The siege of Mafeking ended officially at 10 a.m. on May the 17th, this being the hour at which the Boer headquarters at the main laager, east of the town, broke up camp and Commenced to retreat. Actually, however, at least one condition of the state of siege continued to be felt, since the garrison remained for some days very badly off for supplies, and the ‘siege loaf,’ a marvellous and not altogether dainty compound of various farinaceous substances, was still issued as rations to the troops and to the townsfolk. A tiny, dark-looking roll weighing half a pound was the daily ration to each person. Of meat there was already plenty. A considerable herd of captured cattle had been driven in with Colonel Mahon’s column, and large quantities were almost immediately procured in the neighbourhood. But of other supplies there was practically nothing. A train-load from Bulawayo was anxiously expected, and actually arrived on the Queen’s birthday; but from the south there could be no immediate expectations, nor had we any tidings whatever of what had transpired since we left Kimberley. Not a word had come from General Hunter, and we could only conjecture that he had gone east from Fourteen Streams along the northern bank of the Vaal, probably marching on Klerksdorp, whilst Lord Methuen, upon the south bank, secured the communications with Kimberley. A very pretty combination upon the strategical chess-board seemed to present itself in the idea of Hunter acting as a left flank guard to the army of the Commander-in-Chief, and in the event of the Boers making a stand on the Vaal, being ready to execute a turning movement upon the enemy’s side of the^ river, whilst our column, marching from Mafeking, would in turn protect Hunter’s left, and should the Boers oppose his turning movement with an entrenched position facing westwards, act in his favour just as he would himself do for Roberts.
I spent a good deal of time, after my arrival, in riding round the defences of Mafeking, and was amazed at the ingenuity and perseverance that had been displayed by the garrison. The tiny fortress seems to have kept growing, both in strength and extent, day by day’ or, more accurately, night by night throughout the memorable siege. The amount of excavation accomplished is positively stupendous. I had already a fair idea of what had been done, from looking at the works themselves; but when Colonel Baden-Powell showed me a plan of the defences which he had just completed in order to enclose with his official report’ I realized, as I had failed to do before, the real magnitude of the task which had been accomplished. The perimeter of the place at the commencement of the siege was comparatively small, but by degrees it became extended as the necessities of the case, or the adventurous spirit of the garrison, called for the occupation of fresh ground. Thus, instead of the lines of defence being contracted as the siege progressed, the contrary was the case. Yet the effects of the bombardment, to which the battered buildings of the little town bore witness more eloquent than any words, must have been truly terrific, and the ordeal so heroically endured has but few parallels in history. Compared with Kimberley, and taking into consideration the relative areas of the two towns, more damage was done in a single street in Mafeking than in the whole of Kimberley. That actually more houses were hit in Mafeking than in Kimberley, I am certain. In Kimberley it was often necessary to look round carefully for traces of the bombardment, and frequently none could be detected although, of course, in some places they were plentiful but in Mafeking, go where you would, unmistakable evidences were ever before the eyes.
Splendid, however, as was the spirit that animated all sorts and conditions of men throughout the siege, it is impossible to avoid a special concentration of truly romantic interest upon the repulse of Eloff’s attempted assault in the night of Saturday, May 12th. In order to realize completely the glory won upon that occasion by Baden-Powell and his "illustrious garrison,’ it is necessary ito consider the conditions existing at the time of this gallant episode.
For many weeks the troops had been on short rations, and the end was almost in sight. Nothing could have prevented the fall of Mafeking within a fortnight, unless its relief should actually have been effected. Rumours there were that a relief column was on the march, but, according to the latest news, there was but a mere chance of the siege being raised before the time when the little force must yield to hunger. It would have been but natural had the garrison already fallen into a state of complete despondency. Finally, when in the middle of that eventful night the enemy were found to have penetrated the defences and reached almost to the very heart of the town, it falls scarcely short of the miraculous that all should have risen as one man to eject the intruders. So gallantly and so skilfully were the counter-operations conducted that not only was the bulk of the enemy driven out, defeated, and disgraced, but over one hundred prisoners were captured after being themselves besieged in the very works that they had carried a few hours previously! The defenders laboured under every possible disadvantage. Surprised by an enemy, whose success in carrying the works must obviously have encouraged him to a high pitch of enthusiasm and confidence, the defenders of Mafeking rallied round their brave Commander, and added to their roll of fame an exploit which can never be forgotten throughout Her Majesty’s Empire. Only such a deed could have overshadowed the heroism already displayed. Had Mafeking fallen that night she would yet have fallen gloriously. She has, however, survived all her trials and become even more illustrious.
On May 22 I rode out to the scene of the action on the 16th, and by a lucky error of direction took a line that led rather too much to the north. The result was that I arrived upon the ground a little beyond the right of the Boer position, and consequently realized what might have escaped my notice had I at once become interested in the actual scene of the fight and the various incidents that I had observed thereon. It seemed to me - as I have already stated when describing the fight - that the Boers lost a fine opportunity. Beyond the right of their line of battle the bush is much thicker than elsewhere, and the ground has a slightly superior command. Here, say 1000 men might have been concealed and remained inactive until we had become fairly committed to our advance against the front of the position. Then a counter-attack, beginning with a heavy fire against our left flank, from a concealed enemy, could scarcely have failed to produce a marked effect, and might even have resulted in our defeat. True, our flanking parties would by this time have also entered the bush, and would have found and engaged this new enemy. But smokeless powder has revolutionized the conditions of wood fighting. It used to be understood that ‘once within the wood, assailants and defenders are on equal terms.,, This is no longer a fact. The defenders can still see their opponents as they advance from tree to tree, but the latter, upon the contrary, are no longer able to locate those who are firing upon them. Thus a comparatively small number of the ambushed Boers might easily have ‘ contained’ our men on their own flank, whilst the bulk of their force in the wood devoted its entire attention to enfilading the left of our main attack. Formerly I was of opinion that the Boers in adopting the plan of endeavouring to check us by means of a ‘bogie‘ in the shape of our own fears for imaginary danger to our flanks and rear, had done the best that could have been done; but upon after consideration I am inclined to think differently. Of course the fact remains that the plan actually adopted might have succeeded admirably if applied against a less resolute commander than Colonel Mahon, or if the defence of our right rear had been committed to a less able leader than the gallant Peakman. But actually the plan failed, and it is therefore interesting to consider whether, under the conditions existing, another might not have been more successful. There were two courses open to the Boers. They might have elected to resist us by simply holding their ground, and if possible defeating our efforts to dislodge them; or they might, as they actually did, resort to a stratagem. Their choice of the latter alternative resulted in their defeat; but had they employed the first they might not improbably have been successful. It must be remembered that whilst Mahon was hampered by the presence of a large convoy, the Boers were absolutely independent of such ties. Consequently in a trial of manoeuvring skill our opponents had very much the best of us. Mahon was not strong enough to guard his convoy and at the same time execute a wide turning movement. His only chance was to go straight at his enemy with his convoy following closely behind his line of battle. This he did, and in the event succeeded in defeating the Boers and relieving Mafeking.
In considering the features of this smart little action, it should be borne in mind that the attacking force (or rather, the force which was strategically the assailant) was slightly inferior in numbers to the defenders, and consequently, according to all recognized theories of war, was incapable of delivering a successful attack’ and yet it succeeded. The explanation of this may perhaps be found in the fact that the enemy attempted to seize the initiative by the adoption of the tactical offensive, and in his method of applying this usually excellent plan lost the power to bring superior numbers to the decisive point, i.e. on the main front of his battle. The formidable body which showed itself on our right and right rear, not only failed to create the desired ‘ bogie,’ but by its absence from the scene of decisive struggle deprived the enemy of some 700 riflemen, or, roughly, of one-third of his whole force. Rifle bullets we could not have ignored, but upon the bogie we bestowed scarcely any attention. Thus, although inferior in total numbers, we actually were permitted to enjoy a slight numerical superiority at the decisive point. So by Divine Providence, good leadership, and good fighting, we gained a complete victory.
A train from Gaberones arrived on the evening of the 22nd with a small quantity of supplies, which were very welcome, but from all accounts there was little hope of plenty being restored in Mafeking from northern resources. Carrington’s force was said to be consuming the consignments arriving Beira almost as fast as they were received. It was to Kimberley and the south that our eyes were turned, and from this direction we had so far obtained not even a despatch to tell us the latest news. We were on half rations of bread, and without news from the outer world. Hence many disliked their condition and longed to see it altered. Personally, my chief trouble was a constant apprehension that the British flag might be re-hoisted in Pretoria before I could reach that city. Having taken part in the trooping of the colour and hoisting the flag at Pretoria in May, 1877, [The annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 was effected by the 1st Battalion of my regiment - with two guns and a detachment of half a dozen sappers.] I had a pardonable ambition to be present at the final ceremony. My hopes were actually doomed to disappointment.
The parade of the troops on the Queen’s birthday was necessarily rather a small affair in consequence of the comparatively large number of officers and men absent on duty. The surrounding country was practically clear of the enemy, but Mafeking being within less than a dozen miles of the Transvaal frontier, it is obvious that an efficient system of patrols had to be maintained under all circumstances. The actual numbers on parade probably fell short of thirty per cent, of the strength of the corps represented. The Imperial Light Horse and the Kimberley Mounted Corps made a fair show, owing to their initial advantages in point of numbers, but the other units were represented by mere detachments, between which the usual intervals were left open, with the result that the line looked rather ragged, except on the left, where the Imperial Light Horse and Kimberley Mounted Corps were posted together. However, when at the conclusion of the ceremony the troops defiled past Baden-Powell, no Boer sympathizer who may have been present can have failed to admit to himself, albeit unwillingly, that the men looked absolutely worthy of the great cause which their valour and endurance had so recently vindicated. The colonial Britisher cannot ‘present arms’ with the skill of a regular soldier, but he can ride and shoot and fight, and one’s confidence in his prowess rises higher and higher the more and the oftener one looks at him- Personally, he inspires me with an infinite admiration. In the ranks of the Imperial Light Horse and of the Kimberley Mounted Corps, there were all sorts and conditions of men, including millionaires and others. But in the richest and in the poorest there was the same spirit of self-sacrificing patriotism and determination to do their utmost duty without the smallest regard to the great inconveniences, pecuniary and otherwise, that their protracted period of service entailed. The Empire owes much to its colonial sons, than whom Her Majesty has no more loyal or more useful subjects.
Side by side with their colonial brethren in arms stood the smart soldiers of M Battery, Royal Horse Artillery and the "Pom-pom’ detachment, worthy representatives of the Imperial Regular Army. The ‘ show ‘ was a small one in itself, but the occasion was a great one, and when three lusty cheers were given in honour of Her Majesty’s birthday by the men who had so recently effected the relief of beleaguered Mafeking, the pride of race which manifestly pervaded all present seemed as justifiable as the presence of any muster, however great, could possibly have made it.
In the afternoon we had a gymkhana, and during its progress there arrived the first through train from Bulawayo, decked with Union Jacks and evergreens, and well laden with much-needed supplies for the garrison and townsfolk. A larger bread ration was the immediate and highly satisfactory result of this.
The evening of Her Majesty’s birthday was celebrated by a dinner given by Major-General Baden-Powell to about fifty representatives of the defenders and of the relief columns. Colonel Plumer returned by rail from the north in order to be present. In spite of the absence of many things generally regarded as essential, we had an excellent dinner, and the healths of the Queen and of the various commanders and others were drank with as much enthusiasm as if champagne had been flowing in unlimited quantities. Whisky-and-water answered the purpose admirably, and there were many of the company who had for some time been unaccustomed to even so moderate a luxury. After dinner a number of rockets, unearthed by some most deserving person, were discharged into the air and elsewhere, the sticks of those that succeeded in mounting properly into space frequently descending with an alarming clatter upon the corrugated iron roofs of the neighbouring houses. Many a sleeper must have awakened with an idea that the bombardment of Mafeking had recommenced.
On Saturday, the 26th, the special correspondents of the Times, Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, Manchester Guardian, and Daily Mail with Mahon’s Relief Column, combined in giving a dinner to the Brigadier and Staff. The correspondent of the Daily Mail being in hospital suffering from a severe wound received during the action near the Maratsani river upon the previous Sunday, was necessarily absent from the entertainment, but a cheery and amusing letter written from his bed was read by the chairman amid many expressions of regret for the sender's absence and for the cause of it. Every one had a wild mania for obtaining autographs of eminent and other persons upon ‘siege-notes,’ or any other convenient documents; consequently, after dinner, the entire company exchanged autographs written on their respective menu cards. Each card needed fourteen signatures to complete it, and each was endorsed with that number. Thus, during quite a considerable period, we were all busy. ‘ Siege-notes ‘’being paper-money representing small sums from one shilling upwards’and ‘ siege-stamps,’ were being freely sold at high prices. The craze for obtaining specimens was already very strong indeed, a complete set of siege-stamps costing as much as ┬ú25. I did not invest.
On the morning of Monday, May 28, we were suddenly electrified by an order to the Brigadier to march south with his force and join General Hunter at the ‘ rail-head,’ at Maribogo, where supplies would await our arrival. No time was lost, and at 3 p.m. the column started on its way, but halted for the night on the Beit Spruit, only about four miles from Mafeking. Water is always the great difficulty, more especially during the dry season, so that the length of marches must be regulated accordingly. The Transvaal boundary fence is dose to the route by which we marched, and on Tuesday morning our patrols crossed over, with the result that two wagons with their spans of oxen were captured. These provided a most welcome increase to our transport train. The sudden order to move found a number of our wagons under repair, and in a condition that rendered it impossible for some to be refitted in time’consequently the remainder had to be much overloaded. During the second and third day’s march we saw ample evidence that in making a detour via Jan Mabissi’s, instead of marching straight on Mafeking, Colonel Mahon had exercised a most sound discretion. The Boers had evidently expected us to choose the shorter road direct from the Maratsani river to Beit Spruit, and had made most careful arrangements to give us a warm reception. Indeed, our situation might easily have been rendered most critical if, after a twenty miles’ march without water, we had been confronted by formidable entrenchments, barring our approach to the watering-place at Reit Spruit. In short, had we been unable to force the way, we should have been compelled to retreat, about twenty miles, over a waterless tract, and during such an ordeal not only transport animals, but many men and horses must certainly have succumbed; whilst all must have endured terrible sufferings. The Intelligence Department of the Relief Column was in the able hands of Colonel Prank Rhodes, and to this fact, as well as to the imperturbable good sense of the Brigadier, we are much indebted for the success of the expedition. To have accurate information always up to date, and a commander who knows how to make use of it, forms perhaps the most reliable guarantee for the happy issue of military enterprises.
On Wednesday, May 30, we reached Maratsani Siding, where we found the railway bridge absolutely destroyed and the line much damaged. It was at the same time amusing to observe how the Boers had in many cases failed to do the utmost damage that a given amount of labour should have secured. For example: many rails had been smashed with guncotton or some similar explosive, but in no case had the charge been applied at the junction of two rails. Consequently, the actual damage done represented just half that which the expenditure of explosives should have realized. Apart, however, from the question of replacing broken bridges and culverts, there seemed to be no difficulties connected with a very rapid reconstruction of the permanent way. The line had already been repaired up to a point about six miles north of Maribogo, and the first train might therefore be expected to reach Mafeking within a fortnight. The system under which South African railways are constructed renders it very difficult to destroy them effectually. There are very few long bridges, and there are practically no tunnels. Where in Europe a tunnel would certainly be constructed, the African engineer boldly lays out gradients so steep that it seems almost impossible that heavily laden trains should climb them. The train runs down the slope of one hill as fast as steam and the force of gravity can drive it, and by means of the energy thus acquired, charges up the opposite slope. There is a painfully laboured snorting from the overtaxed engine towards the end of its effort, but finally it gains the plateau above, and its troubles for the time are over.
During Wednesday’s march I had a remarkable slice of luck whilst carrying my gun on the flank of the column. I marked down a brace of koran (bustards), and having dismounted about fifty yards from the spot, proceeded to walk them up. The two rose in quick succession. My right barrel missed fire. A stifled expletive, and the discharge of the left barrel followed promptly and simultaneously. At this moment koran No. 1 crossed the line of koran No. 2, and to my surprise and delight both fell to the shot, No. 1 having by this time placed quite sixty yards between himself and the gun, and being quite fifteen yards beyond No. 2. The immediate result of this happy and rather remarkable accident was a dinner-party, with the koran as not only the piece de resistance, but practically the all-in-all. The birds were stewed in a stock made of bovril, with chutnee, salt, pepper, and chopped bacon. Then, half an hour before dinner, the contents of two tins of ‘road rations ‘ (less the meat) were added. A portion of the liquor drawn off at the last moment served as soup. The general result was that three persons concluded that they had eaten a most excellent dinner. The koran is a first-rate bird, but it needs an artist to roast him properly - hence the decision to adopt the plan described. Our guest was Vernon Kyrke of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, a most excellent young soldier, who has since distinguished himself with Lord Methuen’s column.
On Thursday morning, on our arrival at Kraipan, the news reached us of Lord Roberts’ entry into Johannesburg, and that General Hunter had entered the Transvaal without waiting for Mahon to join him. Glad as we all were at the successful occupation of the Rand, and the consequent safety of the mines, we were selfish enough to wish that the event might have been postponed for a few days in order that we should have been better situated as regards the chances of being present at the entry into Pretoria. At Kraipan we also heard from the Kaffir Chief Malsheta that after our fight between Koodoos Rand and the Maratsani, on Sunday, May 13, his men had been those employed by the Boers to dig graves for the fallen, of whom no less than twenty-two were buried. Fighting in thick bush, it is not easy to estimate losses upon the other side, and upon the occasion in question night fell so soon after the action was over that we had no opportunity of examining the ground that had been occupied by the enemy. That so many as twenty-two Boers should have been killed in so short an engagement, and under circumstances that generally prevented the combatants from seeing one another, seems almost incredible. But Malsheta was positive, and, in default of evidence to the contrary, his statement must be accepted as true. Meanwhile it must be borne in mind that we ourselves supposed the Boer losses to have been approximately equal to our own - i.e. about thirty of all sorts. Yet, upon the other hand, the sudden collapse of the Boer attack requires explanation, and the supposition that - as this occurred just as our artillery and pom-poms became active’ heavy losses were the cause, is not unjustifiable.
At 8 a.m. next day we arrived at Maribogo Siding, but were obliged to continue our march to a ‘pan’ about five miles further on, in order to obtain water. The supply was scanty, and once more, in consequence of having no engineer detachment to rig pumps and troughs, we were compelled to drink extremely dirty water. So dirty was the water that even in a bath its appearance was decidedly uninviting. With proper appliances, plenty of excellent water could easily have been obtained.
Just after we had finished breakfast on the morning after our arrival at Maribogo, General Hart, with the advanced portion of his brigade, marched through on the track of General Hunter, who had accompanied Barton's Fusilier Brigade a couple of days previously. To my surprise I met Thomson of my old regiment, who had, it appeared, become aide-de-camp to the General, and from him I heard for the first time that the second battalion had been transferred to General Hart's Brigade, and that four companies would reach Maribogo the same evening. Thomson had to follow his General without much delay, and, as soon as he had departed, I started off with my gun to obtain the wherewithal for a dinner-party. I was lucky in getting a leash of koran, and thus became ready to welcome my old friends. We had not ft kit" for more than two guests, so Williams and Whatman had to represent the others. I enjoyed my evening infinitely; but it made me wretched to think how, if only I had not been so foolish as to ‘ send in my papers ‘ when I did, I, instead of Williams, should have been in command of those four splendid companies! However, what is done is done, and it is little use grumbling over the results of our own mistakes. We are ‘ mostly fools'' if we would but acknowledge it, and the superlative conceit that prompts our folly is also the cloak that conceals it from our eyes.
With its arrival at Lichtenburg on Wednesday, June 6, the separate existence of Brigadier-General Mahon’s Mafeking Relief Column came to an end, and it became a part of General Hunter's force about to march on Potchefetroom. Our original strength was reduced by the discharge of a portion of the Kimberley Mounted Corps, but this loss was more than made good by the addition of Colonel Bum’s Scottish regiment of Imperial Yeomanry, and reinforcements of Imperial Light Horse under Colonel Wools Samson. Lieut.-Colonel Edwards, who commanded the Imperial Light Horse during the relief of Mafeking, and pending the recovery and arrival of Colonel Wools Samson, became Assistant Adjutant-General of the Mounted Brigade, which was intended to number about 1500 of all ranks, including M Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, and Robinson’s pom-poms.
The march from Maribogo to Lichtenburg was uneventful. On the way we passed General Hart’s Brigade, still marching in two portions - that in advance under the Brigadier, and the rear half under Colonel Brooke, of the Connaught Bangers. The ‘Irish Brigade’ had suffered severely during the relief of Ladysmith, and two of its battalions were so weakened that it was found necessary to replace them with others. The Somerset Light Infantry and the Border Regiment were therefore brought in, and it is amusing to recall the fact that these were the two battalions described by the imaginative correspondent of a London paper’ in relation to the relief of Wepener - as Hart’s ‘Superb Irish Brigade‘! Actually Hart had no Irishmen with him upon that occasion. Talking of the Somersets, it seems a pity, upon sentimental grounds, that this regiment was not given a place in Lord Roberts’ army in order that it might lead the entry into Pretoria. The Transvaal was annexed in 1877 by a column under Colonel Pearson, consisting of two guns, the 1st Battalion 13th Prince Albert’s (Somerset) light Infantry and a small detachment of sappers; consequently the Somersets had an undeniable claim to a share in the reoccupation of Pretoria in 1900.
General Hunter’s arrival at Lichtenburg speedily resulted in the solution of a pressing difficulty caused by armed Kaffirs, who had been looting in all directions. Marauders caught red-handed were shot, and the chiefs were warned that they must keep their young men at home or incur serious penalties. The Kaffirs who proved troublesome were partly natives of the Transvaal and partly Baralongs and others from about Mafeking. Under the stress of circumstances actually existing at the time, Colonel Baden-Powell was fully justified in arming a portion of the Baralongs for the defence of their staats, which actually formed part of the town of Mafeking. But so soon as the need for their services had been removed, not a moment should have been lost in resuming possession of the rifles and ammunition that had been served out. The Kaffirs had, indeed, done good and faithful service during the siege; but it would have been better to risk offending them by prompt disarmament, than to incur the certainty of being obliged subsequently to shoot them for marauding. Hating the Boers as they do, the conduct of the Kaffirs was but natural; but had they been without rifles they would have remained comparatively quiet. A very superior Boer, with whom I talked one day on the march from Maribogo, complained bitterly that whilst he himself had been disarmed by our troops, the Kaffirs had been left free to loot his farm. He was obliged to look on whilst his property was being stolen or destroyed, but had he been permitted to retain his rifle he could have defended himself. I explained to him that the disarmament of the burghers was a necessary proceeding towards the pacification of the country, and that the Kaffir nuisance was only a matter of a few days. But he declined to be convinced as to the propriety of the situation, and his attitude seems by no means remarkable.
On Thursday, June 7, I parted with poor ‘Jess’ with infinite regret. She had carried me exceedingly well for eight months, but it had now become perfectly clear that she could do so no more. The man to whom 1 sold her, a British storekeeper at Iichtenburg, declared that he meant to give her three months’ rest before attempting to use her again, and I saw no reason to disbelieve him, because his obvious advantage lay in keeping her until she could command a high price.
On the same day my friend Young, of the Manchester Guardian, who had now shared my fortunes for three months, received a wire recalling him to England; and I was glad to jump at the chance of securing ‘ Little Bobs.’ Young was one of the first to go, but within a fortnight the great majority of the special correspondents had received their orders for home.
At 7.30 next morning we started for Ventersdorp, and trekked as far as Putfontein, eighteen miles. I shot at a plover on the way, just to see whether ‘Little Bobs’ would let me shoot off his back, and had the double gratification of eating the bird, and finding that Bobs had no objection to being regarded as a shooting pony. At 4 a.m. on the 9th we marched to Ventersdorp, twenty-four miles, and there heard of the extraordinary disaster to the Derbyshire Militia, which, as the story reached us, entailed the capture of Kroonstad by De Wet. The truth was not quite so bad, but what actually occurred at Roodeval was quite bad enough. So far as I am aware, the staff officer responsible for dumping down a militia battalion out of the train in a dangerous position, at 11 p.m. on a dark night, has not yet been hanged.
At Ventersdorp we remained until 4 p.m. on Sunday, when we received orders to march to Potchefstroom with all possible speed. The distance via Frederichstad is forty-one miles, and was accomplished in nineteen hours - not bad going for a column which had been almost continually on the march for over a month. When we were still about five miles from our destination, Colonel Edwards rode forward in front of the advanced guard and kindly permitted me to accompany him. We made a party of half a dozen in all, and when about four miles from Potchefstroom met a train coming out, and galloped hard to cut it off. This we did successfully, and the officials descended to parley. As I rode up to them with one or two others, I noticed that there was considerable perturbation and a frequent and vehement throwing up of hands. In search for the cause I looked round and observed a distinguished officer grimly advancing, determination stamped upon every feature, with a Mauser pistol in one hand and a revolver in the other - both pointed at the enemy. It was represented to him that the men were unarmed, and he then lowered his weapons with an air of disappointment that was truly comical. Captain Bell Smythe, who had now come up, sent the train back to Potchefstroom - and so the matter ended. We had an enthusiastic reception, and whilst the staff held functions at the Landrost’s office, I had breakfast at the Hotel, and wrote a telegram for the Times, which I fondly hoped would go before any other correspondent got near the wires. I believe it was despatched about ten days later, in company with about a dozen others.
Major Coke, of Bum’s Yeomanry, shortly after our arrival at Potchefstroom got wind of a Boer despatch-rider having passed through, and promptly gave chase, catching the man about fourteen miles from the town. The captured despatches gave most important information, and Coke was very properly taken on the Intelligence Staff as the reward for his good performance.
On Tuesday morning I went out to shoot snipe, but had bad luck: saw only twelve birds, killed five, missed three, and had four miss-fires - for the latter I cursed Mr. Poole of Kimberley, who had sold me the cartridges, and for the scarcity of snipe, the increase of the British population since I had been in the country twenty-three years before. The same morning, trooper Forbes Mackay, Scottish Yeomanry, reached Potchefstroom from Johannesburg, after a great feat of physical endurance. The entry in my diary-reads as follows:’
‘On Saturday last a despatch in triplicate was sent by General Hunter from Ventersdorp to Johannesburg, (1) by Mackay, (2) an officer’s patrol (mounted), (3) a native runner. At 12.30 p.m. Mackay left on a bicycle, which broke down after twenty-five miles. He continued on foot, and, losing his way, travelled via Krugersdorp, making total journey ninety miles, of which sixty-five on foot. Arrived at Johannesburg 11 a.m. Sunday - five hours before the patrol. Staff officer referred him for rations, etc., to regiment three miles off. Went to regiment, got nothing - no orders ‘returned to Johannesburg and was then fed. Left Johannesburg, on a fresh bike, for Potchefstroom, 4.20 p.m. Monday; arrived 3.45 a.m. Tuesday, again beating the patrol. Native runner not heard of since.’
I admire Mackay as a man, and the ‘staff officer‘ as a conundrum.
At Potchefstroom I received a parcel from home containing tobacco and other useful things - but no letters. On inquiring at the Field Post Office as to how a parcel by the very last possible mail had reached me, but no letters, I was told that the parcel must have been "miss-sorted,’ as letters for Colonel Mahon’s column were being sent to Johannesburg! I wish they had ‘miss-sorted‘ things directed to me a little oftener, and thus permitted them to be sent where I happened to be instead of the contrary. I received no letters from the time I left Kimberley, May 2, until I reached Cape Town on June 28. Most of the missing have since been delivered to me in England. On Saturday, 16th, we trekked to Wolverdiend, where we again met Hart’s Brigade. The night was wet and very cold. Next day marched at 8 am. fifteen miles to Blauwbank’s wet ride In the afternoon there was a false alarm that De Wet was trying to get past, and we all turned out to intercept him. De Wet proved to be one of our own squadrons returning from a patrol on the right flank.
On Monday, after covering the march of the division for thirteen miles during the morning, Mahon’s force was ordered to occupy Krugersdorp with all possible speed. The distance, a good fifteen miles from the bifurcation of the Doornkop and Krugersdorp roads, was covered in two hours and twenty minutes. M Battery R.H.A. under Captain Du Plat Taylor (Major Jackson having been left behind sick) kept up all the way with the cavalry, whilst Robinson’s pom-poms, drawn by Colonial horses, were left a long way behind. And yet people say that English horses are no good in South Africa! It is not the horses that are to blame, but the silly people who mismanage them. Treated rationally, i.e. on Colonial lines, an English horse that is worth his passage out will wear down any Colonial. The march to Krugersdorp made M Battery horses sweat a good deal, but did them no harm whatever. Yet they had been working hard for six weeks on short rations of grain, and had done many forced marches.
At Randfontein, on the way, we surprised and captured 200 prisoners.
On Tuesday morning I went to see the Paardekraal monument - a hideous edifice the architect of which deserves capital punishment, and whilst I wasted my time looking at it, there was a small outpost affair in which one man of the Imperial Light Horse was dangerously wounded. In the afternoon I trekked to Johannesburg, where I put up at Heath's Hotel, and enjoyed the unaccustomed luxury of a hot bath and an excellent dinner. On Wednesday morning I met Cheatle (the consulting surgeon of whom Young and I had seen so much at Modder River and with Lord Methuen’s column about Boshof), and went with him in the afternoon to see the Robinson mine. He pressed me very much to start with him for Cape Town the following morning, but this I could not do, as I had to sell my homes and cart, and the only market was the Remount Depot, to which I was taking the whole outfit next day. Had I been able to accompany Cheatle I should have come in for Colonel Bullock’s gallant fight at Honing Spruit, and either had a great deal more to write now, or else been numbered amongst those who are buried close to that railway station. Actually I left Johannesburg on Friday, and after many delays reached Cape Town on the following Thursday. The journey down country was necessarily slow, owing to the railway having been broken up by De Wet, and a number of bridges had to be repaired before the train could pass. On the way I met General Smith-Dorrien, whom I had not seen since Poplar Grove. He was in charge of the posts protecting the line from Johannesburg to Kroons tad, and was inspecting the scenes of the recent disasters. The fight at Roodeval, where the Derbyshires were cut up, appears to have been going on at two places simultaneously, the Railway Pioneers being also involved; this I had not previously heard. Major Gale, commanding the Railway Detachment, was killed by the first shell, when the charge of the company devolved upon two American officers, Lieutenants Stocket and Thurstan, both of whom behaved admirably’Thurstan, who had joined with no idea of fighting being still likely to occur, especially distinguishing himself. The positions both of the Pioneers and of the Derbys seem to have been equally untenable, and therefore ill-chosen. At Roodeval I picked up the cylinder of one of our nine-inch howitzer shells that the Boers had destroyed, and took it with me. I am now using it as an umbrella stand, and as it weighs 200 lbs. have no fear of its being stolen.
Passing Laingsberg at 4 a.m. my son met me. He seemed fit and well, and after the manner of boys, although it was freezing hard, was without a greatcoat. I had previously arranged with his commanding officer that he should have a few days’ leave, in order to see me at Cape Town before I sailed, and two days after my arrival there he duly joined me. I fear that he spent most of his leave in the train. On Wednesday, July 4,1 sailed for England in the Dunottar Castle, the same ship in which I had left home on October 14. This was an accident; but to make history complete, I managed to obtain the same cabin’all to myself, as it had but one berth. On the Dunottar were several others besides myself who had sailed in her from Southampton with Sir Redvers Buller; Atkins of the Manchester Guardian, and his wife; Winston Churchill; Captain Campbell (late Scots Guards) Laffan’s agency, and I fancy others. Besides these, there were several that I had met before in one place or another, including the majority of the foreign attaches. We had a pleasant voyage and plenty of fun at times. A debate in the smoking-room upon certain alleged shortcomings upon the part of the ‘Sports Committee’ was especially entertaining; Wigham of the Daily Mail, and formerly of the Morning Post, particularly distinguishing himself by an extraordinary feat of very clever oratory - chiefly in the line of mock heroics. Winston Churchill spoke well, but he had been ‘got at‘ by a most unscrupulous person, whose name I believe is Neptune, and was not quite up to his proper form. Burnham, the American scout, was on board, as well as other celebrities. We reached Southampton on July 20, and within a week I received a rather unwelcome intimation to the effect that I was required for duty as an officer of the Reserve. The result of this is that nearly all the foregoing pages have been written in Raglan Barracks, Devonport.
