TOPIC:

For those of you who have read the 1929 version of the above book, I thoroughly recommend to re-read it in Fransjohan’s edition. The new edition provides contextual information, fact-checks a narrative that was written from memory and includes paragraphs which had been left out for being too sensitive at the time.



Deneys was the son of F.W. Reitz, President of the Orange Free State until 1895 and Secretary of State for the Transvaal from 1898 until the end of the Boer War. Because of this family relationship, Deneys, who entered the war as a 17 year old boy, was in the privileged position of being able to move between Boer commando units almost at will. As a result, he was involved in and/or witnessed many important events during the war. A keen observer and able writer, Deneys’ observations penned down in his book prove a treasure trove of information about the war.

Hereunder follow a few of Reitz’ observations:

Cecil Rhodes prepares for battle:
Deneys mentions that his father F.W. Reitz was visited by Cecil Rhodes and Lord Loch (until December 1895 Governor of the Cape Colony). It is hardly possible to overstate the role of Cecil Rhodes in causing the Anglo Boer War and this visit (possibly visits) is more interesting than it may seem on first glance as it must have taken place between January 1897 and March 1897 i.e.after the Jameson Raid and before the conclusion of the “Mutual Assistance Treaty” between the Transvaal and OVS. FW had stepped back as President of the Free State for medical reasons in December 1895 and only assumed his function as Secretary of State for the Transvaal in 1898 so at the time of Rhodes visit he was not in any official function. Deneys states that Rhodes (“a big florid man who cracked jokes with us boys”) came to see his father to lobby against the conclusion of the Mutual Assistance Treaty. As the Treaty did not have any offensive purpose, the only possible benefit for Rhodes CS in preventing it from being signed was purely of military-strategic nature.

The old guard
Deneys was close friends with Jan Joubert, the son of the Commandant Generaal Piet Joubert of the Transvaal. As such he was in a good position to form an opinion of the Joubert Snr. Deneys describes him as a kindly, well-meaning old man who was bewildered by the situation and “unequal to the burden” Throughout the book Deneys blames bad, seniority-based leadership early in the war for the Boers’ ultimate loss. This sentiment was shared by many of the other officers who came up through the ranks and made names for themselves during the guerilla phase (De Wet, Botha and others)

Boer supply of arms and ammunition:
During the war the British Army became the Boers’ single most important supplier of arms and ammunition. Reitz describes that, by following the trail of English columns, the Boers were able to fill their bandoliers just by picking up the bullets that had been dropped by careless soldiers. Reitz also states that the Boers hardly ever left a battle with less ammunition and guns (and horses) than with which they had started the fight.

Armed Blacks
Reitz made a few observations about this sensitive subject. Blacks who were caught armed, or suspected to be spies for the enemy. were often summarily shot. Both British and Boer forces were guilty of this unlawful practice. According to Reitz, from the Boer perspective one of the reasons for this harsh treatment seemed to have been the fact that the Boers regularly found the bodies of their own dead horribly mutilated with organs apparently harvested for traditional native medicine. Another observation that Reitz made was that the Boers were not impressed by the marksmanship of the natives something that, so he asserts, was due to the general tendency among blacks to close their eyes when pulling the trigger.

Boers and British uniforms
Almost every Boer found himself at one time or another during the war without boots or proper clothing. This was especially the case during the latter stages of the war. The situation for some commandos was so dire that many Boers had to improvise and ended up looking like armed scarecrows wearing women’s clothing, meal bags with holes for head and arms or jackets crudely fashioned from curtains and bed covers. It is thus no wonder that stripping captured British soldiers from their attire became the norm rather than the exception. British forces which, on more than one occasion, were caught off guard by Boers donning innovative variations of the British uniform, were understandably incensed. Kitchener, Ignoring the fact that the British with their scorched earth policies had largely themselves to blame for Boers wearing British garb, proclaimed the death penalty for any Boer caught in British uniform. Reitz, who was at the time with Smuts in the Cape, mentions that their commando remained blissfully unaware of this proclamation for many months with catastrophic consequences for some. Reitz, however, also mentioned that him wearing a British uniform saved his life on more than one occasion, proving that Kitchener had a point.

Thanks to Rob D I have a copy of the original which Deneys Reitz in effect describes as "A lamentable tale of thing done long ago - and ill done"

I have only just started reading it but the final paragraph of Chapter 5 made me ponder:

"Had the Boers made for the coast, instead of tying up their horseman around towns that were of no value to them, the outcome of the war might have been very different, but they sacrificed their one great advantage of superior mobility, and allowed splendid guerrilla fighters to stagnate and demoralize in the monotony of siege warfare, at a time when our only salvation lay in pushing to the sea."

Would his alternative strategy have worked? Would the average burgher have been prepared to leave his homestead so far behind. I imagine the 60-70,000 men he claimed they started out with would have dwindled to far less before they got anywhere near the coast.

Smethwick raises an interesting question: If the Boers had reached the coast would this have changed the outcome of the war? Any answer to that query is by definition pure speculation, but let’s give it a try.

Botha pushing the Brits into the sea at Durban would possibly have provided the Boers an opportunity to concentrate their forces on the western fronts. The victory momentum could have swung wavering support of the Cape Boers behind the Republics and allowed for an offensive west. But then what? A negotiated settlement on favourable terms? Not impossible but highly unlikely after having humiliated the largest Empire in human history. Albion’s world hegemony was at stake and backing down would have consequences that went well beyond South Africa. Boer military victory? Statistically impossible. London on its own had in 1899 already 10 times the number of residents of both Republics combined, and to keep Natal and the Cape under Republican control, the Boers would have needed to permanently block enemy troops from entering the territory. This would have required hermetically closing the northern and eastern land borders, a naval fleet to intercept enemy troopships as well as establishing forts and substantial permanent garrisons at dozens of seaports and many cities in occupied territory. Even if native tribes had not been breathing into their necks and even with outside help of, say, the Dutch and German navies this could never have been accomplished with the available manpower. So, in my opinion, Botha’s dash to the sea could have altered the course and duration of the war but not the outcome.