The commando which had for so long been lying inactive at Rouxville, crossed the Orange Eiver on November 13, and occupied Aliwal North with 450 men and one gun. Commandant Olivier lost no time in issuing a proclamation declaring Aliwal and district to be Free State territory, and detailing the obligations and penalties attached to the performance or neglect of burgher and civic duties. The Transvaal and Free States flags were hoisted with due formality, and British subjects were given fourteen days’ grace in which to swear allegiance to their new masters or quit the country. In actual fact, the fourteen days referred to represented a paper arrangement only, since in the case of all prominent citizens forty-eight hours appears to have been the period generally enforced, either by official notice or by private intimation that it would be wiser to clear forthwith.
The magistrate, Mr. Hugo, seems to have behaved exceedingly well, and, indeed, to have shown not only a strict regard for his duty, but also a courageous determination to brave all the risks that his conduct might involve. Accordingly, he circulated notices calling a meeting of prominent loyalists, with the double purpose of discouraging the enemy by an expression of adverse opinion, and, secondly, of giving the farmers a chance of formally recording their choice in favour of the Imperial Government by a united decision to resist, by force, if necessary, any attempts to “commandeer” them for service with the invaders. This most excellent intention was frustrated by the shameful conduct of two Dutch “loyalists,” one a member of Parliament and the other a justice of the peace. These gentlemen, who had hitherto been loud in their protestations of unswerving loyalty to the Grown, most shamefully betrayed the proposed meeting, which they themselves had promised to attend. Mr. Hugo was given two hours to clear out, and his assistant, Mr. Van Beenen, the same time. Both arrived at Queenstown on Friday, November 17. Mr. Hugo was obliged to leave his wife and children behind him and simply flee for his life. The English refugees, of whom I met many, were unanimous in their praise of Mr. Hugo, whose conduct they declared to have been most plucky. The magistrate’s first adventure with the Boers was really a rather amusing one. It appears that the enemy had for a long time been firmly persuaded that Aliwal Bridge had been mined or otherwise prepared for destruction. In order, therefore, to frustrate any British intention of blowing them into the air along with the bridge, the astute burghers caused the magistrate and assistant-magistrate of Aliwal to stand in the roadway in the centre of the bridge whilst the invaders defiled by them. The scene was much enjoyed by the Boers and by their sympathizers—more especially by the latter, who were invariably most malignant and insulting in their behaviour to the loyalists. These consist almost entirely of genuine Britishers. The colonists of Dutch extraction consisted, to the extent of one-half, of persons openly in favour of the enemy, whilst, of the other half, the majority were “sitting on the fence,” and the small remainder were really loyal to the Crown, because they saw that the interests of South Africa at large could best be served by supporting British supremacy.
Mr. Hugo had hitherto been suspected of entertaining Afrikander tendencies, and there is no doubt that up to a certain point his countrymen commanded his sympathy. He deprecated every step that seemed likely to provoke a warlike solution of the South African question, and consequently performed his duties with less firmness than many people considered desirable. Perhaps in the past he may have been wrong, but, at all events, he made it perfectly clear that under the conditions that had since arisen his loyalty was beyond question. It would have been easy for Mr. Hugo to retire from Aliwal before the climax was reached, or, even remaining at his post to the last, to take his departure then without any specific demonstration of his opinions. By following either of these courses he could have avoided estranging himself from the Dutch or compromising his official relations with the British. He seems, however, to have preferred acting precisely as might have been expected of him had he been an Englishman. The assistant magistrate, Mr. Van Beenen, has acted in similar fashion, standing loyally by his chief to the utmost extent of his power and opportunities. It should not be forgotten that, acting as they did, these two gentlemen made themselves liable, under Commandant Olivier’s proclamation, to the penalty of death. The stand which they made was, therefore, specially meritorious.
The occupation of Aliwal was followed next day by that of Burghersdorp, the forces employed consisting of contingents from the Bethulie and Bouxville commandos, reinforced by not less than a hundred colonial Boers drawn from the Aliwal district. The rebel Boers adopted colours of their own—blue badges with a thin yellow stripe. The forward movement of the enemy was now temporarily arrested, for what reason no one seemed able to explain. Disturbing rumours from Basutoland were plentiful enough, and, if the half of the allegations made were true, there was quite sufficient to account for the delay. Upon the other hand, it is not impossible that the reconnaissances carried out with the armoured train may have led the enemy to imagine that strong forces were on the move from Queenstown to oppose them. Be the cause what it may, the fact remains that, although Stormberg Junction lay at the mercy of the Boers, they refrained for the time from occupying, or even approaching, that station. Scouts, indeed, were seen, but no signs of a commando.
The proper reply for us to have made to the occupation of Burghersdorp was obviously the re-occupation of Stormberg Junction, but no reinforcements having yet arrived, this proceeding was considered impossible. This was a most regrettable error. Reinforcements were already close at hand, and obviously it would have been a lighter task to relieve a garrison holding Stormberg against the enemy than to drive out a hostile force from the same position. However, we contented ourselves with blowing up a railway bridge about halfway between Stormberg and Burghersdorp.
On Wednesday, the 15th November, Major Maxwell, R.E., conducted a reconnaissance with the armoured train as far as the broken railway bridge, and kindly permitted me to accompany him. The train consisted of two trucks only, and conveyed a detachment of the Royal Berkshire Regiment under Lieutenant Gossett, together with sundry engineers and railway men. We saw no sign of the enemy with the exception of a single scout who was prowling about near the bridge and galloped quickly away as soon as he saw the train approaching. The men were much disappointed at the enemy’s failure to put in an appearance. I was particularly struck by the quiet business-like conduct of the detachment, and had every confidence that, in case of a fight, they would give a good account of themselves. It was my good fortune to see the Berkshire men in action at Tofrek (NcNeill’s zariba) in the Suakin campaign of 1885, and found the battalion in South Africa made of the same sterling stuff.
All our attention soon became fastened upon the absorbing question of when an advance would take place. General Gatacre arrived on the 18th with his staff and a portion of the Royal Irish Rifles, more troops being immediately expected. Delay seemed very dangerous, since it tended to encourage the colonial Boers to cast in their lot with the enemy. We heard, on good authority, that at Barkly East eight hundred colonials had gone into laager, but it was not known with absolute certainty even that such a laager had been formed; consequently rumours as to intended movements by the rebels were generally treated as untrustworthy. That something was doing in the Barkly district was clear, but the exact nature of the disturbance had not yet transpired. The departure of the Naval Brigade, who were withdrawn on Thursday (16th) to East London for embarkation to Cape Town en route for Modder River, was no doubt necessary, since otherwise it would scarcely have been permitted, but it is none the less most regrettable. With the reinforcement that he brought with him, and the Naval Brigade still at his disposal, General Gatacre might safely have advanced forthwith to Stormberg. The moral effect of leaving the invaders in undisturbed possession of Burghersdorp, and with no opposition to their further advance, was distinctly prejudicial to our interests.
With the arrival of the General and the battalion of Riflemen, the danger of an attack being delivered on Queenstown appeared to have vanished, and every one felt easier. Sir William had most evidently lost none of that boundless activity which earned for him in Egypt the nickname of “Back-acher.” From the moment of his arrival the General permitted no grass to grow under his feet, and was very much en Evidence. He showed himself to the troops at church parade on Sunday, and in conclusion of a speech, in which he introduced himself in characteristic fashion, he communicated the good news of the highly successful action at Ladysmith on the Prince of Wales's birthday. He had thus an opportunity of making friends with the small body of troops that at the time represented his division, and he made the most of it. Cheerfulness at all times, and a spice of dry humour upon appropriate occasions, will always appeal to the soldier, and, although the men knew their future commander, by repute, to be a hard task-master, it was very evident that they unanimously elected him a popular favourite. Popularity will do much to ensure willingness and zeal in the execution of a stiff programme of work.
On Tuesday, November 21, Sir William Gatacre went by rail to the front to reconnoitre the position on Bushman's Hoek then occupied by the mounted company of the Kaffrarian Rifles, and said to be the appointed place of concentration for the Free State commandos about Burghersdorp, with their colonial adherents assembling in the district of Barkly East. The Genera! also visited en route the camp at Sterkstroom where the bulk of the Kaflrarian Rifles under Major Cuming was stationed. The result of this expedition was the despatch of the Royal Irish Rifles, the Berkshire Mounted Infantry, and the detachment of Cape Mounted Rifles to Putter’s Kraal, about four miles south of Sterkstroom. The infantry proceeded by rail and the mounted troops by road, on Wednesday, the 22nd inst. The object of this movement seemed clear. The colonial rebels must fall foul of the force at Putter’s Kraal if they marched direct on Bushman’s Hoek, whilst, if they made a detour northwards in order to avoid contact, they must lose time in any case, and not improbably offer their flank to a timely attack before effecting a junction with the Free State commandos. The Bushman’s Hoek position is one of great strength, and had it fallen into the hands of the enemy would have proved a most disagreeable obstacle to our advance. Moreover, the railway there climbs the hill by a winding track, in which are many works that would give great trouble to repair should the enemy be enabled to demolish them. The Kaffrarian Mounted Rifles were fairly well posted, and would assuredly have given a good account of themselves, but their numbers were insufficient for a prolonged resistance if stoutly assailed. The presence of the force at Putter’s Kraal would however have enabled support to reach the Kaffrarians long before any great danger could have been incurred. The Cape Mounted Rifles had six 7-pounder screw guns and six Maxims. The force thus formed a compact little column of all arms, composed of excellent material. I noticed the excellent physique of the Royal Irish Rifles. During the night following the departure of the troops for Putter’s Kraal, Amphlett’s and Dewar’s companies of Mounted Infantry, about 280 strong, arrived from East London, and before many days had passed it was expected that quite a respectable force would have been assembled. Many people were clamouring for the immediate reoccupation of Stormberg as a prelude to offensive action against the invaders; but General Gatacre determined to await the arrival of further reinforcements, so as to ensure his being in a position to deliver a really hard blow.
Probably, had the General been able to foresee that only a portion of his division was destined to reach him, he would have acted as he was being urged to do. But under the actual circumstances the delay had necessarily a prejudicial effect upon our fortunes. Yet we must remember that we who criticise are “wise after the event.” The general in war can but guide his course of action according to the information at his disposal and the situation as he finds it or believes it to be.
Refugees from the districts occupied by the invaders or threatened by colonial sympathizers kept arriving in great numbers, and many had suffered immense hardships. For example, one old couple who had secured an ox-wagon to convey them from Aliwal were compelled to walk, as the Boers ruthlessly commandeered the wagon. The wife of an Aliwal doctor, being unable to procure a conveyance of any sort, rode the whole one hundred and twenty miles, under the broiling sun and over execrable roads, on a bicycle. She was subjected, moreover, to a shower of brutal and disgusting insults whilst passing a Boer commando on the road. Similar incidents appear to have been scandalously frequent.
There is just one satisfactory point to be noticed in relation to the invasion. The colonial Dutch were eager in their invitations to their kinsmen in the Free State, supposing that no more would be expected of them than that a general welcome should be accorded, and that a few young men should volunteer for service. Instead of this the luckless people found their allies ruthlessly “commandeering ” in every district occupied, and the joys of rebellion very much modified in consequence. Other districts equally disaffected remained quiet, for no other reason than the knowledge that, if the inhabitants introduced the enemy, they themselves would be commandeered to serve in his ranks. The wire to Barkly East was cut on the 22nd inst., and we were without much information regarding the whereabouts or intentions of the colonial commando, but it seemed far from improbable that it might melt away without doing much. The fact that reinforcements were really arriving was becoming known, and Boer sympathies commenced to be regarded as distinctly dangerous if openly expressed. The meeting at Dordrecht held on Wednesday the 22nd, under the auspices of Mr. Sauer, passed a resolution in favour of remaining “loyal,” but this “loyalty ” expressed no more than discreet abstention from immediate co-operation with the invaders in the field.
Mr. Sauer left Dordrecht on Thursday with the intention of holding a meeting at Barkly and subsequently returning to Dordrecht in order to hold a second at that place. The Boers, who had by then occupied Barkly, declined to permit any meeting of real or pseudo-loyalists to be held.
Sir William Gatacre became ubiquitous from the day of his arrival, and the number of persons, places, localities and positions that he visited is quite wonderful. On the morning of the 23rd, however, he took what he regards as a rest. Having no expedition in view by road or rail, he mounted his horse at 4.45 a.m. and spent his time until 8 a.m. watching the troops at their exercises and inspecting various arrangements at the camp. On the 21st, when visiting the camps of Kaffrarian Rifles at Sterkstroom and Bushman’s Hoek, the General paid some well-deserved compliments to that excellent corps and thereby pleased them greatly. Really the Kaffrarians had done plenty of hard work during the past three weeks, and they had, moreover, been exposed to no inconsiderable danger, holding the post of honour at the head of the division, and, until Thursday, being wholly unsupported by any other troops nearer than Queenstown.
It seemed very remarkable that, although the Boers had for ten days or more been within easy reach of Stormberg Junction, they had not yet taken possession of nor even made a dash to break up the railway. Some said that they were afraid of a "trap” having been set for them, but meanwhile we remained in possession of the great advantage of an uninterrupted lateral communication with Lord Methuen’s column on the Orange Eiver. Late on the night of the 23rd a telegram arrived announcing the successful action at Belmont. From Natal we received scarcely any news whatever, and from this we concluded that there could be very little intelligence of a pleasant nature to be communicated. Nor, as the event proved, were we far wrong.
On the morning of the 28th I went out to see Brabant’s Horse at work near the camp. Some were at drill and some at musketry practice. The progress already made quite astonished me. The men seemed to know what they were about, and thrust their untrained horses into their places with a skill that was really remarkable. Poor De Montmorency * was then the adjutant, and, judging by the results, both he and his predecessor—Collins of the Berkshires—had a great deal to be proud of. The shooting on the range was very good.
On my return to breakfast I found a telegram from my correspondent at Calla, telling me that a highly successful meeting of loyalists had taken place upon the previous day, and that a resolution had been passed by those present pledging themselves to refuse, at all costs, to be commandeered, and declaring themselves ready to take up arms against the invaders provided that troops were sent to support them.
