On the 26th, intelligence of the occupation of Stormberg by the Boers came rather as a shock to every one. In the first place we had become so accustomed to talk about an early re-occupation of that position by our own troops, that we almost regarded it as a piece of deliberate rascality upon the part of the enemy that they should thus have anticipated us at the eleventh hour. Then, again, it was a great annoyance that this objectionable proceeding should have been carried out upon the very day when the English mail ought to have arrived. Had the Boers only been considerate enough to permit the mail train to pass through, albeit for the last time, we should then have accepted accomplished facts with reasonable complacency. But now the mail would have to return to Cape Town and thence be conveyed by sea to East London. In short, we should not now receive our letters for a fortnight, and this misfortune was clearly due to the bad manners of our Mends the enemy. However, the long period of sitting still at Queenstown was now brought to an abrupt termination. The 2nd Battalion ' of the Northumberland Fusiliers arrived at East London upon this same eventful day, and the General instantly determined to advance his headquarters to Putter’s Kraal, to which place the Fusiliers were to be conveyed direct from the coast without any delay at Queenstown. On the 27th the General and Staff proceeded by rail to Putter's Kraal, and I set forth upon my first trek with the “weagon,” Jess, and Arendse. I had bought a pair of good-sized horses from a Free State “refugee ” at quite a reasonable price. “Kruger” was 15 hands 3 inches, and “Steyn” 15 hands 2 J inches—big horses for South Africa. Kruger showed signs of “quality” and could jump, but was rather a rough ride. Steyn was an excellent hack, but could not jump. However, these animals had been purchased to pull the “weagon,” and pull it they did most gamely, as a rule, though Steyn was occasionally known to jib. This addition to the stud necessitated a further increase of the establishment in the form of another “boy.” So “Arendse” discovered an idle, dirty, but quite well-intentioned half-breed, named “Cornelius,” whose business henceforth was to see to the horses under the supervision of Arendse, whilst the latter did the cooking and such personal service as he was capable of, or which I insisted upon his attempting. Arendse eventually became quite a fair camp cook, and he had a virtue that gentlemen of colour alone possess—he could light a fire with a common wood match, in a gale of wind, and this although the fuel might be saturated with rain. He had also a knack of finding firewood, eggs, milk, vegetables, etc., in all sorts of places where no one else had even thought of looking for them. He was a man of few words, as a rule; but judging by the tenour of his conversation, as I have occasionally overheard it, this was perhaps as well. His mastery of the English language was even too thorough. The failings of Cornelius, which were many and aggravating, had the invariable result of making Arendse blasphemously filthy as well as unusually fluent in his conversation. Upon one occasion, at least, he applied a shambok to Cornelius. The latter retaliated by taking an early opportunity of amputating the thin and effective portion of the instrument. I plead guilty to having, under severe provocation, kicked Cornelius. He was apparently accustomed to receiving personal chastisement as well as to deserving it. We halted for the night at Bailey, fourteen miles from Queenstown, and next morning continued to Putter’s Kraal, eighteen miles. At Bailey I was told that a commando from Stormberg had marched towards Steynsburg, and I concluded that this probably portended an attempt to work round our left via Maraisburg and Tarkastad. Nothing of the kind was, however, attempted; why, it is hard to say. Certainly it is what the enemy ought to have done. But the Boer, as a rule, is not very enterprising. Had De Wet been at Stormberg there is little doubt that the movement suggested would have been made. On my arrival at Putter’s Kraal I reported what I had heard to the Intelligence Officer, who had, however, also heard the same report, and had interpreted the object of the enemy as I had done.
Meanwhile, the outpost at Bushman’s Hoek had been reinforced with Imperial and Colonial mounted troops, and Major Cuming, with another company of his Kaffrarian Bides, had also proceeded to the same place from Sterkstroom.
On the 29th I treked on to Sterkstroom, four miles, in order to have some small repairs done to the “weagon,” which had suffered slightly in consequence of Steyn having exhibited a mixture of high spirits and ill-temper. The only blacksmith in the place was busy, and it proved impossible to get the job done the same evening. There was, therefore, nothing for it but to remain for the night. In the Kaffrarian Rifles I found an old friend in one of the subalterns, named Webber, who had been a private in the 2nd Volunteer Battalion of my regiment in the days when I was adjutant thereof. His uncle was the colour-sergeant of B Company, and possessed a very fine bass voice, which I have often heard, not only at the annual volunteer entertainments, but also at concerts, and upon other occasions. This meeting pleased me very much; but not so did my relations with another acquaintance—a ferocious-looking bulldog who discovered, as dogs do, that I was fond of dogs. This horrible beast was called “Bill,” and was apparently imbued with the wholly false idea that he and I were most intimate friends. He followed me everywhere, and finally insisted upon accompanying me to my room at the inn. “Bill ” had quite engaging manners, but it seemed as if it might not be quite safe to quarrel with him. Yet I did not feel as if I wanted Bill in my room, more especially as I realized that his presence obtruded itself disagreeably, even when he was out of sight and hearing. I resorted to stratagem. I put on my hat, opened the door, walked out of the room and called him to follow. The enemy fell into the trap, and rushing joyfully past me clattered down the stairs. Upon which I ran back and shut the door. Thus we parted for the night. Bill scratched the door and himself for a short while, but eventually finding the passage a bit draughty no doubt, betook himself elsewhere.
Whilst I was thus engaged the General was at Molteno with a fatigue party removing grain and flour from the mills. This must have annoyed the enemy considerably, for they doubtless regarded the supplies in Molteno as their own perquisite.
On the morning of the 30th I trekked back to Putter's Kraal, and on arrival heard of Lord Methuen’s desperate fight at Modder River. No details were given, except that the General himself had been wounded, and that the losses had been very heavy. Reinforcements for our own column were reported to be near at hand, but it had already transpired that the concentration of the 3rd Division, as originally constituted, could not take place for the present—a considerable proportion of the troops having been diverted to Natal.
Meanwhile, all sorts of rumours floated in the air. We heard, upon what seemed to be perfectly reliable authority, that 3000 Transvaalers were marching south to join hands with the Free State and rebel commandos about Burghersdorp, etc., and that the intention of the enemy was to attack our advanced post on Bushman's Hoek, defended by mounted troops and Kaffrarian Rifles, numbering some 800 men in all. The distance in advance of Putter’s Kraal camp is about twelve miles, and at Sterkstroom, four miles and a half from here, was an intermediate post defended by one company of Kaffrarian Rifles and 200 Brabant’s Horse. Heliographic communication had been established in addition to the telegraph, so that ample warning could be given in the event of attack. Bushman’s Hoek is a very strong and most important position. The railway to Stormberg here climbs over the pass by a series of snakelike curves, and during the ascent there are large numbers of comparatively heavy culverts, embankments, cuttings, etc., which would require much time and labour for their repair were the enemy permitted to injure them. Moreover, the main road to Stormberg passes also over Bushman’s Hoek, so that the loss of our position thereon would have been a very serious matter. We hoped and believed that the defenders of the post on the Hoek, aided by counter-attacks delivered by the force here, might be able to maintain themselves, but a disaster seemed by no means impossible. Sir William Gatacre was powerless to assure anything whatever owing to the delay in supplying him with troops. His division was represented by two battalions only; and one of these did not properly belong to it. We had no cavalry and no Royal Artillery. Of course, the diversion of early arrivals to Natal, and the later need of others for the Kimberley Relief Force, fully accounts for the disparity of reinforcements in this direction when compared with others; but it is difficult to explain why greater expedition in the despatch of troops from home was not displayed. The want of cavalry in particular was most grievously felt. It is not too much to say that if Lord Methuen had had, say, three regiments of cavalry at Belmont, the Boer army would have been so utterly routed that no further fighting would have taken place.
Late in the evening of December 1st I had a wire from Dordrecht telling me that a commando 1200 strong was marching on that place from Barkly. And upon the following morning the Boers were reported to have occupied the town with a commando estimated at 1200 strong. The distance from Sterkstroom to Dordrecht is only about thirty miles.
The news of the occupation proved to be true, but the commando numbered only 500 men, most of whom were rebels from the Barkly district. At the same time, all idea of attacking them fell through, since they had already gone towards Stormberg or Molteno. A gentleman, who was in Dordrecht at the time of its occupation, counted the numbers of the commando as it marched in. According to his account the Boers still seemed full of confidence. He had a long talk with Mr. Munnik, the renegade ex-magistrate of Barkly East, but without gaining much information.
On December 4 I heard that the Cape Police had cleverly arrested two rebels named Anandale and Botha, whom they caught in the act of commandeering Dutch colonists, on Carnarvon Farm, only about fifteen miles from camp in the direction of Dordrecht. It is to be hoped that these rascals have since been made an example of, but meanwhile they were duly committed for trial by the magistrate at Sterkstroom and sent down to Queenstown.
The 74th and 77th Field Batteries and the 12th Field Company Royal Engineers arrived during the course of December 5, the two latter in the morning, but the former was not complete until late at night, although the horses and a small detachment reached the railway station shortly after midday. It appears that through some jumble on the railway, the train containing the men and equipment of the 74th Field Battery was delayed for nearly three hours within a short distance of its destination. Had not this delay occurred, the battery might easily have been settled down comfortably in camp before dark. The horses seem to have suffered considerably during the voyage. The fittings of the ship appear to have been hastily erected and without any regard for sanitation, so that before the battery artificers could complete the needful alterations no less than thirteen deaths resulted from pneumonia caused by the poisonous atmosphere between decks. The weather, most unfortunately, was such that the “porta” required to be kept shut during the early part of the voyage, just when the ventilation which might have been supplied by them was most needed. In spite of all their troubles the horses are a splendid lot, and in a very few days they will be fit for work. On arrival very many—more especially the original battery animals—were much “tucked up,” and their coats appeared to “stare” considerably. I was glad to find that at least one amongst the officers knows the Cape, so that one might look forward to seeing the horses turned out to graze on the veldt. There was little enough grass, it is true, but the luxury of a roll and a little freedom works marvels with horses that have had a bad time of it. The superior condition of the tram and omnibus horses serving with the batteries is obviously attributable to the fact that they had a better start coming out of hard work and plenty of good food. The 12th Company R.E. did very smart service during the afternoon by making two new “drifts” between camp and station, by which the previous congestion of traffic was entirely removed. The men stuck to their tasks most manfully under a broiling sun; no navvies could have surpassed them. Number-12 Company came out with a reputation, and seemed determined to increase it.
The divisional ammunition column arrived during the night; or rather the men, vehicles, horses, and part of the harness for the mules. The rest, we were told, would no doubt follow in course of time, as well as the Ordnance depot of ammunition. The latter was an urgent necessity. One such battle as Modder River would have exhausted all the available supply of artillery ammunition at hand. Whilst I was at the railway station watching the ammunition column preparing to march into camp I observed an amusing incident which deserves to be recorded. One of the drivers who had been entrusted with a sick horse in addition to an ex-tramcar animal, proceeded to mount the latter, regardless of the fact that it probably had not had a saddle on its back since it was a colt. The result was much kicking and rearing, combined with an obstinate determination to remain otherwise stationary. The man got angry, and, uttering a variety of anathemas, began to ply his spurs with vigour and intention. Just as the contest culminated, another driver standing by called out, “Stow them spurs. Jack; ring yer bloomin’ bell! ” This anecdote represents the light side of the picture, but there was also a serious aspect that might not impossibly force itself into notice. Here we had batteries sent to the seat of war with 50 per cent, of their strength composed of “registered horses ” not half a dozen of whom had ever been worked on the “ride and drive ” system. Thus, in addition to needing gentle exercise and nursing after their voyage, the remounts required also a complete course of training in artillery draught. It might be supposed that batteries which left England on November 2 would have received their reserve horses soon enough to have had time to do some little training previously to embarkation; and yet most of these horses were not actually received until two days before going on board ship. This is a very rough country, and consequently the horses drawing the guns need to be especially well trained in order to give the batteries the desired mobility.
There was a small field day early in the morning in which two battalions and the mounted infantry were engaged. I was sorry that I was unable to be present —being at the railway station—more especially as I should have liked to see whether, under the eye of the General himself, greater attention would be paid to the “use of ground” than I had hitherto been accustomed to see or read of in relation to the present campaign.
The following is taken verbatim from my letter published in the Times of January 2:—
“In all the battles fought it would seem, so far as we can understand from the meagre narratives, that the Boers, having been found occupying a position, the preparatory fire of artillery has been followed by purely frontal attacks delivered right on the position and without any attempts to turn or threaten the enemy’s line by the occupation of adjacent positions towards his „ flanks or rear. There are very few positions in South Africa that are not of the class that tempts the intending defender to spread more and more to the flanks because this or that point is just the one thing needful to ensure perfection. And as each is successively included, another ridge or knoll appears in view and is found equally tempting.
Finally, the defender is obviously obliged to content himself with an extent of front suitable more or less to the strength of his force, and the further points are necessarily left unoccupied. In my opinion the time required for the artillery preparation should be employed by the assailant in effectively occupying one or more of the positions reasonably adjacent to that of the enemy, and not until these pieds-a-terre have been secured should one single man of the force be seriously committed to the attack, or much less to the assault of the position itself. Quite apart from the special case of the Boers, I do not think that any assault can succeed against modem rifles except at an awful cost to the attackers, unless the point assaulted is kept under effective fire until the assailants reach charging distance of it. Such a fire cannot be maintained as a rule by adjacent units, and scarcely ever by those in rear—not even by artillery. Consequently a * fire-position’ nearly perpendicular to the line of advance is required, and this will generally mean in prolongation of the enemy’s position. In any case the advance to the attack should consist in the successive occupation of various fire-positions, the occupants of which can, by their fire, favour the advance of their comrades to others at closer ranges. The advance of a ‘ general line’ is perhaps the 'road to Paradise,’ but it is not the way to victory. To seize something with the right hand, something else with the left, and then more with the teeth—and da capo, or with variations—is the method by which an assailant can approach and finally assault an enemy in position. ‘General lines* look pretty at drill, but cannot and should not be preserved on the field of battle. We need to think of the ground itself, not of the lines we place upon it. The officer, be he of high or inferior rank, who can best turn to account the advantages offered by the ground for the use of the men under his command is the best fighting officer. Until the attackers come under effective fire the retention of power to manoeuvre, or, in other words, the preservation of order, is the chief consideration; but afterwards the occupation of successive tactical points by whatever troops may be able to seize them is everything, and the rest comparatively nothing. The combination of order with the quick grasping of local opportunities is so seldom feasible, if ever, that it is scarcely worth while to discuss means intended to secure it.
“I have to-day heard a whisper that the General may be moved against his will to take early action. That much pressure is being brought to bear upon him by certain ignorant civilians is, I know, the case. But I trust that he will stand firm and postpone his advance until his mounted troops are really fit for service, even if he does not await further reinforcements to his infantry. There is little use in striking until he is in a position to strike hard and drive the blow well home. The delay, of course, is causing great local inconvenience and loss of property, besides encouraging the rebellious section to declare openly for the enemy. Yet the accession of a few hundred extra colonials to the enemy’s forces can, in the end, have but little effect upon the issue that will soon be decided. However, I think it by no means impossible that we may march on Friday or Saturday next, but I still hope that we may wait until Monday.”
