The evacuation of Dordrecht on the evening of Sunday, December 31, was effected without any interference from the enemy, Colonel Dalgety, with the headquarters of the C.M.R. from Clarke’s siding, and Captain Goldsworthy’s detachment from Dordrecht, falling back upon the chosen position at Bird River, to which reference has already been made. De Montmorency and his Scouts at the same time returned to Sterkstroom. That the withdrawal from Dordrecht was a perfectly correct proceeding appears to be certain, although it was, I think, unwise to effect it upon the vary evening of a distinctly successful skirmish, the moral effect of which was thus lost. It is far from improbable that a reconnaissance in greater force upon Monday morning would have had important results. A demonstration against the enemy’s front, combined with a turning movement byway of the heights on the western side of Labuschagne’s Nek, would have been very likely to bring about a precipitate retreat of the Boers and Hie capture of their laager. The risks would have been small, and the possibilities very considerable. Then, after having struck a really hard blow, the troops could have been withdrawn without any sacrifice of prestige, because an unmistakable object for the original expedition would have been disclosed, and the retirement would have been accounted for by the fact that it had been effected. Under the actual circumstances it naturally appeared as if we had deliberately occupied Dordrecht, and subsequently realized that we could not retain our hold upon it. Such, indeed, was, moreover, actually the case. The mistake was in occupying the place at all with any considerable force. Having failed to cut off the commando that De Montmorency had chased through Dordrecht on the 23rd December, the Cape Mounted Sides should have been immediately withdrawn to Bird River, unless it was intended to follow up the enemy with determination. In short, the same error was committed that has been so general throughout the war; namely, to occupy places that we cannot hold, and withdraw from them after compromising the inhabitants. Our newspapers cry unceasingly against the bad faith of those Boers who, having surrendered their arms and taken the oath of neutrality, have again fought against us. But how can we blame these men since we have failed to afford them the necessary protection? That some acted absolutely in bad faith is probably true, but that the vast majority yielded only to compulsion is certainly a fact. The number of times that some towns and districts have changed hands during the war is quite remarkable, and the consequences to the inhabitants have been most unpleasant.
De Montmorency's Scouts had been practically dismounted by their losses at Labuschagne's Nek, and their leader consequently repaired to Queenstown in search of remounts from the depot. On Tuesday he returned with a few horses and a promise of more to follow. This was lucky for him, since had he delayed longer at Queenstown, he would have missed the fight at Cyphergat upon the following day, Wednesday, January 3. At 8.45 a.m. McNeil [A.D.C. to Sir W. Gatacre, and who eventually succeeded De Montmorency in command of ‘ Montmorency’s Scouts.’ No worthier successor to the dead hero could have been selected. I think that had the choice been at De Montmorency’s own disposal, he would Baye chosen McNeil.] kindly came over to my tent with the exciting news that the Police Camp north of Cyphergat, and overlooking Molteno, was being attacked in force, and that a strong commando was reported advancing on Bushman’s Hoek by way of the Loperberg. In short, the Police Camp was thus completely isolated, and the relief of that post promised to be far from an easy matter. The General proposed to start at 10 a.m., after completing his arrangements for the day's work; but as I very well knew that he would gallop all the way, consideration for my horse caused me to anticipate his departure by twenty minutes. Bushman's Hoek is nine miles from Sterkstroom, and is some 1300 feet above it. I arrived at 10.45, and so did the General.
Following the General and staff, I led Jess up to the fort on the eastern crest of the Bushman's Hoek position, and from this point we could hear the heavy firing at the Police Camp, and see the enemy in large numbers on the Loperberg, a high hill nearly due north of Bushman’s Hoek, and about four miles distant. At the foot of the steep western slope, and nestling up into a re-entrant in the outline of the bill, lies the -village of Cyphergat, with its railway station and coalmines. The Loperberg effectually commands the road and railway to Molteno, and so long as the Boers continued in possession, it was useless to think of a serious advance to the relief of the Police Camp, about three miles nearer to Molteno. For the present, moreover, nothing much could be done, because, in consequence of the entire brigade-division of Artillery being absent several miles away at a ‘field-day,’ a long time would necessarily have to elapse before the guns could reach the scene of action. News of the attack reached Sterkstroom before 8.30 a.m., but it was 2.35 p.m. when our artillery at last opened fire. This delay was not, however, entirely due to the field-day. The guns reached Bushman’s Hoek at about 1.30, but in consequence of a quite inexplicable decision to send them into action upon the exposed flank, in a bad position, and right under the kopjes between Bushman’s Hoek and the Loperberg, more time was wasted whilst Dewar’s Mounted Infantry made good the ground and occupied the kopjes, in order to protect them. The guns should have worked round under the western slopes, up the valley running north-west, and come into action just behind the crest of the plateau, about 2500 yards due west of the Loperberg, and ready, therefore, to support a pursuit northwards, in the event of the enemy retiring towards Molteno and Stormberg. By taking up the position that his battery (the 79th) was ordered to occupy, Armitage was at least three miles further from the enemy’s line of retreat than would have been the case had he been posted as now suggested. Had two or more batteries been utilized, then indeed one of them might with advantage have been placed where Armitage actually came into action. Why we had only one battery I have never been able to understand.
Shortly after my arrival in the fort, I saw the Berkshire Mounted Infantry leave the camp below me and trot away in the direction of a small kopje about midway between our position and the Loperberg. I determined to go on with the Mounted Infantry, and accordingly parted company with the other two correspondents who had ridden out with me. My Mends suggested that I should see nothing down in the plain, whilst where I actually was a perfect view of everything lay before me. Possibly this consideration might have carried weight under certain circumstances, but I saw a network of wire fences on both sides of the road, and cutting barbed wire to open up communications had for some time been a very favourite pastime of mine. I acquired the taste during poor De Montmorency’s reconnaissances. As soon as the ‘Scouts‘ began to shoot, I used to begin making gaps to their right, left, and rear. It amused me, and not infrequently proved very convenient to the Scouts.
Filled with the lust for wire-cutting, I clambered down the steep rocky hill, Jess slithering after me as best she could, and then mounting, I cantered after Thornton and his men. I had caught up within less than a hundred yards when a shell from the Loperbeig struck the ground about five yards from the right rear of the company, others in pretty quick succession passing over and all around it as it galloped quickly towards the friendly shelter of the kopje, under whose steep slope horses and men were speedily in safety. Fortunately, the enemy’s guns failed to open until the Mounted Infantry had almost reached the point where the wire fence on the right of the road ceases to run northwards, and turns abruptly to the east. Less than a minute sufficed to dear the defile, and then extending rapidly, the company became safe against serious loss. For my part I had come to cut wire, and rightly judging that the enemy would not waste ammunition upon a single horseman, I pulled up as the first shell struck, and cut the wire immediately to my right; then, assisted by the camp butcher, who joined me soon after, 1 made gaps in every direction that I thought might be likely to prove useful.
There is an art in cutting wire fences. The plan is to choose a weak post that can be pulled down, and then cut the wire by the post to its right or left. Full down the weak post, and then drag the whole length hack and run it along where the fence is still standing. Thus, one post being missing, a man, even when galloping, can scarcely Ml to detect the gap, and the wire having been drawn right back parallel with the fence, no one can get entangled in it.
Having completed this operation to my satisfaction on the east of the road, I cantered to the kopje where Thornton and his Mounted Infantry had gone, and, leaving Jess below, climbed to the top. The enemy’s fire was by this time hot, and the shrapnel kept bursting over the crest in a vicious manner that speedily caused me to realize that, unless I had come to stay, the sooner I was off the better. With the fire a trifle wanner, I should not have cared to run the gauntlet getting away. So down I went again, and galloped for all I was worth, nothing coming really near me. Having regained the road, I cut my way through the wires, and reached the crest of the rising ground on the west, from which I had an excellent view all round. It was well that I had lost no time, since no one else was able to attempt a move in the same direction for over an hour afterwards. Shortly after 1 p.m. a section of Mounted Infantry, which had crept along under shelter, began to pepper the Boers in Cyphergat, and these promptly retired upon their main body on the Loperberg. I ate my sandwiches and watched the proceedings. At 1.40 a single horseman raced from the kopje in my direction, and I instantly recognized De Montmorency’s grey Arab, Baba, the same that he had ridden in the charge of the 21st Lancers at Omdurman. Previously to this moment, I had not realized that De Montmorency and the handful of his Scouts that had horses to ride, had attached themselves to Thornton. A hundred yards in rear followed another, and then another, until thirty had passed me and reformed under a fold of the ground to my left rear as I sat facing the Loperberg. Then I knew what was coming. De Montmorency was evidently about to try and work round towards the Police Camp, and give what assistance he could to the hardly pressed garrison, who, judging by the noise, were evidently fighting hard.
I was undecided what to do. I knew that some artillery had arrived at Bushman’s Hoek, and I knew, moreover, that a half battalion of the Boyal Scots had also arrived by train. If I followed De Montmorency, I should miss whatever was going to be done upon a larger scale, and I did not think that there could be much longer delay in making a beginning. Fortunately, I determined to wait a bit longer and see what might happen. At about 2.25 I saw a battery, to my horror, moving along towards the position that I referred to some time back; but no sign of anything of the sort coming in my direction. Hitherto had I flattered myself that I was close to where our artillery would be sure to come. Certainly I was where it ought to have been. However, there was nothing for it but to watch what might be effected under the actual circumstances. At 2.35 the first gun was fired, and at 2.45 the Boer gun on the Loperberg, at which Armitage was sending his shells, was hastily withdrawn, and everywhere there were signs that the enemy was going to clear. I could see them in hundreds falling back from their positions, their flight being hastened by a well-directed shrapnel fire. At 2.50 Thornton led his company from the kopje and cantered past me after De Montmorency. I waited nearly twenty minutes, hoping against hope for a general advance that came not, and for another battery to come galloping to my pet position. Meanwhile Armitage had begun to search the reverse slopes of the Loperberg, and with, as I soon afterwards ascertained from the police, quite marvellous success. He fired only twelve shrapnel, and of these three took effect. One plumped right into a commando of some 500 horsemen, doing considerable execution. Another fell in a smaller crowd of about 200, with equally good fortune; and a third hit one of our own 15-pounders which the Boers had captured at Stormberg, smashing the elevating gear all to pieces. That the enemy were retreating in haste was evident, and that even if a forward movement upon the part of the British was about to take place, it would be too late to do any good, became equally certain. Therefore I caught Jess, who was enjoying herself on the grass, and galloped after De Montmorency and Thornton to the Police Camp, in rear of which they had just dismounted when I arrived. There I saw a sight that I shall never forget. Streaming over the hills within 3000 yards some 2000 Boers were plainly visible, offering a beautiful artillery target. Had only our guns been where they should have been, the enemy must have had a sharp lesson. That wretched field-day was chiefly responsible for the loss of perhaps the best opportunity ever offered during the war.
Only one more thing was needed in order to ensure the capture or destruction of a large part of the enemy's force, and this was that the Pen Hoek garrison should have received orders to co-operate by intercepting the enemy's retreat. This could easily have been arranged, the distance being only fourteen miles. However, there was nothing to be done under the circumstances except to watch the skirmishing of our small force with the enemy's rear-guard. This was quite ineffectual, the latter having an excellent series of ideal positions, of which he took full advantage.
For a long time I could not understand how Inspector Neyland had managed to defend his post without loss. The ground showed unmistakable evidences of a very heavy bombardment, and I saw many cases of shrapnel shells that had evidently burst in the air at effective distances from the shelter trenches. The position was a hopelessly bad one, when considered in relation to modem firearms, and was indeed nothing but a deathtrap. The conundrum was, however, easily explained. Neyland realized from the first that the position he had been ordered to occupy could not be held, and therefore he did not attempt the impossible. Captain ‘Bonny‘ Maclean, of the Mounted Kaffrarian Rifles, who had reinforced the post, was fortunately a man possessed of similar common sense. The two put their heads together, and the result was that the camp was left to take care of itself, and the men were judiciously disposed amongst the adjacent rocks, or anywhere that good cover could be found and a command retained over the approaches to the position. Consequently, although the Boers kept pounding the camp hour after hour with artillery and musketry fire, the very fact that their fire was so well directed prevented any mischief being done to the defenders for the simple reason that not a single man was in the entrenchments! Thus, when the enemy, very naturally assuming that their fire had been effectual, advanced to the attack, they were driven back with loss, by men who thanks to smokeless powder were concealed from their view, and who, having suffered no losses, had not become dismayed by the fire that had been directed upon their supposed position. The moral to be gathered from this incident is that the defenders of a small post in an exposed position should usually make use of their entrenchments by night only, and in the daytime should occupy pits or natural cover round about. Obviously the change from day positions to night, and vies versa, should respectively take place after dark and before daylight. Under such conditions, at all. events, it is quite clear that smokeless powder confers great advantages upon the defenders. Against an enemy who is not only unseen, but who is also supposed to be where he is not, the assailant is practically powerless. The attackers can only win their way by establishing a fire superiority; and so long as the defenders sustain no loss, it is obvious that such superiority cannot be attained, and therefore no attack, however resolutely conducted, can possibly succeed. On January 3rd the Boers very naturally imagined that the police holding a very ill-chosen position would fall an easy prey. Fortunately, however, Inspector Neyland so arranged for the defence that he succeeded in defeating them. He was what they call ‘slim,’ and completely ‘ver-neuked ‘ (i.e. outwitted) them.
At 5.30 p.m., the firing having ceased, I started in a hurry for Sterkstroom, in order to despatch my telegram to the Times. There was good reason for haste, and I had already delayed too long. My brother correspondents were, I well knew, six miles nearer Sterkstroom than I, but I had Jess, and this meant a good deal. When I had gone about two miles, I met the General and his staff, who asked me for news. When I had told him all I knew, the General decided to keep the artillery at Bushman’s Hoek for the night, and asked me to take the message on my way home. Of course I could not refuse, but the delay troubled me not a little. Hear Cyphergat, I found Armitage, and delivered the order. Naturally he wanted to hear all about the effects of his fire, and thus delayed me still further. Finally I got clear, and as the result, Jess completed her sixteen miles to Sterkstroom in one hour and twenty-seven minutes, which was not bad going, considering that her day’s work had commenced at 9.45 a.m., and she had carried me, so far as I can estimate it, at least twenty miles before she commenced her return journey. I was five minutes behind my rivals, but good fortune permitted my wire to be the first sent away.
On Sunday, January 7, after church parade, I rode with Lieut.-Colonel Morgan Payler and Major Bode of the Royal Scots to the scene of Wednesday’s engagement, which they were anxious to visit. For my own part I wished to verify on the ground the impressions that were already in my mind as to what might have been had the force been handled differently. Everything was exactly as I had supposed. The artillery could easily have reached a position west of the Loper-berg, three miles nearer to the enemy’s line of retreat than the spot upon which they actually came into action. The line of their advance would have been secure from fire, being entirely hidden under the western slopes of the ground. By the choice of this position much time would have been saved, because there would have been no ground on the exposed flank needing to be first made good by the Mounted Infantry escort, and, what would have been of still greater importance, a subsequent change of position in order to fire upon the retreating Boers could have been effected with ease and rapidity. The Boer guns having been silenced and put to flight, the Royal Scots could have mounted the Loperberg, supported by the greater portion of the Royal Irish Rifles from Bushman’s Hoek, who could have occupied a covering position about Phillips’s farm, midway from the camps and the Loperberg. Aided by artillery fire, the garrison of the Police Camp, reinforced as they were by the Berkshire Mounted Infantry and De Montmorency’s Scouts, could have driven in the flfl.Ti1r-giifl.rda placed by the Boers on the kopjes, covering their line of retreat, and assisted the main body with great effect. The result must have yielded a notable success under any circumstances; but had, in addition, the Pen Hoek force been directed to co-operate, with four squadrons and the four guns of the Cape Mounted Sides, the greater part of the Boer force, if not the whole of it, could scarcely have escaped capture. Fortified by the prestige and confidence aroused by such a coup, we might have carried the Stormberg position with comparative ease upon the following day. The fact is, the enemy made a false move, and we flailed to make him pay any penalty for his error. We had an opportunity and lost it. That we might be offered such another was scarcely within the bounds of possibility, nor did anything of the sort recur.
Meanwhile, it seems certain that the Boers did not resolve to incur so much risk without some cogent reason, and the question naturally arises: What was their real object? Now, it is a curious fact that just at this time the local Boers, who were rebels in heart or act almost to a man, had been continually coming forward with warnings of impending attacks upon Bushman’s Hoek, both before and since the actual descent made against the police camps. All this voluntary information certainly was not given through any desire to assist us. The probability is that the seeming solicitude for our security, so obligingly displayed, as well as the half-hearted attack actually delivered, were intended to throw dust in our eyes, and by rendering us anxious for our own safety to prevent any forward move upon our part. The Boers, in short, endeavoured to envelop us in a ‘fog-of-war,’ in the hope that whilst we were groping in it they might be free to carry out some manoeuvre behind it. What I wrote at the time reads as follows: ‘That manoeuvre probably is an expedition westwards to aid their friends now opposed to General French about Colesberg. My impression is that we shall very soon hear of very important developments in that direction. Whether we shall take any steps to prevent the exercise of such pressure upon French remains to be seen. In any case, our potentiality depends in a great measure upon how we may just now be served by the agents of the Intelligence Department. Assuming, for example, that the departure of a Boer column from Stormberg for Colesberg became known to us in good time, and that we could also assure the receipt of accurate information regarding the progress of its march, we might not impossibly find and seize an opportunity to capture Stormberg; but, in any case, we should certainly make a tentative demonstration sufficient to draw back the pressure from French. That we are absolutely bound to do all in our power to co-operate with French, even at the cost of incurring some considerable risk, is perfectly clear provided, of course, that the enemy’s movements eventually justify the predictions made regarding them. For us to attack Stormberg with our present force, unless the enemy has detached a portion of his strength elsewhere, would be absurd. But if the Boers actually detach troops against French, then we should probably be justified in attacking; or if they remain as they are, then it is clearly our duty to demonstrate, in order to keep them fast.’
On the morning of January 8th the ‘Derbys‘ and other troops, with artillery, moved up towards Molteno for use if required, in order to cover the removal of some grain that still remained at the mills. A Boer scout fired a couple of shots at 2500 yards, but otherwise there was no excitement. Meanwhile, I amused myself by once more riding over the scene of Wednesday’s engagement, where I was at hand in case of a collision at Molteno, about four miles distant, and at the same time more profitably employed than had I been kicking my heels at the Molteno Railway Station. There was a terrific thunderstorm in the afternoon, and we all got thoroughly drenched.
