
below its theoretical strength.
[Sidenote: Small proportion of cavalry.]
[Sidenote: [OCT.-NOV. 1899.]
Some further facts have to be noted, as they will help to explain
certain of the British reverses. Out of this 46,000 men only 5,600 men
were mounted--cavalry or mounted infantry. This is a smaller proportion
than would be found in any European army of the same size, and was
dangerously small in view of the fact that in South Africa we were to
encounter an enemy who was mounted to a man. Nor was the artillery as
strong as might have been desired. A German corps of the same size
would have had five more batteries, or 30 more guns. In the course
of the war our need of artillery was such that batteries had to be
improvised from the guns carried on board our warships.
[Illustration:
[Photo by Chas. Knight.
THE BLACK WATCH LEAVING ALDERSHOT.
Like all the other regiments ordered out, the Royal Highlanders (better
known as the "Black Watch") under General Wanchope, who was afterwards
killed at Magersfontein, was cheered by enthusiastic crowds as it left
for Africa.]
[Illustration:
[Photo by Gregory.
TOMMY AS SEA-COOK. DINNER-TIME ON BOARD A TRANSPORT.]
[Illustration:
[Photo by Stephen Cribb.
STORES TO DRAW UPON: RIFLES IN THE ARMOURY AT PORTSMOUTH.]
[Sidenote: Loyal action of the Colonies.]
To the above totals a certain number of Colonial troops must be added.
Canada, New Zealand, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, Western
Australia, South Australia, and Tasmania, all proffered aid, but,
unfortunately, the British Home Government did not avail itself to
the fullest extent of their tendered assistance. It restricted the
contribution of men, in all cases except that of Canada, to small
detachments, and did not want even these to be composed of mounted
troops. But, though the Colonial forces probably scarcely exceeded
2,000, their appearance upon the scene gave fresh proof of the
solidarity of the British Empire, and was a striking earnest of the
loyalty of the Colonies.
[Illustration: THE SEND-OFF OF THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT FROM QUEBEC.
The photograph represents the Governor-General, Lord Minto, addressing
the troops. The French-Canadian Premier, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and the
Mayor of Quebec, also addressed them.]
[Sidenote: OCT.-NOV. 1899.] Enthusiastic Loyalty of the Colonies.]
While Australia and Canada thus responded to the great call of duty,
Natal made the most prodigious efforts, to which fuller attention will
have to be given hereafter. She placed some 4,000 or 5,000 of her
scanty white population in the field, and her sons proved themselves
on the field of battle gallant men and skilful soldiers, winning
well-deserved tributes from all the British generals. At Durban
were many thousands of refugees from the Transvaal, eager to serve
against the Boers, but owing to the parsimony of the Home Government
indifferent use was made of their enthusiasm. Where we might have
had 5,000 good volunteers only 1,000 were raised. The Imperial Light
Horse, composed almost entirely of Outlanders, speedily made a name for
itself, and fought with invariable heroism and devotion.
[Illustration: THE VICTORIAN CONTINGENT CROSSING PRINCE'S BRIDGE,
MELBOURNE.
As in England, so in all the Colonies, immense crowds gathered to
witness the departure of volunteers for the front. This demonstration
of the loyalty of the Colonies is certainly one of the most gratifying
of the results of the war.]
[Sidenote: The greatest expeditionary force ever sent over seas.]
[Sidenote: [OCT.-NOV. 1899.]
When the mobilisation in England began the army organisation worked
very satisfactorily and smoothly. No such task as the transport of an
expeditionary force, 50,000 strong, six thousand miles over sea had
ever before been undertaken in the whole record of military history. In
the Crimean war we had moved 33,000 men with 3,350 horses and 54 guns a
distance of about three thousand miles, and that was considered a very
great feat. With each increase in the distance the space that must be
allowed man and horse grows, and an extra amount of food and stores
must be carried. For very short voyages of a few hours or less one
man can be shipped for each ton of the vessel's displacement. For such
a trip a steamer like the Britannic could carry 5,000 or 6,000 men.
Actually, she embarked only 1,200 men on the voyage to South Africa,
for this reason, that if the troops were to arrive in good health and
fit for service, they could not be packed on board like sardines. The
British soldier is a valuable and expensive product, and far more
carefully treated than the Frenchman or Russian.
[Illustration:
[Photo by Gregory.
GETTING CAVALRY HORSES ON BOARD.]
The Admiralty was charged with the duty of hiring and fitting
transports. It was decided that, as the supply train for the army
could not be ready in South Africa for some weeks, vessels of only
moderate speed should be chartered. In acting thus the extremity of the
emergency seems to have been in some degree overlooked. Long before
the first batch of troop-ships was half way to the Cape troops were
most urgently needed in all directions. In Natal and in central Cape
Colony our generals might have been able to dispense with an elaborate
transport system by making use of the railways. Of the steamers
chartered the great majority steamed 12 or 13 knots. The Aurania
of 17 knots, Britannic of 16, and Roslin Castle of 15, were the
fastest chosen. Though the cavalry and artillery should, strictly
speaking, have sailed first, since horses always require some days'
rest on land before they are fit for hard work after a long voyage, the
time required to provide the horse-transports with proper fittings was
so considerable that very few were able to leave with the head of the
Army Corps.
[Illustration:
Armstrong, Whitworth & Co.]
12-POUNDER NAVAL FIELD-GUN.
The picture represents the 12-pounder gun on field carriage, as used at
Ladysmith and elsewhere.]
[Illustration:
[Photo by Gregory.
A 6-INCH HOWITZER OFF TO THE FRONT.
This is one of the weapons of the siege train intended for the
bombardment of Pretoria, and used against Cronje at Paardeberg.]
[Sidenote: Embarkation of the troops.]
[Sidenote: OCT.-NOV. 1899.] Food for the Voyage.]
On Friday, October 20, the first batch of troops, 5,000 strong,
embarked at Southampton in four steamers; on the 21st, 5,615 were
shipped; on the 22nd, 4,864; and on the 23rd, 6,335, making a total in
four days of over 21,000 men. The troops were of splendid physique, a
large proportion being reservists; their conduct was sober, steady,
and irreproachable. As for the embarkation, it was conducted in every
case with machine-like order and precision. "It was almost automatic,"
says an eye-witness; "no one gave orders; there was not the slightest
fuss or flurry. Every one in every rank knew exactly what he had to
do." As the ships one by one cast loose there was a roar of cheering
from their decks and from the shore. Thus did the soldiers of the Queen
set out upon that voyage from which, alas! too many of them were never
to return.
The supplies carried on board each ship had to be very considerable
in view of the length of the voyages. Taking, as an example, the
Sumatra, which conveyed 1,200 men to the Cape; she was furnished
with 6,000 lb. of preserved meat, 14 tierces of salt beef, 21 barrels
of pork, 2,500 lb. of preserved potatoes, 400 lb. of compressed
vegetables, 670 lb. of salt, 100 lb. of mustard, 60 lb. of pepper, 150
gallons of vinegar, 100 lb. of pickles, 1,250 lb. of rice, 1,300 lb. of
split peas, 6,000 lb. of sugar, 140 barrels of flour, 336 lb. of suet,
900 lb. of raisins, 1,300 lb. of coffee, 113 lb. of chocolate, 1,300
lb. of treacle, 4,520 lb. of oatmeal, and 10,800 lb. of biscuit. These
were the government supplies to be issued free as rations to the men.
[Illustration:
E. M. Rigg.]
THE LAST EMBRACE.]
In addition the canteen laid in stores of corned beef, lunch biscuits,
ginger-nuts, bloater-paste, brawn, butter, cheese, tinned haddocks,
herrings, lobsters, mackerel, jam and marmalade, sauces, sausages,
potted meats, condensed milk, blacking, laces, soap, tobacco, and other
necessaries and luxuries. These the soldiers would have to purchase out
of their none too generous pay. Though from the above list it might
seem that nothing was wanting, there were complaints, not without
foundation, of both the quality and the quantity of the food in some of
the ships. The Arawa's meat was discovered, on inspection just before
she left, to be bad and had to be renewed.
There were one or two other mischances, as might indeed be expected
in an enterprise of such magnitude. The Rapidan from Liverpool with
remounts on board encountered very heavy weather in the Irish Channel,
and had to put back with heavy loss in horses. The Manchester Port
had shipped some compressed forage which, being damp, heated on board,
and detained her till it could be removed.
[Sidenote: [OCT.-NOV. 1899.]
The total tonnage engaged in the movement of the Army Corps, its
supplies, and its transport was about 600,000, exclusive of vessels
chartered for the divisions which followed later. Yet so vast were the
shipping resources of England that the withdrawal of this great number
of steamers from the mercantile marine only slightly affected the cost
of freight.
[Illustration: ARRIVAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES LANCERS AT CAPE TOWN FROM
ENGLAND.
This detachment, being the only Colonial force in England when war
broke out, was accorded an overwhelmingly enthusiastic send-off by the
immense crowds who lined the London Streets to see them march to the
railway station.]
[Illustration: ARRIVAL OF THE WELSH FUSILIERS AT PORT ELIZABETH.]
[Illustration:
[Photo by G. W. Wilson & Co.
BUFFALO HARBOUR, EAST LONDON; WHERE PART OF THE ARMY CORPS LANDED.]
[Sidenote: The voyage out.]
[Sidenote: NOV. 1899.] Sir Redvers Buller's Plans.]
The voyage was covered by the Channel Squadron and its cruisers. At
Gibraltar were the eight battleships of the squadron; between Gibraltar
and the Canaries, patrolling the route, the cruisers Furious,
Pactolus, and Pelorus; and at the Canaries the 20-knot vessels
Niobe and Diadem. Nor were these attentions superfluous. Some days
before the time when the transports began to arrive at the Canaries a
strange cruiser appeared, which had been built in France for Brazil and
sold, no one knew to whom. Before the war there had been talk of Boer
privateers, and this vessel was a most suspicious intruder. She was
watched night and day by the cruiser Niobe, but it was possible that
she had confederates. Accordingly, orders were given to the transports
on leaving the Canaries to put out all lights and to alter course,
steaming 100 miles to the west of the usual trade route. Nothing
happened, however, and the Boer cruiser, if Boer cruiser the stranger
really was, vanished. It would be interesting, however, to know what
subsequently became of her.
The last of the Army Corps transports left England on November 9, and
on the same day the first arrival at Capetown was recorded. This was
the Roslin Castle, which had left Southampton on October 20 with
General Hildyard, his staff, and one battalion of his brigade. She
was at once sent on to Durban by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Redvers
Buller, who had reached Capetown on October 31. The next transports in
were the Moor, which arrived on the 10th, the Yorkshire, Lismore
Castle, Aurania, and Hawarden Castle on the 11th, and the Gascon
on the 12th. Thereafter every day for a week saw the arrival of more
ships and men.
[Illustration:
R. Caton Woodville.]
A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE.]
[Sidenote: The plan of campaign.]
[Sidenote: [NOV. 1899.]
The original plan of campaign had been as follows:--The three British
divisions under Generals Lord Methuen, Clery, and Gatacre were to
land respectively at Capetown, Port Elizabeth, and East London. From
each of these seaports a railway line leads inland: from Capetown to
Kimberley and Buluwayo on the line which will one day run throughout
the length of Africa "from the Cape to Cairo"; from Port Elizabeth
to Bloemfontein; and from East London to Springfontein on the Port
Elizabeth and Bloemfontein railway. On nearing the Orange River these
three lines converge on a front of about 100 miles, the Capetown and
Kimberley line at Orange River station, a distance of some 570 miles,
that from Port Elizabeth at Norvals Pont, 328 miles by the railway,
and that from East London at Bethulie, a distance of 290 miles. The
use of three lines of railway, which in any case would have been very
much to our advantage, was the more desirable from the fact of the
South African lines being single tracks, with but scanty accommodation
for the returning trains, and few facilities for the transport of
huge quantities of stores and war material. It was probably intended
to effect the concentration a little south of the Orange River, or
perhaps ultimately upon Orange River station, where the Capetown and
Kimberley line crosses the river. The three divisions would then have
advanced on Bloemfontein. Meantime the original idea was that Sir
George White would be able to keep the enemy at bay in Natal. This was
a lamentable miscalculation, and the fact that after twenty days of war
he was enveloped, defeated, and shut up in Ladysmith with 12,000 men
profoundly affected the whole conduct of the campaign.
[Illustration: OUDEMOLEN CAMP.
12th Lancers parading one hour after receiving orders to proceed to the
front.]
[Illustration: ARRIVAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES LANCERS IN CAPE TOWN.
Passing the General Post Office in Adderley Street.]
The problem before General Buller when he reached South Africa was a
difficult one to resolve. Was he to depart from his plan of campaign
and detach a great part of his force to Natal to relieve Ladysmith?
If he did so, an advance on Bloemfontein must be almost indefinitely
postponed. Or was he to advance resolutely upon Bloemfontein and to
trust to such strategy drawing off the Boers from Natal to the defence
of the threatened capital of the Free State? But, in this case,
how could he be certain that the Boers would not "swap queens"--or
determine to take Ladysmith with the 12,000 British troops inside the
town, and allow Bloemfontein to fall? It is possible that political
pressure decided the problem; but, be this as it may, General Buller
eventually decided to move about half his force to Natal. One division,
that under Lord Methuen, received orders to undertake an advance upon
Kimberley, which town was reported to be in some straits, though the
published despatches were cheerful enough in tone. Lord Methuen began
to concentrate at De Aar. General Gatacre, with a greatly attenuated
force, was sent to East London, to operate in what is perhaps the most
difficult region of all South Africa, in the midst of a population
thoroughly disloyal.
[Illustration: MARINES WITH HEAVY GUNS PASSING THROUGH DURBAN.]
[Illustration: DURBAN TOWN HALL.
This building claims to be the finest in Natal. It has been fitted up
and used as a hospital during the war.]
[Illustration:
[Photo by the Biograph Company.
FEELING THE ENEMY.
The "firing-line" approaching within rifle range. From an instantaneous
photograph of troops actually in action.]
[Sidenote: NOV. 1899.] Climate of South Africa.]
[Sidenote: Character of the country.]
[Sidenote: [NOV. 1899.]
A word must now be devoted to the terrain in South Africa. Except in
Natal the country through which the advance was about to take place
is generally arid, waterless, and unproductive. The climate is dry,
salubrious, and generally hot. Rain is almost unknown except in the
rainy season, which includes the months from mid-October to mid-March.
Over a great part of Western Cape Colony the rainfall is less than 10
inches; in Central Cape Colony and the west of the Free State it ranges
between 15 and 25 inches. In consequence of this diminutive rainfall
forage for horses and mules is difficult to obtain in any but the wet
season, and South Africa generally cannot maintain its own population,
but has to import breadstuff's. The physical structure of the country
is a vast table-land, 2,500 to 5,000 feet in height, lying on both
sides of the great Drakensberg Range, the topmost summits of which
rise to 11,000 feet. As in most mountainous regions, the climate of
this great upland is hot by day and cold by night. The rivers, for the
most part, shrink in the dry season to mere chains of stagnant pools;
the Orange River alone is able to float small boats along the greater
part of its course at all times of the year. When the rains do come
the tricklets swell to formidable torrents, and can only be crossed
with difficulty. The surface of the interminable table-land or veldt
is broken by innumerable low hills or kopjes, which are covered with
boulders, affording the finest possible shelter for marksmen. Here and
there rise the low conical mounds which mark the nests of white ants,
and which give equally good cover. Desolate, monotonous, and forbidding
though this land appears at first sight, its charm grows upon the
traveller. Its very dryness makes it a healthy home for the white
races; its air is clear and stimulating to a degree.
[Illustration: A VIEW IN THE KARROO.
The northern portion of Cape Colony and much of the Orange Free State
is of the arid character indicated in this photograph. It is dotted
with ant-hills and with low scrub.]
[Illustration: A KAFFIR HUT IN THE KARROO.]
[Sidenote: New tactics required.]
In such a country as this the tactics of Europe cannot be employed. The
general's greatest difficulty will be to provision and water his men
and beasts of burden. The absence of good roads compels entire reliance
upon railways, and gives them an importance which they nowhere else
possess. Yet, liable as they are to interruption by a single daring
horseman, they are most untrustworthy lines of communication, as was
seen again and again during the course of the war.
[Illustration: A BATTERY OF ARTILLERY CROSSING A DRIFT.
The rivers in South Africa are subject to rapid fluctuations in volume.
A river which is easily fordable in the morning, may by night be quite
impassable, and this fact has had to be reckoned with by our Generals.
Buller, in particular--"The Ferryman," as a humourist dubbed him on
account of his frequent crossing and recrossing of the Tugela--found
his operations greatly obstructed by the swollen river.]
[Sidenote: Despatch of the Fifth and Sixth Divisions.]
[Sidenote: NOV.-DEC. 1899.] Despatch of the Fifth and Sixth
Divisions.]
When the news of the defeat of Sir George White on October 30 reached
England the Government did not, as might have been anticipated, gather
from this the extreme need for large reinforcements, or awake to the
gravity of the war. Three battalions were ordered out to replace the
men lost at Nicholson's Nek, but a steady stream of reinforcements
was not kept flowing towards the Cape. There was talk of mobilising a
Fifth Division, but the mobilisation was not begun until November 13,
and thus 10 days were wasted at a time when every moment was precious.
Nor was there any haste in the despatch of this Division; the first
transport conveying troops belonging to it did not leave till November
24, the last not until December 9, forty days after the disaster. The
Sixth Division was not mobilised until December. Had both divisions
been mobilised on November 3 or 4, it may safely be predicted that the
misfortunes which befell British arms in South Africa during the second
week of December would not have had to be recorded. Whatever may have
been the cause of these delays, it is certain that they occasioned deep
disappointment, not only to the generals at the front, whose despatches
again and again adverted to the necessity for more men, and especially
for more cavalry and artillery, but also to the public at home, who
throughout had manifested their readiness to meet any expense and to
make any sacrifice to secure a prompt and permanent settlement. There
were rumours of friction between the War Office and the Treasury,
but Sir Michael Hicks-Beach has indignantly repudiated the charge of
parsimony. Lord Wolseley has, however, frankly admitted that the forces
of the enemy were underestimated; an error into which, unfortunately,
we fall again and again.
[Illustration:
[Photo by Argent Archer.
RESERVISTS AT KILKENNY.
The photograph represents the playing into barracks at Kilkenny of the
last batch of reservists of the King's Royal Rifles (3rd Battalion).
Of this regiment the Duke of Cambridge is Colonel-in-Chief, and Sir
Redvers Buller Colonel-Commandant.]
[Illustration: PLAYING THE BOER GAME.
British soldiers using ant-hills and boulders for cover.]
[Illustration:
S. Charlton.]
BRITISH CAVALRY DRIVING IN A BOER OUTPOST.]
