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1899 - From the diary of Trooper A J Crosby, Natal Carbineers

Feeling much better. Sheney passed a bad night.

On this day, after breakfast, the Manchester's continued their march, a rather short one, but, quite frankly, it really cannot have been an enjoyable one, to Dargle Road, that evening Arthur Curran was in receipt of a telegram advising him of a state of urgent need to get his men to Ladysmith.

1899 - The State of Victoria begins to prepare for war.
. In the Legislative Assembly to-day, Sir G. Turner brought forward a motion in regard to the despatch of a contingent to the Transvaal. Mr. Duncan Gillies formally seconded the motion. Several members, for various reasons, opposed it, and talked of the absurdity of the whole thing. Generally, however, the view was expressed that the Government was taking the right course. An amendment was moved by Mr. Hamilton, to add words to provide that a military force should be sent to the Transvaal only on condition that the difficulties there were prolonged, and that the interests of the British Empire were seriously threatened. The House negatived the amendment by 69 to 11, and subsequently carried the original motion by 67 to 13. "God Save the Queen" was sung, and cheers were given for the BRitish Empire.
The Inquirer [Perth], Friday 13th October 1899


1901 - Following an attack in The Times newspaper General Sir Redvers Buller gave a speech defending himself, as a result of which he was dismissed from the Army on the 22nd of October.

....The fat is in the fire with a vengeance. Sir Redvers Buller has replied to his critics in a slashing speech, which we print elsewhere at length. His defence is by way of a challenge so direct that the "Times" will be compelled to take it up, and we shall now know in plain English the things which for the last fortnight have been deftly conveyed by insinuation. The matter is one intensely interesting to Devonians. Sir Redvers is a Devonian, a gallant soldier, a popular man, who won his way into Ladysmith by sheer pegging away at the difficulties which beset him. His honor is dear to his friends and neighbours—and we are all neighbours in Devonshire —and the aspersions cast upon his military capacity since his appointment to command the First Army Corps was announced, have been read with pain and not a little indignation. Sir Redvers was urged to speak out, but with characteristic carelessness of popular applause or blame, he refused, until yesterday, and his object now presumably is to bring the affair to a head, to have it out with his enemies. That story of the detective and his warning, by the way, is curiously suggestive in view of what followed immediately after, and but for the unquestionable reputation of the papers concerned, the coincidence of simultaneous attack might have raised ugly suspicions. One point upon which Sir Redvers Bullers critics will fasten is the telegram heliographed to Sir George White relative to the surrender of Ladysmith after the lamentable Colenso affair. The "Times" is challenged to produce the copy of that telegram which they are alleged to hold, and he then proposes to produce the original, so that the public may judge. Sir Redvers Buller's point is that the telegram does not bear the construction that has been placed upon it. It is alleged he ordered Sir George White to surrender. Sir Redvers says all he wished to do was to lend moral support to the commander in Ladysmith in case he had to surrender, as judging by information to hand at the time, Sir Redvers thought he would be compelled to do before another attempt at relief could be made. He wished to let Sir George White down easily in that event, by placing it in his power to produce a telegram from his superior officer—Sir Redvers—contemplating the necessity of surrendering. That is in keeping with what we know of Sir Redvers Buller. As to the question whether he is capable of commanding the First Army Corps, he challenges his critics to indicate an officer junior to himself, and available, who is more fitted for the command than he. The plea which he made generally for calmness, and confidence in those at the front, following hard on Earl Roberts' remarks to the same end, and the categorical letter from Mr. Brodrick, which we print elsewhere, should do much to steady the public mind of its natural apprehension at this moment.

. ....General Sir Redvers Buller was to-day present at a luncheon given at the Queen's Hall, Westminster, to celebrate the return of the Service Section of the Queen's Westminster Rifle Volunteers.
....Sir Howard Vincent, the Commandant of the Regiment, presided. Others present included the Duke of Norfolk (who is the Mayor of Westminster), Col. Horatio Mends, commanding the Rifle Department; Major and Adjt. Gordon Clark, lately commanding the Service Company in the Transvaal; Col. Fludyer, commanding the South London Volunteer Infantry Brigade, etc.
....The Chairman proposed the health of the King's Royal Rifles, of which Sir Redvers Buller is Colonel Commandant, and to which the Queen's Westminster Volunteers were officially attached in South Africa. Sir Redvers Buller, who was cordially received, after acknowledging the hearty reception of the toast, said:—Sir Howard, with regard to your references to this detachment of your regiment, they served in South Africa with what I know they will not complain of my saying was bad luck. They were caught for probably the most disagreeable and the least pleasant of all soldiers' duty—work on the line of communications. At the same time, there is no work more important, there is no work that calls more thoroughly, more exhaustively, I may say, for the discharge of the higher duties of the soldier, that makes a greater tax on discipline, or that tries the moral character of the individual man more fully and more heavily. So far as I know, and I think I fairly know, they performed their duties most admirably—(cheers). While I am speaking to soldiers, and to good soldiers, I want to send out a message to those of their comrades who remain behind in Natal, who are, at this moment, bearing as much the brunt of the end of this war as any other troops are. ....What I want to say is this: that I do not think through this war the Army has been given fair play. Men have to do this or that or the other; the opportunity comes, the question to be decided is presented to them, and a decision has to be arrived at, all in one moment. Their action may be successful or it may not be successful. But so long as they do their best, in my opinion, you ought and we all ought, and as a rule the British public does, support the man who does his best —(cheers). It is not everybody that does so, and especially I think is the want of the duty noticeable in some of the newspapers of this country—(cheers). During the whole of this war, from the very beginning of it, some of the leading newspapers of this country, and especially those of this Metropolis, have, apart from where they had especial things they were obliged to put in, devoted more space to finding fault with their countrymen than they have to praising them—(hear.hear). I tell you, ladies and gentlemen, that the result of that has been, in my humble belief, to a great extent one of the causes of the continuance of the war—(hear, hear). There are lots of gallant Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Irishmen, who will risk their lives for their countrymen at anybody's bidding, but when it comes to risking their lives, and to knowing that if they are not successful it is not only their lives, but their fair fame,their character and their conduct that will be assailed by a certain number of writers in the Press, and that their belongings will be struck at by them in an unfair and in an improper way, then I think you ask almost more than human endurance can carry out—(cheers). ....I am here talking to members of the Natal Army, and in that Army we had a gallant fellow, as gallant a fellow as I believe has ever been in any Army. We used to call him by two names. We sometimes called him "Good Little Gough," and sometimes " Gallant Little Gough," but I do not think we ever put any other adjective to it. That little man has commanded mounted infantry to a force in the field now for two whole years, and I question if there has ever been a week in which he has not been in personal danger, and I doubt if there are many days of the two years on which he has not been under fire. He was out the other day in a very difficult country. He saw some of the enemy, and he chased them as he would, because it was the proper thing to do, and they led him into an ambuscade, and he lost a large number of his men. Without any reference to his two years' previous history—and there are many of us who can instance several occasions in which he has done singularly good service—some newspapers said, "This is another instance of the extraordinary manner in whioh officers throw their men away by neglect of ordinary military precautions." That is the sort of criticism made upon his conduct. Now I do not think it is fair. I know that particular place well. Two and twenty years ago I was in charge of mounted infantry, and had the duty of protecting convoys through that very country. I believe it was the identical road. I said to my General, I am not going through that place again without 500, if I have got a convoy to protect." He said, "We will go and see it to-morrow at daylight." We went, and he said, " You are right. I will put a fort here." And during the months I was at Kambula, that fort eased my mind a great deal. We called it in those days Boulter's Spruit. It is now called Scheeper's Nek. It is a most difficult place, and I do not care who the cavalry leader is, unless he has got a very large force with him he could not possibly safeguard a convoy through that country in a fair attack. Well,Gough got caught when he was chasing the Boers. What ought he to have done except chase the Boers at the end of the war? We have got to finish this war, and the only advantage we have is the advantage of numbers; for every man we kill we knock one chalk off. For every man we have killed, we have two Volunteers to put in his place—(cheers). That is our chance. We are fighting against every possible disadvantage in this sort of fighting. We don't shoot natives if we see them walking round our camp, and if we don't shoot them, they take back information to our adversaries. We cannot talk the language, the two languages, in fact, that we ought to know. ....As you see by the police reports yesterday, whereever we are we have traitors in our midst. How can an Army be expected to get through a difficulty of that sort unless it is fairly and properly and decently supported? In my opinion, every single man who risks men and loses men now, so long as he kills one Boer, ought to be praised by the Press and not abused. It is not fair, and it is not decent, and it is not calculated to finish the war—(cheers)—and I have received hundreds of letters, all in this strain, asking me if I can do something to help to remove the "funk" they are in of being found fault with if they lose a man. We cannot finish this war without losing men. Guerilla warfare requires fighting, and consequently sacrifices. There are men out there, gallant men, good Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotchmen, who will fight if you will let them ; but if, when they have fought and done their best, you find fault with them, they become discouraged—(hear, hear). The father of a lad, a gallant officer himself, a man who has gained the Victoria Cross, writes to the papers and says, "Don't abuse my son till you know the truth," and what do some of the papers do? They put in his letter, it is true, but they also put in a footnote calling attention to the paragraph objected to, and thus spread the scandal. Now, is that fair? I say it is not fair. I ask you, gentlemen of the Press, to take that message to the Press, and I ask you all to write out to your comrades in Natal and say it is not really the wish of the people of England to have this sort of thing put in the papers—(cheers). So much for Natal. ....I have been attacked myself. I do not care what they say about me—(laughter). A comrade wrote me the other day. He said, "I know you do not care about it, but your Army does, and they are furious." I want to say a few words about myself—(cheers). I know there is a correspondent of the "Times" here, and I want to send a message to that journal. I came home in November last and took over the Aldershot command on 10th January. In February I got a letter from a man; I admit he was not a respectable man; I had never seen him in my life; I had heard of him, and I know about him, and he wrote to me to the effect that I had let him out of prison. If it was done in my name, he particularly wished to see me, and asked whether I would give him an appointment in London. The man was what I should call an international detective, or possibly a spy. He is an old man, and he has been at it all his life. I did not want to give him an appointment. I was afraid of being put in a hole, but I wrote asking him to meet me at Aldershot. He came down and told me a lot of interesting stories about the Secret Service of the Transvaal, and how stupid we were, and how we allowed ourselves to be deceived, and how he got his information through. I then said, "Well, I am really very busy, and very much interested in your stories, but perhaps you have come down to tell me something else." He said, "I have," and continued: "Well, the other day you published a paper about Artillery, didn't you ?" I said, "Yes, I did." "And you were told to withdraw it." I said, "Yes, I was." He said, "You have got money to live upon. Give up the Aldershot command"—(laughter). I said, "Thank you very much, but I do not know that I need. But why?" He said "I will tell you. You have got enemies, not exactly enemies, but men who mean to get you out of the way, and they will do so. You had better get out quietly and happily." I said, "I do not know what you think. I am a fighting man, and what you have told me will make me much more likely to stay." "Well," he said, "as I stand before you, I come to tell you this as a favour." Of course I did not ask him for names. As he was going away I said "Of course, if it is necessary for me to use this information I shall do so"; and he said, "You can." So I tell the story to-day. It is a curious thing. A fortnight ago a few of the London papers brought out on the same day articles against me. It might have been an accident—probably it was—however, it was a coincidence. They were all on the same day, and they all attacked me in the same manner. But whether they attacked the Government through me, or me through the Government, with the idea of kicking me out and putting in somebody else, I do not know. I read only one of the attacks—that was the one in the "Times," but I believe there were others in the "Morning Post," the "Spectator," the "Statist." the "St. James's Gazette," and others. However, I will deal with the one in the "Times." ....I was attacked. It was said I was unfit to be commanding the First Army Corps at Aldershot. I should not have cared sixpence for that attack. The only reason I have cared for it is this, that a good many people wrote to me and said, "You should answer." I said I did not care to. A friend wrote to me and said, "If you don't mind, I shall send a letter to the 'Spectator." By the same post another man sent me a later issue of the "Spectator," in which I saw that an officer who had served under me had kindly written a letter that I did not ask him to write. So far as I know, I do not know the man, but he wrote a letter in which he complained of the "Spectator" judging me without any real evidence before them. At the end of his letter he made a reference that was simply repeating a conversation that is common among a class perhaps not as highly educated as we are here. The "Spectator" published it, but the editor "tagged" on to it a "tag" that I considered a vulgar "tag," a stupid "tag," and a "tag" I thought showed a want of education. He claimed the right to base experience on a single incident. At school they taught me not to argue from the particular to the general, and he really tried to turn this poor, honest friend of mine, who was not, perhaps, a skilled debater, into ridicule. But the editor said one thing for which I thank him—he accused me of reckless courage. Reckless courage is a quality I should like to possess, but, unfortunately, I have never been gifted with it all my life. If ever I displayed reckless courage in my life, I assert, and possibly some day I may prove, that I displayed reckless courage in having in my pocket the very telegram that he talked about, in which I was ordered to do something which would have involved the loss of 2,000 or 3,000 men. I withdrew the men because I thought they could not get through, and I would not lose a man unless I thought I could get something for it— (cheers). ....I am only making this speech because I find I cannot hold back my own friends, and if there is to be a row, and if there is to be discredit, I would far rather get it myself than that any other man should get it for me. That is why I have opened my mouth. The "Times" attacked me by way of a letter from "A Reformer," who may be, for all I know, a penny-a-liner or the greatest man in the world. At any rate, he is an anonymous scribe. The "Times" says I am not fitted to be in command of the First Army Corps, and I assert that there is nobody at this time in England, junior to me, who is as fit as I am—(cheers). I challenge the "Times" to say who is the man they have in their eye more fit than I am. I challenged the "Times" a good many years ago at a time when they were discussing the beat rifle to say which was the rifle that was better than what was then called the Lee-Meford. They were writing at the time several articles describing a rotten Government, a stupid Government, the ridiculous War Office, which had adopted the worse rifle in the world. At the end of their article they showed the cloven hoof by saying the Godsall rifle was better, and abusing me for standing up for the Lee-Metford Well, the Lee-Metford has been in the hands of over 200,000 British troops for two years, and every man is satisfied and confident with it, whereas the Godsall rifle of the "Times," so far as I know, has never been heard of since. I do not believe one has ever been made—(laughter). They have attacked me, and they say that I wrote a telegram in which they say I ordered Sir George White to give up Ladysmith, and destroy his books and so forth. They say that I wrote a great many telegrams, and I certainly wrote one telegram which admits partially of that description. I wrote and received a great many telegrams to which I cannot refer, because an officer, who is an officer in a large Army, if he is of high rank, is merely a partner in a large concern. I should be the last man to stand forward and say, "I am not guilty of this. I only did it because someone else did that, and because someone else did something." We must stand or fall together. The war is still going on, we are all fighting for the country, and so far as I can I would strengthen the hands of every man now in the Army and now in authority. God forbid that I should try and defend myself at the expense of anyone, but with regard to this particular telegram i stand absolutely alone. It is me and no one else, and, therefore, I have not the least objection to tell you the story, especially as I am going to end up with a challenge to the "Times." ....I attacked Colenso on the 15th December. I was unsuccessful. It was a very trying day. I was at work 36 hours, and in the saddle 14 hours. It was the hottest day of the whole year, and I had rank bad luck. I still believe and hope to show that if I had not had bad luck, I had enough men to get in, but that is another story. I attacked Colenso and failed, and having failed, I had to consider, not myself, but the people in front of me, the garrison of Ladysmith. As far as I knew then, my appreciation of the situation was this: There was a very good man holding Ladysmith. I am not ashamed to mention the report I made to the War Office of my opinion about him. The very day he was shut up I said I did not know him well, but I had met him once or twice, and that as far as I knew him, and had seen him, I did not know that there was another man in the British Army I would have sooner have selected to hold a beleaguered garrison—(cheers). I knew the horse sickness was almost certain to come very heavily and strongly in the Tugela Valley; I knew that enteric fever was epidemic, and almost continuously becoming epidemic, in the Tugela Valley, at that time of the year I knew, or thought I knew, that the Boers were putting dead horses in the water which the garrison of Ladysmith were obliged to drink. I was in great fear that whatever other misfortune happened to that garrison, they would have immense trouble with their sick and great suffering with those of their garrison who were sick. The whole of the staff were shut up in Ladysmith, I thought. I know that I had official information in writing that the garrison could not be fed beyond the end of the year. I was wrong, I have found out since. At that time I thought that, and believed it. It was then the 15th December; the end of the year was 15 days off. The message I had to send to Sir Geo. White was that I had made the attack, and that I had failed, and that I could not possibly make another attempt for a month, and then I was certain I could only do it by slow fighting, and not by rushing. That was the message I had to send, and I had to ask him certain questions. I wrote a telegram out and looked at it two or three times, and said, "It is a mean thing to send a telegram like that. He is a gallant fellow. He will sit still to the end." I was in command. Whatever responsibility there was there, was mine, and I thought "Ought I not to give him some help, some assistance, and some lead—and something which, if it came to the last absolute moment, would have enabled him to say, "Well, after all I have Sir Redvers Buller's as my commander's opinions in favour of this." Therefore, I "spatch-cocked " into the middle of the telegram a sentence in which I suggested that it would be necessary to abandon —to surrender—the garrison, what he should do when he surrendered, and how he should do it—between one question he had to answer and followed it with another question. I did not like to suggest to a man I believed to be a brave man and a good soldier, I did not like to suggest that he should do this or that or the other, but I stuck that into the thing simply because if he ever had to give up, it might be some sort of a cover to a man who I thought was in much greater difficulty than I was myself. That was the telegram. ....Now, I challenge the "Times" fairly to put forward their scribe "Reformer," to bring him down into the ring. Let us know who he is, by what right he writes, what his name is, and what authority he has. Let him publish this telegram. I know where it is, I believe. It is in the hands of the editor of a magazine who some years ago made himself remarkable—notorious—not, I should think, popular—by raking over the garbage of a 50 year old story, and dishing it up hot and insulting an old and valuable public servant. That is where it is. It must have been stolen, because it was a cypher telegram addressed to Sir George White, and perfectly secret. I challenge them to produce it, and say how they got it, and when they do that I will publish the certified copy of the telegram I sent, and the public shall judge me. I am quite ready to be judged—(cheers). Let it be understood that I make that challenge as a whole. Please be careful about this, Mr. "Times" reporter. I say "the whole thing," because that is a part. They are not going to draw me by saying "I have got a thing," and then not produce it. They are to publish the telegram if they have got it and say how they got it, and I will then put my official telegram down. It hurts no one else but me—(laughter). I make this statement to save my friends. I have not been drawn as regards myself, but I want to keep my own people out of the newspapers.
....In conclusion, Sir Redvers Buller proposed the health of Lieut. Wyld and the members of the Active Service Section.
....Lieut. Wyld replied.
....At the conclusion of the proceedings, Sir Howard Vincent intimated that he had received an important communication from the Secretary of State for War, but he could not make it public without his consent. It was an important communication, and he shouldtelegraph to the Minister and ask for his permission to make it public to-morrow. It concerned the whole policy of the war in South Africa.
....Subsequently the company adjourned to the Westminster Town Hall, where the medals awarded by the King were presented to the l Volunteers for their services in the South African campaign.
....In the course of some remarks here, Sir Redvers Buller spoke of the Volunteers as representing the spirit of the country. We had always avoided conscription, and he hoped and believed that so long as the Volunteer movement was properly supported, we should continue to do without conscription. In his own regiment he had not been able to find any difference between the Volunteer and the Regular soldier—(cheers.) .
....The letter referred to in General Buller's speech was published in the "Times" on September 28th last, under the signature of "Reformer," who wrote as follows:—
....The command of the First Army Corps, the most important of all, has been assigned to Sir Redvers Builer. The qualifications Sir Redvers Buller has shown for high command in the field are by now pretty well known; in the public interest, it is as well that there should be plain speaking about them. The utter fatuity of Colenso, the unnecessary abandonment of the guns, the message to Sir George White suggesting the surrender of Ladysmith, the want of direction at Spion Kop, the half-hearted attempt at Vaalkrantz, the costly blundering back into the Colenso death-trap after the capture of Monte Cristo might have shown tho way to the blindest, the inexcusable failure to pursue a demoralised enemy—is this the record for which the Government and Lord Roberts, who know all, have chosen the commander on whom the first shock of the next war may fall? Is it not plain that Mr. Brodrick's promises are forgotten, and that the old Army theory that the highest appointments are matters of the vested interest of senior generals has triumphantly reasserted itself? Not one of these three generals in command of the first three Army corps is likely to lead his men in the field; and, once again, when war comes upon us, we shall have the state of affairs portrayed by Mr. Brodrick—"a commander hastily appointed, a staff the members of which had often never seen their commander, with officers unknown to each other."
The Western Times, Friday 11th October 1901

A really interesting post, Berenice. A thanks also for all the work you put into these posts.