TOPIC:

Frederik Christiaan Clase

Corporal, 2nd Battery, Transvaal Staats Artillerie
Lieutenant of Scouts (Verkenners), Van Zyl’s Vrywilligers – Anglo Boer War

- Anglo Boere Oorlog Medal to Luit. F.C. Clase
- Lint Voor Wonden

Frederick Clase was born in Bloemhof in the North West part of the Transvaal on 18 July 1882, the son of Frans Engelbertus Clase, a Farmer in the district, and his wife Martha Maria Magdalena Clase, born Mynhardt. As was often the case in the rural heartland, the families were large with the men-folk having to till the soil and work the farm whilst the women of the household were called upon to churn the butter and busy themselves with a multitude of chores.

The Clase family were no exception and Frederik was joined in the house by siblings Susanna Sofia Van den Berg, Martha Maria Magdalena Matthyser, Anna Cornelia Germishuizen, Frans Engelbertus Clase and William Christoffel Clase.

No doubt tiring of farm work, a 17-year-old Clase attested with the Transvaal Staats Artillerie on 17 July 1898 with the rank of Artillerist. Posted to the 2nd Battery, he was assigned no. 684. Based in the state capital of Pretoria the TSA had, initially, been a small-scale operation with a handful of antiquated guns and fewer than 100 men to man them. This all changed after the abortive Jameson Raid took place in 1896 where, it was felt, the sovereignty of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek was being threatened.

A massive rearmament programme was undertaken and the TSA was a major beneficiary of this with the acquisition of both Krupp (from Germany) and Creusot guns (from France) being added to the arsenal. Along with this came a recruitment drive to swell the numbers of Artillerymen and, it is supposed, Clase was one of the young men who responded to the call.

Talk of war would have been everywhere at the time, the actual outbreak on 11 October 1899, not many months away from his enlistment date, would thus not have come as a surprise on the streets of Pretoria or in the barracks of the Staats Artillerie. Indeed, preparations placing the Artillerie on a war-footing had been underway for weeks.

The main armament of the Staatsartillerie consisted of C96 Krupp 77 mm Field guns, 75mm Creusot field guns, 37mm Vickers Maxim "Pom-Pom", 120mm Krupp Howitzers and the famous 4 155mm Creusot Fortress guns or "Long Toms". These guns were augmented, as the war dragged on, by guns captured from the British forces. Clase’s battery was armed with 75 mm Krupp quick-firing field gulls, the 55 mm siege guns known as 'Long Toms', 37 mm Maxim Nordenfeldt 'pom-poms' and various other assorted weapons.

Discipline in the Staatsartillerie was similar to that of the Prussian Army, where a number of the Boer officers had attended courses, and European instructors had been seconded to mould the force into an efficient fighting unit. Daily drill and inspection parades were carried out and the garrisoning of the recently completed Fort Schanskop formed part of their duties.

Almost immediately after war was declared one half of the Staats Artillerie was sent to Zandspruit, while the other half was despatched to serve under General Cronje at Mafeking and Kimberley – it was with the latter half that Clase was to serve, the Boer forces losing no time in resolving to meet the enemy after war had been declared. At the midnight hour on the 11th October, De la Rey, at the head of a strong patrol of Cronje's western column, crossed the Bechuanaland border, about twenty miles to the south of Mafeking, on a reconnaissance to discover the strength and possible movements of its garrison.

The first encounter of the war occurred at Kraaipan, south of Mafeking, and to General De la Rey belongs the credit of securing the initial victory for the Republic. He had started from Cronje's laager with two hundred Lichtenburghers before artillery had arrived from Pretoria, in order to be over the border at midnight, and was to await the arrival of Captain Van der Merwe with guns before engaging any force he might locate between Vryburg and Mafeking. On reaching the railway station at Kraaipan he found that the English outposts at that place had retired on seeing the approach of the Boers. De la Rey, in awaiting the arrival of Van der Merwe, tore up the railway going south to Kimberley, and cut the telegraph wires.

The official report of this opening engagement of the war, as sent by General Cronje to Pretoria, was as follows:

" General De la Rey on his arrival at Kraaipan found that all the British troops and police had fled to Mafeking. He immediately tore up the railway lines on both sides of the station, and also cut the telegraph wires. In the evening a locomotive with two wagons, protected by iron work, was seen approaching the derailed spot. On reaching it the locomotive capsized, together with the wagons.

The burghers prevented the train from being replaced on the rails, and were successful in their efforts throughout the night. Meanwhile the enemy kept up a hot fire with a Maxim and two mountain guns. The burghers kept strict watch during the night. In the morning Captain Van der Merwe arrived with cannon. Directly he opened fire with them, the white flag was hoisted, and the enemy surrendered. On our side there was no wounded. The enemy's casualties were their captain and eight men (slightly) wounded.”

The British press took a different view of the proceedings:

"At that point the look-out man saw a Boer battery posted in a position commanding the track. Captain Nesbit determined to make a run for it, and putting on full steam made the attempt. The Boer artillery opened fire, and almost simultaneously a mine exploded beneath the track, and in another moment the armoured train was off the rails. Captain Nesbit and his men took up positions and commenced to return the Boer fire.

The Boers steadily pounded the train with shell and Nesbit and his men pluckily replied. The unequal fight lasted for four hours. At the end of that time there was no longer any response from the Mosquito, and the Boers then advanced and took possession of what was left of it. It is known that the Boers lost heavily. The list of casualties on our side has not been received, but there is too much reason to fear that Captain Nesbit and all his men, including the civilian telegraphist, perished at their posts."

The fortunate thing about researching Boer participants in the war is the fact that, in order to claim their medal, they were required to complete “Vorm B”, a form which requires the combatant to list all the places and battles in which he participated. In The case of Clase who applied for his medal in September 1922, he lists not only the Kraaipan incident featured above but also participation in Derdepoort, Mafeking, Kliprivier, Donkerpoort, Dalmanutha (Bergendal), Leeukop, Rooiwal and Yzerspruit. His movements are thus relatively easy to track.

The next incident in which he claimed to have been present was the controversial (so termed in some circles) battle of Derdepoort on 25 November 1899. In what was supposedly a “white man’s” war this was an incident in which armed Africa troops from the Bechuanaland Protectorate attacked a fixed Boer position in the Transvaal. Under cover of darkness Kgatla regiments led by Romano forded the Madikwe River near the town of Sikwane and at daybreak initiated a three-hour long attack on the commando laagered next to the small settlement of Derdepoort.

The British troops accompanying the Kgatla withdrew minutes after the opening shots had been fired. The Z.A.R. raised a diplomatic outcry in Europe over the use of armed Blacks against their White troops and accused the Kgatla of committing atrocities. The Kgatla suffered 14 dead and the Boers, under J.T. Kirsten, six dead. The Staats Artillerie do not appear to have played a role here so quite what Clase was doing there is a matter for conjecture.

The fight had moved on to Mafeking by this time – Baden-Powell and his small garrison were about to be surrounded and besieged by a Boer force. Over 217 days, from 13 October 1899 to 17 May 1900, little more than 1,000 totally outgunned and outnumbered European and African defenders, ultimately only surviving on starvation rations, were initially besieged by 8,000 and, from mid-November 1899, a reduced number of around 2,000 Boer fighters, led respectively by Generals Cronje and Snyman.


Staats Artillerie at Mafeking

But what role did Clase and his Artillerie play in the siege? One of the first actions was at Cannon Kopje to which the Boers attached some importance, shelling the position, the key to gaining entry to the dusty town, on a regular basis. The Kopje itself was manned by 50 men, primarily B.S.A. Police. At daylight on 31 October a cross-fire of artillery opened on the Kopje, coming from the race course, Rooigrond and from the heavy and light pieces in front of Jackal Tree. The aim was accurate and the small fort stationed there, much knocked about but no casualties were suffered.

Under cover of the bombardment the Boers were able to steadily approach the town – this attack was repulsed with some loss to the garrison only for the Boers to try again the next day, again under cover of a withering artillery bombardment, but didn’t seem inclined to press home. Again they retreated and contented themselves with a redoubling of their artillery shelling.

The Boer artillery had placed two big guns on Game Tree Hill, about two miles north of Mafeking and another at Jackal Tree from whence a daily bombardment was forthcoming. Stalemate had been reached and the Boers became exasperated with the lack of progress. Cronje’s reputation as a leader was taking a battering and, on 18 November, he was moved south along with 6 guns and 4000 men, leaving it up to General Snyman to continue the siege.

During December the interchange of artillery fire grew but the Boer gunners were hampered by well-placed sharpshooters and by the small British pieces on Cannon Kopje. On 26 December a concerted attack was made on the Boer position on Game Tree Hill but was repulsed with much loss in what was not a well-considered move. All was quiet until New Year’s Day 1900 which the Boers celebrated by a combined bombardment of 5 guns for 6 hours – the 94 pounder firing the most shells. The shells, it was discovered, contained phosphorus and it was feared that the Boers were preparing to fire the town.

On 3 January Bade-Powell arranged for 4 pieces of artillery to range on the 94 pounder and, after it had discharged 5 rounds, it was silenced by these guns forcing the Boer gunners to be driven from their piece. For a number of days after this, sharpshooters were used to pin down those manning the 94 pounder, to the extent that the big gun and its attendant Krupp were moved to a position 2 miles east of Mafeking. For the remainder of the siege, the Boer guns were moved about the outskirts of the town with rapidity, designed to confuse the defenders. With the relief column approaching Mafeking the Staats Artillerie was moved away.

The tide of war was slowly but inexorably turning in favour of the Imperial forces. Men and equipment were flooding into South Africa from all parts of the Empire and, by sheer weight of numbers alone, it could be seen that the writing was on the wall for the Boer effort. Mid-1900 saw the fall of the Orange Free State capital, Bloemfontein, followed by Pretoria, the home of “Oom Paul” Kruger. This transition to a more mobile form of warfare made certain changes necessary in the constitution of the Staats Artillerie however, and after Bergendal, the last pitched battle of the war, only light artillery was employed by the commandos.

Bergendal, also known as Dalmanutha was the next battle of substance that Clase and his gun crew in the Staats Artillerie found themselves and it was also, as has been stated above, the last time the Transvaal Staats Artillerie, as a complete battery, was in action. This battle took place over the period of a week – from 21 to 27 August 1900 and came after Lord Roberts had consolidated his position in and around Pretoria.

General French then led the British advance eastwards – an advance which was co-ordinated with Buller’s advance from Natal. On 27 July 1900, French took Middelburg, but he was then required to remain in the region for about a month so that Buller could be given the opportunity to advance further. When the British advance was resumed, General Louis Botha and 5 000 Boers blocked the British forces’ advance at and in the vicinity of Bergendal, north-west of Dalmanutha Station in the area of present-day Belfast. From 21 August, British forces, under the command of Buller, attacked the Boer positions. During the main attack on 27 August, British forces succeeded in driving the Boers eastwards. British casualties in this battle came to about thirteen dead and 103 wounded, while on the Boer side there were at least 50 casualties.

The battle, in which Clase and the 2nd Battery also took part, was seen thus from the Boer point of view:

Louis Botha's commando, an estimated seven thousand men, with twenty guns, including several Long Toms, controlled the railroad between Belfast and Kruger’s headquarters to the east. They faced 19,000 British with 82 guns.

The battle of Berg and Dal, commenced on 27 August with an assault by the cavalry, followed by the usual artillery bombardment. Buller noticed the tactical key to Botha's position - the big red hill near the farm Berg en Dal, a jumble of rocks stacked over a distance of three acres. If he took this “kop”, he would split the Boer line in two and further threaten their retreat route. Unlike Spioenkop, the position couldn’t be supported from behind or from the sides. Botha entrusted the decisive action to sixty of his best men, the ZARPs, members of the Republican Police Force. They were given a pom-pom (fast-firing, automatic cannon) along with one simple command: hold the hill to the last man.

At dawn on August 27, General Maj. JF Brocklehurst and his 2nd cavalry brigade as well as the 4th Corps mounted infantry were already in motion. They must provide cover for the advance and especially seek out positions from where Berg and Dal and the northern slope of the hill can be bombarded.

Early on the morning of the 27th, Inspector Kommandant P.R. Oosthuizen and S. Van Lier (ZARPs) occupy trenches dug during the night. From there, the commanders go to the front guard post of the police on the hill. The group sat quietly behind their sconces, ready to take on the British.

However, there are concerns about the ammunition, which has shrunk significantly over the past few days. Immediately, a wagon with ammunition and Martini-Henry rifles is dispatched and at 8:30 the group on the hill can hear the cracking of the whip and the screams of the drivers. The wagon must travel across an open stretch of 220 yards to reach the waiting post.

An hour later, the shells rained down on police positions. Sometimes as many as seven shells explode on the hill. The yellow smoke and fumes from the shells are suffocating. Despite being bombarded for three hours, no one left his post. Everyone remained silent, waiting for the British to charge, Finally, at noon, the long-awaited attack began, when the British stormed the ridge. The British troops were trapped in the deadly fire of the Boers. The terrain over which British troops must move is broken and provides excellent shooting targets to the defenders on the hill. At around 800 yards, British soldiers are greeted by heavy fire from the police. The British soldiers go to ground to answer the fire.

Twice the British are driven back until they finally reach the relative safety of a steep incline about 800 yards from the Boers. When the British attacked for the last time, they were greeted with even more accurate fire than before. The artillery also fires with renewed vigour on the approaching British. British troops are being spurred on by their officers, pushing courageously forward. In the end, the handful of ZARPs on the hill must succumb, their ammunition spent. Some managed to reach their horses, others fled on foot. Nineteen of the ZARPs were captured by the British and fourteen ZARPs were killed in this battle. On the British side, seven officers were wounded and three killed, while a hundred men were wounded or missing and twelve were killed.

Clase, according to his file, seems to have been manning one of the guns assigned to the Rustenburg Commando under General Kemp. It was around this time that he was moved from the Staats Artillerie which had, as previously mentioned, become fragmented and had ceased to operate as a cohesive force.



Promoted by General Van Zyl to the rank of Lieutenant, he was placed in command of the Van Zyl Vrywilligers; a shadowy body of scouts who were to prove invaluable to the Boers as the guerrilla war raged on. It was to this small group of men that the onerous task fell of identifying where the Imperial presence on the veld was, how many men were ranged against the Boers in the area and how many guns they had at their disposal.

They were soon hard at work and heavily involved on 25 February 1902 when, under the command of General De la Rey the Boers charged, shooting from the saddle in almost reckless disregard for their foe, into battle.

Near a stream called Yzerspruit, on the road from Wolmeranstad to Klerksdorp, they ambushed one of Methuen’s convoys, consisting of 151 wagons. This was one of the very few convoys which by this late date still had to travel across open country as opposed to along a blockhouse line. It was in charge of Major Anderson of the 15th Hussars, who commanded the 5th Imperial Yeomanry. Two hundred and thirty men of this battalion formed the mounted part of the convoy’s escort.

Once again De la Rey’s intelligence, based on ubiquitous scouts (most likely Clase and his men) and the heliograph, far outmatched Methuen’s. Every movement of the convoy was at once made known to the Boers. Anderson, by contrast, had no idea that 1200 Boers were awaiting him in ambuscade.

Well before dawn these carefully hidden Boers burst forth, attacking first the front (Kemp), then the rear, General J.G. Cilliers) and finally, hoping in vain that front and rear would have drawn the escort to their defence, one flank, under General Liebenberg, of the convoy.

All three attacks were skilfully and stoutly resisted. As the day broke, De la Rey, seeing that the native drivers and conductors were in a state of panic, ordered a general charge. The official historian described its progress thus:

“Nine hundred horsemen appeared on the left. Having advanced in unbroken line to within 500 yards, firing from the saddle as they ambled forward, the whole body suddenly charged impetuously down upon the flank. A fire that was not to be faced met the stormers; three times they came on, wavered and fled back out of range. Once under shelter they were steadied by their officers, and twenty minutes later advanced and charged again. For the fourth time they were hurled back by a terrible fusillade from the men of the flank guard who lay immovable, in the face of what were virtually repeat rushes of cavalry.

….Soon after the second repulse of Kemp from the flank (Cilliers) galloped onto the field with 500 men and immediately rode against the British rearguard…. Like Kemp, Cilliers met with a shattering reception; his men refused to face the fire, and scattering backwards and outwards, contented themselves for the next two hours with bringing a cross-fire to bear upon the rearguard, which suffered considerably but replied with vigour.”

It was to no avail. The escort was outnumbered at least three to one. By 7 a.m. when at last the firing ceased there could be no doubt that there had been suffered an unmitigated disaster. De la Rey, though he found most of the wagons empty, got what he so badly needed. Among the booty were three ammunition carts with half a million rounds in them. He also captured most of the 170 horses and 1 450 mules which were with the convoy. He lost, though, which he could ill-afford, fifty-one burghers. The British casualties numbered 381, of which 58 were killed and 194 taken prisoner – these were released the next day.

It was at this battle that Clase was Wounded in Action – by a “stukbom aan linker kant van voor hoofd” – “a piece of shrapnel on the left side of his forehead.”

The next and final battle that Clase was to participate in was that of Rooiwal on 12 April 1902. De la Rey was away parleying with Kitchener when his lieutenant, Kemp, with a rashness his commander would certainly have censured, led the most spectacular charge of the war, executed by either side.

It occurred in the course of the last large-scale drive of the campaign, which Ian Hamilton had been sent by Kitchener to co-ordinate. His group of columns numbered some 11 000. Kemp, wrongly believing that the two columns under Kekewich and commanded by Von Donop and Grenfell, numbering perhaps 1 750, constituted the weak point of the twenty seven mile long line, concentrated against them.

In all he had summoned practically all the remaining fighting burghers in the Western Transvaal: seven commandos, numbering between 1 700 and 2 600 men – a singular feat at the war’s eleventh hour. When Kemp, in broad daylight led some 800 of these, formed in orderly and compact lines, two, three and even four deep, riding, it was said, knee to knee, against the British advance screen, Von Donop mistook them for part of Grenfell’s column and Grenfell mistook them for part of Rawlinson’s. Von Donop actually ordered his signallers to open communication with them.

Kemp’s men, having started a good mile and a half away, were less than 1 000 yards off, topping a slight ridge in what was otherwise flat, open veld and already firing from the saddle, shouting in a blood-curdling manner, before their real identity was established. An irregular dismounted defensive line was speedily formed: there were but a few seconds in which to do it. kemp, whose Intelligence had led him to believe that the right flank of the drive comprised no more than 300 troops, was amazed to see over 1 000 dismounted men with two field guns and a pom-pom hastily making a rough semi-circle to oppose him.

Nearby were many more dismounted troops, including the Imperial Light Horse in Rawlinson’s column, with a further four field guns and two more machine guns; something approaching 3 000 men with rifles , supported by six guns and three machine guns, arrayed against 800 burghers firing at random from magazine rifles.

“To continue the charge,” wrote Thomas Packenham, “seemed folly, if not madness. Yet Kemp and Potgieter (who appears to have been leading the central section) both accepted the challenge; in their attempt to out-do De la Rey’s achievements, they threw his tactics to the wind. They cantered on, forming a massed phalanx…. The six British guns began to tear holes in the column. Still they came on, gambling everything on the chance the British would turn and run.”

A few of the raw, untried Imperial Yeomen did, in fact, turn and run, but the mass of Kekewich’s men stood firm. Considering that so many of them were only half-trained, it is to their credit that they did so, faced by such an alarming spectacle. Certainly such a perfect target had not presented itself to the British troops since the battle of Omdurman.

At one point Kemp’s centre checked its pace to allow his flanks to swing forward into line just as the Russian cavalry had done at Balaklava. The sonorous charge of European cavalry, wrote the official historian, the chanting onset of the Zulu impi were less impressive that the slow oncoming of this brigade of mounted riflemen. Potgieter got to within thirty yards of the British line before he fell with three bullets in his head and body.

At the same moment those behind him spun round and cantered away. ‘I am by no means sure, ‘ wrote Ian Hamilton a week later, ‘that the Boers would have actually fled, had it not been for the promptitude with which Briggs, of Rawlinson’s column, threw the Imperial Light Horse in a direction by which they must fall on the flank of the Boers, unless they cleared right back,’

Now was the time for counter-attack – for three hours the chase went on, covering eighteen miles, but only twenty three stragglers were picked up. By far the most interesting aspect of what was in effect the last engagement of consequence in the Boer War was the question of casualties.

The counted loss in burghers was only fifty-one killed, of whom all fell in the great charge, forty wounded and thirty six unwounded prisoners, making 127 men in all. That so few of the Boers in that phalanx were hit argues that the firing of the British riflemen was abysmally inefficient. At least two and probably six 15-pounders and two machine guns were in action and it seems that these last did “most of the actual execution’. Numbers of the burghers were seen to have received two bullet wounds in the abdomen ‘where machine-gun fire caught them just above the pommel of the saddle’.

This reverse was a crushing blow for the Boers left in the field from which they never fully recovered. The war staggered on until the declaration of peace on 31 May 1902. Clase was never captured and was thus never a Prisoner of War. His discharge certificate, written out and signed by General Van Zyl on 14 June 1902, read as follows:

“Discharge
An honourable discharge is hereby granted to Frederik Christiaan Clase, Corporal of Artillery in the South African Artillery and for the past three months (until the laying down of arms at Schweizer Reneke on 12 June 1902), Lieutenant of Scouts with Van Zyl’s Volunteers.

He always did his work to my complete satisfaction, was a competent and brave officer and is recommended by me to the authorities for any work or service which he would be required to perform.

J. Van Zyl
Combat General”



The war over Clase decided not to return to Pretoria but to go back to his roots – farming in the Bloemhof district - but this was not the last we were to hear from him, he was quick to complete a Claim for Compensation – a mechanism devised by the Imperial authorities to provide monetary restitution to those on both sides who had suffered loss on account of the war.

Dated 25 September 1903 and directed to the Compensation Board at Wolmaranstad, Clase claimed the sum of £99 (and was awarded £10). The claim was substantiated by promissory notes in the amount claimed from various cattle and other animals sold to the Boers during the war. These notes, signed on behalf of the Z.A.R. by a number of “Vecht Generaal’s” (Combat General’s).

Undaunted by the low return on his claim, Clase next completed a “Vorm van Eisch voor Oorlogsverliezen” – the Dutch equivalent of the Compensation Claim form – stating as follows:

“I am 20 years of age, unmarried; before the war I was an Artillerist. I am a Burgher of the late Z.A.R. by birth; I have always lived in the Transvaal; I am now living in the town of Bloemhof. I have filed no Claim with Military Compensation Board. I now produce my claim for war losses amounting to £113. The receipts I produce were given me by the different officers I was serving under. I got them as my share of the loot we made during the war. The two for notes of £5 I got for a horse I sold to the Commando.” This was virtually a repetition of his earlier claim and received short thrift from the authorities. The signatories to the notes make for interesting reading – they were signed, variously, by General Kemp; General Liebenberg and Commandants Marnewick and Groenewald.

At around the same time Clase turned his attention next to the War Losses (Under Article 10 of Terms of Surrender) – he wasn’t going down without a fight. Providing a Vrededorp, Johannesburg address he completed the forms in May 1903 stating that he was a 20-year-old Artillerist (presently farming). His claim for £276 was in respect of arrears “for salary as an Artillerist”. The sworn statement accompanying his claim read as follows:

“I was an Artillerist of the South African Republic stationed at Pretoria. My salary was 5/- per day and I held the rank of Corporal. That I surrendered at Schweizer Reneke on 12 June 1902.”

How he fared with this claim is unknown but the likelihood of the Imperial Government sanctioning the payment of salary of an adversary during the period he took up arms against them must have been slim.

Clase’s attention now turned to matters of the heart – on 30 August 1904 at Bloemhof he wed Johanna Magdalena Potgieter, a 25-year-old lady from Kareepan, Wolmeranstad. He was 23 at the time. This union produced seven children.

In 1926, four years after being awarded the ABO Medal and Lint Voor Wonden; he applied for the Dekorasie vir Troue Dienst. This application was turned down on the grounds that he had only been commissioned as an officer three months before the end of the war.

After a long and, as we have seen, eventful life, Clase passed away at the Japie Kritzinger Oue Tehuis in Bloemhof on 11 April 1976 at the age of 94. He was a widower at the time of his death.

Thank You Rory..... I had not realized how much the Staats Artillerie had grown in size...… A great history lesson and a typical man against bureaucracy fight...… Mike