Queenstown is a very pretty little place, most charmingly situated, but tactically indefensible, unless by a force so large that there could be no excuse for shutting itself up. The town lies in a broad basin surrounded by hills that would need to be held against the enemy, and a perimeter of at least fourteen miles would require to be occupied in order to present a really good defence. The garrison at the time of my arrival consisted of a Naval Brigade with two 12-pounders, and the headquarters and four companies of the Eoyal Berkshire Regiment with the Mounted Infantry company of that excellent corps. In addition to this there were sundry detachments of Cape Mounted Rifles, Cape Police and Volunteers. The C.M.R. had also their battery of six 7-pounder muzzle-loading screw guns, as well as a battery of Maxims. A couple of antique 9-pounder muzzle-loading field guns under Second-Iieut. Reeves, Royal Artillery, completed this formidable array, amounting in all to some 1300 of all ranks, with ten guns of sorts and six Maxims. Practically speaking, the two naval guns were efficient weapons and the remainder more or less useless—with the exception of the Maxims.
Under snch circumstances it is scarcely to be wondered at that the military authorities regarded the defence of Queenstown as an impossibility, and contented themselves with making an entrenched camp to be defended without regard for anything else than the protection of the troops themselves. This entrenched camp was, however, constructed on an ill-chosen position, commanded on all sides, and even had it been tenable, it failed to fulfil the only object that could justify its existence—namely, to deny to the enemy the use of the railway. It was, moreover, so close to the town—only about 800 yards from the south-western outskirts—that in any fighting that might take place the latter must be compromised. This error was quite inexcusable, because an excellent position was ready to hand at a distance of about one and a half miles from that chosen, and from it the railway would have been commanded at a point where there was a bridge over the river. It was an almost ideal position, having towards the river about 800 yards from the northwestern face of the kopje a natural horseshoe-shaped parapet that seemed as if it had once formed part of some great line of Roman entrenchments. Water was handy and good, and the extent of the position was suitable to the numbers of the garrison. A branch line such as was actually constructed to the chosen camping ground could as easily have been brought to the place suggested. As for the entrenched camp itself, looking at it one could not help wondering whether it had been laid out with the idea of being defended with flintlock muskets against Kaffirs armed with assegais. It had, for example, curious little circular bastions at the angles presumably intended te afford flank defence to the adjacent lines of low parapets. In the days of Marlborough these would have been quite useful. There is many a true word spoken in jest, and of such were the remarks of a “ bluejacket ” engaged in digging the trenches. A comrade inquired, “What are you doing, Bill?” The reply was, “Digging my bally grave.” It struck me that if it should be the ill-fortune of the speaker to take part in the defence of the camp, it was far from improbable that this prediction might be fulfilled. For myself, I made up my mind that if Queenstown should be attacked I would evacuate the place, if possible, before it was too late.
A couple of days after my arrival it was my good fortune to witness the detraining of a detachment of the Cape Mounted Rifles, who formed a most valuable accession to our little force. I never saw a more workmanlike body of men; smart, active fellows in the prime of life, and evidently in a most satisfactory military condition. The discipline seemed to be excellent, and the men the quickest and most willing workers that it is possible to imagine. To see them detraining their horses and off-loading their stores and equipment was a positive treat. There were Kaffirs helping, and one might see two great brawny fellows taking gentle hold of a case and bearing it sedately between them to its destination, whilst single riflemen simply chucked similar cases on their backs, ran with them, and were back again for others before the two blacks had deposited their first burden. The Cape Mounted Bifleman is a first-rate fighting man, and a downright good soldier all round. The corps has but one fault, so far as I could judge, and this is that the officers are in many cases for too old.
The inhabitants of Queenstown are Britishers of the British, and the people of other districts lying immediately south and east of it are similarly, for the most part, British and loyal to the core. But northwards, towards the Free State and Basutoland borders, the people are chiefly Dutch, and disloyal almost to a man. Two facts impress themselves upon the visitor to South Africa more and more as he gains, on the spot, greater knowledge of the subjects involved. The first is that the present war, and all the long series of troubles that have preceded it, is due entirely to the South African question having for so long been regarded and treated as a “Party” one in the British Parliament. My meaning will be understood by any who have read Mr. Spencer Wilkinson’s little book, “British Policy in South Africa.” The title of this brochure must have been selected in an ironical spirit, since what it most distinctly proves is that there never has been any such thing as a “ British Policy in South Africa.” The second fact is that the British Colonists and the British Afrikanders, be they English, Irish, Scotch, or Welsh, Conservatives, Liberals, or Radicals, are practically unanimous in their dislike and contempt for the Party Politicians who have injured them, whilst at the same time they are filled with an enthusiastic loyalty to the Queen and to the Empire such as is seldom met with in any part of Great Britain herself. Imperialistic loyalty is the paramount sentiment amongst all the Britishers in this country. They have lived on and endured much for it in the past—and they have shown recently that as many of them as the Imperial Government would employ were willing to risk their lives for it.
For many years past the complaint has been that a Dutch, or at all events a Boer name is a necessary qualification for any public appointment in the Cape Colony. Similarly, in everyday life the " Bond ” has so asserted itself that the Britisher has had to make the best of belonging to a practically unrepresented minority in a country nominally ruled by her Majesty the Queen-Empress. After the war, when the entire situation comes under review, our statesmen must look to it that the “equal rights for all men,” which obviously represents the one thing especially needed for the future peace and prosperity of these territories, shall no longer be permitted to mean “ all except the Britisher.” It is obviously ridiculous that the loyal subjects of the Paramount Power should occupy a position in colonial affairs subordinate to that of the disloyal representatives of a hostile element within the Queen’s dominions. A parallel may be drawn with the condition of affairs which even yet prevails to some extent in Malta, where the mere fact of being a Britisher, or more especially a soldier, has furnished sufficient reason for being denied even a fair hearing in court, as a preliminary to receiving an unjust sentence. It may be a surprise to many to learn that the grievances of the Transvaal Uitlanders have exceeded those of many British colonists in the Cape territory only in so far that the latter have had votes which have nevertheless been useless to them. This was not formerly the case. The isolated British farmer amongst a crowd of Boers was, until after 1881, usually good friends with all—or, if otherwise, for personal, not national, reasons. The Boers were taught to despise the British, and in their ignorance have based their contempt upon a conception of our character that was not justified by the actual facts. This erroneous conception was not, however, any less pernicious in its effects than if it had been a veritable one, and the growth of the Afrikander Bond is not the least of the many evils that have been fostered by it. The origin and aims of the Afrikander Bond have been clearly explained by Mr. Theo. Schreiner.* The fact that this gentleman, who is a brother of the Premier, should, under the circumstances, have come forward to expose the conspiracy, gives even greater weight to his arguments than they must under any circumstances have commanded upon account of their remarkably able construction. Guilty the Afrikander Bond undeniably is, and the mere fact that a disloyal section has for long years been conspiring to overthrow British supremacy is sufficient to condemn the British Governments that have sat still with their hands folded until the canker has grown so deep-seated that a terrible operation has become necessary in order to eradicate it. A few years ago comparatively mild treatment would have sufficed.
The consequences of weakness and vacillation in the past have not only involved great loss of life and much ill-feeling during the war, but, in addition to this, numbers of her Majesty’s loyal subjects in the Cape Colony and Natal are suffering losses which the compensation which it may be assumed will be given them, can never make good. The same thing applies to British farmers in the Orange Free State, but with the difference that, legally, at all events, they are not entitled to compensation. Morally, however, they have at least equal claims to favourable consideration.
Large numbers of colonial border farmers, and many also from the Free State, were daily arriving in Queenstown ; and unless handsome compensation is hereafter awarded to them, the great majority must be ruined completely. It speaks volumes for the loyalty of these men that, in spite of the personal misfortunes entailed upon themselves, they were nevertheless unanimous in approving the straightforward determination of the British Government to prove itself the paramount Power. Many who were until recently rich men will find themselves obliged to resume the struggling existence of their earlier lives; but they console themselves
20
in the Boer War.
with the reflection that they will do so under different conditions to those of the last few years. At least they will be able to go about their work free from the insults and petty annoyances that they have hitherto so constantly experienced at the hands of their Boer neighbours. The tales told of personal encounters between Britons and Boers, more especially during the six months just before the war, would be amusing but for the shame that one feels in remembering the conditions that gave rise to them. The Boers have been in a position to treat the British as an inferior race, merely existing on sufferance in territories that did not rightfully belong to them, and from which they were soon to be ejected bag and baggage. The British farmer in Burghersdorp, Aliwal, Barkly East, and many other districts, has long been made to feel himself an Uitlander. To realize what has been the situation it is necessary to have heard it described by those who have been themselves subjected to its evils. The facts simply beggar description. Nor has Boer disloyalty been confined to the lower classes and to the politicians. Even the country magistrates have been implicated, and their administration of “ justice ” has been moulded accordingly.
On Tuesday evening, November 7, my mare Jess, and the “ weagon,” under charge of Arendse, arrived safely after an eventful journey of five days. All three of these valuable possessions appeared to have survived the ordeal without having sustained any damage, and the next day I commenced the education
21
With Seven Generals
of Jess by riding her about the camp, and thus getting her accustomed to troops. Soon afterwards I had opportunities of teaching her to stand fire, when Brabant’s Horse commenced musketry practice. Nine horses out of ten can be made steady under fire if only they are taken the right way. The proper thing to do is to bring a horse gradually up to the firing point whilst the firing is going on, and to let him graze now and then as he advances. Eventually he will graze quietly when close alongside the men who are shooting. The same thing applies to artillery fire. Jess became perfect. I have several times sat on her back, with the reins on her neck, observing artillery fire through my glasses, within half a dozen yards of the flank of the battery engaged. Of hostile fire, unless at very close range, horses as a rule take very little notice, unless bullets actually pass close to their ears or strike the ground at their very feet. A shake of the head or a slight start is even then the most that is likely to result.
At this time it was a cause of general surprise that the Free State Boers still continued inactive. Beyond crossing the Orange River and raiding a few border farms, the enemy had as yet made no sign. The way lay open to them to advance when or where they chose. Not one single British or Colonial soldier was in position between Queenstown and De Aar, a distance of about 200 miles, so that, even if the Boers were not desirous of risking a fight, there was nothing to prevent them from invading our territory
22
in the Boer War.
with absolute impunity anywhere within this unguarded interval. Many reasons were suggested to account for this prolonged inactivity; but that which found most supporters was that the enemy feared complications with the Basutos. Certainly, had the Basutos risen against the Boers, the situation would have become extremely awkward. It would have been our duty to protect our enemies from our Mends, and we should have been utterly powerless to do so. Fortunately, the suggested complication failed to arise, and the need for speculation as to the causes of Boer inactivity was removed by the long-expected invasion being actually commenced.
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