On first realizing the extent of the disaster which had befallen his column, General Gatacre gave orders for a general retreat on Queenstown. Fortunately, however, he was dissuaded from this intention, and yielding chiefly to the advice of Iieut.-Colonel Jeffreys, Koyal Artillery, he decided to withdraw his main body only so far as Sterkstroom, and to maintain the advanced posts at Bushman's Hoek and Pen Hoek. During the afternoon and night of the eventful 10th of December, the evacuation of Molteno was carried out by road and rail; the artillery and infantry being conveyed at once to Sterkstroom, whilst the mounted infantry, etc., retired by road. Brabant’s Horse remained at Molteno for the night, and at daylight retired as far as the Police camp, two miles south of Molteno on the Cyphergat road; afterwards marching to Pen Hoek, from whence they had come. The garrison of Pen Hoek had been included in the strength of the force detailed for the attack on Stormberg, but owing to some bungling about the transmission of orders from Putter’s Kraal, the instructions sent to the commandant failed to reach him in time. Brabant’s, the Cape Mounted Rifles, and the battery of the latter corps, all of which were at Pen Hoek, were consequently late for the fight. Brabant’s, under De Montmorency, indeed arrived on the ground after all was over, and covered Molteno against any advance of the Boer forces, but the Cape Mounted Rifles, having been compelled to travel more slowly with their guns, took no part in the operations. I slept Sunday night at the Central Hotel, Molteno, and never had such a good night in all my life. I dined at 6.30 and retired to my room at 7.30. Then, after a hot bath, turned in, and never stirred, so far as I am aware, until shortly after 8 a.m. on Monday. I was very tired indeed, but my fatigue, compared with that of those who had been on their own legs throughout the business, must have been a mere nothing. Poor Jess had much more to complain of than I. Her saddle had been put on at Putter’s Kraal at 10 a.m. on Saturday, when she was ridden down to the station, and conveyed with seven other horses in an open cattle-truck to Molteno, where she was detrained and fed the saddle being of course removed for the time. At 9.15 p.m., after a halt of about -three hours at Molteno, she carried me towards the battle-ground, and by 2.30 a.m., including the return to Molteno for orders and the ride back once more to the front, she had, without counting any odds and ends but merely point to point distance, covered twenty-one miles. Then came a rest of one hour and a quarter, followed by, in one way or another (patrolling, getting to the fight, and - going backwards and forwards during the retreat), at least twenty-five miles more. Tet the good mare was pulling when she trotted in to Molteno at 10*45 a.m., and never seemed a bit the worse for what she had done.
Arendse, Cornelius, and the ‘weagon’ arrived at Molteno during the afternoon, having come through by road from Putter’s Kraal. It was curious to notice how very little the disaster seemed to affect these two Cape boys. They appeared quite confident that more soldiers would soon come and put everything to rights. Shortly after breakfast on Monday morning I had a wire from Amery (chief correspondent of the Times at Cape Town) directing me to go myself or send my assistant to join General French at Rensburg. Had Stormberg been a victory I should most certainly have elected to go to Rensburg myself, since the presence of a large force of cavalry at the latter place gave promise of very interesting operations. But as it was, I could not make up my mind to forsake the 3rd Division on the very day following the disaster. So I decided to send Hallimond to Rensburg and remain myself. No doubt in so deciding I made a great mistake. However, that is past.
At about 9.45 a.m. my cavalcade started for Bushman’s Hoek, where we arrived about one o’clock, and remained for the night. I cannot recollect having ever been colder or more uncomfortable. A strong gale was blowing, and its blast was most chilling. Early on Tuesday morning we continued our march to Sterkstroom, where things had already begun to look ship-shape. The tents had come up, and the troops had pulled together wonderfully well. The camp was close to the station, and, so far, was conveniently placed; but, tactically speaking, we were in a very bad position, and had we been attacked it is difficult to say what might have happened. There is an excellent position about a mile to the south-west, but water was a difficulty. This could, however, have been overcome, as boring machines were available, and were used in order to provide wells in the camping ground.
During Tuesday evening, after my arrival, I wrote my letter describing the Stormberg disaster, and on Wednesday, 13th, I rested, after the turmoil of the past few days. On Thursday morning we heard of Methuen’s fight at Magersfontein, which seemed to have been terribly bloody and upon the whole distinctly unfavourable to our troops. After our so-called victories we seem never to be left masters of the field and in a position to count the bodies of the dead Boers. According to the reports received the enemy's losses have invariably been enormous, but we have been altogether without evidence as to the actual number of the slain. The Highland Brigade appears to have walked straight into the lion’s mouth, just as we ourselves did on that fatal Sunday. Such catastrophes cannot be classed as accidents. If a man ‘coasts‘ down a steep, winding hill and runs into a flock of sheep or some other obstacle, the consequences to himself and to his bicycle are not the result of accident, but of recklessness. So also in the case of columns surprised upon the march. If proper precautions are taken, surprise is impossible, and therefore somebody in the force that allows itself to be surprised must ipso facto be guilty of negligence.
With reference to the disaster at Stormberg a most peculiar incident was brought to my notice. Captain Hall’s company of the Royal Irish Rifles lost touch of the battalion and was proceeding by the main road from Molteno to Stormberg, but, unfortunately as it happened, the error was detected [By Lieutenant Sitwell, the adjutant, whose eyes were everywhere] and the company was brought back on to the Steynsburg road. Had Captain Hall been left to proceed by the Stormberg road his company would have bivouacked thereon with the hospital, the Maxim gun of his battalion, and the other details that had become detached. The result would have been as follows: At 3.45 a.m., when we three Correspondents, together with two Cape policemen and four blacks, rode forward to reconnoitre, I had it from Captain Hall himself that he would have moved with his company and the Maxim to support us. Three-quarters of an hour later, when we had located the fight and sent a guide to conduct the hospital, etc., by a circuitous route to the rear of our troops, Captain Hall would have elected to go straight for the field of battle as we did. The consequence would have been that, instead of three Correspondents watching helplessly the retreat of our men from the scene of their surprise to the defensive position upon which they rallied, a hundred rifles and a Maxim would have opened fire from an excellent point of vantage upon the flank and rear of the Boers.
Such an interposition would, in my opinion, have saved the day. The riflemen and Maxim would have arrived, probably unseen, within a thousand yards of the Boers. Certainly we were very ill-served by fortune.
I also learned that two mounted infantry men of the Berkshire regiment actually reported the error of the guide in passing by the correct turn to the right from the Steynsburg road, but their protest was unheeded by the officer to whom it was addressed, he naturally supposing that the guide at the head of the column knew better.
On the morning of the 15th it had been my intention to accompany a patrol of the mounted infantry under Lieutenant Braithwaite, Northumberland Fusiliers, in the direction of Tarkastad, but at the last moment the patrol was despatched by a different route to that originally intended, and consequently I missed the party. However, I had a most enjoyable ride whilst searching for the patrol, and saw quite a large number of springbok, besides capturing a tortoise, which I brought back to camp in triumph when I returned to breakfast at 9 a.m. The scenery to the west of Sterkstroom is very fine, and the morning was comparatively cool. The headquarters of the Royal Scots marched into camp from Putter’s Kraal about 10 a.m. The men were a very fine-looking lot. The other four companies of the Scots were already at the front at Bushman’s Hoek.
Some friends from Queenstown came by rail to see the camp and have lunch with me. A fearful sandstorm was in full swing, and to give ladies lunch in my tent was hopeless. However, we took possession of the ladies’ waiting-room at the railway station, which was only a hundred yards distant, and managed very well indeed, although Arendse, overcome with his responsibilities, had the mutton chops ready before noon, and these were consequently of a rather cinder-like description when we encountered them at 1.30 p.m.
In the evening we heard that the 10th Brigade was en route to join the division, but next morning we were bitterly disappointed to learn that this welcome and much-needed reinforcement had been at the last moment diverted to Lord Methuen. The 1st Battalion of the Derbyshire Regiment, then landing at East London, represented all the assistance that Sir Redvers was in a position to grant us. This meant inactivity and a consequent spread of rebellion. I heard upon reliable authority that some 400 colonials joined the enemy since our defeat of Sunday. Naturally, numbers of those who were still wavering threw in their lot with their kinsmen. The situation in the district was thus becoming extremely serious, and something needed to be done. I hoped that, on the arrival of the Derbyshires, we should at least reoccupy Molteno. The guns lost at Stormberg had been replaced, [By depriving Second Lieutenant Beeves, B.A, of two 15-pounders that had recently been given to him instead of his antique muzzle-loaders] and the 79th Field Battery had joined, thus completing the brigade-division. A howitzer battery had also arrived at Queenstown, so that we were stronger than before.
The Derbyshires arrived in camp whilst we were at church parade on Sunday, 17th. A very fine-looking battalion. They had been lucky as regards the weather, which had been threatening all day; but the rain, most considerately, delayed its descent upon us until after the new-comers had pitched their camp.
With the Colenso disaster, of which we became aware on the 18th, the prospect of any serious military enterprise in the immediate future became more than ever discouraging. The news from Natal was decidedly bad, and our howitzer battery was taken from us, no doubt in order to make good the losses in artillery so unhappily experienced on the Tugela. Moreover, the Northumberland Fusiliers were ordered to East London, and, our infantry force being thereby reduced to a strength equivalent to only two battalions, the column became almost impotent. The Derbyshires were very strong, nearly 1100, but the Irish Rifles had been reduced by losses at Stormberg to about 500 of all ranks, and of the Royal Scots but four companies were available. Under the circumstances no move forward seemed feasible.
I could not help thinking that the strategical organization of the campaign had been injudiciously contrived. We tried to be ubiquitous, and consequently paid the usual penalty. Weak everywhere, we left the initiative with the enemy. Had the whole force in Cape Colony been concentrated for a single effort against Bloemfontein, the mere fact of our proceeding against it would have sufficed to raise the siege of Kimberley, and at the same time to remove a great deal of pressure from Natal. Concentration of force is always preferable to dispersion, except in cases where the only object that needs to be considered is the destruction of the enemy. In the present campaign we have been obliged to pay much attention, and not wholly successfully, to securing our own safety. Strategically we had had for a long time the worst of it, whilst tactically we could not justly claim any valuable balance in our favour. It should from the first have been taken into account that Boer troops, like all irregulars, are most formidable when in comparatively small bodies, and that the proper aim of the commander of a regular army opposed to such an enemy is to compel concentration against himself by directing a sufficiently heavy force against some important and unmistakable objective. Thus, had we marched 25,000 men on Bloemfontein, instead of attempting a direct relief of Ladysmith, the Boers must either have concentrated to oppose us or been content to permit our movement to take place without serious hinderance. Such concentration would have compelled the enemy to raise the siege of Kimberley and to renounce all incursions over the Cape Colonial border, besides seriously shaking the confidence of the invading army in Natal There was but one thing that comforted me with reference to the manner in which Sir William Gatacre’s division was permitted to drift along in an incomplete condition. And this was, that WO were clearly being kept in a state of abnormal weakness merely in order that other columns might be strengthened. Thus concentration seemed really coming to be regarded as desirable, although in two directions instead of in one only.
Of all the regrettable incidents recorded in the history of the region allotted to the 3rd Division, the next after our disastrous repulse at Stormberg, December 10, was the failure to reoccupy that formidable position immediately on the arrival of the Royal Irish Rifles at Queenstown, when such an operation at once became feasible. The Rifles and Sir William Gatacre reached Queenstown on November 18, and it was not until the 26th that the Boers took possession of Stormberg. I admit that a detachment at that time occupying Stormberg would have been exposed to the chances of a siege, but I do not think that it could have been in the smallest danger of capture. In any case the risk attending an expedition for the purpose of relieving a British garrison at Stormberg would have been far less than that which we actually incurred with such fatal results in attacking the Boer position. However, that which is done is done, and it is easy to appear wise after the event. Moreover, I feel sure that had General Gatacre had any reason to suppose that the troops promised him were not destined to arrive he would have anticipated the Boers in the occupation of Stormberg. With an entire division at his disposal the general could have made the Boer position untenable without being obliged to waste a man in attacking it. Naturally, therefore, he awaited the arrival of means for the accomplishment of that bloodless result. If generals could always foresee the march of events then there would be few mistakes made in war, and the critics who know afterwards what the generals cannot under existing conditions know at the time, would find their occupation gone.
On the 19th, as previously arranged, the shattered remnant of the Northumberland Fusiliers departed for East London to my great regret. I had received infinite kindness from this most hospitable battalion.
Upon the following morning I heard finally that my going to Natal could not be arranged, for reasons that I recognized to be unanswerable. And having nothing better to do I employed myself in reviewing the general situation as follows:’ [This extract is taken from a letter published in the Time* of January 19.] ‘The political horizon at the present time is heavily clouded and necessarily reflects the military situation. The only thing that has so far prevented a general rising of the colonial Boers is the manifest determination of Great Britain to persevere until completely victorious. Were any doubt to arise upon this latter subject, every waverer would instantly declare for the enemy. Boer loyalty has scarcely any appreciable existence except in the imagination of professional anti-Englanders. Every member of the Bond proves himself, ipso facto, a rebel at heart, since no loyal subject could possibly reconcile membership with loyalty. The aims and teaching of the Bond are the overthrow of British power in order to make room for a pan-Afrikander confederation; but, as a rule, the influential members have not hitherto been prepared to risk person or property in anything further than what is now termed constitutional agitation, but was formerly known as treasonable conspiracy. The quarrel between the Transvaal and the British Government has offered a chance to the Bond such as could have been gained by no other means, and if it is sought to comprehend the reasons which moved the Orange Free State to make common cause with the sister Republic, one has not far to seek. Bond intrigues lie at the bottom of everything. At the present time the Republics are both of them very angry, and justly so, with their colonial brethren, because so many fair promises of support have yielded comparatively little result in the form of armed adherents. But the Bond is playing its own game in its own way. Should the Republics vanquish Great Britain, the Bond pulls off the long odds and wins a huge stake; whilst so carefully has hedging been attended to that in the contrary event these ’loyal’ subjects stand to lose nothing. ‘Loyalty’ at present means abstention from active rebellion and no more; but even this remaining shred is now being subjected to a heavy strain. Many of the doubters are beginning to wonder whether the numerous reverses of the British may really be accepted as evidence of forthcoming victory for the allied Republics - their cat’spaws. The moral effect of any great success upon either side just now would be tremendous. For example, should Lord Methuen relieve Kimberley within the next few days, not only would the tide of rebellion be instantly checked, but many now in arms would steal back to their farms. Upon the other hand, were Kimberley to fall, our enemies would gain the services of several thousands of colonists. Had Gatacre been successful in his attack upon Stormberg, the rebel movement in the eastern provinces would have been reduced to positive impotence. His failure has added several hundred men to the enemy’s commandos. The marvel is that this local rising has been of such comparatively small dimensions. Probably the fact is that nearly all those of a really adventurous spirit have already joined hands with their kinsmen, whilst the remainder still need further convincing as to the probability of ultimate success before deciding to risk their necks or their farms. Your Afrikander is a shrewd man of business. He is willing to speculate only when, whatever the fate of the venture itself, he can see what he firmly believes to be a sure source of gain for himself. The fog of war still limits the power of reading the future, and pending the appearance of a strong light the Bond and its adherents will continue sitting upon the fence.
‘The Free State troops invaded the Cape Colony only because they were pressingly invited to do so. Naturally, the commanders expected a great number of men from the territory invaded to join their standards, but they were doomed to disappointment. Consequently, proclamations were issued annexing the districts occupied, and, this done, commandeering commenced in order to provide, under pressure, the recruits who had failed to join voluntarily. But the application of commandeering has been very partial; the rich Boers escaping it, and only the poor being enrolled for service without their own consent. As a body the well-to-do Boers will have nothing to say to rebellion unless they can clearly foresee its success, and since this remains improbable, outward ‘loyalty’ will be preserved to the end. Afterwards, rebels and arch-rebels will sing * God save the Queen ‘with the best of us, and resume the paths of constitutional agitation.’
There was a field-day at 5 on the morning of December 21, the object of which, so far as I could understand, was to enable the general to judge the value of a neighbouring position by standing thereon whilst it was being attacked. The conclusion to which he probably arrived was that, if the enemy would only employ similar tactics to those adopted in the instance under his observation, the position could certainly be held without difficulty, and the attackers would suffer heavy loss. It was the old, old story, use of ground utterly ignored, and faith pinned solely upon a frontal attack directed across the open veldt. We play so, fight so, and get beaten so. Something in the climate of South Africa has clearly produced an epidemic of mental aberration amongst our superior officers. Africa is proverbially the grave of military reputations, and
with these sink also the bodies of brave officers and men. We have beaten the Boers in the end, but by sheer weight of numbers, not by the superior skill and efficiency that should have given the advantage to an army composed chiefly of highly-trained Regular troops.
