On December 22, De Montmorency, with a mixed patrol, in all fifty strong, met a party of about thirty Boers between Halseton and Dordrecht, about nine miles west of the latter place. The Boers fled precipitately, leaving a wagon loaded with stores and three rifles in possession of the patrol.
The next day De Montmorency, following up this success with an increased force and the armoured train, in all 170 officers and men, attacked 300 Boers near Koups Laagte, and, continuously outflanking them in spite of their superior force, drove them for over seven miles from kopje to kopje until they took refuge in Dordrecht. Only that portion of the force under De Montmorency’s own command (about sixty men) was actually engaged; the supporting squadron of Brabant’s Horse, under Captain Fielden, having no share in the fighting. The armoured train returned to Sterkstroom at night, but De Montmorency bivouacked upon the ridges overlooking Dordrecht, and about two miles from the town. Reinforcements were applied for, but not granted, and the party was ordered to retire. This was a pity. A favourable moral effect would have been created by the capture of the Landdrost with a few other prominent rebels, and would have been worth a little risk. In actual fact there was no danger of a reverse, the enemy being completely demoralized.
On the morning of the 24th I accompanied the armoured train which left at daylight to cover the retirement of De Montmorency and his men. The enemy, however, made no sign, and consequently we were back at Sterkstroom by lunch-time. Then, indeed, there was a real sensation. In my tent I found a telegram, brief, but full of importance: ‘Roberts coming out Commander-in-Chief; Kitchener Chief of Staff; lots more mounted troops.’ The first part of this telegram was sensational enough, and also most satisfactory. Tet it did not afford a text for any comments of mine. But as to the second part I wrote as follows:’
‘Apparently the authorities have at length realized that mounted infantry are more than a match for ordinary infantry, unless the latter be in overwhelming force, and prepared to sustain immense losses wholly disproportionate to the results achieved. Whilst our slow-moving infantry are laboriously prosecuting a wide detour, the mounted Boer will jump on his horse and reinforce the threatened flank, or not seldom form a false flank beyond it. What we need is to have mobile troops of some sort, regular or irregular matters not, so long as they are expert riflemen and reasonably well-mounted. To beat the Boer we must adopt Boer methods, more especially as these are all of them strictly in accordance with the common-sense dictates of modem tactical science. The Boer carries out his tactical and other manoeuvres on horseback, and we must do the same. Mobility superior to that of the enemy enables a force to deliver or to decline battle at will, or in the event of a combat to frustrate by counter manoeuvres all attempts of the assailant to work round the flanks. It is idle for an army composed for the most part of infantry to attempt manoeuvring against an enemy whose chief strength is in mounted infantry, since the latter can always concentrate with such speed upon the threatened point that superiority attained against him can seldom be more than temporary. Success, be it admitted, can of course be gained by the combination of frontal and flank attacks, but only at great cost. Upon the contrary, however, when opposed by troops having mobility equal to their own, and who show sufficient dash under good leaders, the Boer can readily be dislodged from almost any position. In support of this I have only to quote the success achieved by De Montmorency yesterday. Upon this, as on every other occasion, the Boers fled precipitately upon the instant that each successive position had been turned. At last, so completely was the enemy demoralized that when, after a race for a kopje, De Montmorency ‘got there first,’ with only three men, he was permitted to retain his advantage. The Boer, for all that is said, is not as a rule a courageous fighter; but he is a crafty and a skilful one. The stubborn resistance offered by Boer forces during the present war is to be accounted for by the fact that, in spite of sensational allegations to the contrary, their losses have almost invariably been insignificant. Any troops will fight on so long as they escape punishment. 1 am convinced that had the same Boers who fled before some sixty men under De Montmorency yesterday been holding the position at Sterkstroom, attacked by British infantry at the field-day mentioned in the second paragraph in this letter, [The Field-day mentioned at the end of the preceding chapter] they would have held it successfully, or at all events been enabled to withdraw after trifling loss, whilst the casualties upon our side would have been extremely heavy.’
Scarcely had De Montmorency withdrawn from the western side of Dordrecht when Colonel Dalgety and the Cape Mounted Rifles, whose co-operation had been expected upon the previous day, marched into the town unopposed from the east. It appears that the commando which fled before De Montmorency's Scouts was so completely disorganized that it melted away. The members, mostly rebel farmers, were no doubt soon back on their farms, and peacefully following the ordinary avocations of husbandmen. The success gained by Colonel Dalgety was satisfactory, but had the troops acting from this direction been immediately reinforced, it is probable that the rebel commando might have been captured almost to a man. Colonel Dalgety’s Mounted Riflemen operated against Dordrecht from Clarke’s Siding, seven miles east of that place, whilst Feilden, with his squadron of Brabant's Horse and the Scouts under De Montmorency, advanced from the west Thus had all things been well the enemy should have been pinched between the two forces.
Christmas Day in Sterkstroom camp was chiefly remarkable for the utterly vile character of the weather. A hot wind, blowing half a gale, with clouds of dust, and followed up in the afternoon by a furious thunderstorm. Anything more un-Christmaslike it would be impossible to imagine.
I dined with the Mounted Infantry, in accordance with a fairly long standing engagement, and although Amphlett’s company had been unexpectedly sent off on patrol towards Dordrecht, we spent a very pleasant evening. Our plum-pudding was one of a number sent out by Mrs. Alderson with the Mounted Infantry Battalion when it sailed from England under the command of her husband. Needless to say, it proved to be most excellent.
Boxing Day was celebrated by a gymkhana meeting, most successfully organized by the Frontier Mounted Rifles. There was a full programme, which kept us interested from 11.45 a.m. until dark.
On the 27th I went down to have a look at the artillery horses, and was much distressed to find very little signs of picking-up condition. The great majority were badly tucked up and many very much hidebound. All this was, I think, due to the constant field-days held in conjunction with the Mounted Infantry. Of course, in the case of the 74th and 77th Field Batteries, the traces of the terribly hard work which they went through before, during, and after the disastrous fight at Stormberg could scarcely have been effaced altogether; but certainly I expected to have seen a better recovery than had been made. After a month at sea horses require tender treatment until they have regained their strength. Instead of this, ours were being worked just as if they were in the pink of condition. ‘Fat horses ‘ are no doubt an abomination and a deception, but they are preferable to animals with their bellies drawn up to their backbones. The 79th Field Battery, which escaped the Stormberg ordeal, seemed a trifle better off than the other two as regards flesh, but this advantage was discounted by the extraordinary prevalence of bad feet. In many cases it seemed quite marvellous that the farriers succeeded in finding any hold for the nails, and as the condition of the feet was clearly a long-standing evil, it does not appear as if the selection of the animals can have been very carefully conducted. Horses with brittle feet are no use for a campaign. A draft of Hew Zealand horses had arrived and, although rather ugly, as a rule, they appeared to be a useful lot. Eight, however, were quite unbroken.
Sir George Clarke’s ‘spade’ seems to give general satisfaction. Many remedies are found to be even worse than the disease, but in this case the check to the recoil is effected without involving any consequent inconveniences in other directions. An artillery officer told me that he invariably made use of the spade whether rapid fire was required or not. In a word, this invention seems to be exactly what is required; it is efficient as a means of checking the recoil, whilst at the same time involving no loss of freedom in training the gun at will This is where the central spade shows its marked superiority over the various other systems, such as the Darmancier, which adopt a spade at the end of the trail. All that we now need is the nearest possible approach to a genuine quick-firer mounted upon the Woolwich carriage. A real quick-firing field gun of reasonable calibre is practically an impossibility, because a necessary condition is that the carriage shall be master of the gun, and this is inconsistent with mobility, except in the case of a small gun such as the ‘Pom-pom.’
On December 28, De Montmorency, with thirty of his Scouts and their horses, proceeded by train to Dordrecht. The object was to discover the positions and strength of the Boer forces reported to be in the neighbourhood of that place. At Dordrecht we were rapturously received by the few English in the place. The town is on a hillside about two miles north-west of the railway station. On the west side of the station road, about one and a half mile from it and nearly equidistant from town and station, a mixed force of Brabant’s Horse, Cape Police, and Cape Mounted Rifles with four 7-pounder M.L. guns, was encamped under the command of Captain Goldsworthy, C.M.R.
Next morning De Montmorency set forth in search of the enemy. The weather was truly awful, and from first to last the changes were rung between Scotch mist and thunderstorms, varied once, in the case of the latter, by a severe shower of hail Under such circumstances reconnaissance, more especially in a mountainous country, was naturally difficult. Indeed, at times it was impossible to see more than a few hundred yards. At all events, not a Boer was to be seen, although in the course of our wanderings we passed under the very bills on which the enemy was found upon Hie following day, and from the summits of which I have every reason to believe that their sentries must actually have been watching us. The object of the expedition was twofold’(1) To find out the position of a large commando reported to be about six or seven miles north-west of Dordrecht; (2) to find a smaller commando said to be a little further to the west, and if opportunity offered to give the latter a fright. This smaller commando was reported to consist of the rebel colonists, whom De Montmorency had chased eastwards into Dordrecht the week before, and was that which we chiefly desired to meet. It had, however, most evidently cleared altogether or else had joined forces with its stronger neighbour. To give an idea of how deceptive is the veldt on a misty day I need only mention that a flock of sheep, which the thunderstorm had caused to close up into a block, was actually mistaken for a Boer laager! This misconception was not dispelled until after our scouts, advancing with the utmost caution, had approached within 400 yards. At double that distance all of us were prepared to certify that we could see wagons, oxen, and mounted men. Now De Montmorency's Scouts were picked men, and, whether colonial or home born, every one of them thoroughly accustomed to solving all the various conundrums that life on the veldt gives rise to.
As the result of the day's work the existence of the small commando as an isolated unit was considered to be disproved, and De Montmorency therefore determined to devote all his energies upon the following day to fixing the exact position of the larger one, and, if possible, obliging it to disclose its strength.
The programme for December 30 was as follows: ’A detachment of Captain Goldsworthy's force at the Dordrecht camp was to be placed at the disposal of Captain De Montmorency. Lieutenant De Cerjat, Frontier Mounted Rifles, temporarily attached to the ‘Scouts,’ was to proceed with an English farmer to a point from which the latter alleged that the Boer laager could clearly be seen. Having grasped the situation, De Cerjat was to join the patrol at the appointed rendezvous, about half-way between Dordrecht and Labuschagne's Nek. Unfortunately a strong Boer patrol impeded the researches of De Cerjat, so that he was prevented from reaching the intended point. Finally, De Montmorency decided to proceed without waiting any longer for De Cerjat. But meanwhile there had been a considerable delay, and the enemy had been given time to take up positions upon the hills about Labuschagne's Nek with a force amounting at least 800 men. Had we been one hour earlier it seems probable that we should have been able to occupy these hills, and from them overlook the laager. Yet, even as things actually turned out, we ascertained the enemy’s fighting position, his approximate strength, and' the fact that he was provided with two excellent guns. In short, sufficient information was obtained, and therefore we had every reason to be satisfied.
However, this desirable result was not achieved without some hard fighting, and the various incidents are deserving of a full description.
At 12.45 p.m. a scout belonging to the patrol on our right flank was fired at as he rode along the slope of the adjoining hill, about half a mile south-east of Labuschagne’s Nek. Captain De Montmorency, who was with the advanced party on the road, immediately galloped over the drift, where the: road crosses the donga, and having placed the horses behind a fold of ground, commenced replying to the fire by which he was instantly assailed from the rugged slopes on the south side of the nek. Orders were sent to the main body to get cover in the donga to the southwest of the drift; a party being detached towards the south-western outlet of the donga in order to guard against any turning movement. A small picquet was also let drop, during the advance, with orders to safeguard the right rear, more especially against any movement by way of the donga from the south-east.
An idea of the scene of operations can be gained from the sketch.
The enemy was in force on the double-crested ridge of hills above the right bank of the donga, and was still arriving thereon from the hills to the east and north-east, at the time when the Scouts had reached the drift crossing the donga just above the point B.
Observing the weakness of the party opposed to them, the Boers very soon took the offensive, galloping down from the nek and endeavouring to turn the left flank. The first effort was defeated by De Montmorency and the few men with him. On seeing what was about to occur De Montmorency galloped round the rising ground west of the donga and surprised the Boers with a rapid fire from its south-western end. The enemy retired precipitately whence he had come. Just at this time, 1.45 p.m., De Cerjat arrived, having a trooper of Brabant’s Horse with him. I explained to him that as far as I could see there was a prospect of a stiff affair, and suggested that he should send the man in to report to Goldsworthy at Dordrecht, asking him to bring reinforcements. This De Cerjat instantly did. At 2.35, after a lull followed by heavy firing, the Boers made another nasty rush, and, avoiding De Montmorency, worked right round until they fell foul of Captain Flanigan of Brabant’s Horse, who commanded the party at the head or western outlet of the donga. Recoiling from the accurate fire of Flanigan’s men, the enemy took cover about a thousand yards north-west, and the firing was soon brisk. It struck me that if this party of Boers should be reinforced sufficiently to contain Flanigan and at the same time execute a turning movement by way of the valley to our left, things might get rather awkward; therefore I determined to ride myself to hasten the arrival of Goldsworthy. But before leaving the ground I thought it desirable to acquaint the picquet guarding our right rear which was posted overlooking the donga about seven hundred yards from the point where the Dordrecht road reached the top of the plateau. Here was a cluster of rocks which afforded an excellent little position. My fear was that when Goldsworthy arrived the picquet might mistake friends for enemies. Just as I reached the picquet I saw a party of our men, which I rightly surmised to be that actually with De Montmorency himself, galloping rapidly towards us along the bottom of the donga. This finally decided me that not only must I do as I had proposed, but do so quickly. De Montmorency was evidently about to reinforce the picquet and then retire his main body under cover of it. At 2.50 I began to gallop, and at 3.40 I was back at the same place once more and Goldsworthy and his men with me. I met them only just emerging from Dordrecht, or, in other words, about five and a half miles from the scene of action. On our arrival on the plateau we met De Montmorency, who explained the situation. He had given orders for the whole force to retire, covered by the picquet on the right rear, which he had, as I had expected, reinforced with the Scouts who had been skirmishing under his own command Having seen this covering party properly posted, De Montmorency had returned by himself to see the retirement carried out, and on reaching the head of the donga, he met Flanigan just emerging, and inquired about Milford, whose detachment had been posted near the drift at B. Flanigan replied that Milford had received the order and was coming along all right. To make things quite sure, De Montmorency galloped along the eastern bank of the donga to B being heavily fired at while so doing and not finding Milford naturally concluded that Flanigan was right, and returned to the picquet. Actually what had happened was that Milford had been obliged to change his position owing to a cross-fire which commanded that first taken up, and De Montmorency had thus failed to find him. Meanwhile it was very naturally concluded that Milford had really received the order and would presently appear, there being, so far as could be seen, nothing to stop him. We did not know that in consequence of their horses having been shot, and being encumbered with wounded, Milford’s party could not move.
Therefore, it being believed, as I have explained, that the entire force had been extricated, De Montmorency and Goldsworthy thought only of an attempt to punish the Boers who were engaged with Flanigan’s covering party on the left front; and accordingly the whole galloped across the plateau for that purpose, receiving as they went a well directed but ineffective fire from the hostile artillery. A series of skirmishes ensued westward of the original scene of the engagement, and finally the troops returned by the Jamestown road to Dordrecht. The absence of Milford’s party caused no immediate alarm; but as the evening wore on a suspicion of the truth enforced itself upon us, and finally the arrival of a messenger from Milford removed any doubt as to what had occurred. Captain Goldsworthy reported the situation to the authorities, and, with reference to his suggestions about reinforcements and a rescue, was reminded that it was seldom desirable to risk a large force in an attempt to extricate a small one. In face of this cold water Goldsworthy determined to engage every available man, as well as his four ‘pop-guns‘ 7-pounder muzzle-loaders. For thus manfully facing responsibility Goldsworthy deserves the highest praise. It was arranged that the troops should reach the ground at daylight next morning, and accordingly a start was made at 2.30 a.m. Whilst De Montmorency and his remaining Scouts made for the donga, by crossing the valley forming the south-western boundary of the plateau, intending at all costs to reach their beleaguered comrades with a supply of ammunition, Goldsworthy, with 115 men and the C.M.R. guns under Captain Lukin, reached the south-eastern end of the plateau by the road, and after scouts had carefully examined the ground, men were dismounted and others led their horses to the spot where Milford’s party was confined. Meanwhile Goldsworthy himself, with the dismounted men, covered the right flank by advancing along the donga itself. The success of this venture was due to the enemy having evidently shifted their artillery, no doubt in order to put it in a position to shell the donga, and not having had time to get it back again. At all events, not a gun was fired by the enemy until after the operation had been completed. It was a ticklish business, more especially as the enemy made a target of the party carrying Lieutenant Warren, Gape Police, in a blanket. This party relying upon the forbearance of the enemy as was indeed natural under the circumstances made at once for the road from the donga instead of inclining to their right as others had done. I could see the bullets striking all around and amongst these men, but providentially none were hit. As soon as the front was clear of the rescued and rescuers the four guns of the C.M.R. opened fire on the Boer position, and shortly afterwards the enemy replied. There was an artillery duel for about three-quarters of an hour, during which we sustained no casualties. The whole force then retired to Dordrecht. My telegram to the Times was delivered at Dordrecht Station by my own hand at 9.30 a.m., but when I reached Sterkstroom at 430 p.m. it had not yet arrived. This was very unlucky. Having been the only correspondent present on the ground, it was hard that I should have obtained no start of the others, who had been comfortably sitting in Sterkstroom and gained their information from the Intelligence Department.
An adventure of my own, which took place during the morning’s work, is worth telling. De Montmorency asked me to write a note to Goldsworthy, explaining a few details which might possibly have been otherwise misunderstood, and also to make arrangements for the removal of our reserve ammunition from Dordrecht to the camp. Consequently, I started half an hour late, following the ‘spoor’ of De Montmorency’s party along the road. The moon was bright, and I had no difficulty until leaving the road, soon after which I lost the trail. However, I knew the general direction, and finally crossed the valley about daybreak, and mounted to the plateau just opposite the donga at a point where a small re-entrant breaks the general steepness of the further side of the valley. At the head of this was a loose stone wall, in which I proceeded to pull down a ‘gap’ for my pony to pass through. Whilst 1 was thus engaged, I suddenly observed three men stealthily approaching, and not more than fifty yards from me. To run was impossible. Had it been otherwise, 1 should have certainly made a bolt of it, for I fully believed that those whom 1 saw were Boer scouts. I tried to appear unconcerned, and continued to pull down the gap. Then, as the men drew near, I discovered to my great relief that they were three of De Montmorency’s men who were looking for a place to bring up the horses out of the valley. De Montmorency and most of the party had gone forward on foot, carrying ammunition to Milford, and leaving the horses to follow. My satisfaction under the circumstances can easily be imagined.
More especially as almost immediately afterwards we saw Goldsworthy's Scouts cantering across the plateau in the direction of the donga, and some Boers retiring rapidly towards Labuschagne's Nek under fire from Milford's party. Half an hour later I had the pleasure of shaking hands with Milford, Gordon Turner, and that most excellent man Doctor Perkins, all of whom were rescued safe and sound. The defence of their post in the donga by Milford and his thirty-five men against some 800 Boers with two guns was a fine performance, and contrasts somewhat sharply with .many cases in which parties that have been ‘cut off" have surrendered without much ado. The enemy's loss, so far as could be ascertained, was 8 killed and 22 wounded, besides 33 horses killed and 2 captured uninjured. Of Milford's horses, 26 were killed, but otherwise his losses were wonderfully small: Lieutenant Warren, Cape Police, dangerously wounded (since dead), and two men slightly wounded.
Amongst the party was a ‘Scout,’ who, because he was a Dutchman, was regarded with some suspicion. However, during the fighting, this man cleared himself, and came to be recognized as a genuine ‘loyalist." It happened in this wise. A Boer galloped past, and the suspect, by a brilliant shot, killed the horse. After a short pause the man got up and began to run, when the Scout, after a preparatory spit to clear his eye, took steady aim and fired. The Boer threw up his hands and fell in a heap stone dead. It was considered that, if the suspect had had any sympathies -with his Mends the enemy, he would at least have been sporting enough to give his fallen foe a "chance.’ Indeed, if anything, there was regret that he had not done so. However, he had effectually cleared his reputation.
