At 8 a.m. on the morning of April 3, Young and I started for Boshof, where the force under Lord Methuen had been ordered to rendezvous during that and the following day. On the road we passed several traction-engines, all of which were in difficulties, although the loads in all cases were absurdly light. The soil was generally sandy, but with a mixture of clay. There had recently been rain, and the result was that in the wet places the driving-wheels became loaded with hard mud, which effectually prevented the cross-ribs from having any grip to speak of anywhere, and none whatever in places where the road was deep with sand. We were much amused to see how when one of the engines had repeatedly failed to draw its wagons, those in charge got out their winding-gear, and, when all was ready, set the engine to work. The result was scarcely what they had expected. Instead of the wagons coming up to the engine, the latter wound itself rapidly back to the wagons! Eventually, by taking the wagons one at a time, the difficulties were surmounted; but, all things considered, I came to the conclusion that a good team of oxen could give points to a traction-engine on soft or loose ground.
We had intended to go right through to Boshof, a distance of about thirty miles; but, as the roads were heavy, we decided upon resting for the night at Frankfort, rather more than halfway, and on the following morning trekked on to Boshof, where Lord Methuen and the staff of the Division also arrived during the afternoon of the same day.
From all accounts, the country about Boshof seemed to be pretty full of small commandos of marauders, whose object was to terrorize any of the inhabitants who might otherwise have felt inclined to make their submissions, and, of course, to seize any favourable opportunities to attack British detachments or convoys. Previously to Lord Methuen’s arrival, the garrison of Boshof had been composed of militia, and it subsequently transpired, from documents found on the prisoners, that Colonel de Villebois Mareuil, whose commando was cut off on April 5 with such signal success, had intended to attempt the capture of that town by surprise. Instead of this, the gallant Frenchman was defeated and slain. The following is my narrative of this little action, as originally related in a letter to the Times, written on April 9:’
‘About 10.30 a.m. a Yeomanry patrol reported the presence of the enemy on a kopje about nine miles east by south of Boshof; and at 11.15 the Yeomanry under Lord Chesham, with the Kimberley Mounted Corps under Lieut.-Colonel Peakman, and the 4th Field Battery, started in pursuit. There was, however, but little expectation of catching the Boers, who might certainly have escaped had their commander been more wary and expeditious. The ‘turn-out‘ of our men was quite a remarkable feat in itself. Their horses were all out at grass, and yet within thirty-five minutes after the receipt of their orders the troops were ready to start. Lord Methuen commanded in person, and shortly after 1 p.m. the enemy was found to be still in position on the kopje, from which he opened fire upon our scouts. Naturally the general was particularly anxious to ensure the capture or destruction of the entire party as an example to others, and in this case there was everything in his favour. It became almost immediately evident that the enemy had not more than perhaps 100 men, and measures for effectually cutting off his retreat could, therefore, be taken without any risk of danger from a counter-stroke. Lord Scarbrough, with Captain (Lieutenant - Colonel, Notts Yeomanry) Holies ton’s squadron of Imperial Yeomanry, was sent round by the left, whilst Peakman’s Kimberley Mounted Corps proceeded by the right, with the result that the enemy’s retreat was effectually prevented. Meanwhile the main body of the Yeomanry took up positions in front, and when everything had been reported ready, the attack was commenced in earnest by the dismounted men.
‘Of this attack, inconsiderable as the operation may appear in comparison with many others, it is scarcely possible to speak in too complimentary terms. The Kimberley Mounted Corps had already a reputation, and might naturally have been expected to acquit themselves in a manner worthy of them. But the Yeomanry, upon the contrary, represented a corps that was practically untried, and some people, both out here and at home, had ventured to declare that they would prove to be of very little use, for a variety of reasons which it is now quite useless to recapitulate. The event, however, has proved these critics to have been false prophets. Not only did the Yeomanry show fine courage under fire, but they did their work throughout in exactly the fashion that should be followed in all operations similar to that in which they found themselves engaged. Full of dash and enterprise, yet taking advantage of every bit of cover, and utilizing the general features of the ground to the utmost, they prosecuted a perfectly methodical advance, gaining ground steadily, and never yielding an inch that had been gained. In a word, the Imperial Yeoman has shown that he possesses, to almost the same extent, that eye for ground which renders our colonial troops as well as our enemies the Boers so formidable in both attack and defence. Even to those who already believed in the Yeomanry, the fight brought a positive revelation, since the reality so entirely surpassed the most sanguine expectations. It must, of course, be admitted that a great share of the credit is due to Lord Chesham himself, whose personality represents a very strong factor. He has succeeded in earning the confidence of his men, and day by day has proved the justice of the good opinions gained. The Yeomanry believed in Lord Chesham up to the last few days, but now they swear by him, and Lord Methuen appears to entertain very similar sentiments. This war will not have been waged in vain if it results, as many believe will be the case, in the resuscitation of the Yeomanry and Militia forces. The latter have not yet had their opportunity for distinction in action, but if they show the same spirit under fire that they have exhibited under the hardships of long, trying marches, fearful weather, and bivouacs deep in mud, we shall have good reason to be proud of them.
‘After about three hours and a half of steady progress the Yeomanry fixed bayonets and charged up the kopje, when the enemy promptly hoisted the white flag and surrendered. Then, in the same dastardly fashion that has already been so frequently followed, some cowardly scoundrel fired on our men with fatal result. The man was instantly shot down, but this furnishes only a sorry retribution for the murder of a gallant British officer thus treacherously done to death. It seems high time that strong measures should be taken to put down such iniquitous proceedings by denying quarter in the next case when a shot is fired by the enemy after capitulation. Our loss was slight in comparison with the success achieved, being only twelve killed and wounded, including two officers. Of the enemy, upon the contrary, not one man escaped, fourteen being killed and wounded, and the remainder, numbering fifty-four officers and men, taken prisoners. Another party of Boers, or possibly a detachment from that captured, was observed to retire hastily upon the approach of our troops; but Lord Methuen very wisely determined to devote his entire attention to such of the enemy as were actually within his grasp, and the runaways consequently made good their escape unmolested. Colonel de Villebois Mareuil, a French officer, who is said to have been a valued adviser of the Boer leaders, was amongst the killed, and it is noteworthy that those under his command appear to have been chiefly Frenchmen and Hollanders. Probably the men whom we saw running away represented the genuine Boer element in the commando. The Boer is less easily entrapped than the European, for the simple reason that he will never submit the security of his line of retreat to the chances of combat, unless the odds are ten to one in his favour.
‘The little action which has just been described, although insignificant in itself, has nevertheless considerable importance first, on account of the complete success attending its results directly and indirectly, and, secondly, because it was the occasion when the Imperial Yeomanry were for the first time under fire.’
Rain commenced to fall almost immediately after the action was over, and every one was thoroughly drenched. Towards night the weather grew worse, tremendous thunderstorms succeeding each other in rapid succession. Young and I had pitched our camp near the commissariat supply park, on the low-lying ground in the south-western part of the town, and when we returned from despatching our telegrams announcing the result of the fight we found the whole place flooded. A torrent was rushing past in the hollow close alongside, and on our actual camping-ground the water was quite six inches deep, and most of our possessions were afloat. These we rescued and piled upon the table and upon our two stools; then we turned in, regardless of everything, very thankful indeed that we had stretcher-bedsteads to keep us out of the water. By morning the flood had subsided and we shifted our camp to a more elevated position. That night I dined with the Imperial Yeomanry, and spent a very pleasant evening; but as we were to march next morning the party broke up at an early hour.
At daylight on April 7, Lord Methuen, with the bulk of his force, marched to Zwartkopjesfontein farm, about ten miles on the Hoopstad road north-east of Boshof. There was no opposition, the Boer commando which had been laagered in the neighbourhood of Beck’s farm, about four miles distant, having discreetly sought a fresh camping-ground. It is very unlikely that the actual direction of our march could have been discovered by any of the numerous spies whom our system of making war encourages to throng the towns that we occupy; but the fact that a move somewhere was about to take place no doubt transpired, and this was enough. Probably other commandos also shifted, although with less reason.
On the following day, at 6.30 a.m., the column marched to Mahemsfontein, which was reached in a couple of hours. It had been intended to proceed another six miles in the evening, but a telegram from Bloemfontein ordering our further advance to be postponed, resulted in a retrograde movement to Zwart Kopjes. This was, of course, regrettable for obvious reasons. To move troops impulsively forwards and then clutch them convulsively backwards is not a good way of making war. Had this order, however, been received three hours earlier Lord Methuen’s force would simply have remained at Zwart Kopjes; but having marched therefrom, a retirement to that camping-ground was absolutely inevitable in the circumstances. The grass at Mahemsfontein could not have lasted two days, being at all times evidently poor, and at the actual moment exceptionally bad; whilst, even if the trees surrounding the homestead had been utilized, which would have been a pity, the supply of fuel would have proved equally inadequate for our wants. Thus, sorely against his will, Lord Methuen was compelled to retrace his steps to a more favourable camping-ground, where, moreover, the tactical advantages were very superior to those afforded by any position about Mahemsfontein. From what I could gather, it was actually intended to proceed to Hoopstad, but as to what would afterwards be done I was hopelessly in the dark. Possibly we might cross the Vaal River about Bloemhof, with a view to holding some strategic position blocking the road against the enemy retiring from Fourteen Streams; but, as it appeared that the 8th Division had been diverted from Kimberley and Warrenton to some other destination, probably Bloemfontein, it was difficult to find any particular reason why the Boers at Fourteen Streams should retire at all until the resources of the entire district in which they were quartered had been consumed. This consideration led me to think that Lord Methuen would probably strike northwards towards Christiana, crossing the Vaal at Zoutspan’s Drift or some other point within easy distance of Fourteen Streams. Against this theory was the obvious fact that we had taken the eastern road to Hoopstad, via Mahemsfontein, in place of the western, via Basberg, whence a good road runs directly to Christiana. But, upon the other hand, the road by which we were apparently about to proceed might have been selected with the special purpose of concealing the real intention. At all events, the actual plan of operations had been successfully kept dark so far as regards the troops themselves, and we could only hope that the enemy had been equally unable to comprehend it.
On the morning of the 9th the mounted troops under Lord Chesham made a reconnaissance in two bodies to the eastward that under Lord Chesham in person taking the most northerly direction. I was informed that the latter had the better chance of meeting the enemy, and therefore elected to accompany it. My information proved to be correct, but nothing of any importance occurred. A small party of marauders was sighted, about four miles distant, when our scouts had advanced about ten miles from camp, but the enemy made off so rapidly that it was quite impossible to come up with them. The whole force returned to camp about 2 p.m., after having effectually searched or cleared a wide area on our front and right flank. The Boer farms as a rule were tenanted by the women and children, who freely sold chickens, eggs, and milk to the troops at remunerative prices, but the men were almost invariably absent. Whether the latter were serving with the commandos or merely keeping out of sight it was not easy to say, but it is fairly clear that in either case it was fear of their friends rather than of their enemies that prevented the majority of them from resuming their ordinary avocations. Whatever Dr. Leyds or others may say, the average Free State Boer was by this time anxious for peace unless the statements made by prisoners are to be discredited wholesale.
Shortly after our return to camp Major Streatfeild, the Press Censor, came round to tell me that two flying columns would start next morning at daybreak; the one, under General Douglas, making a circuit of the country to the south-east and east of camp, and the other, under Colonel Mahon, commanding Kimberley Mounted Corps, proceeding from Boshof south and east of that town. The object of these expeditions was to disperse any roving commandos that might be prowling about with the intention of giving trouble upon the lines of communication. That such commandos existed was certain, but whether we should have the good fortune to repeat the success achieved against that under Villebois seemed somewhat doubtful. The other commandos, warned by the fate of Villebois and his men, would certainly be very shy and hard to get near. Be all this as it may, the attempt was well worth making, and good results were by no means impossible. We decided to throw in our lot with General Douglas. The chances of both columns seemed fairly even as to finding the enemy, but General Douglas, having the Northamptons in addition to Lord Chesham’s Yeomanry, seemed to have better means of striking hard in case any considerable body of the enemy should be encountered.
Accordingly at daylight next morning, Wednesday, April 11, we set out with General Douglas’ Flying Column. Our route lay at first to the south-east, after which, bending northwards and westwards, we returned to camp upon the third day, having described a pear-shaped circuit about forty miles in extent. Taken as a whole, the results of the expedition were disappointing. Many had looked forward with some confidence to a repetition of the good fortune which had attended the recent enterprise against the commando under Villebois, overlooking the fact that the circumstances were wholly dissimilar. Instead of a sudden dash by mounted troops, for a short distance, in order to take advantage of an opportunity that actually offered itself, we had now a column encumbered with infantry and baggage, setting forth to find opportunities as best it could. That luck might have been witty us is of course possible, but it is nevertheless only natural that the Boers easily succeeded in evading us. On Wednesday, it is true, the enemy gave us just a shadowy chance of intercepting him, but his dispositions were so judicious that our opportunity was more apparent than real.
Upon the first night the column bivouacked at a farm named Granaat Platz, about eleven miles E.S.E. from camp. The homestead is situated upon a ridge running nearly north and south, the highest part of which, rising southwards from the farm, forms a by no means contemptible position of about one mile in extent. To the north, the ridges are lower, and undulate gently until they finally terminate by an easy descent to the level of the plain at a distance of about two miles. At 9 a.m. General Douglas received a report from Lord Chesham that a Boer force estimated at 500 men was in position on the ridges about Granaat Platz, and a quarter of an hour later the general himself arrived at the front. It was perfectly obvious that the enemy’s right was the proper flank to be operated against, and accordingly Lord Chesham was instantly directed to reinforce his left and work therefrom round the position. Peakman, with his detachment of the Kimberley Mounted Corps, watched the right, whilst the guns, with an escort of the Northamptons, followed the flanking movement. Meanwhile the convoy was parked under the protection of a strong escort of the Northamptons, whilst the remainder of the battalion was shortly afterwards directed to follow the artillery. On drawing near to the northern extremity of the ridges, the yeomanry scouts came under a desultory fire, which, as the event proved, was directed against them by only a few men. But at the time there was no means of discovering the enemy’s numbers unless by delivering a tentative attack. This, Lord Chesham very wisely decided not to do; but it is not improbable that, had he made the attempt, the enemy’s weakness would at once have been disclosed, and in addition to our troops being relieved from the fatigue of a long march round, the enemy might possibly have been cut off. At all events, the fact remains that, by means of a ‘false flank,’ held just long enough and no longer, the Boers compelled us to make a wide turning movement, during the execution of which they found ample time to withdraw their entire force without loss. By the time that Lord Chesham had worked round to the rear and the Northamptons had crowned the summit of the northern ridges, not a Boer remained within range, and an hour later it was reported by our scouts that the enemy was once more in position upon a kopje about six miles east of Granaat Platz Farm, to which he had retreated directly from that place, retiring from both flanks in rear of the centre. By cleverly concealing their weakness and leading us to believe that they were strong, the Boers caused our cavalry to undertake a detour amounting to some eight miles, whilst the infantry engaged in the same operation marched six miles extra before reaching their bivouac upon the ground recently occupied by the enemy. We gained our point, in that we dislodged our opponents from our intended bivouac, but the latter also gained theirs, in that they gave us a great deal of trouble and wasted our time. One man of the Northamptons, a volunteer, was slightly wounded, whilst the Boer loss was probably nil. Our artillery shelled the ridge to cover the infantry attack, but by that time it is pretty certain that not a Boer remained thereon. A shrapnel, however, decapitated a partridge which a man of the Northamptons picked up. Thus our guns were not employed entirely without effect!
Scarcely were the troops settled down in their bivouac than it began to rain in torrents, continuing throughout the night, so that lying down was utterly impossible. Personally I found shelter in an outhouse adjoining the farm which was itself occupied by a large Boer family, and consequently unavailable. I had many companions and was not particularly comfortable, but I have no hesitation in reaffirming that, upon such a night, ‘the worst billet is better than the best bivouac.’
On Thursday morning the column marched via Elandsfontein to Buitendam, the residence of Field-comet Groenevaldt, a distance of about twelve miles. Here the Intelligence Department had information that a considerable quantity of ammunition was concealed; and true enough, after a brief search a small magazine was found sunk in a comer of the garden, in which there was not only ammunition - chiefly Mauser,- but also a case of dynamite. The result of this find was that in addition to some desultory sniping at our front, a constant fusillade was maintained in camp whilst the cartridges exploded singly or in volleys in the fires lighted for the purpose of destroying them. There was no real fighting during the march or afterwards, but about fifty Boers could be seen from time to time hovering in the neighbourhood, and always taking good care to keep at a very respectful distance from our scouts. These, it appears, represented the rear-guard of the force encountered upon the previous day, the main body of which, about a hundred strong, was retiring with a small convoy of about half a dozen waggons. We had, however, no intention of pushing eastwards beyond Buitendam, so that the retreating enemy had no real cause for anxiety. To have maintained an active pursuit would have involved an expenditure of horseflesh that we could ill afford, and even if a successful result had attended the effort, the prize would scarcely have been worth the cost. That which had actually been done was sufficient for Lord Methuen’s purpose. The Flying Column had pushed back the enemy to a distance of over twenty miles from the camp at Zwart Kopjes; and although this operation could not be expected to have more than temporary results, yet upon the next occasion the moral effect created might be relied upon to ensure that a smaller force would be able to repeat the process without difficulty.
On Good Friday General Douglas determined to march the whole distance back to Zwart Kopjes in place of taking two days, according to the original programme. There was nothing to be gained by delay, and the weather looked decidedly threatening, although Friday itself was quite fine. The event proved the wisdom of this decision, since for many days afterwards we had showery weather, varied by spells of steady downpour of tropical thunderstorms. Had the column waited until Saturday, the latter part of the march would have been attended by great difficulties for the transport, the route passing over very deep ground traversed by no roads whatever. Starting at 5.30 a.m. from Buitendam, the column reached Zwart Kopjes about 5 p.m., having marched twenty-one miles, and rested during the heat of the day at Roberts’ farm, about half-way, where the horses and oxen had excellent grazing. General Douglas’ force consisted of 450 Imperial Yeomanry and Kimberley Mounted Corps, two guns 38th Battery R.F.A., the 2nd Northampton, and sundry details. All did well, but the marching and general efficiency of the Northamptons calls for special remark. The marching-out strength of this fine battalion was 935 of all ranks; the work was very hard, and on Wednesday night not a single man could lie down for an instant owing to the rains. Yet no one fell out during or after any march, and 933 out of the 935 were present in their places marching into Zwart Kopjes. One man wounded and one man kicked by a mule accounted for the difference of two men. The cheerful and steady endurance of all the troops, regular and irregular, under very trying conditions, was beyond all praise.
One important fact, at all events, was brought into prominence by the march of General Douglas’ column, namely, that the practice of the British authorities in permitting Boers to nominally return to their farms, furnished an example of wholly misplaced "magnanimity.’ Women and children, with an occasional old man or boy, were to be found on the farms, whilst the able-bodied males performed intermittent service with some convenient commando. The occupants of the farms sold freely, at high prices, to the Government and to the troops, their property being, of course, carefully respected under the terms of the proclamation, although the real owners were still fighting against us or amusing themselves by cutting the telegraph wires. It should from the first have been enacted that whenever an able-bodied Boer absented himself from his farm without a pass granted for a specific purpose, his property should thereby become liable to confiscation in every case where the farm might be situated within the areas effectively occupied by our troops. The same difficulty applied with even greater force to the case of rebel colonists within our proper frontiers. Any rebel could with ease obtain a permit authorizing him to " return to his farm,’ subject to liability to " come up hereafter for judgment if called upon.’ But in no district where there were many rebels thus "returned to their farms’ could a loyalist venture to reside, because his rebel neighbours took care to render this impossible. At the time I am now speaking of, it was more profitable to have been a rebel than to have been a loyalist, and it need scarcely be said that this should not have been the case.
Colonel Mahon’s Flying Column, which should have gone as far south as Klip Drift, returned to Zwart Kopjes on Saturday the 14th, having been compelled by stress of weather to abandon the completion of its march. Owing to the heavy rains, the country was rendered impassable for the transport. Mahon’s force had an even less eventful career than that under Douglas.
On Saturday morning Young and I drove his ponies, generally known as the ‘uglies,’ into Boshof, where we wished to purchase stores that, as our stay at Zwart Kopjes seemed likely to be somewhat prolonged, we thought we might venture to acquire. Accordingly we invested in sundry tins of various meats, and a good stock of jam, marmalade, sardines, and such-like, with which we returned rejoicing in the evening. This and the succeeding four days passed without any excitement whatever excepting such as arose from the deluges of rain. The drainage works that we constructed about our camp were a triumph of engineering skill, and at all events perfectly effective for the object in view. So successful were these works, that it was positively a sorrow to us when they had so effectually drained the ground that it became no longer possible for us to arrange races between bits of stick down the various channels that carried away the water.
By Thursday, 19th, the weather had cleared up, and on this day the enemy once more exhibited signs of activity. A patrol of four men of the Notts Yeomanry was cut off at a place about ten miles north-west of camp. No Boers had been seen during the morning, nor had any signs of their presence been detected. The story goes - it has been contradicted - that the men were engaged in dining off a fat turkey, when suddenly Boers appeared upon the scene and interrupted the feast. At all events, it is clear that the patrol was completely surprised. One man, although wounded, was successful in making his escape, but the other three were taken prisoners.
In consequence of this event, Lord Methuen despatched a strong force of Yeomanry and Kimberley Mounted Corps, at daylight on Friday, with orders to clear up the situation so far as practicable, but without allowing themselves to be drawn away to any great distance. In accordance with these instructions, Lord Chesham and Colonel Mahon (with whom, for a time, was also Lord Methuen in person) advanced to a commanding position about five miles N.N.W., their patrols being thrown out well in front to search the surrounding country. Boers were found in small parties in various directions, and bodies of about one hundred each were sighted to the front and right flank respectively. Very few shots were however exchanged, the enemy remaining fast on the kopjes, which our men naturally made no attempt to attack. Satisfied that whatever might be the actual numbers opposed to us, the enemy had, at all events, been considerably reinforced, Lord Chesham, at about 10.30 a.m., decided to return to camp as soon as one remaining operation had been completed. Colonel Rolleston’s squadron of yeomanry were unanimously anxious to ascertain the exact fate of their comrades who had been surprised upon the previous day, and yielding to this feeling, Lord Chesham somewhat reluctantly permitted Colonel Rolleston to make a dash at the distant kopje, about four miles to the north, where the catastrophe, had occurred. Covered by its scouts, the squadron rapidly crossed the wide stretch of undulating veldt to the foot of the hills. Here the main body halted, well secured by parties thrown out at a wide interval upon both flanks, whilst Colonel Rolleston himself, with about a score of picked men, entered the bush and went forward to search the kopje. Meanwhile Lord Scarbrough, who had accompanied the squadron, took command. To our right, a considerable body of Boers could be seen on the kopjes about three miles distant, freely showing themselves upon the sky-line in a manner that experience tells us is not their wont unless present in force, and ere long the enemy was seen to be on , the move in our direction, but whether with a view to cutting off the detachment in front or to interpose between the squadron and Lord Chesham’s force in rear, it was impossible to determine. However, before matters became critical. Colonel Rolleston’s party had completed a careful search of the kopje, and Lord Scarbrough accordingly gave the order to retire. No trace was found of the miming men, and the natural conclusion was that all three had been made prisoners. This assumption was confirmed on Saturday by the Boers themselves, who further informed us that none of the party had been wounded.
The reconnaissance was very well carried out, and as regards Colonel Rolleston’s particular enterprise, it was especially gratifying to observe the combination of dash and precaution that characterized the entire proceeding. Everything was done, and nothing that was needed in order to assure all possible security was neglected.
Whilst the Notts men were thus engaged, Colonel Mahon swept round by the south-west with his two squadrons, thoroughly scouring the country not hitherto examined, and returned to camp without meeting any opposition or sighting any considerable body of the enemy. The fact had, however, been established, that instead of two or three dozen Boers hovering round, we had now two or three hundred at all events, and very possibly a much larger number. The want of horse artillery with Lord Methuen’s column was greatly felt during this reconnaissance. Had a battery been present, all mystery to the north of the camp, in the direction taken by Colonel Rolleston’s squadron, might readily have been cleared up perhaps with loss to the enemy.
At the moment when they received the order to retire, Colonel Rolleston’s party had secured a number of Boer horses which they were driving in; but their orders being peremptory, they were obliged to abandon them. The situation had, however, become so threatening, owing to the advance of the Boers on the right flank of our position, that the risk of losing men in order to capture horses was far too great to be lightly incurred, and Lord Scarbrough was undeniably right in withdrawing his force without further delay. The retirement was steadily conducted in excellent order, and finally we regained the camp without having lost a man. On our arrival we were astonished to see unmistakable signs of an immediate move. Men were everywhere busy packing the wagons, and it speedily transpired that an order from Bloemfontein had been received, directing Lord Methuen to retire at once to Boshof.
At 2 p.m. we marched off, and within an hour afterwards, just as the head of the column was passing Spitz Kop, the flippant tones of a pom-pom on our right flank gave notice that the march was not to be unopposed. Fortunate, indeed, was it that the precautions taken against any attack, great or small, had been so carefully arranged, and the result consequently was never in doubt although we were at first severely handicapped by the difficulty of obtaining artillery positions from which to reply to the Boer guns. Our mounted troops, however, worked manfully, and the right-flank guard, supported by the Northampton, successfully beat all serious efforts of the enemy to head off the convoy. We had no less than 136 wagons stretching over a distance of more than two miles, not to mention 1000 sheep, and a large number of cattle and remount horses. To have brought in this large convoy without losing so much as a sheep, is an achievement that Lord Methuen and his troops may well be proud of; more especially perhaps as convoys, as a role, have been either less fortunate or less ably protected in other parts of the theatre of war. The critical period of the operation was the passage of a basin about three miles from camp, where the kopjes to the north and north-west, had they not been stoutly defended against the enemy, would certainly have enabled him to hold us at a very great disadvantage. Even as it was, the distant fire of the Boer artillery was not to be despised, although it, fortunately, had little or no effect. Besides one ox killed, 1 believe that no damage was done. The isolated hill named the Spitz Eop, which rises suddenly out of the basin, moreover afforded us considerable assistance, since the convoy whilst winding round below its eastern slope was completely protected. During the closing scenes of the action, the Spitz Eop, which was held by part of the rear-guard, almost too long, was the scene of some very hot fighting. The firing upon both sides was extremely heavy; but, thanks to the shelter of friendly boulders, our gallant yeomen suffered no loss, although there were several very narrow escapes.
It was during their retirement from the kopjes to the north and north-west of the Spitz Eop that our men suffered almost all of the comparatively trifling losses that we sustained. Two men killed, eleven wounded and unwounded prisoners, together with half a dozen other wounded, brought in by our own ambulances, was not a high price to pay for the safe withdrawal of so large a convoy. True, the enemy’s strength probably did not exceed our own, but the nature of the country, during the first five miles of the march, conferred infinite advantages upon the assailants, who, moreover, were at all events superior to the defenders in the number of their mobile troops. Where all did their best with such satisfactory results, it may seem invidious to find fault, but it is nevertheless needful to observe that there was a lack of system in the working of the flank guard covering the right of the column. The various units acted somewhat incoherently, failing in several cases to observe two cardinal principles of covering tactics. There was an absence of attention at times to giving mutual support, and the urgent need for anticipating the enemy upon successive positions as the fight rolled southwards was sometimes overlooked. From personal observation, I am sure that had the enemy been a little more enterprising, by sending forward, say, fifty men instead of half a dozen or so, he might have effectually forestalled our mounted troops upon the low kopjes north-west of Beck’s Farm, from which the march of the convoy might have been subjected to considerable annoyance; although its actual security could no longer have been seriously endangered. Having passed Brackfontein, the column entered upon open veldt stretching far away towards the east and south, so that fire from the north-west could have been avoided by leaving the road and inclining eastwards. Yet, in order to have made their work perfect, the Yeomanry should have provided against even such a contingency as this. Of the gallantry and discipline of the Yeomanry it is impossible to speak too highly, but they had still need to learn some few tricks of the trade from their adversaries. What our men so often failed to realize is that the top of a kopje is everything and the bottom of it nothing. Three men on a kopje can, for a time at all events, deny it to fifty, but fifty looking at it cannot prevent three from mounting from the other side and shooting down upon them. To deny positions to an enemy in the first place, is safer and cheaper than ejecting him in the second. I had myself a rather narrow shave near Beck’s Farm, where I was going for the purpose of sending on our carts to Boshof. These had been at the head of the convoy, and had turned at Brackfontein, according to orders given before we marched off. It had been intended to encamp near Beck’s, but the position was reported unsuitable, and Lord Methuen consequently decided to proceed to Boshof. Our servants very stupidly adhered to their instructions from me, instead of conforming to the route followed by the wagons behind them. I heard of what had occurred, and went off in some haste to put the matter right. I was only just in time. When I had arrived within about 800 yards of the farm I halted to have a look round, and, observing some men riding down the slope from Brackfontein, took out my glasses to discover whether they were friends or enemies. Having satisfied myself that they were friends, I put away my glasses and was just about to turn Jess round and go on, when a flash from the top of the low kopje about 150 yards to my left, and the sharp ping of a bullet, hastened my movements so much that I failed to put my hat in its place it had been pushed to the back of my head whilst using the field-glass and as the mare spun round to be off, the hat flew away, and I was in no mind to wait and recover it. As I went, several more shots came pretty close; but within fifty yards I was round a comer and under cover. How the Boers missed me I cannot think. The first man to fire had a ‘sitting’ shot. For the others there was some excuse. At Beck’s I found the carts, and soon had them trotting in the direction of Boshof, whilst I rode quickly to report to General Douglas that a party of half a dozen Boers at least had got round our right flank. But the ubiquitous and keen-sighted Peakman had already detected the enemy, and soon put them to flight, though he had only four men with him.
On the morning after the fight Young and I accompanied the ambulance party sent under a flag of truce to bury our dead. We passed the Boer picquets without adventure, and within a few hundred yards north of the Spitz Kop were politely received by Commandant P. A. Cronje (second son of the captured general) and Assistant Commandant Dowthwaite, a man said to be of Scotch extraction. The Boer leaders gave permission for the ambulance to proceed to the line of kopjes east of where we stood, but directed that none of the burial party or others than Bed Cross officers and men should advance further. My companion failed to hear the latter order, and when some Boers, including a doctor, galloped off to a kopje on our left, where a wounded man was said to be lying, he instantly followed them. In vain British and Boers shouted and whistled, he appeared to be deaf. Oronje was, however, very nice about the matter, admitting that what had occurred was evidently a mistake, and that we had for our part done all that we could to stop the career of our comrade. The Boer doctor appears to have been equally ignorant of the orders given, since, after a fruitless search for the wounded man, he took my Mend into the neighbouring laager, where he entertained him with coffee, etc. Thanks to the courtesy of Commandant Cronje, no difficulty was made about the return of the unauthorized visitor.
I had a certain amount of conversation with Cronje, but his slight acquaintance with the English language presented a difficulty. With Dowthwaite, upon the contrary, I talked a great deal. He told me that our expedition to Buitendam had been the cause of his coming down to these parts apparently from Mafeking. Douglas’ flying column appears to have been mistaken for tbe advanced guard of Lord Methuen’s entire force, which was assumed to be undertaking a march eastwards. Dowthwaite expressed himself as deeply disappointed that the supposition which had brought him here had not proved correct. In his opinion the Boers had been deprived of a favourable opportunity. He further remarked, somewhat dolefully, that he had been without a change of clothes for a fortnight. With reference to the previous day’s fight, Dowthwaite contended that two more hours of daylight must have yielded great results for the Boers. This must, however, have been merely ‘ bounce,’ since the enemy could have done us no real harm after we had reached the open veldt, and had they there pressed on, the chances are that we, instead of they, might have secured sundry advantages. A rebel ‘ minister ‘ from Stellenbosch was with the Boer leaders, and his bearing contrasted most unfavourably with theirs. He was as tactless as they were the contrary, and was the only person amongst perhaps a hundred of our friends the enemy, with whom we were then brought in peaceable contact, whose act or word was otherwise than absolutely nice.
It was an impressive sight when our two poor fellows were buried side by side, in the ground on which they had gallantly fallen. There, by the grave, all joining with equal reverence in the burial service, about a score of Britishers and rather more than double that number of Boers stood together, their quarrel forgotten in the presence of the dead. When all was over, we parted with mutual farewells that were, I firmly believe, perfectly cordial and genuine on both sides. The fact is, that the war has given Britons and Boers good cause to respect each other, and in the discovery of each other’s good points lies the best hope of future good will throughout the Dominion of British South Africa.
Methuen’s column was now once more established at Boshof, and from all appearances likely to remain for some days to come. Very rightly it had been decided that no forward movement should be made until the whole army was in a condition to advance simultaneously. The pity is that this wise determination was not arrived at in the first instance. The marchings and counter marchings already ordered had been productive of nothing but wear and tear of the troops and general loss of moral effect. Nor is it easy to understand what was the motive of the proposed move of this column towards Hoopstad, whilst the Boer commando at Fourteen Streams remained not only undefeated, but not even vigorously assailed. Had Lord Methuen's advance been continued, his communications must have been in considerable danger from the superior Boer army on his left rear. It was well to recall him, but it would have been better to have refrained from despatching him.
The vacillation displayed by the Headquarter authorities with reference to the operations about Kimberley is remarkable. Lord Methuen was first ordered to march to Griquatown, but when the greater part of the journey had been accomplished he was recalled to Kimberley. Then he was directed to concentrate a column at Boshof and move with all possible speed on Hoopstad. Two days' march beyond Boshof, at Mahemsfontein, he received an order to halt, which compelled him to retire to Zwartkopjesfontein, owing to the absence of grazing and fuel at Mahemsfontein. Finally came the order which recalled him to Boshof.
General Douglas had been far from well at Zwart Kopjes, and had intended to drive from thence to Boshof; but the attack on the column caused him mount his horse, and this for a man seriously threatened with dysentery was a severe ordeal. The result was that for many days at Boshof he was very bad indeed. Fortunately nothing occurred during this time to call upon him for any exertion. There were a few skirmishes on the outpost lines, but otherwise things kept quite quiet.
It is surprising that the enemy made no attempt upon Lord Methuen’s communications with Kimberley. Posts had been established at Frankfort and at intermediate places; but had the Boers been really active, we should have had a great deal of trouble. The 5th Fusiliers celebrated St. George’s Day, April 23, according to their usual custom, and this was the greatest event of the week ending Saturday, April 28. Upon this day I received a telegram from Kimberley, from which I gathered that the Mafeking Belief Expedition was really upon the point of departure. Curiously enough, Young, who intended to accompany me, received, almost at the same moment, instructions to proceed to Bloemfontein - much to our mutual annoyance. The mischief was that he could not explain why he did not wish to obey these instructions, and was compelled to make all sorts of excuses instead of saying plainly that he proposed to go to Mafeking, and thus giving away the secret. However, he set out with me for Kimberley on Sunday, April 29, and on arrival at that place, to our great joy, he had a wire which once more set him free to go where he pleased. Thus we were able to make preparations for a joint expedition.
