Natal threatened--Armoured trains--Ladysmith
bombarded--Assault on the town--The Boers
at Chieveley--Armoured train wrecked near
Chieveley--Endeavours to clear the obstruction--Capture
of Mr. Winston Churchill--The Estcourt garrison in
danger--Shelling of Mooi River Camp--Boer advance
checked at Nottingham Road--The Willow Grange
fight--Arrival of Lord Dundonald and General
Buller--Comparison of the opposing armies--The forward
movement begins--Boer position at Colenso--Buller
determines to attack.
The Boer success before Ladysmith on October 30 was not promptly
followed up, probably because of the want of a properly organised
transport, and the diminutive British forces outside the beleaguered
town were given three or four very precious days to prepare for the
worst. Colenso, we have seen, was evacuated on November 2, and the
British garrison withdrawn to Estcourt, 27 miles farther south. The
Boers occupied a strong position on a hill known as Grobler's Kloof,
a little to the north of the Tugela, commanding thoroughly the roads
between Ladysmith and Colenso. Upon this hill they placed heavy guns
and erected entrenchments with two objects--the first to prevent the
advance of a relief force from the south, the second to shut in Sir
George White. They also showed well to the south of Colenso, in the
neighbourhood of Frere, having apparently marched by the roads which
lead down into the centre of Natal from the Upper Tugela region. They
did not immediately occupy Colenso, but they made all preparations to
destroy the two bridges, should such a measure become necessary.
[Sidenote: Natal threatened.]
The danger for Natal was great. Captain Percy Scott of the Terrible
landed with a large number of guns and bluejackets to defend Durban;
works were erected at Pietermaritzburg, the capital of the Colony,
and volunteer forces were raised with all possible expedition. The
Imperial Infantry Corps, 1,000 strong, was enrolled at Durban and
Pietermaritzburg; Murray's Mounted Volunteers, Thorneycroft's Mounted
Infantry, the Umvoti Mounted Volunteers, and the Durban Light Infantry
were among the other regiments raised by the Colony.
[Illustration:
Frank Craig.]
COLD STEEL: BRITISH SOLDIERS DRIVING THE BOERS FROM A KOPJE.]
[Sidenote: [Nov. 1899.]
Hundreds of refugees from Colenso and the abandoned districts poured
down into the seaboard of Natal, yet there was no sign of panic. The
women especially distinguished themselves by their fortitude and
bravery in this hour of sad calamity. Nor did the Colonists reproach
the Home Government, which had failed, in spite of many entreaties,
adequately to garrison the Colony, though to the irresolution and
tardiness displayed by the authorities at home all these sufferings
were due.
[Illustration: DURBAN, THE BRITISH BASE IN NATAL.]
[Illustration: CAPTAIN PERCY SCOTT, C.B., OF H.M.S. "TERRIBLE."
Under Captain Scott's direction a number of 45-pounder naval guns were
rapidly supplied with carriages, which gave them mobility and rendered
them available as a sort of heavy field-gun. So mounted, they were
of the greatest service both in the defence of Ladysmith and in our
numerous assaults upon Boer positions. Captain Scott also designed a
railway truck to carry the gun, and from which it could be fired.
[Photo by West, Southsea.]
[Illustration: GUNS LANDED BY THE "TERRIBLE" AT DURBAN, ON CAPT.
SCOTT'S CARRIAGES.]
[Sidenote: Armoured trains.]
An armoured train daily proceeded from Estcourt to reconnoitre in the
direction of Colenso. Why this dangerous and clumsy contrivance should
have been used for such a purpose it is difficult to say. The lives of
somewhere about 100 men were daily risked upon an errand which could
have been accomplished with infinitely greater ease by half-a-dozen
mounted infantry. The train was tied of necessity to one line of
advance or retreat; it was a conspicuous object, and made enough noise
with its puffing and blowing to alarm all the Boers for miles around.
Nothing could be easier for them than to bring up and lay their guns on
some particular point of the line, removing one or two rails. If this
were done after the train had passed, its retreat might be cut off and
its capture rendered certain. The risk was a matter of common talk in
the British camp, yet these foolhardy expeditions continued day by day.
[Illustration: ESTCOURT.]
[Sidenote: Nov. 4-9, 1899.] Armoured Trains in Natal.]
On November 5 the armoured train carried two companies of the Dublin
Fusiliers close to Colenso, when the enemy was sighted. The infantry
detrained, but, as it was clearly seen that the Boers were endeavouring
to cut the British line of retreat, entrained again and fell back
towards Estcourt. Then the enemy in his turn retired, and the train
advanced cautiously as far as Colenso station, while the British
troops entered the town and removed at their leisure four waggon loads
of shell, provisions, and stores. On the 9th the train advancing on
Colenso found the line torn up about a mile from that town.
[Illustration: INSIDE AN ARMOURED TRAIN.]
[Sidenote: Ladysmith bombarded.]
Meantime the Boers had steadily bombarded Ladysmith. Day by day their
heavy guns poured shell and shrapnel into the town, doing, however,
very little damage, and inflicting insignificant loss of life. On
November 4 General White opened negotiations with Joubert, in command
of the Boer forces, for the removal of the sick and the women and
children, who should have been sent away before the siege began, but
who, with the lamentable want of foresight which characterised all our
operations, had been allowed to remain in the town till the investment
was complete. It is natural for a general officer in command of an
investing force to refuse to allow a besieged force to rid itself of
its encumbrances, but Joubert suggested that the non-combatants should
be removed to a certain point outside the zone of fire. This point
was afterwards known in the British camp as "Funkumdorf"; few of the
wounded and very few indeed of the women consented to remove to it.
In fact, the bearing of the British women was here, as in all other
quarters, heroic, and above all praise.
[Illustration: THE LEE-ENFIELD RIFLE, USED BY THE BRITISH TROOPS.
The cartridges B are placed singly in the magazine A, from which a
spring at the bottom forces them upwards till one of them enters the
breech, when it is pushed forward by the bolt D into the chamber C and
fired. The withdrawal of the bolt ejects the spent cartridge. There is
a slide which, when required, cuts off the magazine and allows single
cartridges to be used. F is a cleaner and oilcan carried within the
butt.]
[Illustration: THE MAUSER RIFLE, USED BY THE BOERS.
The cartridges E are carried in a holder, from which, by one pressure
of the thumb, they are released and dispose themselves in proper order
in the magazine A. They are pressed upwards by a spring B, and forced,
one at a time, into the chamber C by the bolt D. The rifle is sometimes
provided with a bayonet, but this the Boers do not carry.]
[Illustration: LADYSMITH CAMP AND UMBULWANA.]
[Sidenote: Assault on the town.]
[Sidenote: [NOV. 9, 1899.]
[Sidenote: NOV. 9-15, 1899.] The Armoured Train Disaster.]
On the 9th the Boers delivered a half-hearted assault upon Ladysmith,
and were repulsed with some loss. The main attack came from the north,
and was met by the King's Royal Rifles and the Rifle Brigade. It was
never pressed home, as the Boers did not approach within a thousand
yards of the British works. They could be seen in all directions just
out of range massed for an advance, but the advance was never made.
There was a furious interchange of rifle and cannon fire, but little
more. The British losses were absurdly small--only three killed and
seventeen wounded. To what extent the enemy suffered it was difficult
to say, but there is reason to think that the Boer losses were far
heavier. When the conflict died away, the naval weapons fired a salute
of twenty-one guns in honour of the Prince of Wales' birthday, and
the troops sang the National Anthem "to the accompaniment of shrapnel
and 100-lb. shells from the Boer guns shrieking through the air."
Altogether the result of the fight was such as to make the enemy
very chary of attacking our works, and to put fresh spirit into the
beleaguered force. On this same day Mr. Kruger threatened that unless
a Transvaal spy, named Marks, who had been arrested and confined in
Ladysmith, were released, he would execute six British officers. The
threat was received with the contempt which it deserved. It appeared
that Marks was a member of the Transvaal detective service who had been
in Natal gathering information before the war. As such his detention
was perfectly justifiable; indeed, in any European struggle he would
have been summarily shot.
[Illustration: THE EYES OF THE ARMY, NATAL POLICE ON PATROL.]
[Sidenote: The Boers at Chieveley.]
On November 12 the first ray of light pierced the deep gloom in Natal,
when the first troops of General Hildyard's brigade landed from the
Roslin Castle at Durban. They were at once sent up country to
Estcourt. On this same day a general movement of Boers coming from the
Free State began upon Central Natal. On the 13th the railway line was
destroyed at Chieveley, one station to the south of Colenso. A force
of about 500 Boers was seen at Chieveley on this day. The armoured
train arrived while they were actually at work destroying the line and
temporarily drove them back. About the same time parties of Boers were
seen at Estcourt, and some alarm began to be felt for the troops at
that place. On the 14th the Lismore Castle and Yorkshire arrived
at Durban, on the 15th the Gascon, and on the 16th the Hawarden
Castle, and landed fresh reinforcements, which were hurried up to
General Hildyard at Estcourt.
[Illustration: THE DUBLIN FUSILIERS CLIMBING INTO THE ARMOURED TRAIN ON
THE DAY OF THE DISASTER.]
[Illustration: FIRING A GUN FROM AN ARMOURED TRAIN.]
[Sidenote: Armoured train wrecked near Chieveley.]
[Sidenote: [NOV. 15, 1899.]
On the 15th a second and easily preventable reverse befell our troops
in Natal, causing general discouragement. This was the derailment
of an armoured train near Chieveley--a catastrophe which had been
foreseen for some days by every private and subaltern in the British
camp. Early on the 15th the train, with a company of Dublin Fusiliers,
half a company of Durban Light Infantry, and one wretched little
muzzle-loading 7-pounder gun from H.M.S. Tartar, mounted on a truck
and manned by bluejackets, left Estcourt. The train passed Frere, the
station south of Chieveley, in safety without seeing any Boers. Just
beyond Chieveley, however, the enemy were made out in some strength
upon a hill. A message reporting this fact was sent back to Estcourt,
whereupon the train was promptly ordered to return to Frere. The order
was obeyed, but when less than two miles from Frere, a hill in front
commanding the line at a distance of only 600 yards, was seen to be
held by the enemy. The Boers gave no sign of life till the train
was close under them, and then opened a tremendous fire from their
rifles and from two field guns and a Maxim automatic one-pounder.
Simultaneously the driver of the locomotive put on all steam and the
train headed furiously down a steep gradient towards Frere. But the
enemy had made full preparations. A large stone had been placed on the
line, and this derailed the leading truck (containing plate-layers'
tools, a breakdown gang, and the guard), an armoured car behind it, and
another truck. The occupants were flung through the air, and several of
them severely injured. The engine, one armoured car, and the truck with
the 7-pounder, kept the rails.
[Sidenote: Endeavours to clear the obstruction.]
Unfortunately the derailed armoured car and truck blocked the line
and had to be removed. The Boer guns had changed their position, and
opened a pitiless fire at a range of 1,300 yards. None the less, the
men of the Durban Light Infantry and the Dublin Fusiliers, led by
Captain Haldane and Mr. Winston Churchill--sometime a lieutenant in
the Army and now acting as a newspaper correspondent--bravely set to
work. Shells and bullets rained upon them, yet, in spite of this, one
truck was dragged backwards and then toppled over so as almost to clear
the line; it still overlapped slightly, and the engine was set to work
to butt it aside. There was great danger of derailing or injuring the
locomotive in this operation. Attempt after attempt was made carefully,
with unsuccess. Each time the engine moved it a little, but only a
little, and the successive pushes failed to clear the line. At last,
however, a well-aimed shell struck the locomotive, setting the wood
with which it was protected on fire, and the driver in despair turned
on full steam. With a grating, tearing sound the engine tore its way
past, but, unhappily, the armoured car and truck behind it parted their
couplings, and could not be got past the obstruction. They had to be
abandoned.
[Illustration: THE DISASTER TO THE ARMOURED TRAIN NEAR CHIEVELEY.
In which Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill, the special correspondent
of The Morning Post, son of the late Lord Randolph Churchill,
distinguished himself by his gallant conduct.]
As many of the wounded as possible were placed on the engine, and
keeping on the further side of it the survivors retreated. The Boers,
however, poured in such a hot fire that order soon vanished from the
British force. The engine had to put on steam to escape; the infantry
were left behind, and dropped here and there crying for help. A few
were doubling to some houses for shelter, when a wounded private raised
the white flag.
[Illustration:
[Photo by Gregory.
GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER, K.C.M.G., K.C.B., V.C.
Born, 1839; entered 60th Rifles, 1858; served in China, 1860; Red
River Expedition, 1870; Ashanti War, 1874; Kaffir War, 1878; Zulu War,
1878-9; Deputy Adjutant-General, 1885; Under Secretary for Ireland,
1887; Adjutant-General, 1890; Lieut.-General, 1891; in command at
Aldershot, 1898; appointed to command of Army Corps, South Africa,
1899. Sir Redvers Buller arrived in Capetown October 31; having matured
his plans he went on to Natal, arriving on November 25.]
[Sidenote: [NOV. 15, 1899.]
[Sidenote: Capture of Mr. Winston Churchill and eighty men.]
At once the Boers galloped in upon the shattered remnants and demanded
their surrender. Churchill was captured with the party; he had been
on the engine, but upon reaching Frere had gallantly jumped down and
gone back into the battle. Five of the British force were killed;
twenty wounded and sixty unwounded prisoners were taken; fifteen
wounded escaped on the engine, and about twenty men who were not on
the engine got away through the bush. Thus needlessly and wastefully
were a hundred men, whom the country could ill spare, thrown away. The
defeat had, however, one excellent result. It thoroughly discredited
the armoured train, and this death trap was used no more. Henceforward
scouting was done by mounted men. The Boer detachment which had
effected this capture was 300 strong, part of a commando of about
3,000 men who were moving south under General Joubert to raid Natal.
The unhappy British prisoners were assembled and marched to Colenso,
whence they were despatched to Pretoria. They were treated with extreme
kindness. The Boer commander complimented them upon their defence, and
permitted them to see the guns which had wrought their discomfiture.
These were of the latest type, quick-firers, using fixed ammunition
(i.e., with shell and cartridge made up together as in rifle
ammunition), and of much greater range than British field guns.
[Illustration: FRERE BRIDGE, DESTROYED BY THE BOERS, November 24.]
[Illustration:
[Photo by the Biograph Co.
AT CHIEVELEY: SIGNALLING FOR REINFORCEMENTS.]
[Sidenote: The Estcourt garrison in danger.]
[Sidenote: NOV. 15-20, 1899.] The Boers in Central Natal.]
In face of the Boer advance, the position of the garrison at Estcourt,
which did not reach 3,000 men, became very serious. The place was
commanded by heights from which the Boer long-range guns could bombard
with effect, and from the numerical weakness of the British force and
the want of water these heights could not be occupied by our men. There
were no cavalry or mounted infantry beyond a couple of hundred men
to meet and keep touch with the enemy. The only artillery available
was composed of one or two naval 12-pounders and the Natal Government
obsolete 9-pounder muzzle-loaders. The Home Authorities in their
wisdom had decided that this was to be an infantry war; and the result
was that the Boers by their extreme mobility, and the ubiquity which
resulted from that mobility, were able to do what they liked. They
could collect great quantities of cattle and loot, could isolate the
British garrisons in Natal, and almost invest them. Had they determined
to destroy the railway, the culverts, and the railway bridges south of
Colenso the damage and delay caused would have been very great, but for
some inscrutable reason they did little beyond wrecking the iron bridge
at Frere and tearing up the rails in one or two places.
[Illustration: KAFFIRS DIGGING A TRENCH FOR THE BRITISH AT CHIEVELEY.]
[Illustration:
[Photo by Elliott & Fry.
MR. WINSTON LEONARD SPENCER CHURCHILL
Is the eldest son of the late Lord Randolph Churchill, and inherits
many of his father's brilliant qualities. He was born on November 30,
1874, and is therefore only a little over twenty-six years old. He
was educated at Harrow and Sandhurst, and entered the Army in 1895.
He served with the Spanish forces in Cuba in that year, and saw much
Indian service with the Malakand Field Force in 1897; was orderly
officer to the late Sir William Lockhart, and was attached to the 21st
Lancers with the Nile Expeditionary Force in 1898, and present at the
battle of Khartoum. On November 15, 1899, when an armoured train was
captured by the Boers at Chieveley, Lieut. Churchill distinguished
himself by his bravery; he was taken prisoner and deported to Pretoria,
where he remained in prison at the State Model School for many weeks.
On January 14 he escaped, and, after enduring very many hardships, he
reached Delagoa Bay, and again went to the front.]
[Illustration: PRETORIA.
Showing in the foreground (above the point marked) the Model Schools
where the British officers were imprisoned.]
[Sidenote: [NOV. 20-22, 1899.]
[Sidenote: Shelling of Mooi River Camp.]
As the transports reached Durban a considerable force of British troops
assembled at Estcourt between November 16 and 19. Two battalions
of infantry, Bethune's mounted infantry--raised in Natal--and two
batteries of artillery were the first to arrive. On the 18th there
was skirmishing between the Boers and the British troops a couple of
miles to the north of Estcourt. The enemy raised the Transvaal Flag
at Weenen and scoured the whole country on both sides of the railway
between Colenso and Estcourt. On the 19th Boers were seen at Highlands,
two stations to the south of Estcourt and close to Mooi River, where a
small British force was encamped. It was decided to attack the enemy
under cover of darkness, and on the 20th 900 British infantry, 450
mounted men and two naval guns moved out from Estcourt under Colonel
Hinde. But at the last minute news was received that the Boers were far
stronger than had been supposed. Colonel Hinde hesitated to attack,
and the opportunity was lost. On the 21st the British column tardily
approached the enemy's position, and was about two miles off it when
intelligence arrived that another Boer commando was approaching the
railway from the west. Fearful of being cut off, after indulging in a
little skirmishing with the Boers the British fell back to the railway,
entrained, and retired precipitately to Estcourt. In the evening, the
railway and telegraph south of Estcourt were broken and the British
force there isolated. On the same day Mooi River Camp, where were 4,000
or 5,000 British troops, was shelled at extreme range. The boldness of
the Boers is proved by the fact now known that they ventured upon this
daring act in the face of a far superior force of disciplined troops
with a second superior force to their rear.
[Illustration: LANCERS AT NOTTINGHAM ROAD.
The most southerly point reached by the Boers in Natal.]
[Illustration: THE CLOCK OF CHIEVELEY CAMP.
The cartridge-case of one of the large naval guns was used as a bell, a
sword serving as clapper to strike the hours.]
By this Boer advance a small party of Natal Police, under Captain
Cayzer, who had gone to Weenen to maintain signalling communication
with Ladysmith, were all but cut off. They had an exciting time of it.
Having climbed a mountain 5,000 feet high and set up their instruments,
just as night fell a native brought them news that they were in the
very midst of 1,200 Boers. Fortunately the night was pitch dark,
pouring with rain, and in the plash of the deluge they were able to
steal their way unperceived down a precipitous disused Kaffir track.
At the bottom, however, it was found that Captain Cayzer's horse had
broken its fetlock. One of the police took the Captain up behind, and
in this plight the party rode before the enemy first into Greytown and
then on to Pietermaritzburg.
[Sidenote: Boer advance checked at Nottingham Road.]
The most southerly point reached by small raiding parties of the Boers
was Nottingham Road, twelve miles to the south of Mooi River Camp. Here
they looted farms, destroyed the farmers' furniture, and did an immense
amount of wanton damage.
[Illustration: TOUGH WORK FOR TOMMY; DRAGGING A HEAVY GUN UP A HILL.
[From an Instantaneous Photograph.]
[Illustration: BRINGING IN THE WOUNDED FROM THE WILLOW GRANGE FIGHT.]
[Sidenote: The Willow Grange fight.]
[Sidenote: NOV. 22, 1899.] The Action at Willow Grange.]
[Sidenote: [NOV. 22-24, 1899.]
To check this advance an effort was at last made on the 22nd by the
troops at Estcourt. In the afternoon of that day the West Yorkshires,
East Surreys, and Durban Light Infantry, with a naval 12-pounder,
moved to Willow Grange. The gun was dragged up a steep hill known as
Klobber's Kop. The Boers were in position upon Brynbella Hill, three
miles away, and fired a couple of shots at the gun. During the night
the column was strengthened by all the available mounted troops--two
more battalions and a battery of artillery. The West Yorkshires and the
East Surreys then advanced to storm the Boer position at daybreak in
a terrific hailstorm, during which hailstones fell as big as eggs and
wounded two or three men. They climbed the slopes of Brynbella and were
close to the Boer camp when a picket challenged and opened fire. In a
moment the British troops with fixed bayonets were upon the picket,
but the Boers in camp had taken the alarm and fled along a ridge which
extended for about a thousand yards, to the main force, now seen to be
posted at the further extremity of the ridge. A heavy fire was opened
upon the West Yorkshires, and the battalion promptly took shelter
behind a low stone wall. Here the Boer guns shelled them with effect,
while as the naval gun was unfortunately unable to reach the enemy, the
British had no artillery of their own to reply. The position was quite
untenable; there was nothing left except for the infantry to retire.
The retreat was covered by the mounted men, and by a squadron of the
Imperial Light Horse; it was not effected without difficulty, as the
Boers poured in a tremendous fire, moving their guns forward to shell
the infantry. The British losses were eleven killed and sixty-seven
wounded, while Major Hobbs and eight men were taken prisoners. Major
Hobbs had stayed behind to give aid to a wounded man. The affair was
far from satisfactory, as the British force, with a great numerical
preponderance, failed to dislodge or capture the enemy's commando. It
had, however, in the end the desired result, since the Boers became
anxious about their retreat and at once began to fall back.
[Illustration: COLENSO RAILWAY BRIDGE.]
[Illustration: BRINGING A BOER MESSENGER INTO THE BRITISH CAMP.
Bearers of messages between the opposing commanders, and in many cases
ordinary prisoners of war, are blindfolded before being led into
camp, in order that they may not be able to report particulars of the
defences.]
[Illustration:
[Photo by Knight.
GETTING A WAR-BALLOON READY: ADJUSTING THE TELEGRAPHIC APPARATUS.]
[Sidenote: NOV. 24-30, 1899.] British Concentration Effected.]
[Sidenote: Arrival of Lord Dundonald and General Buller.]
This foray was not without its comic side. On November 24 the 6,000
British troops at Mooi River manned the trenches and prepared to do or
die, under the impression that the enemy, in overpowering force, was
all around. At that very moment the Boer commandos, 3,000 strong, were
scuttling back to Colenso with their plunder, only too pleased to be
unmolested. The high-water mark of the Boer advance had been reached.
On the 24th the Estcourt force pushed forward to Frere unopposed,
but found that further progress was stopped by the destruction of the
railway bridge over the Blaauwkrantz. The engineers at once went to
work to build a trestle bridge. In the next two days the railway was
repaired between Estcourt and Mooi River. On the 30th Lord Dundonald,
who had arrived and taken over the command of the mounted troops,
pushed forward with 1,400 mounted infantry and a battery of artillery
to Colenso, and drew a very heavy fire from the Boer positions. After
reconnoitring these he fell back without the loss of a man. On the same
day the railway bridge at Colenso was blown up by the Boers.
[Illustration: BRINGING UP A BATTERY OF FIELD ARTILLERY.]
In the meantime, during the closing weeks of November and the early
days of December, no less than sixteen battalions of infantry, two
regiments of cavalry, and five batteries of field artillery had
arrived at Durban, and with them had come General Buller to take over
the command. Added to the 4,000 men already under arms in the colony
outside Ladysmith, they gave an available British force in the field of
a little over 21,000. In this force the infantry numbered 18,000, the
cavalry and mounted infantry 2,600, and the artillery 750 with 30 guns.
A mountain battery armed with six miserable little screw seven-pounder
muzzle-loaders should be added to this total.
[Illustration:
[Photo by Debenham & Smith.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEOFFRY BARTON, C.B.,
Took part in the Ashanti War of 1873-4, and in the Zulu War of 1879 in
command of the 4th Battalion of the Natal Native Contingent. He again
saw active service in the Egyptian War of 1882 as D.A.Q.G., and went
through the battles of Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir. During the Soudan
campaign of 1885 he was Assistant Military Secretary to Sir Gerald
Graham. He commands the 6th Brigade of the South African Field Force.]
[Illustration:
[Photo by Evelyn, Aldershot.
MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY JOHN THORNTON HILDYARD, C.B.
Had the command, until the beginning of the war, of the 3rd Infantry
Brigade at Aldershot. Originally destined for the Navy, in which he
served from 1859 to 1867; three years later he entered the Army, and
in 1876 became Captain in the Highland Light Infantry. From that time
forward his advance was rapid, and he attained his present rank in
1899. He served with the Egyptian Expedition in 1882, and was present
at Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir. From 1893 to 1898 he was Commandant of
the Staff College. Commands the 2nd brigade in South Africa.]
[Sidenote: [NOV. 1899.]
[Sidenote: Comparison of the opposing armies.]
Certain points must now be noted as bearing upon the adequacy of this
force for the work which was before it--the work of clearing a way to
Ladysmith. In the first place the strength of the enemy was believed
to be at least 25,000, and might easily be nearer 35,000. General
Buller was thus, even adding in as available the 10,000 effectives
at Ladysmith, by no means certain of outnumbering the enemy. In the
second place he would have to act on the offensive, and would have to
assail or "turn" strong Boer positions. To "turn" a position, it need
scarcely be said, is to work round it. But positions held, as were
these, by good and mobile troops cannot be successfully assailed, and
certainly cannot be turned unless there is a considerable advantage of
numbers on the assailants' side. In point of mobility General Buller's
infantry could not compare with the Boers, who were, of course, to
a man mounted, who slept in the open and needed no such elaborate
transport system as is required in the British Army. While the British
soldier was moving five miles the Boer could cover fifteen. Again, in
artillery, which must be used freely to pave the way for an infantry
attack, General Buller's army was very weak. The usual proportion in
European armies is five guns to every thousand men; he had only thirty
field guns, instead of 105, to 21,000 men. Finally, his mounted force
was inadequate, and his transport system hastily improvised.
[Illustration:
[Photo by Elliott & Fry.
MAJOR-GENERAL THE HON. NEVILLE GERALD LYTTELTON, C.B.,
Took command of the 2nd Infantry Brigade at Aldershot last year. He was
born in 1845, and was educated at Eton. He joined the Rifle Brigade in
1865, and served with it in Canada and India, seeing a good deal of
active service. A.D.C. to Lord Spencer, Viceroy of India, from 1868 to
1873, and Military Secretary to Sir John Adye, Governor of Gibraltar,
and to Lord Reay, Governor of Bombay. He went through the Egyptian
campaign of 1882, and commanded a brigade in the Nile Expedition
of 1898, being present at the battle of Khartoum. He was Assistant
Military Secretary at the War Office during 1897 and 1898, and now
commands the 4th Brigade in South Africa.]
All these considerations militated strongly against any substantial
success. It is not known whether he asked of the Home Government a
larger force, but if he did it was not granted him. Yet 50,000 men with
200 field guns would have been not one whit too great a strength for
the proper performance of his task. Here as elsewhere in South Africa
the disasters which befell British arms may be traced to these three
causes--under-estimating the enemy's force, attempting to effect most
difficult operations in a difficult country with inadequate strength,
and failure to observe the precautions which the lessons of the past
have shown to be necessary.
[Sidenote: NOV.-DEC. 11, 1899.] Composition of the British Force.]
In the last week of November, General Buller's army was reinforced by
two naval 4·7-inch guns and fourteen 12-pounders, which had been sent
ashore from the Terrible for the defence of Durban. These weapons,
from their great range and extreme power, were a valuable addition to
the British artillery, though, mounted on improvised carriages and
drawn painfully by oxen, they could not compare in mobility with our
field guns. They were manned by bluejackets, who proved themselves
formidable marksmen.
[Illustration:
[Photo by Van Hoepen.
SOME OF THE MEN WHO KEPT US OUT OF LADYSMITH.
Boer farmers with their servants encamped on a hill overlooking the
town.]
[Illustration: BOER COMMANDO WITH MAXIM GUN DRAWN BY HORSES.]
[Sidenote: The forward movement begins.]
On December 11th everything was ready for a forward movement. The
troops were disposed as follows:--
HILDYARD'S BRIGADE. LYTTELTON'S BRIGADE.
2nd Royal West Surrey. 2nd Scottish Rifles.
2nd West Yorkshire. 1st Durham Light Infantry.
2nd East Surrey. 1st Rifle Brigade.
2nd Devonshire. 3rd King's Royal Rifles.
14th and 66th Field Batteries.
BARTON'S BRIGADE. HART'S BRIGADE.
1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 1st Connaught Rangers.
2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers. 1st & 2nd Rl. Dublin Fusiliers.
2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers. 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
2nd Royal Fusiliers. 1st Borderers.
63rd and 64th Field Batteries.
DUNDONALD'S MOUNTED BRIGADE.
1st Royal Dragoons.
13th Hussars.
Composite Regiment of Mounted Infantry.
Bethune's Mounted Infantry.
Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry.
South African Light Horse.
7th Field Battery.
[Sidenote: [DEC. 12-14, 1899.]
Barton's brigade was the first to move out from Frere Camp. At dawn on
December 12 it advanced to a kopje three miles south of Colenso. From
this kopje the ground sloped smoothly and gently down to the River
Tugela, hidden in its deep bed by scrub and brushwood.
[Sidenote: Boer position at Colenso.]
To the north in a hollow lay the tin roofs of the little village of
Colenso and the road bridge, which the Boers had left intact. Across
the river the outline of the enemy's works could be vaguely made out by
powerful glasses along the slopes of two strongly fortified kopjes and
beyond these on the high hills which rise to the north-west and which
are known as Red Hill and Grobler's Kloof. At Fort Wylie, on a low hill
just across the river, was another strong Boer position close to the
railway and commanding the two bridges. Away on the extreme British
right rose the steep purple slopes of Mount Inhlawe on the southern
bank of the river. This mountain towered to a height of over 4,000
feet, dominating the whole neighbourhood. From its slopes and summit an
enfilading fire could be directed upon any force attempting to cross
the river near Colenso. It was held in strength by the Boers, who had
built a military bridge over the Tugela to the north of it, though the
fact was as yet unknown to the British. Nearer Colenso were the heights
of Monte Cristo and Hlangwane, both, like Inhlawe, held by the Boers.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING BULLER'S THREE UNSUCCESSFUL AND FINAL
SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO DRIVE THE BOERS FROM THEIR POSITION ON THE
TUGELA.]
The naval guns followed close on the heels of Barton, and took up a
position facing Colenso on the evening of the 12th. On December 13 they
opened fire on the Boer entrenchments at 7,200 yards, giving particular
attention to the two kopjes. No reply could be drawn from the enemy.
From time to time small groups of Boers were seen scattering as shells
fell, but except for this there was silence in their positions.
On the 14th Hildyard's, Lyttelton's, Hart's, and Dundonald's brigades
followed in the steps of Barton's, and encamped to the north of
Chieveley, in sight of Colenso. The naval guns advanced somewhat and
again bombarded the kopjes and Fort Wylie, at times also shelling a
laager which could be seen 10,000 yards away, on a ridge beyond the
river. Once more the Boers maintained absolute silence, and very few of
them were seen. The general impression was that they were falling back,
and that they did not intend to hold the line of the Tugela.
[Sidenote: DEC. 14, 1899.] Preparations for the Great Battle.]
[Sidenote: Buller determines to attack.]
That evening General Buller determined to force the passage of the
river with all his troops on the 15th. The mounted troops under
Dundonald were to occupy Hlangwane Hill, covered by the 7th Battery;
the English [Hildyard's] and Irish [Hart's] Brigades, supported by
artillery, to advance towards the river and endeavour to cross by the
fords, Hart's Brigade by the Bridle Drift, above Colenso, Hildyard's by
the main ford close to the iron railway bridge. The 7th Battery was,
if possible, to take up a position on Hlangwane Hill so as to enfilade
the enemy's position. Barton's Brigade was to take ground between
Hildyard's and Dundonald's, Lyttelton's between Hildyard's in the
British centre and Hart's on the British left, ready to support either.
The naval 4·7's and four of the 12-pounders, under Captain Jones of
H.M.S. Forte, took up a position on the top of an eminence two miles
from Colenso, prepared to set to work when the advance began.
[Illustration: THORNEYCROFT'S MOUNTED INFANTRY PACKING KIT AT MOOI
RIVER CAMP, BEFORE GOING INTO ACTION.]
[Illustration: STEAM ROAD LOCOMOTIVES USED BY THE BRITISH GENERALS IN
SOUTH AFRICA TO BRING UP SUPPLIES.]
[Illustration:
[Photo by Lieut. Crawford.
LETTERS FROM HOME: DISTRIBUTING THE BRITISH MAIL IN CAMP.]
[Illustration: PANORAMA OF THE BATTLE OF COLENSO.
[From a Sketch by Capt. W. S. Carey.
This picture includes about 2½ miles of the river, which divided the
contending armies. It is taken from behind the British positions,
looking almost due north towards Ladysmith, which lies behind the hills
a little to the left of the centre. In the foreground are the 4·7-inch
naval guns being brought into position by ox-teams. To the left is an
armoured train, and in the extreme right a portion of a Kaffir kraal.]
[Illustration: DEATH OF LIEUTENANT ROBERTS, ONLY SON OF FIELD-MARSHAL
LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR, IN AN ATTEMPT TO RECOVER THE ABANDONED GUNS
AT COLENSO.
Lieut. Roberts is seen on the extreme right of the picture. He fell
mortally wounded; Capt. Congreve returned to his assistance, and
brought him in.]
