The following extracts from my journal will give an idea of the general run of affairs at the time, and also show what I thought about them. That I was mistaken in some of my predictions, the actual march of events has since proved.
‘January 9.’Further information which I obtained to-day from a British ‘refugee’ goes to confirm the theory that the Stormberg commando has already or will shortly send a detachment against French. There is, however, no certainty, for the excellent reason that our patrols do not keep touch of the enemy. When De Montmorency’s ‘ Scouts ‘ have commenced work in the Stormberg direction we shall, in future, be kept better informed regarding Boer movements, and the latter will know less about ours. De Montmorency returns from Queenstown to-morrow morning, and hopes to bring with him sufficient remounts to make good his losses about Dordrecht. As soon as he has the means, he will speedily utilize them, and I hope that it may be my good fortune to be with him on his next important adventure. I would not for worlds have missed the three days’ reconnaissance near Dordrecht the week before last.
‘The Divisional Boxing Tournament commenced in Sterkstroom camp to-day, and promises well. Captain Broadley of the Royal Scots is the moving spirit, and has managed everything most excellently. He was fortunate in securing a very competent referee in Captain Bushe, late of the Queen’s Bays, whose decisions have so far had the somewhat unusual merit of giving universal satisfaction.
‘January 10.’I hear, on fairly reliable authority, that Commandant Grobelar, whose brother is already engaged against French in the Colesberg district, has actually left Stormberg for Colesberg with 1000 men. Nothing is more likely, but as there is no official confirmation of the rumour, I have not as yet thought it desirable to cable this intelligence. If it be true that Grobelar has indeed gone, then a very important move has been made, and may not improbably exercise a very serious influence upon the situation. General French has hitherto done extremely well with the very small force at his disposal, and, until the unfortunate disaster to the Suffolk Regiment, his operations have been uniformly successful. Now, however, if he is sharply attacked, after the enemy’s reinforcements have arrived, a serious reverse seems by no means improbable. Activity upon the part of the 3rd Division is in my opinion most, necessary, but so far as I can gather there does not seem to be the least prospect of our attempting anything whatever. Nothing could be easier than for us to harass the Stormberg garrison, if only it were decided to send infantry to Pen Hoek, and thus release the greater part of the mounted troops now idly sitting there, concerned chiefly about their own safety and doing little or nothing else. Considering that we have not less than 800 mounted men, it seems ridiculous that the question of whether 1000 Boers have or have not quitted Stormberg should ever have been in doubt. Clearly, however, so long as our men are camped at such great distances from the Boer positions, it is impossible for them to patrol the country, continuously, in an efficient manner. It is the business of the infantry to occupy well-selected tactical positions to be used as strategical pivots for the mounted troops. Such a post ought to be established near Molteno, dominating that town, and at least 500 mounted men should be kept actively employed in the surrounding country, with this fortified post as the base of their operations. Supposing the Boers to make an attempt to capture the position, so much the better. The one thing of all others that we desire is, that the enemy shall come out of his fastnesses, and try conclusions with us upon ground that he has not prepared for defence. Should the enemy so act, he could scarcely avoid giving us sundry opportunities. Therefore we would do well to offer him bait sufficiently attractive to draw him provided that we, at the same time, are careful to dangle only such morsels as he cannot comfortably swallow. Far be it from me to recommend dissemination of force as a general principle, but for our present purpose the occupation of an advanced strategical position, by a small force within reasonable reach of support from the main body, would make just this difference to our present situation, that whereas we are now impotent to adopt any aggressive plan of action, we should become capable of so doing from the moment that our mounted troops possessed a pied d terre within striking distance of our opponents’ laagers. To maintain patrols constantly in touch of the enemy at Stormberg, when the nearest haven of safety is Bushman’s Hoek, some nineteen miles distant, is quite impossible, and it is perfectly obvious that unless the patrol duty is done thoroughly, and reconnaissance made with reasonable frequency, we cannot be kept informed of what the enemy is doing, and the enemy himself will moreover continue free to do exactly as he pleases.
‘We hear rumours of strong reinforcements being sent to this part of the theatre of war, but 1 disbelieve them entirely. Our probable fate is to continue ‘ marking time’ until either Ladysmith or Kimberley has been relieved. Afterwards, reinforcements might indeed be sent here, merely to make a ‘ show,’ but I greatly doubt anything remaining for them to do this side of the Transvaal border, if then. The victories that must be won in order to make us masters of Kimberley and Ladysmith will be of so decisive a character, that when these have been accomplished there will be very little more fighting to be done upon a large scale. After the Boers covering the siege of Kimberley have been defeated, the fall of Bloemfontein and the submission of the Orange Free State will follow within ten days. Concentration of the British forces on the Kimberley and Ladysmith lines, with a view to prompt and decisive action, is absolutely necessary. Therefore we shall receive no considerable reinforcements to the skeleton of the 3rd Division just at present. Had a really strong force been at first collected for a single effort either in Natal or the Cape Colony, there would have been no disasters, much less loss of life, and a successful issue to the war within a very brief period of time. We have instead been weak everywhere, and consequently beaten everywhere. The few successes that we have won have been purely tactical.
‘January 11.’The 3rd Division Boxing Tournament was continued yesterday, and brought to a conclusion this morning. The results of the ‘finals’ were as follows:’
‘Feather Weights : Private Connolly, Sherwood Foresters, and Private Platt, Sherwood Foresters, were so evenly matched that a ‘ draw ‘ was the only possible decision.
‘Light Weights: Corporal Bray, A.S.C., beat Private Marshall, Kaffrarian Bides.
‘Middle Weights: Private Holmes, Sherwood Foresters, beat Corporal Dutton, Royal Scots, after a very tough fight.
‘Heavy Weights: Private Brown, Koyal Scots, beat Private Rawson, Sherwood Foresters. Rawson had injured his wrist during a very heavy contest on the previous day, and what had otherwise promised to be the most exciting event of the meeting consequently resulted in Rawson’s withdrawal during the second round. The pair were well matched, and both men good boxers.
‘Sir William Gatacre gave away the prizes.
‘The Royal Scots were exercised at field-firing this morning. The oftener I see field-firing the more convinced I become that, although a valuable and indeed almost indispensable item of company training, its application to battalions or larger bodies is absurd. The use of field-firing is to give practice to section commanders in the control of fire in accordance with observed results. Reality, in the tactical schemes propounded for field-firing exercises, has never yet been attained. The fact that there are bullets in the rifles renders it invariably necessary to leave undone many things that ought to be done, and to do many things that in a real action would be impossible or at all events ridiculous. So far as such things be well done, the Royal Scots succeeded very well indeed. Their fighting efficiency seems to be of no mean order.
‘January 13.’At present we have at Sterkstroom the 74th, 77th, and 79th Batteries of Field Artillery, the 1st Battalion Royal Scots, the 1st Battalion Derbyshire Regiment, the 12th Company Royal Engineers, and about 300 Mounted Infantry and Colonial mounted troops. We have also the wreck of the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, and about 500 Kaffrarian Rifles stationed at Bushman’s Hoek; as well as some 700 more mounted troops divided between that place, Fen Hoek, and other stations.
The main body of the Cape Mounted Rifles, under Colonel Dalgety, is to a limited extent under Sir William’s orders, and if these two squadrons be added, the grand total of our mounted strength rises to about 1200 men.
‘At first sight it may appear as if 1200 mounted men should be capable of doing a great deal; but this is not so under the actual conditions prevailing. Had we even one more battalion of infantry, to be utilized in order to hold fortified posts as pivots for the mounted troops, then indeed something satisfactory might be undertaken; but so long as the protection of their own camps is added to their patrol duties, etc., it is clear that the available fighting strength of the mounted corps must remain subject to an immense reduction.
‘In my own opinion this state of stagnation could easily be remedied by strongly fortifying the two kopjes on the immediate west of this camp, so that the vast accumulation of stores could as safely be guarded by one battalion as by two, and infantry be thus set free for the duties at the front already indicated. The responsible authorities seem, however, to entertain a different opinion with regrettable results.
‘For example. Yesterday a Boer commando about 300 strong was in position, within three miles of Bird’s River, where Colonel Dalgety is encamped with two squadrons of the Cape Mounted Rifles. The enemy had advanced from the neighbourhood of Dordrecht, and had with him a working party which proceeded to reap the crops of sundry rebel farmers. Dalgety elected to sit still, without offering any opposition whatever, simply because, after deducting an adequate garrison to defend his camp, he considered that the residue represented so weak a force that seriously engaging the enemy became impossible. That such conditions should prevail is altogether wrong. Not only should we be ready and eager to pounce upon the enemy upon any occasion when he ventures from his strongholds, but, more than this, our correct policy is to be ubiquitous in worrying him with patrols and reconnaissances. For us to sit still just now and do nothing must certainly be attended by calamitous results to General French’s column, upon which the enemy will be enabled to concentrate his efforts. A step in the right direction has been taken to-day by the despatch of a patrol of fifty Frontier Mounted Rifles towards Steynsburg, where they will join hands with the Colonial troops of French’s column who are now at that place. But this is not enough. It behoves us to distract the enemy as much as possible by unexpected blows in widely different directions. Dordrecht, for instance, should be re-occupied to the extent of putting its garrison and the covering force to flight, or capturing one or both if we can. Through some error, the origin of which I have been unable to ascertain, the previous combination, which should have resulted in the capture of the Dordrecht commando, failed to fulfil its purpose. De Montmorency, indeed, drove the Boers helter-skelter into the town, through which they fled not, as intended, into the hostile arms of Colonel Dalgety and his Cape Mounted Rifles, but into the friendly bosom of the neighbouring mountains. Next morning, when Dalgety at length reached Dordrecht, not a Boer remained within seven miles of the place, and his march had therefore a fruitless result. Had he been twelve hours sooner, at least 200 prisoners would have fallen into his hands.
‘January 14.’To-day I rode over to Pen Hoek, a strong position astride of the Queenstown-Jamestown road and about sixteen miles distant from the Sterk-stroom camp. There has of late been much talk of an impending attack upon Pen Hoek, and I was anxious to see what arrangements had been made for the defence of this important pass. The key of the position is the bold kopje on the west of the road, and its weakness a ridge about 3500 yards to the northwards, upon which the enemy’s guns would certainly be formidable, whilst the 7-pounders of the Cape Mounted Rifles would, at that range, be at the mercy of the superior weapons of the Boers. To meet this difficulty I was glad to see that gun-pits had been dug on the slope of the hill about 500 yards nearer to the opposite ridge, and here two of the 7-pounders had been placed, whilst the other four are securely entrenched on the commanding summit of the kopje. Shelter-trenches and * schanzes ‘have been made in all directions, every avenue of approach being excellently commanded. Three squadrons of Brabant’s Horse are responsible for the eastern kopje, and, so long as the western is successfully held, they should have no difficulty whatever in maintaining a successful defence. In short, if natural strength aided by judicious improvements can avail anything, Pen Hoek is impregnable against any attack that the Boers are capable of delivering. I should say that Pen Hoek is stronger in every way than Bushman’s Hoek, and its importance even greater. By capturing Bushman’s Hoek the enemy would place a very serious obstacle in the way of our future advance, as well as striking a heavy blow against the very limited stock of prestige that yet remains to us. But by gaining possession of Pen Hoek, the Boers would turn our right flank, and thus obtain a good road to Queenstown and our communications so that, unless we could instantly retake the position, a retrograde movement would be inevitable. The loss of either of these posts would be such a calamity that the Stormberg disaster itself would be a mere nothing in comparison with it.
‘Strong as the Pen Hoek position undeniably is, and sanguine as I am that its present garrison could defend it against any attack, there is one serious drawback that it is impossible to ignore. The garrison consists entirely of mounted troops, whose horses would be in great danger in the event of any serious effort upon the part of the enemy. To place the horses out of reach of fire would no doubt be possible, but the question of watering and feeding them would present serious difficulties. The water supply for animals is provided by a large pond, nearly two miles off, and certainly unapproachable in face of the enemy. I have previously expressed the opinion that an infantry garrison should be provided, but the very cogent reason for this, to which I have now referred, had not then occurred to me. There should be infantry to hold the position, leaving the mounted troops free to detach themselves from it and to act against the flanks and rear of the assailants. It is, moreover, a great mistake, in almost any circumstances, to allow mounted troops to become bottled up in a beleaguered place. The business of such troops is to clear out before it is too late, and assist the defenders left within, by harassing the enemy from without. Mounted infantry are superior to other infantry only so long as they retain their powers of increased mobility, and this when they are shut up in a small post is at once sacrificed. To use mounted infantry to hold fortifications is pure waste of material better suited to more active employment.
‘January 15.’Another of the many false alarms was given last night, and in consequence of it the Royal Scots, with half the Derbyshires and the artillery and mounted troops, proceeded by road and rail this morning to protect Molteno against an attack said to be pending. As a matter of course, the enemy made no sign; but as I learned that De Montmorency had obtained permission to sleep at Molteno, I proceeded thither with every confidence that the morrow would bring forth a certain amount of excitement.
‘January 16.’Absolute need of rest for both men and horses prevented an early start, but at about 8 a.m. the ‘ Scouts ‘ moved off in the direction of Stormberg, using a little-frequented road, which, after passing through an extremely odoriferous Kaffir location to the eastward, finally turns north and west towards Storm-berg at a distance of about two miles and a half from the Rooikop. We proceeded without any adventures, until, after passing Goosen’s farm, our advanced scouts ascended a rising ground, under the eastern edge of which the road began its bend northwards, after passing on its right a lofty kopje, from which, afterwards, we obtained a view which well rewarded us for the trouble of climbing it. Upon the rising ground referred to, and securely concealed amongst the rocks, was a Boer grazing-picquet, who allowed the scouts to approach within two hundred yards before declaring their presence by a ragged volley, which was so marvellously ill-directed that not a man or horse was hit. This reception naturally caused us to retire a few hundred yards to a friendly ridge, where the situation was offered time to develop itself. The enemy, however, made no sign, although so far as his opportunities for observation went, no more than half a score Britishers were before him, our tiny main body having kept out of sight. The number of Boers was probably a dozen or thereabouts, and we might easily have ousted them had we felt so disposed; but the object for which De Montmorency had come out was not to fight unnecessarily but to reconnoitre. Accordingly, therefore, the commander of the ‘Scouts‘ was content to place his men so that they could temporarily check any advance by the enemy, whilst he himself seized the opportunity to ascend the kopje already mentioned. From this point of vantage the entire stretch of country up to the Stormberg position lay before us, whilst to our right front was Schoeman’s farm, where a large commando had been reported to be encamped. Of this commando there was no trace whatever, nor was any laager elsewhere visible. On the hillsides near Stormberg about three hundred horses and perhaps four hundred oxen were grazing, but on the alarm caused by the firing, mounted Boers were already busy ‘ rounding them up/ There was no sign of any movement against ourselves. Two or three Boers galloped down to the picquet which had fired at us’ no doubt to inquire into the matter, but otherwise nothing was done. Six men were seen on a ridge west of Schoeman’s farm, about a thousand yards to our front, and these after a time rode down to the farm itself. Having seen all that there was to be seen, and being convinced that whilst a nearer approach directly on Stormberg would yield no advantage it would certainly be dangerous, De Montmorency decided that he could best singe the Boer’s beard by a raid on Schoeman’s farm, which was accordingly searched for arms, but without result. Two of the six men proved to be ‘ suspects ‘ resident in Molteno; but as no rifles could be found, nor was there sufficient evidence against any of the party, it was decided not to arrest them. When leaving the farm, De Montmorency inquired of the Boers ‘how far they intended to let him get away before firing on him.’ To this question they replied volubly that no such intention was in their minds, nor indeed could they do anything of the sort, having no weapons. However, very shortly after our departure these innocent farmers were on a convenient kopje firing away at us most merrily’ and harmlessly.
‘Whilst all this was going on, the Cape Police, under Major Neyland, had arrived on the scene, and knowing more about Mr. Schoeman than we did, promptly drove off a considerable number of his horses and cattle. Awkward complications were, however, by this time developing, and the sound of firing on our left warned us that it was time to clear. The Boers on the ridge had gradually been reinforced by perhaps a couple of hundred men, and commenced to make a half-hearted attempt to cut us off. Had they been more enterprising we might have had trouble, but they contented themselves with firing a great many rounds at long ranges, to which our men replied somewhat less vigorously, but yet with sufficient effect to keep the enemy in check during our retirement from ridge to ridge. So heavy was the fire at one time that people in Molteno became seriously alarmed, and telegrams were sent to Sterkstroom and Bushman’s Hoek, with the result that the armoured train arrived just as all was over, and a battery with some mounted infantry marched rapidly from Bushman’s Hoek, nearly as far as Molteno, only to return, disappointed, whence they had come. The Scouts and Police regained Molteno without man or horse being scratched, but a patrol of the latter, which revisited the scene of the action an hour later, was rewarded by the sight of a Boer stretcher-party with a white flag; from which we may conclude that the enemy sustained at least one casualty. Thus ended a most successful little reconnaissance. The information gained was, that if the enemy still has a strong force about Stormberg, the greater part must be encamped upon the far side of the hills, i.e. to the north of the station; and secondly, that the report as to a commando being on Schoeman’s farm was absolutely untrue. The object with which such reports were furnished by pretended ‘loyalists’ was probably to throw dust in our eyes, so as to conceal the detachment of a commando to operate against French. It is a thousand pities that, for want of men, the General is not now in a position to make a reconnaissance in force, with the intention of converting it into a serious attack, in the event of the enemy’s defence proving to be weak.
‘The view I had of Stormberg, when with De Montmorency on the look-out kopje, has convinced me that to attack the position the proper course is for the assault to be given from the east, along the ridge of the Rooi Kop, which rises gently, in waves, for about two miles; whilst a strong containing line should make a vigorous frontal demonstration from the south, with its principal strength to the west of the main road. This demonstration should be arranged so that the troops should be in position shortly before daylight, in order that their advance should not be exposed to the enemy’s artillery. The inferior range of our guns makes it imperative that they should attain positions near enough to ensure effective fire. I need scarcely add that whilst the infantry and artillery assailed the enemy in front and flank, the mounted infantry and irregular horse should work round towards the rear. The strength of the Stormberg position has, I think, been exaggerated. Instead of a position complete in itself, there is a series of positions, requiring a large force to hold them; and the loss of the Rooi Kop would probably involve the loss of the remainder.
‘January 17. On my return from Molteno this morning I learned that the Royal Irish Rifles have received a strong draft, including several volunteers from 'section D,’ and secondly that the Derbyshires are to relieve the Rifles* at Bushman's Hoek; probably in order that Colonel Smith-Dorrien of the former corps may be given a semi-independent command, without detaching him from his battalion. Bushman's Hoek is, moreover, an important position, with a garrison which will soon amount to some 2000 men, including the Kaffrarians on the Loperberg; and an officer of rank is clearly required. Hitherto, Major Maxwell, R.E., has been commandant.
‘To my great delight, I observed that two batteries of artillery are at the Hoek, where they are, apparently, to remain for the present. There are two great advantages in this arrangement. In the first place, the horses will enjoy excellent grazing, and, secondly, they will no longer be obliged to drag the guns up that terrible hill every time that artillery is despatched to the front.
"By the English mail which arrived during my absence at Molteno, came newspapers up to December 23, and containing the casualty list of the Colenso disaster, which we thus see for the first time. No one in authority has troubled his head to consider that troops in this country have relatives and friends engaged with other columns besides their own. The information given as to operations elsewhere is always most meagre. For example, all that we at Sterkstroom yet know about the second attack on Ladysmith is that there was desperate fighting, certain positions being several times taken and retaken, with heavy losses on both sides. We have received no particulars ‘not even the list of officers killed and wounded. I need scarcely say that great dissatisfaction is felt and expressed. Naturally, we assume that such reticence covers something that needs to be concealed, and this same assumption gives encouragement to the Colonial rebels with most mischievous results.
‘January 18.’It is reported this morning that the Dordrecht commando has blown up several culverts on the line from Sterkstroom to that place; but, so far, no official confirmation has been received from Colonel Dalgety at Bird’s River Siding.
‘January 19.’The Derbyshires marched this morning to Bushman’s Hoek and relieved the Koyal Irish Rifles, who returned to this camp. It is said that Colonel Smith-Dorrien has been given a ‘free hand;’ but this seems doubtful, since, from all accounts. Sir William Gatacre being himself very strictly tied down by orders from headquarters, is not in a position to delegate liberty of action which he does not himself possess.
‘January 20.’Lieutenant Nickerson, R.A.M.C., the doctor who has been attending to the wounded at Stormberg and elsewhere, returned to camp this morning. From his account, the Boers behaved well, both to the wounded British officers and soldiers, and also to himself. Upon the other hand, the conduct of certain Colonial rebels was disgraceful. Lieut.-Colonel Eager, of the Royal Irish Rifles, who, as will be remembered, had been terribly wounded by a shell, was conveyed to a farmhouse, where Dr. Nickerson attended to his injuries and hoped that his patient would be allowed a little rest. But it was not to be. The rebel owner of the farm returned with a number of companions, and in spite of Dr. Nickerson’s entreaties, insisted upon the instant removal of the wounded man, who was accordingly placed on an ox-waggon, which, jolting terribly over the vile roads, nearly shook him to pieces. That farmer’s name is Yan Zyl, and when the time comes for adjudicating upon the cases of the various Colonial Dutch who have thrown in their lot with the enemy, it is to be hoped that the behaviour of this inhuman wretch will not be forgotten.
‘From this abominable incident it is pleasant to turn to the truly noble and patriotic conduct of the British inhabitants of Burghersdorp, which was certainly ‘ beyond all praise.’
‘January 21.’So little is occurring in our immediate neighbourhood that our attention is now engaged chiefly with the operations elsewhere. The news from Natal is most encouraging, and everything seems to point to a Boer Sedan [News of the Spion Kop disaster was shortly to bring a rude awakening from these pleasant dreams.] within the next few days. That the investing and covering forces of the enemy round and about Ladysmith may succeed in making good their retreat, leaving their artillery and stores behind them, is not improbable; but that they can escape as an army seems most unlikely. All depends, of course, upon the distance northwards and eastwards that Warren and Clery may be enabled to accomplish before the Boers decide upon bolting. Van Reenen’s Pass is already closed, we might almost say; and it remains only to intervene further north so as to command also the route to Laing’s Nek, in order to ensure that although men and horses may still escape via Dundee and Wakkerstroom, everything else must fall into our hands. The perfect consummation would of course be that the greater part of the Boer forces may be obliged to surrender. Should this happen, the end of the war will have approached within easily measurable distance.
‘Next to the progress of the army in Natal, the matter which chiefly exercises our minds is the reorganization of everything upon Egyptian lines that is at present going forward. That the Omdurman campaign, and the preparatory operations that preceded it, afford undeniable proof that a thoroughly sound system prevailed is well known; yet it does not therefore follow that what was good in Egypt will necessarily prove equally suitable in South Africa. For example, the practice of decentralization in the transport service has stood the test of successive campaigns in this country ever since it was employed in absolute perfection by Sir Evelyn Wood with his ‘ Flying Column ‘ in Zululand. Under the regimental system, every squadron and company has been a self-contained unit, capable of immediate detachment at any moment, with its reserve ammunition and rations, and everything else complete. This arrangement is now abolished, and all transport is to be permanently centralized under the responsible officer of the divisional staff. It is difficult to see how improved efficiency can result from this change, and certainly, until the new machine gets into proper working order, difficulties are pretty sure to arise. Where the means of regimental transport is a drove of grunting, evil-smelling camels that as soon as their daily task has been completed, every one wishes to have removed from range of sight, hearing, and scent-then, indeed, the centralized system is preferable. But where wagons drawn by mules or oxen are used to convey the company-baggage and equipment, the case is totally different, since the wagon provides a sort of mobile store in which everything not for the moment required can be left in safety without any trouble about packing or unpacking. For example, the reserve provisions and ammunition having once been packed on a company wagon will never need to be again handled during the campaign unless an emergency calling for their use should actually arise.
‘January 22.’Rumours are plentiful, and even more so than usual, about an impending attack upon this column by the Stormberg commando. There is very little doubt that the tales which so continually reach our ears are circulated by the Boers themselves, simply in order to try and frighten us into leaving them alone. At the same time it is not absolutely impossible that a deep-laid scheme is hatching, and that some day an attack may actually be delivered when they think that we have been educated into a belief that no information as to their intention to attack can by any chance be true. It would not do at all for us to absolutely ignore what we hear, but at the same time we need to do no more than to be always ready, and never for a moment to allow any relaxation in the vigilance and frequency of our patrols.
‘January 23.’This afternoon I rode up to Bushman’s Hoek, and was delighted to find that, with the exception of three companies, the troops have all been moved forward to the ridges south of Phillips’s farm, where there is an excellent camping ground on a position that is practically secure against any attack. The right is protected by the Loperberg, which is occupied by the Kaffrarian Rifles, whilst on the left there is a perfect glacis, over which no troops could possibly advance and survive. In front the ridges have been crowned by a breastwork with sandbag loop-holes, and unless the enemy succeeded in gaining the eastern heights, in face of artillery fire from the Bushman’s Hoek redoubts and the Loperberg, it seems to me that the troops would do well to accept battle at their camp without any idea of retiring to Bushman’s Hoek itself. In any case, it is most undesirable that men should get into the habit of thinking that an entrenched position is essential to their safety; and that such a feeling should arise is inevitable if they are allowed to remain boxed up for any length of time. Moreover, the camping-ground within the area of the Bushman’s Hoek position has been occupied for a very long time, so that, in spite of the beautiful air and every other natural advantage, it could not have continued healthy for an indefinite period. Between the Derbyshires and Bushman’s Hoek, two batteries are encamped, and on the eastern side of the road the mounted infantry. It was most satisfactory to notice a considerable improvement in the condition of the artillery horses, although it would have been most surprising had this not been apparent where grass, water, and climate are all so favourable. The water, indeed, might be cleaner, but it is at hand and plentiful. Perhaps, however, even the local advantages already enumerated have had better results than might otherwise have been the case, in consequence of the horses being now spared the great tax upon their strength that was formerly entailed by constantly dragging guns and wagons up the steep hill to Bushman’s Hoek as often as some ephemeral suspicion of danger called them from Sterkstroom.
‘January24.’The patrol of Brabant’s Horse, under
Captain Flanigan, which was despatched from here to Steynsburg ten days ago, returned to camp this morning after having successfully accomplished its task, which was to gain touch of other troops detached eastwards by General French. The object of this move was, I understand, to impose upon the Boer commanders by leading them to expect joint action against Storm-berg by French and Gatacre; and there seems to be every reason to believe that the desired result was actually attained. At all events, a movement towards Colesberg by a commando from about Bethulie appears to have been arrested.
‘January 25.’News received this morning that British troops have occupied Thebus, fourteen miles west of Steynsburg. The intention was to repair the railway, gradually, in the direction of Stormberg,’
