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LETTER 13

Wonderfontein
Near Middelburg
Transvaal
Aug. 18th 1900

My Dear Lord Minto

I have just had lent me by one of the Commanding Officers of the Canadian Mounted Rifles a copy of the Militia Report for 1899, which was formally presented to you on the 24th April.

This report includes, much to my surprise and astonishment a Report which proports to be mine and to be signed by me. I don't really know whether to be angry or sad! Of course it is a distinctly dishonorable act on Dr. Borden's part to submit my Report in a garbles form over my signature, as if it were the real Report. I have not got my own printed proof with me here, it is with a number of confidential papers which I left with the Bank in Cape Town, so I cannot categorically enumerate the alterations made by Dr. Borden, or technically speaking I presume, by the Deputy Minister since in the report in question this latter functionary has the impertinence to submit my Report himself.

The really serious omission is that of Part III of my Report, of which I gave you a Galley Proof as I dare say that you remember. The preparation of the whole Report especially including Part III took me many weeks of hard work. The Scheme for the reconstruction of the whole Militia had been the subject of discussion at each of the Meetings of Commanding Officers in every District and my proposals were the outcome of all practical knowledge and experience of the Canadian Militia gained in 18 months personal intercourse and acquaintance with every senior officer of importance and standing throughout the Dominion.

Of course I never expected the Laurier Ministry to accept all my recommendations in 1899 any more than they did those of 1898. My report was not written for the Ministers approval but for his information and consideration. I am however entitled wither to have such Report published in its original form, or if not that it shall at least be stated that the published Report only contains “Extracts.”

My first impulse was to write officially to you at once on the subject, but not being able to draw the absolutely correct and complete comparisons between the original and the garbled reports without my own Printed Galley Proof, I have differed my action until I hear from you. Nothing would give me greater pleasure than to show up the Laurier Ministry and to lend a hand in cleansing the Augean Stable by giving evidence, producing facts before a Royal Commission, but I will only do so if there is good to be gained either to the Empire, to Canada or to the Canadian Militia.

I have the deepest and most profound contempt for the present Canadian Government and have the lowest opinion of their integrity and honor, but I have no wish to be personally vindictive towards them now, any more than I had in February last. The whole retrospect of the attitude of the Canadian Government towards me, and their scandalous treatment of me through their instrument Doctor Borden is sad in the extreme, and I can hardly describe how very deeply I feel that the interests of my friends and comrades of the Canadian Militia are now in an even worse condition than they have ever been, in as much as a desperate effort to raise the status of Militia in Canada to that of a National Institution has failed.

However I will not expatiate more on this, as I know how deeply and warmly your views and mine in these matters coincide. You are one of the few men, who are endued with the same anxious and earnest determination to do good and to raise the instinct of military service to the highest place which a Nation or an individual is capable of. You and I know and feel that we are working with a purely disinterested object, but the Canadian Politicians can not understand such motives.

It is some weeks since I wrote to you and the war is by no means at it's close, although we may well say it is at its final stage. These Boers are as stubborn as they are ignorant and fanatical. They are moreover intensely proud, and having posed as patriots are ready to make any sacrifices for their opinions. This country is so vast that to subdue such a race as these Boers who are all in arms is a task which will tax all the patience and energy combined which we posses. I don't believe that we shall fight any regular action by which we shall be able to definitely settle the war, but the present guerrilla system by which small detached posts are attacked and isolated patrols and scouts shot, will be continued.

Our march upon Middleburg was a great success strategically. French had his Cavalry Division newly horsed and equipped about 2200 strong and I had a column of about 3500 including two strong infantry battalions and 2 five inch guns as well as a portion of my own Mounted Infantry Brigade. We turned very scientifically 3 difficult rivers in 4 days and the Boer Army had no other recourse but to fight or fly. They fled but we did not either demoralize or inflict sufficient punishment on them. The fact is that the Field Marshal either ties French and me up too tight, or when let go allows us to go just not far enough.

The two battalions of Canadian Mounted Rifles have been with me throughout and are full of fight. Of course it is a case of survival of the fittest and Alderson has got them in good shape. It is a curious fact that our Canadian Officers are not equal to those from Australia. The weak spot in the Canadian Mounted Rifles is the Officers.

They do not seem to posses a military instinct to the same degree as the others and I ascribe this to the small and indifferent training which Canadians have had for the last 30 years since the withdrawal of the Imperial Troops in fact, and also to the parti-political intrigue and injustice which has crushed the professional life out of our Canadian Officers. Evans is the best senior officer.

I hardly know what the Field Marshal proposes for the next development on this side.

Sir Redvers has arrived and I rode over to see him on the 16th. There is behind his treatment at the hands of Lord Lansdowne and Roberts much that is personal I fear.

He told me that he should read the future official history of the Campaign with great interest to know why he and his Army were kept inactive in Natal for nine weary weeks! This is strange commentary upon the cruel imputations and insinuations rife in Bloemfontein in April and later at Kroonstadt, among the H.Q. Staff.

However my pen is running on too fast and I will close.

I hope that Her Excellency is very well and that you both enjoyed your Tour West. Remember me most kindly to her and to all your cheery household.

Wishing you all and every success with your difficult administrations.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely

Edw. T. H. Hutton

LETTER 14

Kaapsche Hoop
Transvaal
September 23rd 1900

My Dear Lord Minto

We have just concluded the final and closing stage of this Campaign. The last particular expedition which I have had to conduct has been the most critical, if not the most important of all that I have had the good fortune to have fall to my lot. I was much annoyed at having only a scratch pack so to speak given me, but the difficulties of maintaining units especially mounted units have been so great, that I have no real grievance. The troops comprised of my Brigade have proved so valuable and are and have been continually in such constant demand that my command has been a constantly varying one. This is, as you know, especially trying to any leader, and is a serious detriment to all Troops no matter how good.

I will tell you the particulars of this last phase so far as I am concerned, as it cannot fail to give you a good idea of our last final difficulties in dealing with one enemy.

I had at Middleburg and the vicinity a mixed force of some 5000 men, but had not the good luck to be actively engaged in the operations of the 25th, 26th, and 27th, August about Belfast, and Machadodorp.

The Boers held onto a very strong position with great tenacity, but eventually got away with all their guns, and with little if any molestation in their retreat as usual.

Machadodorp is the small town at the end of the High Veldt, and at this point the railway decends into the deep valley of the Eland River.

Sir Redvers Buller and Hamilton were sent to operate North towards Leydenburg, Pole-Carew to the head of the Eland Valley at Waterval Onder and French South to Carolina with a view to moving thence by the Natal Road on Barberton.

On the 5th September, Kitchener sent for me and said that Pole-Carew had reported that, it was impassible for him to advance, would I be prepared to help him out of the impasse and if so how.

Having learnt the country through my Corps of Scouts, and having first rate local information, I proposed to him to move along the watershed between the Eland and Komati Rivers, forming a link between Pole-Carew and French, and thus to turn the enemy's positions in their efforts to hold French and Pole-Carew in the difficult vallies through which they were advancing.

There was a large element of risk in my proposals based as they were upon guides information, and upon the plain geological facts that there are no mountains in this country such as we understand in Europe or in India, but only lofty and extensive plateaux, which have been denuded by water action into deep vallies, gullies and kloofs, marking the courses of the rivers and streams.

I had a column of Mounted Troops made up for me of 1600 men including a battery of Royal Horse Artillery, 4 Pom Poms and two guns belonging to Brabant's Horse. I managed to secure my trusty Alderson for the command of one small brigade and I got Henry and 400 men belonging to my IVth Corps who had been with Pole-Carew throughout the Campaign to form another.

I hoped with good luck to seize the position at Kaapsche Hoop by a coup-de-main and thus open all the country East to Kaap Munden and Komati Poort , Lord Roberts and Kitchener looked upon my expedition as rather a forlorn hope as the country was considered by the Boers themselves to be impassable for our Troops.

We started on the 8 th and on the following day we found the Boers posted in a very strong position among rocks and boulders right upon the highest portion of the watershed between Komati and the Eland. We went at them, Henry with his men, Victorian Mounted Rifles, South Australian Mounted Rifles and the 4th Battalion Mounted Infantry, attacking in front, while I sent Brabant's Horse under H. M. Grenfell ( 1 st Life Guards, son of Pascoe Grenfell, old G.'s brother) down a deep Kloof to make a wide sweeping move over another mountain, and take our enemy in flank and rear. The fight was a pretty stubborn one and we lost a lot of horses, but once Brabant's Horse got at them we fairly started them and never left them alone until we had swept them clean off the ridges and into the vallies and kloofs, in numbers about 400. They left some 7 or 8 dead and 12 horses equipped and saddled with several prisoners behind. Oddly enough although we were hotly engaged for 5 or 6 hours we had not a single casualty among the men.

The next day we had another skirmish and made good our advance to the edge of the deep valley of the Godwan. Which looked like an insurmountable obstacle to our further advance, as the High Veldt Plateau here narrowed to a serrated edge which alone masked the watershed, that I had counted upon!

It looked rather serious for our further advance, but we had opened up the Eland Valley for 25 miles to Pole-Carew, and has tied French's advance to Pole-Carew even if we succeeded in doing mo more.

However thanks to an excellent guide and careful personal reconnaissances I decided to risk it and on the 12 th sent Alderson by an almost impassible track into the Godwan Valley with orders to gain a foothold upon the southern edge of the Kaapsche Hoop Plateau opposite us. I had the whole of the remainder of my Mounted Troops with two Guns and two Pom Poms and one Ambulance ready to shove down into the deep valley as soon as I saw Alderson had made good his hold on the Plateau. French was meanwhile in trouble 20 miles South of me in the deep vallies of the Komati and I knew that if I only could make good my foothold on Kaapsche Hoop Plateau that I should help his advance in the most important manner.

I took up my position on the topof the highest peak, and as you may suppose with deepest anxiety watched with my glasses Alderson's movement into the vallies below me, French's Guns booming away in the distance. Little by little he made his way and by 10 a.m. The 12 th his leading men by scrambling up rocks and gullies had gained a foothold on the promised land, meeting with little opposition. I helio'd “Go” to the rest of my mounted troops, and in a few minuets they were all driving into the deep recess of the Godwan. All the rest of my guns, waggons and transport I sent back to Machadodorp by the mountains with orders to rejoin me in 4 days time in the Eland Valley. We meantime had two days forrage and food on our saddles.

The risk was justified by out success and by the importance of the result. By 3a.m. On the 13th we had seized the little mining town, which us a regular fastness upon the highest part of this plateau.

It commands all the roads leading East, as they all pass over this plateau, and it also commands the railway from Machadodorp to Kaapmunden.

On the 13th in consequence of out move the day previous, French crossed the mountains in his front and entered Barberton unopposed and on the 14th. Pole-Carew and the Old Guards came up and occupied this place thus enabling my hungry warriors to retire down the railhead, and their food.

I am only so sorry that my Canadians were not with me in this final operation but the Field Marshal would not allow me to withdraw them from the outpost work they were employed upon at Belfast and Middelburg.

We are now awaiting the orders for the dispersion of the superfluous troops and for the formation of the Army of Occupation. I have told Kitchener that I am anxious to go home on the termination of hostilities. In fact the rules as regards local rank make my employment almost impossible even if I wished, as I do not.

I expect Kitchener will remain in the first instance as High Commissioner and Commander in Chief and will be succeeded later by Grenfell as Administrator and Commander in Chief but I have not seen the H.Q. People lately.

The Campaign has been full of valuable lessons. The absolute necessity of Mounted Infantry has been established and the imperfections and short comings of our Cavalry and our Cavalry system has been exposed in most glaring colors.

French and I are quite agreed that there must be at least six regiments of Mounted Rifles raised as a portion of our Cavalry System, these regiments would form a type up to our own Yeomanry, and all our Colonial Mounted Troops would be trained and equipped. They would moreover supply the staff and instructors as required. Mounted Infantry must be better trained and for longer periods!.... and at properly organized Schools of Instruction.

I am more sorry than I can express at the retrogressive move of naming the 1st Battalion Canadian Mounted Rifles, “Royal Canadian Dragoons”. I was never consulted you may be sure. It was that foolish fellow, Colonel Lessard in his anxiety to gain the honors for the R.C.D. As I have told him, I had always intended to as that the R.C.D. Should be renamed “Royal Canadian Mounted Rifles”, and that the honors of the two Battalions should be perpetuated in the Corps thus created.

As it is “Dragoons” as such are dead and relics of an historical past.

My efforts to get the Royal Canadian Artillery uo have been so far syccessful, as to bring “D” Battery (Ottawa) up into the latest operations with Hamilton.

I have watched with realest interest and pleasure the ovations which Her Excellency and you have received in the Far West.

I often consider with regret that I shall not have renewed opportunities of helping Canada and you both in a Military way.

Remember most kindly to Her Excellency, and to all your family circle and.
Believe Me

Yours Very Sincerely

Edw. T. H. Hutton

P.S.

Write me a line to 34 Eaton Place, where I shall hope to by by the middle of November. I fear that old Pomposity (O'G-H.) won't help on things Military much and as for Borden – well it's to sad! - Did you get my letter re Militia Report from Middleburg dated 18th August.


LETTER 15

Pretoria
October 5th, 1900

My Dear Minto

My force has been broken up and the Colonial Troops composing it will shortly be concentrated at the Cape prior to embarkation. My command is therefore at an end, and I am going home. I shall probably be in London by the 4 th November.

There is some talk about my going out to Australia and Commanding the Federal Army there, although I know nothing official, the offer is, I believe, likely to be made! If it is I should beel it to be my duty to accept, in fact as I should be called upon to put into practice the system of Federal Defence which I drew up in '94-96 for the six Australian Colonies. I could not well refuse without stultifying my own proposals.

The difficulties of such a task, as to wield into one harmonious whole the somewhat conflicting elements of six separate little armies is obvious, but I should have many chances of success, which would be denied to most other Generals of a previous acquaintance with Australia, and above all of having commanded the Troops of the various Colonies in the Field.

There is again the knowledge that a unique opportunity would be open of doing a great and lasting work in the interests of Australia and the Empire, work which I believe that I could successfully cary through if given a free hand and unfettered by the lowering and demoralizing influences of personal and party political intrigue.

A new Australian Federal Government would be free from those taints which make a soldiers position in Canada almost untenable!

I will write to you more at length some remarks upon the Campaign and the part taken by the Canadian Troops on my way home. In the mean time I knew that you would be interested to hear of my return to England.

Lord Roberts begs to be very kindly remembered. ---

With kindest remembrance to Lady Minto and yourself.

Yours very sincerely

Edw. T. H. Hutton

LETTER 16

Union Castle Line
R. M. S. Norman
October 20th, 1900

My Dear Minto

Your letter of the 5th Aug. only reached me on the 16 th October just as I was leaving Cape Town. I have had all your recent letters but I have lost one among the five mails which I lost when de Wet burnt the Mail Bags at Rondeval in June. The worst is that I have no doubt lost the letters of many of my Canadian Friends at the same time, and so have been unable to acknowledge or reply to them.

Through the Canadian papers I have followed your movements with the greatest interest, and I had seen the accounts of your enthusiastic reception in the North West. It is nothing more that I expected, as I told Her Excellency when I returned how extremely popular you were out there from your prominent services on '85 during the Rebellion.

As regards the contents of your letter.

I. I am astonished to hear of poor Lord Williams vagaries. His action is simply that of a man with a diseased brain. No correspondence in connection with his absurd accusations against my humble self have ever reached me, Poor Fellow! He has I believe resigned, or been suspended in the command and I see the papers replaced by Sir G. Warren-Ferguson, Rifle Brigade, Lord William's A.D.C. Came out and arrived at Bloemfontein late in April lat. He told me that his late Chief had become quite impossible, and was so thankful to be allowed to leave Halifax.

It certainly was most unfortunate that the scandal of a British General going off his head, and behaving like a lunatic should transpire with the French Canadian Government who as Borden told me very plainly one day ( perhaps he had been drinking and it was a case of “in vino veritas )”, saw little advantage to Canada in having and Imperial Officer forced upon them.

II. Sam Hughes has done much mischief in South Africa by lowering the opinion generally held of Canadian Officers. Lord Roberts in his usual anxiety to please public opinion over-rode Buller's decision that S. H. was not to be employed, and allowed him to be appointed to Staff work on the Lines of Communication. However he has had a good reason to repent and acknowledged his mistake to me. I believe Sam Hughes is a species of lunatic, but none the less he will find plenty of supporters in Canada and I should never be surprised to see him Minister of Militia.

III. Stone has now resigned, so his difficult position is at an end. I recommended his appointment to Command because I had already had experience in Australia of the impossibility of getting and real reforms effected through an Officer who was merely “Inspector”. It is no use having only recommendations presented when reform is required and there is no one to put the recommendations into execution.

I knew what was wanted for the Canadian Artillery without the assistance of any “Inspector,” but what I did want was an Executive Officer, who would carry out the reforms necessary in a sound and practical manner. There was no Canadian Officer who had had the Artillery Training or experience to do this. Stone was not a success in this respect, but if Borden or the Government had ever really meant to improve the Militia Force and put it upon sound lines as a National Institution, Stone would have answered the purpose in seconding me upon all Artillery detachments. He was far to weak a man to run alone. Foster if of course exactly the same. Able and quick as he is in mental grasp he is deficient in military judgment as apart from statesmanship and strategy. If fact his naturally weak character and want of practical military experience makes him quite out of place in Canada now under the existing conditions. He also is to weak to run alone and he would be far more value in the Intelligence Department in Queen Anne's Gate than in Ottawa.

IV. Herchmer is a sad story. The correspondence after being published by Borden and the Canadian Press has been forwarded to me officially through Lord Roberts and the War Office for explanation.

I have written the whole story and returned the correspondence which in due time ( probably six weeks ) will reach you officially. I have made no comment upon Colonel Herchmer's outrageous accusations leveled at me the effect of an impaired intellect, nor have I remarked upon Borden's effort to drag me in an unfavorable light before the Canadian Public.

Herchmer like many a better man failed miserably both mentally and physically when subjected to the responsibilities of command and to the strain of hardships incidental to a campaign!

He was relieved of his command while in the Prieska District under Parsons before joining my command, but it was not until shortly before his reporting himself to me that I hear rumors of the facts of the case. Immediately upon his joining at Kroonstadt I saw that the poor fellow was quite unequal to the tough job we had in hand, both mentally and physically he looked pale and haggard and spoke excitedly and as a man under suppressed mental worry. He walked like an old and infirm mand, in fact I was most distressed at his appearance.

I immediately sent for the Surgeon of his regiment and found from him the facts as they had transpired in the Prieska District:---

The Surgeon one Devine of the 90th Rifles – a medical man from Winnipeg – simply told me that Colonel Herchmer was physically and mentally unequal to the strain of action service – much less to the serious responsibilities of a command of a battalion during the approaching advance upon Pretoria and all the fighting and hardship in front of us.

I then sent for Colonel Evans and dragged from him with great reluctance the fact that if Colonel Herchmer resumed command during the march there would be most serious discontent and general lack of confidence among all ranks in the Battalion. After sending for the P.M.O. Of my force, I desired him to consider the medical aspect of the case which he did and he reported to me officially what was obvious enough viz that Colonel Herchmer was unequal to the responsibilities of command.

Knowing that Herchmer was no friend to the Laurier Government and that the Canadian Government would jump at any pretext for getting rid of the unfortunate man, I sent again for Colonel Herchmer and offered him the command of The Depot of my Troops at Kroonstadt including the considerable detachment of his own men for whom there were no horses. I felt and expressed the deepest sympathy but plainly to him that his resumption of command was not possible on medical grounds under the existing circumstances, but that I hoped he would be well enough to rejoin after the Capture of Pretoria. I pointed out that a Medical Board was the alternative. The outcome of which would necessarily be his return to the Base.

Colonel Herchmer, after some deliberation in accordance with my earnest advice, declined the appointment and desired a Board.

Borden's action in publishing the unfortunate Colonel Herchmer's latter, and Sir Wilfred Laurier calling it insubordinate was a most cruel action. Of course the only excuse for Colonel Herchmer's writing such a letter is the condition of his health. He has a brother and a sister already inmates of a lunatic Asylum I believe in any case he can hardly be held responsible for his actions. Personally I have great sympathy with him, as he has done undoubted service to Canada at the head of the North West Mounted Police for many years.

V. You tell me of the General Election being likely to take place in September. This has, I presume, been postponed, as I have not seen it alluded to in the Press. I gather from Canadian news extracts which are sent to me from time to time that the Opposition intended dragging the action of the Laurier Government as regards myself into the strife. The Government Press write abusive paragraphs and make scurrilous innuendos at my expense.

It would be very easy for me to raise much popular feeling, and great indignation against Borden and his Colleagues it I wished to do so, sufficient under the existing conditions to seriously affect the result at the Polls. On general grounds it would however be most expedient to do so, I think. Although you do not say so I gather that you would be sorry to see this French Canadian Government in Opposition just now with so weak a Conservative Minister as Tupper would have at his disposal in power.

I wish that I could believe for a single moment in Hugh John. He seemed to me a “gas-bag”, certainly not a Statesman to be entrusted with the Supreme Executive power for Canada.

VI The American pattern saddle although quite unsuited to an Englishman's hunting seat, and although made too narrow in the withers for all except North American horses is not unpopular. The saddle bags are wrongly hung, not one man in 100 knows or understands the cynch girth.

As you know I proposed an adaptation of this very saddle and saddle bags in '89 for use by Mounted Infantry, it was tried for six months by the Cavalry at Aldershot and 15,000 ordered by Lord Wolseley but refused by the Treasury in '90.

I feel quite convinced that this class of saddle iw what we require, but who is to persuade the Conservative Element which Lord Roberts will bring with him to Pall Mall? I wont!!

VII I will send you a list of Canadian Officers telling you those who have done well under me

VIII There is good reason to fear that the ignorant public will award too great a measure of praise to the Colonial Troops and argue from the success of the Boers that training, organization, discipline and above all experienced Officers and a highly educated Staff are unnecessary.

Heigh Ho!

I am expecting to be offered the command of the new Commonwealth Army when I return home. I have made up my mind that, if I can get my conditions I will accept! Indeed, I could hardly refuse to put in practice in 1901 the Military Scheme for the Federal Defence of Australia which I took such pains to prepare and get accepted by the Governments of the Six Colonies of Australia and Tasmania in '93 – '96.

With the regime about to control the destinies of the British Army, I see so little prospect for changes which we for many years have been hoping for that I shall be less disinclined to leave home.

Remember me most kindly to Her Excellency and tell her how often, how very often I recall all the pleasant times and kindly greetings at Government House.

Wishing you all continued success and feeling certain that your work in the cause of the Empire as regards the despatch of Canadian Troops will be rightly and fully appreciated.

Believe me

Your very sincerely

Edw. T. H. Hutton


LETTER 17

At Sea, Off Madeira
October 30th, 1900

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

My Dear Lord Minto

You ask me for my opinion of the value of Canadian Officers who have served during the Campaign, so as to enable you to form a good estimate of their relative merits.

As regards those Officers who have actually served under my command, I enclose you a copy of my Recommendations to the Field Marshal which will best serve you as a guide. To this I would add that Evans is by far the best Officer among the Mounted Troops. Lissard though personally brave enough lacks confidence in himself in action or upon any emergency, and naturally fails therefore in inspiring confidence among those under him. He is also lacking in judgment.

Evans - due to his Canadian experience is a bit of a sycophant and panders to the political system under which he has been brought up. He has learnt much of his trade as a soldier, and is undoubtedly a stout man and something of a leader. He ought to do and is broad enough in his ideas to see that the Canadian Militia Cavalry of the future must abandon the threadbare system of trying to copy an obsolete cavalry organization.

Williams and Forester - are both useful, but the latter has much disappointed me. Both have succumbed temporarily to Rheumatism. Greenwood is no good at all and does not mean fight.

Nelles – the Adjutant, has learnt much and is well spoken of and Young is a capital man.

The above are 1st Battalion Canadian Mounted Rifles, now forsooth, Royal Canadian Dragoons.

As to the 2nd Battalion Canadian Mounted Rifles.

Herchmer you know of.

Howe - no good whatever. He asked to be sent to Transport just before we marched North again from Kroonstadt. No one has a good word to say for him and he certainly “cuts it” and does not mean fight. I left him behind with Herchmer at Kroonstadt, but Kitchener made use of him later, as he was on the spot, and he got a command of some mounted men of sorts I believe. He very wisely never rejoined my command.

Cuthbert - is absolutely useless for any purpose whatever, as bad as Howe except that he did not funk.

Sanders - did well, and is a useful man although weak and ignorant of military duty.

Macdonell ( Wounded ) - is a long way the best of all the Officers of this Battalion and was a great loss after he was hit on the 12th of June.

Moodie - was nearly as good as Macdonell, but had not the same military knowledge.

Inglis ( Wounded ) - was also a capital man.

Chalmers and Eustace, good.

Baker - the Adjutant, quite useless and out of place. I never quite understand how Herchmer coukd have selected such an unsuitable man as his adjutant. He no redeeming quality.

Bliss – that unmitigated scoundrel, was attached to this Battalion. I need hardly say that he was quite useless except to run up bills at Bloemfontein, Kroonstadt and Pretoria which he was unable to pay until forced to by the Provost Marshal, thus creating an unwholesome scandal at all three places.

You will gather no doubt from the above that the Officers with that fine Battalion from the North West Territories were the weak feature of what should have been a splendid body of fighting men. Until six weeks or 2 months had elapsed the officers were for campaign purposes against such an enemy as the Boers of little use as leaders, nor did they devote themselves to consider the comfort and interests of their men and the feeding and conditioning of their horses as they should. However Alderson taught them their business, assisted by some very plain speaking from myself with some “simple earnest words” in homely language.

The Officers of the 1st Battalion were much the best, and it was entirely due to them that the men did so much better relatively to the 2nd Battalion than I had expected.

Major Cartwright – served with me as Acting D.A.A.G. Until we took Kroonstadt when his health broke down. He is very anxious to be useful, but is quite devoid of staff knowledge and experience, cannot spell or write and is short sighted. He is however honest, zealous, and to be depended upon.

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon – did useful work at the base. This officer was sent out contrary to my express recommendation, as he had been guilty of appropriating company money just before I left. The papers should be in the Militia Department and Foster could tell Your Excellency all the facts. Had I remained in Canada, I should have certainly got rid of Gordon.

Otter – Our friend Otter has done well in one sense but has I fear quite failed to win the good will of his men and I hear very ugly rumors of the intentions of some of his officers. He seemed quite unable to act upon my advice, and to trust his officers and to decentralize his command. He will keep all under him at arms length and thus alienate everyone's sympathy and loyalty also I fear!

Buchan – is always well spoken of. I wish that I could say that he had been loyal to Otter.

Mac Dougal - has done very good work at The Base, but failed as adjutant with Otter.

Denison - has been with Lord Roberts and has done well. He is all froth and lacks the solid qualities requisite in a Commander.

Drury – Everyone speaks well of Drury, who is undoubtedly a most useful man but he has not been tried very high.

Hudon – Hudon is a drunken fellow but has found himself in the command of the Battery which had the best chance. Thanks entirely to Panet the battery has done very well, Hudon has had nothing to do with it, but he does not “cut in” I hear.

After much trouble I got Kitchener and Marshall to bring up “D” Battery ( Ottawa ) and they took part in the operations East of Middleburg and did very well. Greatest possible credit is due to Major Hurdman, ( – UTR –) Lieutenant Morrison ( Editor of the Citizen ) is a regular fire eater and full of zeal and energy with this same Battery.

I will end by recommending young Elmsly to you of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. He was with me as Extra A.D.C. For two months and is a fine plucky youngster and has all the makings of a good soldier. He would do Your Excellency very well as A.D.C. He holds his tongue and is very good looking. I only hope for his own sake that he wont be spoilt by the fair ladies of Toronto when he returns.

I am concerned at the length of my letter, but in your sympathetic mood you will excuse it.

Yours very sincerely

Edw. T. H. Hutton

P.S. - Colonel Biggar – I hear is doing well in an office at Cape Town. He is no soldier but has business qualities they say.