Quitting Lord Methuen’s column at Boshof on Sunday afternoon, April 29, we reached Kimberley on the following morning. That a relief column was about to start for Mafeking had become pretty generally known, but whether the enterprise would take the form of an advance in force, after defeating the Boers at Fourteen Streams, or be a dash round the enemy’s flank executed by mounted troops, only the favoured few could tell, and these naturally kept their information to themselves. I had, however, arranged with a friend at Kimberley to send me a wire couched in language that I could interpret, in the event of anything important being on the tapis, and this message having reached me on Saturday night, I waited at Boshof only long enough to make sundry transport arrangements which I had afterwards good reason to regret, and then made haste to Kimberley, where particulars of the impending operations could be obtained. Having ascertained that Colonel Mahon with a ‘ Flying Column ‘ was to make an immediate effort for the relief of Mafeking, it need scarcely be said that I was most anxious to accompany him. But it was clear at the same time that by so doing I should certainly miss most, if not all, of the much more extensive operations which were expected to be commenced by General Hunter’s Division. Consequently, before making a final decision, I wired an enigmatical telegram to Amery at Capetown, who fortunately understood my meaning and advised me to use my own discretion. Consequently I decided to throw in my lot with the Flying Column; the relief of Mafeking being, in my opinion, the enterprise of most importance, although to be attempted by a comparatively insignificant force only about 1100 of all ranks.
Before leaving Boshof I had disposed of the ‘weagon,’ and also of Kruger, Steyn, and Cronje, and purchased a small ox-wagon. My idea being that I should thus be enabled to carry forage for Jess and a pony, without having any other horses to feed by the way. The six oxen would of course live on the veldt. Upon our arrival at Kimberley, however, I learned that only mule transport was being taken with the Flying Column, and was told that oxen would have no chance of keeping up! I did not agree with this view, my own experience being that with fat oxen and a light load it is by no means impossible to keep up with mules. However, I allowed myself to be persuaded - foolishly, I think - and having sold the ox-wagon, purchased a Cape cart with four horses. I lost nothing over the ox-wagon, and, considering the condition of the market at the time, did not pay extravagantly for the cart and horses. I also bought a capital chestnut pony, whom I named ‘Solomon,’ after the dealer from whom I obtained him. The leaders were christened ‘Kruger ‘ and ‘Steyn,’ and the wheelers ‘Cronje’ and ‘ Joubert.’ Young also purchased a similar outfit, with the exception that he was unable to find a second riding pony, and had to pin his faith upon the unaided efforts of ‘Little Bobs.’
Arendse and Cornelius had already given place to Abraham and Hoven. I had had differences of opinion with the original pair. The change was very much for the better.
The Flying Column included M Battery Royal Horse Artillery under Major Jackson, the Kimberley Mounted Corps under Lieut.-Colonel King, the Imperial Light Horse under Lieut.-Colonel Edwards, a composite company composed of detachments of twenty-five men under an officer from each battalion of the Fusilier Brigade, and two Pom-poms under Captain Robinson, R.A. Thus, this little force was thoroughly representative of the Empire; Royal Horse Artillery and Colonial Corps, and the infantry company of the ‘Union’ Brigade’ English, Scotch, Irish and Welsh soldiers.
The staff officers were as follows:
Brigadier: Colonel Mahon, D.S.O., 8th Hussars.
Brigade Major: Captain Bell-Smythe, King’s Dragoon Guards.
A.D.C.: Captain H.S.H. Prince Alexander of Teck, 7th Hussars.
D.A.A.G. (b): Major Sir John Willoughby, late Royal Horse Guards.
Galloper: Captain F. W. Smith, Imperial Light Horse.
Chief Intelligence Officer: Colonel Frank Rhodes, late Royal Dragoons.
Assistants: Major Baden-Powell, Scots Guards; Major Hon. Maurice Gifford, attached to Imperial Yeomanry.
Commanding Royal Artillery: Major Jackson, R.H.A.
Supply Officer: Captain Cobbe, 9th Bengal Lancers.
Transport Officer: Major Samuel Weil, Imperial Yeomanry.
The column assembled at Barkly West during Wednesday and Thursday, May 2 and 3, and on Friday, the 4th, we set out, marching, however, only a short distance to a place called Greef Putts, which from my point of view has a most appropriate name. The wheel horses of my] cart escaped from the ‘ boy ‘ whilst grazing in the bush, and I have never seen them since. Both were ‘ knee-haltered/' and had been seen within five minutes of their disappearance. Consequently they must either have been bred in the neighbourhood, and made off straight for home, or else they were stolen ‘which matters not. The disaster was equally serious, whatever may have been the cause. Fortunately, the transport officer came to my rescue by offering to carry my forage, and with this assistance I succeeded in keeping up with the column. Yet the leaders were but ponies, the roads terribly rough, and the cart heavy, so that unless I could obtain further help or get horses at Vryburg my chances of reaching Mafeking seemed somewhat doubtful.
The march during the first few days was otherwise uneventful, no opposition being met with. Cronje left Fourteen Streams on the 3rd, in order to intercept us, but does not appear to have given us credit for the rapidity that marked our movements. No doubt the fact that the column included infantry was duly brought to the knowledge of the Boer leader, and for once the very excellence of his intelligence department proved an evil rather than an advantage to him. The number of infantry was no doubt much exaggerated, and hence the mistake. At all events, we succeeded in getting safely round the Boer positions about Fourteen Streams, and were soon so far advanced on our way that it became impracticable for Cronje to catch us up with a force strong enough to defeat us. Moreover, the enemy had quite enough to do in defending himself against General Hunter, whose action at Rooi Dam was fought with the express purpose of preventing Cronje from attacking the Flying Column.
Of armed Boers between Kimberley and Vryburg we saw none, but a score or more of notable rebels were captured, together with sundry rifles and a considerable amount of ammunition. The Vryburg district contains many Boers, said to have been sent thereto by Mr. Kruger to occupy farms bought with secret service money the object, of course, being to import voters favourable to ‘The Bond.’ I have this on excellent authority, but cannot absolutely vouch for the truth of the statement. Personally, I believe it folly, and there is every probability of its accuracy.
Speaking just now about the capture of rebels reminds me of an amusing incident. I was with the officer commanding the advanced guard near Bank’s Drift on Monday, April 7, when a wagon was brought in by a flanking patrol. Sitting inside was a fat old woman, apparently hostile. The officer called for a man who could speak Dutch, in order to have an interview with the lady, who, however, cut short these preliminaries by observing, ‘Shure I don’t want any of yer Dutch - I’m Mrs. McGreer!‘
The column entered Vryburg on the afternoon of April 9, not only unopposed but undisturbed even by rumours of hostile bodies being in the neighbourhood. The Transvaal officials had cleared a couple of days before we reached the town, one of them carrying in a box at the back of his cart the moneys collected during the term of his office. Whether these funds have subsequently been devoted to the service of the republics or to the personal benefit of a single individual, I cannot tell.
Vryburg is a pretty little town, wanting only a background of high hills to render it picturesque. It is situated upon and under the southern slope of a great roll of the veldt, being therefore what is termed in the west of England ‘back sunded,’ to some extent, and the gardens must consequently suffer from the cold south winds and winter frosts.
Wood for fuel was one of the difficulties which the Flying Column had to contend against. We could not carry it, and were therefore obliged to ‘live on the country’. Doors, windows, fences, gates, and all sorts of things had to bum in order that the soldier might cook his dinner. Dry wood near the Vryburg camp proved even more scarce than it had been elsewhere; but close at hand stood a tumble-down looking building. This was speedily assailed with axes, and hearing the noise and guessing the cause, I repaired to the spot armed with a small hatchet, whilst my servants were attending to the horses. Just as I reached the scene of action an infuriated little party of staff officers also arrived to stop the proceedings. The building, it turned out, was the stable of the Mounted Police Barracks - in short, Government property! The soldiers were soon sent off to seek other sources of wood-supply, and one man who was carrying off a doorpost was ordered to leave it on the ground. This doorpost, when all was quiet again, I was fortunate enough to secure; and half an hour afterwards it was usefully employed under the frying-pan, in which the lamb chops for our dinner were pleasantly hissing.
From all accounts, the railway to Mafeking had been left practically uninjured for nearly fifty miles north of Vryburg, and to the south the damage did not seem to be great. Therefore we had good hope that General Hunter’s troops would be able to reopen the line for traffic before very long. The future movements of the Flying Column, of course, depended very much upon the rapidity with which the railway could be repaired behind us. Supplies would be required at Mafeking before we could start for Pretoria, and if these were seriously delayed we feared that we might fail to reach our destination until after its occupation by Lord Roberts* army. So far everything had gone well. We learned that the passage of the Vaal at Fourteen Streams had been forced by Genera! Hunter, and that the Boer positions on the northern bank had been captured. We had heard the big guns as we marched by on Saturday about twenty-five miles west of the Rooi Dam battlefield.
It was dark on the evening of our arrival at Vryburg before we were properly settled down in camp, the convoy having been a long way in rear of the advanced guard, with which Young and I had entered the town, and until the baggage had come up we could not do much in the way of searching for a pair of horses. In the morning, however, following up a clue obtained upon the previous evening, I was successful, and ‘Bruh‘ and ‘Vryburg‘ replaced the absent Generals Cronje and Joubert. Both were given to jibbing, but Abraham was a fine whip, and managed to get them along very well as a rule. At all events, the horses never jibbed in crossing ‘drifts’ and therefore their occasional misconduct was of but little consequence.
Having remained at Vryburg during the whole of Thursday, May 10, the Brigadier continued his march at 6 p.m. The guide lost his way, and after a very tedious march until 2 a.m. the following morning, we halted cold and hungry, and without any water for the animals. The march was therefore resumed at 6.30, and at 8.15 we reached Majoiner Mabili’ commonly called ‘Johnny Mabili‘ having then completed about twenty-two miles from Vryburg.
Here Young bought two pounds of salt butter’ probably made in County Cork ‘under the fond impression that he was being supplied with the fresh product of the chum. He still objects to being reminded of this incident, therefore I recall it for his especial benefit. The butter was, moreover, rancid, and utterly uneatable by any white man. Our Kaffirs profited accordingly.
In the afternoon we marched thirteen miles to a small farm ‘ name forgotten ‘ thus completing thirty-five miles in twenty-five hours. Here we met an officer named (I think) Marsden, who had safely reached us after a very adventurous career. First he had penetrated the Boer lines by night, and thus obtained an interview with Baden-Powell, with whom he discussed the situation upon behalf of Colonel Plumer, to whom he returned and reported. Then riding south, he made for the Flying Column, in order to bring information to Colonel Mahon. He was very surprised to find us so far advanced on our march, and delighted us infinitely by the assurance that everything was still going on well at Mafeking.
Next morning, May 12, at 6.30, we marched to Jackal’s Pan, and then in the afternoon continued onwards to Fraser’s farm at Setlagoli. The total distance of this day’s march was less than sixteen miles, but a bad ‘ drift ‘ had delayed us very much. The Frasers were kindness itself, and supplied us with all sorts of things at most reasonable rates, including a quantity of forage. About a mile north-east of the farm is a small fort built on a kopje by Sir Charles Warren during the Bechuanaland Expedition. In answer to questions from Baden-Powell and Plumer as to the strength and condition of his column, Colonel Mahon sent replies that would have puzzled the Boers had they cut off the messenger. Here are the questions and answers seriatim.
Question 1. What is the strength of your column ?
Answer 1. ‘Naval and Military’ x 10 (= 94 Piccadilly x 10).
Question 2. How many guns ?
Answer 2. Equals number of sons in Ward Family (=6).
Question 3. How off for supplies ?
Answer. Ask the C.O. 9th Lancers (‘Small’’ Little).
Krai Pan.
On Sunday, 13th, at 6.15 a.m., the column set out from Setlagoli and marched about eight miles to its breakfast outspan, near Brodie’s Farm. The Brigadier was quite aware that a Boer force held the Koodoos Band ridges, blocking his route by the direct road to Mafeking. He was well content to leave the enemy sitting there, and swept off to his left so as to turn the position simply by marching past it. This proceeding most have annoyed the Boers very much. No doubt they expected the Flying Column to run its head against a brick wall after the accustomed fashion of British forces; at all events, they must in that case have been disappointed.
At 2.30 p.m. we continued our march through an undulating bush veldt, of which it is providential that the enemy failed to take early advantage. Clouds of dust, and sometimes bodies of horsemen, could be seen at and about the Koodoos Band from a very short time after we commenced the afternoon march. Soon our scouts on the right flank came in contact with those of the Boers, who, however, retired before our men. The head of the convoy made a short halt in order to permit the tail to close up, but otherwise the march continued throughout the action almost without interruption until dusk, when the Brigadier decided to halt until his scouts should have made certain about the proper line to the Maratsani.
At 3.40 the firing upon the right increased in intensity, and many Boers were reported to have been seen galloping from the direction of the Koodoos Band towards our right front. Jackson’s guns now unlimbered, but after waiting for some time without any target presenting itself, they moved forward once more, still keeping upon the exposed flank. The bush was everywhere thick, and the approaches therefore easy for the enemy under folds of the ground, had not our gallant Imperial Light Horse and Kimberleys proved generally quite as clever as the Boers themselves.
By 4.35 the firing was general on the right flank and in front, and the guns, which had once more unlimbered the pom-poms- also taking post to cover the front of our advance - were soon to have their chance. Just at this moment the attention of those of us who were with the General was diverted from the skirmishing around by the sudden outbreak of a very heavy fire, directed against the right front of the column where we then were, and at quite a short range. Mr. Hands, of the Daily Mail, fell badly wounded almost immediately, and a good many men dropped here and there, whilst, in the convoy itself, mules and drivers were also getting a baddish time of it. The Fusilier Company formed a line behind the crest of a rising wave of ground, from which they had a fair view of the approaches to their front, the bush just at this part being not quite so thick as elsewhere. Personally I was very glad indeed to get behind the same friendly shelter, after catching Solomon, who had just begun to enjoy a nice patch of grazing. During the time it lasted - just ten minutes - this fire was the hottest I have ever known, and it is really a marvel that there were not more casualties. Most of the bullets, however, seemed to go high. The convoy wheeled to the left so as to gain shelter where the ground fell away slightly to the westward, and soon reached comparative safety.
At 4.45 our guns and pom-poms at last finding a visible target, opened upon the enemy with almost instantaneous effect, and at 5.5, the fight being over, the guns limbered up and resumed their normal position at the head of the convoy. For a few moments the situation had been distinctly unpleasant, although, thanks to the fine quality of the troops, it was never for even one moment perilous.
What had happened was that the advanced guard, finding the enemy recoiling before their vehement offensive, had pushed onwards so rapidly that the right flank guard, heavily engaged with the enemy opposed to them, could not keep up, and a gap thus opened on our right front. The enemy here finding their way clear before them, pushed onwards through the interval, and thus arrived within easy range of the main column and the convoy. But the right flank guard pushing fiercely against them, and the guns also having succeeded in bringing their fire to bear upon them, these adventurous Boers were swiftly driven back, and their comrades making no real effort to support them,' they were compelled to fly from the field. The behaviour of the British troops was quite excellent, and the victory was well deserved. We lost five killed, twenty wounded, including Major Mullins of the Imperial Light Horse, and one missing. The Boer loss will never be known, for the simple reason that as the column continued its march before daylight, the ground over which the enemy had advanced was not properly searched, and in any case the bodies were probably removed during the night. However, as the Kaffirs who were commandeered by the Boers to dig the graves declare that they buried twenty-two men, we may safely claim to have at all events inflicted upon the enemy a loss exceeding our own. Our ambulance picked up one wounded Boer, but the rest, at their own request, were left for their own friends to remove, and received only such treatment as was immediately necessary.
As soon as all was over, Colonel Mahon caused his wagons to be parked as if for the night, and ordered the troops to form their bivouacs. This seems to have completely deceived the enemy, and as the result we were enabled to march at daylight and effect the passage of the Maratsani river without the smallest opposition. We had bivouacked without water, and had counted upon a plentiful supply at the Maratsani, but were disappointed. The river was quite dry, and we were compelled to dig holes in the sand by means of which the horses and mules were laboriously and, I fear, insufficiently watered. This might! have proved disastrous, but when animals are really well cared for and suffer no privations of this sort as a rule, they easily put up with occasional scarcity. We remained by the river on a good position until 3 p.m. when, the animals having had a really good feed, we set forth to accomplish the long march of over twenty miles to the Molopo river, on which we hoped to effect a junction with Plumer. At 8.30 p.m. we outspanned till 1 a.m. on Tuesday, when we continued our march and reached the Molopo at 8.30, exactly twelve hours after leaving the Maratsani. Shortly after daylight our scouts reported a force approaching the north bank of the river, and soon after it was found that we were actually in touch with Plumer’s column, which reached Jan Mabissi’s just half an hour before the head of Mahon’s column crossed the river and joined hands with it. Here it was that we heard the glorious news of Baden-Powell’s fight upon the previous Saturday, when a determined attack upon Mafeking resulted not only in the defeat of the enemy but in the capture of over 100 prisoners, including the notorious Eloff - who with all his faults has. at all events proved himself to be a plucky fellow and a fine leader of men.
We were now only eighteen miles from Mafeking, which lay almost due east of Jan Mabissi’s, and all ranks felt perfect confidence in the result of whatever fighting might follow. The march of the Canadian Artillery under Major Hudon, and the Queensland Mounted Infantry under Major Kelly, who, in order to catch up Plumer, marched on foot no less than twenty-eight miles on the 14th, was a fine performance, more especially when it is remembered that since the men disembarked at Beira, they had, practically speaking, spent all their time in the train. The dismounted portion of the Rhodesian Regiment also marched the same distance, and although these men were fully acclimatized, it must be remembered that they had not been accustomed to covering long distances except on horseback.
Finally, just to give one more instance of the fine spirit that animated this gallant little force, it should be mentioned that Lieutenant Watson, of the Kimberley Mounted Corps, who was on sick leave at Cape Town, heard of the march to Mafeking, hurried back to the front, and having ridden absolutely alone all the way from Barkly West, joined the column on Sunday just in time for the fight, having covered 220 miles in five days. With such officers and men, a commander may safely face pretty long odds.
Colonel Plumer’s column numbered rather less than 700 of all ranks, and included the following units :’
B.S.A.P., three squadrons, Lieut.-Colonel Bodle.
Queensland Mounted Infantry, Major Kelly.
Rhodesian Regiment, five squadrons, Major Pilson (half squadron dismounted for want, of horses) [The original strength of this corps had been twenty-two officers and 428 men. Its casualties up to March 31 amounted to eleven officers and ninety-five men killed and wounded.]
South Rhodesian Volunteers, one troop, Captain Ramsay.
Canadian Artillery, four 12-pounder guns, Major Hudon.
One Vickers-Maxim, 12£-pounder, Captain H. P. De Montmorency.
Three 7-pounder MX. mountain guns, Captain Llewellen. (The latter officer being actually in command of the mixed battery.)
The combined columns remained for the night at Jan Mabissi’s (deserted kraal) to thoroughly rest the horses against the trying day that was certain to follow.
At 7.30 a.m. on Wednesday, May 16, began the march which was destined to relieve Mafeking and thereby to set the whole British Empire wild with joy. The Flying Column occupied the left of the line, with Plumer’s on the right, reaching to the Molopo river and astride of it - the Police being upon the southern bank, where they had a rough time a little later on and acquitted themselves most manfully. At noon the column halted to water and feed about a mile on the Mafeking side of Balokutwe, and between that kraal and the Malopo river. A Boer force was reported in front of us at a distance of about two miles, and at 1.45, after some little skirmishes between patrols upon both sides of the river, the Imperial Light Horse on the left front became heavily engaged. At 2.10 Colonel Mahon, having by this time gained a fair idea of the situation, and the ground in front and flanks being covered to his satisfaction, brought up Jackson’s guns and also Robinson’s pom-poms, all of which were speedily in action. Ten minutes later the fighting became general, and the artillery as well as riflemen on both sides were firing for all they were worth. Our convoy was meanwhile crawling slowly over the veldt towards a hollow in rear of the left centre where there was complete shelter, but as they went the Boer shells kept falling thickly amongst the wagons. A Maxim-Vickers 12-pounder, which had been posted in an admirably selected position just in rear of a single but wide-spreading mimosa tree facing the centre of the British line, was especially active and charmingly impartial in its choice of targets. The position of this gun was for a long time undetected, but its eventual discovery soon led to its hasty withdrawal.
Plumer’s force, which was directing its attack against Israel Malama’s farm, where the Boer left touched the Malopo river, was now fighting hard, and though holding its own, unable to gain ground.
At 2.45 the firing on the left slackened slightly, but only because before pushing on Colonel Edwards awaited reinforcements, which were already on their way to support the fight in that part of the field, and by 3 p.m. the firing resumed and soon exceeded its former intensity. The ridge just to the left rear of the convoy which by this time had gained its place of security in the hollow, was also occupied as a precautionary measure, so as to provide against contingencies. On the right, the British South African Police were fighting hard, and finding a further advance for the time impracticable, fell back a short distance to good cover, from which they effectually checked every effort of the enemy to push them further. A large number of Boers, amounting to about 700 men, showed themselves freely on the sky line on the heights south of the river, and a very heavy fire of artillery and pompoms was directed against our right rear. But the brigadier had complete confidence in Lieut.-Colonel Peakman, who had command of the rear-guard, and right well did this gallant officer fulfil the trust committed to him. A considerable number of mounted Boers, galloping down by the village of Saani, gained the bed of the Molopo river, and from thence sought to assail the rear-guard, but so accurate was the fire of the party of Kimberley Mounted Corps, that the enemy was not only checked but was also unable to retire. These Boers were kept practically prisoners in the river-bed until nightfall, when they made their escape in the dark. Peakman’s success was due to his own cleverness in choosing his ground, by which he avoided losses to his own men, whilst at the same time securing a perfect command over all the approaches to his position. Tet the trial, in spite of the excellent cover, was no light one. As I watched the shells pitching all over Peakman’s position, it seemed to me to be almost impossible that heavy losses were not being sustained. The practical immunity that was actually enjoyed affords a lesson to many who have refused to believe the statements of the Boers as to their own trifling losses under very similar circumstances upon very many occasions.
At 3.40 p.m., Jackson’s guns changed position towards the north to a higher point of the ridge in order to engage the Boer quick-firer, whose position under the mimosa tree had at last been detected. This move resulted in the speedy withdrawal of the enemy’s gun, and consequently relieved the pressure previously exercised on Peakman’s rear-guard, on which this gun had fixed heavily from time to time, and dangerously also, since it enfiladed the position.
Ground was now being gained continuously by the left wing, under the clever leadership of Iieut-Colonel Edwards, whose own corps, the Imperial light Horse, led the advance with the skill and courage that they have so consistently displayed throughout the war. In the centre, where the brigadier had his station, the resistance had grown feeble on the withdrawal of the 12J-pounder quick-firer, and the Fusilier company, with the dismounted Rhodesians, were ordered to advance across the vale which divided the opposing positions. At 4.25 a general advance was ordered, Robinson’s pom-poms being sent to the right front to deal with a number of Boers observed in retreat. I took a photograph of the pom-poms limbering up, but the film was a bad one, and the picture is scarcely capable of satisfactory reproduction. At 5 p.m., Plumer, commanding the right attack, reported all going well, but that he would like to have assistance against Israel Malama’s farm, which was still being held stubbornly against him. Jackson’s guns accordingly joined in the bombardment already being conducted by the Canadians further to the right, but at this juncture the enemy fled, and the farm was soon in the hands of our troops. The fight was now practically over. The general advance was continued for about a mile, the convoy following after us and crashing its way through the bush in the fast - gathering darkness. Then the brigadier wisely decided to halt until the moon had risen, and meanwhile sent forward Major Karri Davis, with six volunteers. of the Imperial Light Horse, to announce the victory to Baden-Powell, and report that the relief column would enter Mafeking during the night.
The battle had been well won, the enemy having been pushed back over three miles and parted right asunder, so that no Boers remained in front of the column. Our loss, moreover, had been slight, only about thirty casualties all told. The scene <rf the combat was the southern slope of the veldt north of the Molopo, from which great easy spurs, with valleys of similar character between them, run down to the river. Upon two of these spurs were the main lines of the opposing positions. There was a sprinkling of bush everywhere, with a dense tract on the right front of the enemy. On the south side of the river the heights rise more abruptly, especially east of Saani - that is, to our right front. On these heights the enemy had at least two guns and several hundred men, probably from 700 to 800, who freely showed themselves moving along the hills in the direction of our rear.
It seems clear that the idea in the mind of the Boer commander was that by assailing us on both flanks, and showing a strong force on our right moving apparently to attack us in rear, he would frighten us into thinking more of defending ourselves than of attacking our enemy. He forgot, however, that Colonel Mahon knew the entire strength of the besieging force to be no more than 3000, of whom at least 1000 would certainly be needed to keep in check the garrison of Mafeking. Consequently, when he saw large numbers of the enemy on the hills to his right, and found his left also assailed, Colonel Mahon could scarcely fail to argue that the opposition in front was unlikely to be very strong. Therefore, in place of halting to await attack, he promptly pushed onwards, with the excellent results that have done such credit to his cool judgment and readiness of resource. Lieut.-Colonels Plumer and Edwards, commanding the right and left wings, and Lieut.-Colonel Peakman, commanding the rear-guard, proved worthy lieutenants to their gallant leader. It was because the troops were well handled that this brilliant little action had so successful a termination.
What might have happened had-the Boers attempted real business instead of trying to frighten Mahon with a ‘bogie,’ it is hard to say. They might have concentrated on their main position, with a false flank on the heights south of the Molopo, and a strong offensive flank in the thick bush to their right front. A fierce counter-attack based upon this bush, and falling on our left, might have caused considerable trouble. Hampered with his convoy, Mahon was almost incapable of tactical manoeuvres in a bush country; and to a direct frontal attack, manoeuvre is the only alternative, if ground is to be gained.
At midnight the column commenced its march on Mafeking, and at 4 a.m., Thursday, May 17, the head of it arrived on its camping-ground, west of the railway station. I was only just in time for the meeting of Baden-Powell and Mahon, having stupidly mistaken a right-flank guard for the advanced guard, and remained with it for a long time before discovering the mistake. Young, whom I had lost in the dark, was more fortunate, and entering Mafeking with the advanced guard was regaled with hot cocoa at the headquarter mess. I envied him very much, for I could get nothing hot myself until after daylight, fires in the camp being necessarily prohibited. During the day j there was some little skirmishing but no serious fighting, as the Boers gave way in all directions. Snyman’s main laager was captured about 10 a.m.; but the enemy succeeded in removing almost everything of value - one small gun and a few stores represented the extent of our booty. The relief column, as a whole, had had too much hard work to be capable of an effective pursuit, but it would seem as if more use might have been made of Plumer’s force, a considerable port of which was comparatively fresh. Yet, Baden-Powell had to decide this question on the spot, and it is more easy to criticize after the event than to do the right thing at the actual moment.
A number of official telegrams found in Snyman’s laager furnished much amusement. I had a copy of the collection, but have unfortunately mislaid it, otherwise a few extracts should now have been quoted.
Shortly before noon, Baden-Powell, Mahon, and Plumer rode into the town at the head of the troops, the town-guard lining the streets. There was much enthusiasm. The Mayor, Mr. Whiteley, read an address, and after mutual congratulations and much cheering the troops marched to their camps, and the town guard was dismissed.
