I think that in telling the story of Stormberg I cannot do better than to give my original letter to the Times exactly as it was written, and explain and correct by means of notes anything that seems to require explanation or amendment.
“Putter’s Kraal, December 7.
“The move forward is at last at hand. A strong column will leave here by rail to-morrow evening, and, having detrained north of Molteno, march on to the Boer laager at Stormberg, which it is proposed to rush with the bayonet at 3.30 a.m. on Saturday. Only one field battery [This arrangement was most providentially altered, and two batteries, the 74th and 77th, under Majors Macleod and Perceval, were present at the fight. Had only one battery been taken with the column, it is probable that the whole would have been destroyed or taken prisoners.] is to proceed with the troops, and this, having selected horses, is to be also conveyed by rail. The distance is about twenty-five miles, and would be far too much for horses only just off the ship, and General Gatacre has wisely decided against overtaxing their strength by such a march. Every one is to go as lightly equipped as possible, the baggage being left to follow the column later on. Sir William has most kindly arranged to have the horses of the newspaper correspondents conveyed with the train that carries the Headquarter Staff, so that it will be our own fault if we are unable to gain a fair idea of what takes place, To attempt such an enterprise on foot is of but little use, since a pedestrian with his limited powers of locomotion cannot cover a sufficiently wide area to gain a comprehensive view of operations upon even a reasonably large scale. We shall have somewhere about 2500 of all ranks, including two and a half battalions * (less details), mounted infantry and artillery. It is a thousand pities that, owing to the delay in sending him reinforcements, the General is not in a position to do as he would have much preferred—make a decided move with the intention of sweeping the enemy right over the frontier by a continuous advance. But even what is about to be attempted must, if successful, be attended by very important results. The line to De Aar will be reopened within a few days, and the petty commandos in the Dordrecht and Barkly districts will be obliged to fall back as the only alternative to being destroyed in detail. A concentration of the enemy about Burghersdorp and a subsequent fight in that neighbourhood, probably at Albert Junction, may be expected to follow the Stormberg engagement. At all events, the immediate concentration of the enemy * Only two battalions were actually employed is a certainty; but there is, of course, a chance that his combined strength may be too great for us to tackle with the troops at present available; in which case we shall be obliged to await the arrival of reinforcements. Such delay, if it occurs, will be most regrettable, since much moral effect will thus be lost.
"December 8.
“The move northwards has been postponed until tomorrow, the reason being, I believe, that after further consideration it has been decided that an earlier start than that arranged for to-day will be necessary in order to reach the enemy’s position before break of day. Under present arrangements, therefore, we shall leave here about the middle of the day to-morrow. The 16th Field Hospital, under Major Lilley, R.A.M.C., only arrived in camp yesterday, and although fully efficient in every way, yet I imagine that a start off to fight a battle on the very same evening would have been a somewhat severe test.
“December 12.
“I have had neither time nor opportunity to write more until now, and the task before me is a very difficult one.
“General Gatacre had under his command in this district only three and a half battalions, [2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, 1st Royal Scots, and four companies 2nd Royal Berkshire.] two batteries field artillery, and some 850 mounted infantry and volunteer horsemen. The Colonial Boers were joining the enemy in considerable numbers, and it appeared very needful to strike a blow that would have sufficient influence to check the stream of rebellion. Stormberg Junction had been occupied by the enemy, who had thus cut the lateral communications by rail and telegraph with the British forces under Lord Methuen and General French to the westward. At first sight it may appear as if all Sir William Gatacre needed to do was to move forward his troops north of Molteno to a position of observation threatening Stormberg, and by so doing, even if obliged to delay an attack upon the Boers at that place, overawe the disaffected. But inactivity after a forward movement will generally, and rightly, be interpreted as a confession of inability to proceed further, and such, pending the arrival of reinforcements, would have been the actual condition of affairs. Moreover, with the forces at his disposal, the • General was not strong enough to maintain himself in the vicinity of the enemy and also to guard his own communications. Something therefore needed most urgently to be done, and Sir William elected to adopt a bold course. Accordingly he arranged for a sudden swoop by rail upon Molteno from Putter’s Kraal, followed by a night march and an attack at dawn upon the enemy’s position. That the enterprise involved extreme risk, and that such an attack upon a difficult position that had not been properly reconnoitred by efficient staff officers is against the principles of war, it would be idle to deny. Yet there are occasions when the true instinct of a commander leads him to disregard all rules and accept the risks that his conduct may entail upon him. The whole question turns upon the value of the advantages consequent on success in comparison with the losses that may be incurred in case of failure. General Gatacre was quite aware that he might incur disaster, but he considered it his duty to face the risks before him without regard for his own reputation or any other considerations except the immense gains to the British cause that would assuredly accrue in the event of victory.
“I am fully persuaded that the decision to carry the Stormberg position by a coup de main was justified by the circumstances under which it was arrived at. Certainly, had the enterprise proved successful, no one who attempted to pass hostile criticism upon the victorious General could have obtained so much as a hearing. The actual failure was due to a variety of accidents, some of which, it is true, were not unavoidable.
“Stormberg Junction, at the foot of the Rooi Kop a considerable mountain overlooking the station, is situated about nine miles to the north of Molteno, the magnetic bearing being 356°. The Rooi Kop has its greatest length east and west, and to the north-west, west, and south-west of it were the Boer positions and the scene of the fight. The intention of the General was to fall upon the south-western portion of the Boer defences by inclining somewhat to the westward and then coming up in a north-easterly direction upon the right front of the enemy. In the event—owing, no doubt, to some extent, to the darkness—the guide at the head of the column lost his way, with the result that the force made a wide detour to the westward, circling completely round until, returning from the north-west, it struck the right rear in place of the right front of the enemy.
“Owing to various delays upon the railway, the start from Molteno took place two hours later than had been intended, and this fact, added to the immense increase in the length of the march, deprived our troops of the aid which the moon would otherwise have afforded upon the road to their halting-place, and further, which was even more detrimental, necessitated their subsequent advance against the enemy being proceeded with after only one hour’s rest instead of three. The infantry had been at work, or in the train in open trucks, or marching since 4 a.m. on Saturday morning. The actual march occupied seven hours, and it is, therefore, little to be wondered at that the men were wholly incapable of making a supreme effort when at last they were surprised by receiving fire at short range whilst marching in fours in fancied security. On receiving the enemy’s fire the companies at hand rushed at once against the kopjes from which it proceeded, and, advancing from boulder, to boulder, swiftly commenced to ascend. Indeed, it is the fact that a considerable number actually reached within a few yards of a lower line of ‘scanses ’ which could not, however, be reached without ladders. But at this juncture our own artillery, failing in the yet uncertain light to observe the ascent of the infantry, opened fire upon the enemy, and several shells falling short dealt destruction amongst the assailants of the position. A partial retirement instantly ensued, and, having been brought to a standstill, the attack gradually melted away until, convinced that the case was hopeless, the General gave the order to retire. Had the order been promptly obeyed the troops might not improbably have been withdrawn without very serious loss, and a fresh attempt might even yet have been successfully prosecuted. But it was not to be. Many men were loth to retire because they were anxious to go on, whilst not a few were so utterly exhausted that they simply preferred to stay where they were, at all hazards, than to undertake the ordeal of a rapid retirement over the open ground at the foot of the hills. Eventually over 500 [The number was actually about 600] unwounded men were taken prisoners. Steadily, as if on parade, the retirement was executed by those who responded to the order, the soldiers moving back at a steady pace, without the least hurry or confusion, and halting constantly to fire. As an example of rear-guard skirmishing, the performances of the Northumberland Fusiliers and Irish Rifles could scarcely have been surpassed. Disputing every inch of ground, the survivors of the ill-fated attack finally gained a line of low hills, which formed a horseshoe about 1500 yards west of the scene of their repulse, and from which the road by which the column had advanced shortly before was within easy reach. It was indeed fortunate that .this most excellent rallying position was at hand.
Whilst a sufficient portion lined the crests and easily kept the enemy back, the remainder were re-formed in rear. Then, finally, when all hope of collecting more men had to be abandoned, the General gave orders for the retreat upon Molteno.
“Fortunate, indeed, was it that at the last moment, before leaving Putter’s Kraal, Sir William decided to take both batteries of artillery in place of only one. Had there been but one battery, the entire force must have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Never were batteries more skilfully handled. Retiring alternately from position to position, the gunners splendidly atoned for the mischance of the earlier morning. The courage and steadiness of all ranks in the 74th and 77th Field Batteries undeniably saved the remnant of the infantry and themselves also from destruction or capture. Even as it was, had the enemy shown the very least enterprise, the situation must soon have become desperate. The mounted troops, too, vied with the artillery in their unflagging energy and devotion, but all would have been unavailing had the enemy pursued his advantages with courage and average common sense. Our line of retreat lay round the circumference of a circle of which the enemy held the centre, so that from first to last the Boers possessed the advantage of working on interior lines. Their heavy guns, themselves in complete security upon account of their superior range, swept the plains over which the tired troops were wearily plodding. The fire was beautifully directed but fortunately harmless, owing to the shells being nearly all plugged. Bursts were quite the exception. Be all this as it may, it is at least certain that before many miles had been traversed in retreat stragglers were the rule and formed bodies the exception. Amongst the latter a party of the Koyal Irish Rifles was most skilfully directed and kept well in hand by the adjutant, Lieutenant Sitwell, whose behaviour was distinctly conspicuous. I am certain that, say, five miles from Molteno, 300 average good men could easily have rolled up the entire column—all that was needed was to head it and swallow it by driblets as it came along.
“So far as I can understand the matter, the causes to which this most lamentable failure must be attributed are as follows:—
“(1) The map of the ground was utterly misleading, and worse than useless.[ The map was a bad one, but this condemnation of it, written at a time of keen disappointment, is slightly exaggerated.] Not only was the contouring so incorrect as to give a totally false picture of the configuration of the hills, but the actual distances and the roads were inaccurately represented.
“(2) So far as I am aware, no one amongst the responsible authorities had taken any compass bearings, and consequently no one knew where he was being taken in the dark. A knowledge of the general direction in which it was intended to proceed, and occasional reference to the compass, would have sufficed to disclose the fact that the guide completely boxed the western half of the compass-dial—concluding with a straight shot at the needle-axis—instead of keeping a line pointing a few degrees west of north.[ Note by the editor of the Times, printed with the original letter ] Our special correspondent at Cape Town, in forwarding this account of General Gatacre’s repulse, makes the following interesting comment : * Your correspondent with General Gatacre, I think, exaggerates this point. Owing to the abundance of magnetic ironstone all oyer South Africa (and the name “Rooi-kop,” “red-head,’ probably indicates its presence near Stormberg) compass bearings are liable to be all over the place, especially at night, when it is impossible to know how near one may be to magnetic rocks. At Chieveley one day I was taking some bearings which made Colenso lie due east instead of north, north for the nonce happening to be a large stone a yard or two away.* *’
This objection does not hold good. Compass errors, occasioned by local influences, are always so great, and moreover so variable, that with ordinary care it should be impossible to be deceived by them. To check a compass, it is only needful to take a bearing, advance straight to an intermediate point, and then take a second bearing. If the two agree the compass is unaffected, and may be relied upon. Be this as it may, I had a compass bearing upon the night in question, and found it particularly useful.]
“(3) The Berkshire regiment, by whom the redoubts now occupied by the Boers at Stormberg had been built, and to whom every inch of the ground was familiar, were left at Queenstown instead of being employed to recapture the works which they had so unwillingly evacuated about a month previously. The consequence of no one knowing where he was going or what he had to attack, or when proximity to the enemy had been reached, was that the infantry, marching in fours, were suddenly fired into at a point where, after ascending but a few feet, their further advance against the enemy was precluded by an unclimbable precipice. The moment that the first shots were fired, companies doubled straight at the points whence the firing seemed to have proceeded, and commenced to scale the hill. Soon, however, they came upon a perpendicular wall of rock, from the summit of which the Boers were plying their rifles at half a dozen yards’ distance. Here fell Lieut.-Colonel Eager,[Lieut.-Colonel Eager was carried in a fearfully shattered state to the farm of a colonial Boer named Van Zyl, where he was put to bed, and the surgeon attended to him. Scarcely had this been completed when the wretch, Van Zyl, came home and insisted upon the sufferer being instantly removed. In vain the doctor pleaded that this would endanger his patient’s life. The wounded officer was conveyed to Stormberg and Burghersdorp in an ox-wagon. He died, subsequently, in the hospital; not impossibly in consequence of this inhuman treatment, although he actually lived for several weeks] and close to him Major Seton, of the Royal Irish Rifles. Colonel Eager was the man who reached the highest point attained by any of the attackers, and was then shot down, where many another British officer has fallen before now, at the head of his battalion, gallantly leading them as in the days of old when long-range weapons had not been invented.
“(4) Over five hundred men, afterwards made prisoners, had fallen into a trap from which they failed to extricate themselves. Consequently, when the rest of the force had been rallied upon a defensive position in rear, the General had not forces sufficient to warrant a fresh attempt upon some selected point of attack.
“(5) In any case the men, who had been by this time on the move for over twenty-four hours on the stretch, who had just completed seven hours’ marching through the night, and who had been actually under arms for upwards of sixteen hours, were so dead beat that severe hill-fighting was quite beyond their powers. During the actual retirement from the hills attacked—or rather under which we were ourselves attacked in anticipation —men were falling asleep in the open ground, under fire, after or before using their rifles. No sooner did they halt to fire than they fell forward sound asleep. An officer told me that he awoke several such men by kicking them soundly, and thus insisted upon their continuing their retreat to a place of safety.
“(6) The guns were at first in the same trap as the infantry, and were compelled to retreat some distance over very difficult ground before they could come into action upon, even then, a poor position, with most inferior command. During this movement a gun was lost [The breech-block of this gun was removed and placed on an ammunition wagon. Later on, whilst the drivers of the wagon were assisting their battery daring the passage of a drift, the horses stampeded, and the whole concern fell into the hands of the enemy.] in consequence of being stuck fast and the struggling horses shot down by the enemy. It was a pitiable sight, of which those who saw it cannot speak without emotion.
“Finally, to state the case in brief. The position to be attacked had not been reconnoitred by any of those to be engaged against it, and even its exact situation was unknown to any of them. The information supplied by the Intelligence Department was complete and accurate, but owing to the misdirection of the march its value was thrown away. The distance to be marched was nearly doubled. The start was two hours late, so that the moon set long before the journey had been completed to an intermediate halting-place, and the men lost the rest that they so much needed. Day broke without the point of attack having been reached, and at the time when the enemy opened fire the column was unsuspiciously ‘ route marching/ Both battalions were winding along the foot of the hill and were fired upon simultaneously; both consequently became at once engaged in a skirmishers’ fight, so that there remained no formed body of troops to interpose by any deliberate action in accordance with any fixed idea.
“Defeat in such circumstances was the natural consequence. The only marvel is that the force escaped annihilation; certainly but for the good work done by the artillery and by the mounted troops, not one man could have reached Molteno, although the shooting of the Boer riflemen was contemptible in the extreme. Worse shooting in action than that of the Boers in the Stormberg engagement has, perhaps, never been seen in war. Moreover, the failure of the enemy to make any determined attempt to cut off the straggling procession of worn-out troops denotes either strange want of confidence or incompetence. That we should have been beaten by such an enemy renders our case the more deplorable. Our retreat was molested merely by ‘snipers/ Upon the other hand, the Boer artillery practice was splendid. They had no field artillery, and apparently not more than two mobile guns. Some say that they had but two guns in all, including the 40-pounder in a fixed position. Yet they succeeded in teaching most of us what it is like to come under a well-directed shell fire. Luckily, however, we had our instruction at small cost to ourselves, since few of the Boer shells burst. This was, no doubt, a cause of disappointment to their gunners—but not to us.
“ It was, I think, a pity that the two companies of the Royal Scots and the 12th Company R.E., who remained in Molteno, were not ordered out to cover the retirement of the troops. The occupation of one very awkward position about three miles from Molteno by fresh troops was most desirable. [In justice to Major Birbeck, the senior officer of the Boyal Scots, it should be explained that he fully realized the situation, and requested permission to march out with his two companies in order to hold the position referred to—but was refused.] Had the Boers been enterprising and made use of this position, we should have been cut off when actually in sight of our goal.
“Sterkstroom, December 13.
“I omitted to mention that the armoured train which advanced towards Stormberg from Molteno had a narrow escape. The Boers had laid a pretty little trap by partially removing fish-plates and getting ready a big gun to open on the train as soon as it got into difficulties. The sharp eyes of those in the train were, however, destined to perceive the trick, and a halt in time saved the situation. No sooner had the train come to a standstill than the gun opened fire, the range evidently having been measured since the first shot was pretty close, and the second and third within a few feet. The range was about 7000 yards. lieutenant Grosset did not wait for more. Forty-pounder shells cannot be digested, even by armoured trains.
“It should also be noted, in order to show how early in the proceedings misfortunes commenced to befall, that the field hospital, bearer company, maxim gun of Boyal Irish Rifles, with sundry ammunition wagons and other vehicles, lost the column at the very start, and pursued the direct road to Stormberg, upon which they bivouacked at the point C, shown on the accompanying rough plan. At dawn, this detachment, guided by a native policeman, moved round to the west, and eventually rejoined the column during its retreat. Until this reunion took place, the troops were absolutely without any hospital or ambulance.”
