TOPIC:

Andries Johannes Le Roux – P.O.W.

Burger, Heidelberg Commando – Anglo Boer War

- Anglo Boere Oorlog Medal to Burg. A.J. Le Roux

Andries Le Roux fought with one of the most active Commandos in the Natal Theatre in the Boer War – born in Smithfield in the Orange Free State in about 1853 he was the son of Jan Hendrik Le Roux, a Farmer, and his wife Catharina.

At some point he made the trek from the “Free State” to the Transvaal where he settled in the Heidelberg district, a town close to the Free State border. On 29 September 1899, with war between the two Boer Republics and Great Britain imminent, he enlisted with the local Heidelberg Commando for service. Like most Boers outside of the main cities, Le Roux was a Farmer, someone comfortable in the saddle, a good shot and a chap who knew the veld like the back of his hand.

On 11 October 1899 the war erupted onto the world stage and the Boer forces to the east, who had already massed at the Natal Border, sped up their preparations to invade the Colony – the Transvaal Commandos from Zandspruit and the Orange Free State Commandos over the Drakensberg mountain passes.

We have the completion of the Vorm B – a form the Burgers were required to complete to claim their medal – to thank for the detail as to which battles a Burger participated. Le Roux appears to have missed out (or failed to mention) any involvement in the first two major battles of the Natal front – these were Talana outside Dundee, where the outcome was inconclusive, although it led to the withdrawal of the British forces and the falling back on Ladysmith; and Elandslaagte where the Boers were given a bloody nose but where the British failed to press home their advantage.

These actions culminated, as has been mentioned, in the British forces retreating to Ladysmith where General George White decided to remain. The Boers were quick to pounce on the opportunity to invest the small garrison town and, by the 1st November, the last train out had departed the station, the telegraph wires to the town had been cut and Ladysmith was besieged, with the Boers and their Long Tom guns situated at strategic places on the hills surrounding the town.

The first action in which Le Roux participated was at Modderspruit. This battle, which the English have named both Lombard's Kop and Farquhar's Farm, and the Boers, Modderspruit, began soon after four o'clock on Monday morning, 30 October, with a fierce artillery duel.



The British had sent forward two strong columns, with most of their guns, to a point near the railway at Limit Hill, from whence the main attack on Long Hill was to be made, after their batteries had prepared the way. Joubert's guns on Long Hill were only seven, but "Long Tom" and his two fifteen-pound Creusot consorts maintained the unequal combat for three or four hours; the big gun sending his shells occasionally a distance of 9,000 yards into the town of Ladysmith.

While this artillery fight was proceeding, Generals Lukas Meyer and Schalk Burger had engaged, both French's mounted column and White's right wing so hotly that the plan of assaulting Joubert's centre had to be abandoned in order to rescue the forces which Joubert's left had furiously assailed both by Mauser and artillery fire south of Farquhar's Farm. White's right wing thus attacked had previously succeeded in gaining a spur of a hill which the Heidelberg burghers under Weilbach (Le Roux among them) had held as an advanced position of Lukas Meyer's commandoes. The ground thus taken from the Heidelbergers was not long in possession of the British. An incident had happened which may be said to have decided the fortunes of the day for the Federal forces.

General Meyer had been unwell since the battle of Talana Hill, and became indisposed during the progress of the fight at Modderspruit. Louis Botha, who had been attached to the Vryheid commando as member of the Volksraad for that district, was at hand. He held no distinct command, but had been an adviser to his friend and colleague, Lukas Meyer, from the outbreak of the war. The command of Meyer's force at a most critical moment in the battle of the 30th was virtually placed in his hands, and he directed the operations which largely helped to achieve the victory that was to be won for the Boers.

He urged a concentration of artillery and Mauser fire upon the position gained by a part of White's force from the Heidelbergers. Under cover of this fierce attack, a body of Meyer's men advanced on the English from their concealment, and drove them from the spur of the hill back upon some of the reinforcements which White was sending to the assistance of his right. During this confusion among the British, Pretorius played his pompoms with deadly effect upon the troops which had been forced out into the open, and the British forces chief loss in dead and wounded in the battle occurred at this turning point.

This unexpected counter attack on his right compelled White to abandon the contemplated blow at Joubert's centre, which General Hamilton, with the bulk of the British troops and thirty guns, was to deliver. Generals French and Grimwood had got their men into such serious trouble north of Lombard's Kop, where they had run up against Meyer's and Burger's changed positions, that a large force from the enemy's left column had to be sent across to extricate White's right from its perilous situation. This change in the English general's plan of battle was giving the Boer artillery splendid practice on the flanks of his right and left, and rapidly determining the fortunes of the combat, when two events occurred in this battle of surprises which changed and re-changed the checkered chances of the fray.

At the time when White was forced to send a large part of his centre column to the help of his right, and when the Boer guns were pouring a most deadly fire into the English lines, a body of marines in charge of two huge naval guns arrived on the scene, after a continuous journey from Durban, and joined at once in the fight. These guns were most ably handled, and after a few trial shots at the Boer artillery, a shell fired at " Long Tom " at Pepworth killed and wounded half a dozen burghers. This intervention of the navals in the battle arrested the tide of Joubert's artillery success, and enabled White to pull his right wing out of Botha's reach, and to prepare his centre again for the desired but delayed attack upon Joubert's position at Pepworth.

At this juncture "Long Tom" became suddenly silent, and it was believed in the English lines that the naval guns had succeeded in putting him out of action. What really happened was this:

Ammunition for the Boer guns at the centre had run out. Supplies were to the left of the hill on which the now silent Creusot stood, away in a location which was being remorselessly shelled by the British naval guns. No effort was being made by the men in charge of the artillery, or by the burghers on the hill, to go for a fresh supply. Every moment was of vital value, and a suggestion was actually made to remove the big gun to the laager in the rear so as to save it from possible capture.

Colonel Blake's Irish Brigade were on this hill, as an extra guard for "Long Tom," awaiting a possible infantry advance by the British. Seeing the situation in the matter of the ammunition, Blake instantly ordered his men to go and procure what was required. The order was carried out with pluck and promptness. They raced across the zone of fire, and the needed ammunition was soon brought for the huge gun. The renewed activity of the big Creusot had such a discouraging effect upon the English batteries and the mass of infantry who were preparing again to advance towards the Boer centre that both retired precipitately on Ladysmith, and the fight was over.

The British retreated, having doubtless learned by this time of the surrender of the Irish Fusiliers and Gloucestershire regiments at Nicholson's Nek, two hours previously.

With the British having been repulsed by this action and the adjoining one taking place at Nicholson’s Nek, the protagonists settled down to life under siege – for those trapped in Ladysmith, life became daily more intolerable – with food scarce disease started to take hold and the patient numbers at the nearby hospital at Ntombi Camp began to swell, in keeping with the swelling bellies of the malnourished inhabitants.
This contretemps suited neither Boer nor Brit and the pressure was gradually mounting on the Boer leadership to make a full-scale assault on Ladysmith in order to break the deadlock and seize the town, thereby forcing White’s surrender. After prompting from President Kruger in Pretoria, the Boer leader General Joubert, convened a Council of War where a plan of attack was decided on.

Platrand is a two-and-a-half-mile long ridge that dominated the south side of Ladysmith. It had been occupied by the British from the start of the siege in November 1899 and was seen by many the key to the defences of Ladysmith. Its lose would certainly have made General Sir George White’s task much harder.

The British recognised the importance of the Platrand and had fortified the hills at each end. At Caesar’s Camp, on the eastern end of the ridge, they had built walls seven feet high. There they had 400 men from the Manchester Regiment, HMS Powerful and the Natal Naval Volunteers, and one 12 pounder gun. Wagon Hill, at the west end of the ridge, was not so strongly fortified, but work was in hand on two gun emplacements. The garrison of Wagon Hill was 600 strong (three companies of the 1st King’s Royal Rifle Corp and the Imperial Light Horse, as well as a detachment from the Royal Engineers). The Natal Naval Volunteers moved a 3 pounder gun onto Wagon Hill the day before the Boer attack, and two naval guns were being moved onto the hill when the attack began. The British commander on the Platrand, Colonel Ian Hamilton, had around 1,000 men to defend the two-and-a-half-mile long position.

The Boers intended to attack him with twice that number. 1,000 Transvaal men under Schalk Burger, consisting of the Utrecht, Vryheid, Winburg and Harrismith Commandos, assisted by the Heilbron, Kroonstad, Wakkerstroom, Krugersdorp and Heidelberg Commandos were to attack Caesar’s Camp. De Villiers with 400 Free Staters were to attack Wagon Point. Finally, 600 men from Vryheid and Winburg and a unit of Germans were to attack the middle of the ridge, between the two hills. However, not everyone in the Boer camp was convinced that the attack was worthwhile. Many men who were meant to have taken part in the third attack decided not to take part.

The attack went in at 2.30am on 6 January. Under cover of darkness the fighting was chaotic. Hamilton was woken by the noise. Finding a strong Boer attack underway, he used a newly installed telephone to call for reinforcements. Amongst other troops, White sent field artillery that played a crucial part in the daylight fighting.

At daybreak the Boer attack had failed to reach the summit of the ridge, but the Boers held a line along the entire southern side of the hill, and threatened to outflank the British position. Boer guns on neighbouring hills now joined in, and the British position looked vulnerable. However, the field guns sent by White now arrived, and helped stabilize the position.

The fighting went on from early morning till noon without a break. After a short break the Boer attack was resumed. By now British reinforcements had arrived on the hill. The Boers failed to make supporting attacks elsewhere around Ladysmith, allowing White to move troops to the Platrand. The Devonshire Regiment made a particularly significant contribution, clearing a pocket of Boers from the southern side of the ridge with a bayonet charge, in the process losing a third of their strength. Finally, as darkness fell at the end of the day the remaining Boers retreated down the hill.

British losses were high. 168 men were killed, out of a total of 417 casualties. Five Victoria Crosses were won (two posthumous). Boer losses were reported at 64 dead and 119 wounded, but the Rifle Brigade counted 99 Boer dead on their part of the hill. Amongst the Boer dead was De Villiers, shot dead in a close encounter with Hamilton. The failure of the attack on the Platrand demoralised the Boers. It was to be their last concentrated attempt to capture Ladysmith.


Platrand

The next action of significance in which le Roux partook was the battle of Donkerhoek (Diamond Hill) which took place on the 11th and 12th June 1900. Boer General Ben Viljoen, of Elandslaagte fame, in his book “My Reminiscences of the Boer War” wrote about the action thus: -

‘Our first and best positions were now obviously the kopjes which stretched from Donkerhoek past Waterval and Wonderboompoort. This chain of mountains runs for about 12 miles E. and N.E. of Pretoria, and our positions here would cut off all the roads of any importance to Pietersburg, Middelburg, as well as the Delagoa Bay railway. We therefore posted ourselves along this range, General De la Rey forming the right flank, some of our other fighting generals occupying the centre, whilst Commandant-General Botha himself took command of the left flank.

On the 11th of June, 1900, Lord Roberts approached with a force of 28,000 to 30,000 men and about 100 guns, in order, as the official despatches had it, "to clear the Boers from the neighbourhood of Pretoria." Their right and left flanks were composed of cavalry, whilst the centre was formed of infantry regiments; their big guns were placed in good positions and their field pieces were evenly distributed amongst the different army divisions.

Towards sunset they began booming away at our whole 13 miles of defence. Our artillery answered their fire from all points with excellent results, and when night fell the enemy retired a little with considerable losses.

The battle was renewed again next day, the enemy attempting to turn our right with a strong flanking movement, but was completely repulsed. It was fiercest on our left flank, where General French and his cavalry charged the positions of the Ermelo and Bethel burghers again and again, each time to be repulsed with heavy losses.

On our right General De la Rey had an equally awkward position; the British here also made several determined attempts to turn his flank, but were repulsed each time. Once during an attack on our right, their convoy came so close to our position that our artillery and our Mausers were enabled to pour such a fire into them that the mules drawing the carts careered about the veldt at random, and the greatest confusion ensued.



About two o clock in the afternoon Smuts applied urgently for reinforcements, and I was ordered by the Commandant-General to go to his position. A ride of a mile and a half brought us near Smuts; our horses were put behind a "randje," the enemy's bullets and shells meantime flying over their heads without doing much harm. We then hurried up on foot to the fighting line, but before we could reach the position General Smuts and his burghers had left it. At first I was rather in the dark as to what it all meant until we discovered that the British had won Smuts' position, and from it were firing upon us. We fell down flat behind the nearest "klips" and returned the fire, but were at a disadvantage, since the British were above us. I never heard where General Smuts and his burghers finally got to. On our left we had Commandant Kemp with the Krugersdorpers; on the right Field-Cornet Koen Brits. The British tried alternately to get through between one of my neighbours and myself, but we succeeded, notwithstanding their fierce onslaught, in turning them back each time. All we could do, however, was to hold our own till dark. Then orders were given to "inspan" all our carts and other conveyances as the commandos would all have to retire.

Thus ended the battle of Donkerhoek, and next day our commandos were falling back to the north’

Le Roux and the Heidelbergers moved on to Dalmanutha or Bergendal as the Boers were wont to call it. This was to be the last Pitched Battle of the war. The battle lasted from 21 to 27 August 1900 and was one of the most severe of the war with its climax coming on the last day, when 70 men of the Johannesburg Zuid-Afrikaansche Rijdende Politie (ZARP), a special mounted police corps of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) or the Transvaal Republic, faced a full attack by General Sir Redvers Buller's Natal Field Army.

By the end of May 1900, most of the major and better known battles of the war had been fought. The British forces had captured Bloemfontein on 13 March 1900 and marched on to Pretoria which was captured on 5 June 1900. This did not bring the war to an end as was anticipated but, instead, led to the beginning of a new phase – one where small, highly mobile Commandos would attack lonely and isolated British patrols or lines of communication and, having plundered them for stores, supplies and ammunition, would “denude” the troops of their clothing and ride off to fight another day.

Buller’s Army, marching up from Natal had, on 15 August and 11 000 strong, reached the farm Twyfelaar just south of Carolina and about 36km south of Wonderfontein Station. Having been ordered to await the other British forces being sent to the region, it was only on 21 August that he could order his troops to march to the farm, Van Wyksvlei, 24km south-east of Belfast. The offensive against the Boers could then start in earnest.

On 23 August, Buller's and French's forces were positioned on the farm Geluk. On the same day, the 11th Division under Pole-Carew assembled at Wonderfontein, and the next day they occupied Belfast.On 25 August, Lord Roberts arrived in Belfast from Pretoria to take overall command of the British forces. Roberts, Buller, French and Pole-Carew held a war council and drafted their strategy.

Buller wanted to move northward, and in the end the plan that Buller should advance towards the east was abandoned. French and Pole-Carew would concentrate the attack north of the railway, and Buller's army would advance directly on Machadodorp. The line of attack led right across the farm Bergendal where the ZARPs were positioned. The combined British forces of about 20 000 were brought into position along a 20km front to stage the offensive against Botha's 5 000 Boer commandos spread over a much longer line of defence.

Just south of the railway, on a stony kopje, or hillock, 70 men of the ZARPs dug themselves in. The defence of the railway was entrusted to them. A German detachment under Commandant Krieger was positioned immediately to the east of the ZARPs. The Germiston Commando took up position a bit further south.

The third object of defence in the Boer line was the Carolina-Machadodorp road and the route of retreat to Barberton. Positioned further to the south were the Heidelberg, Carolina and Bethal Commandos. Their main task was to oppose Buller if he advanced from the south. General J Smuts and 800 burghers had to defend the route of retreat towards Barberton.

The ZARPs established their position on the kopje and in some of the buildings on the farm Bergendal at the junction of the Carolina and Dalmanutha roads. Dalmanutha is a railway station just to the east of the kopje, which is almost the highest point of the ridge and rises suddenly from the surrounding grassy slopes. It consists of a mass of immense stones and rocky crevices, and forms a kind of natural fortress. The surrounding grassland afforded no shelter to any advancing troops. The ZARPs were supported by about 1 000 burghers on either side, but they were not directly connected to any of the other commandos. This virtual isolation would eventually have decisive consequences for them in the final battle.

Botha commanded the entire Boer defence and, for the first time in the war, the four State Artillery Creusot guns, the Long Toms, were under his command. There were also a number of other artillery pieces at the disposal of the Boers, but it is difficult to determine the exact strength of the Boer artillery owing to the varying numbers given by different sources.

The four Long Toms were initially placed so as to repel any British advance on Machadodorp and to secure the routes of retreat. One was placed on Groot Suikerkop, north-east of Belfast, to defend the roads leading to Dullstroom. Another was sited at Driekop about 2,5km from Dalmanutha Station, and was still in full operation on 25 August. Precisely where the other two guns were initially placed is not clear. Presumably, one was intended to defend the road leading from Carolina to Machadodorp, while the fourth was positioned further south to safeguard the Carolina Machadodorp road as well as the bridge over the Komati River.

On 26 August, three of the Long Toms were placed on Elandskop, Driekop and Suikerboschkop and one in the vicinity of Elandsfontein. Botha's military strength, in soldiers as well as artillery, was far less than that of the British. In general, the Boer forces also experienced shortages of ammunition. On the day of the main battle, the ZARPs in particular faced this problem.

Also on 26 August, Buller marched his troops from Geluk to the farm Vogelstruispoort. He explained in a report to Roberts: - 'During the day, I became convinced that Bergendal Farm, a very strong position at the junction of the ridge we were on, that which runs from west to east from Belfast to Dalmanutha, was the key of the Boer position, and that if we could gain that ridge we would pierce the centre of the enemy's defence and probably get in rear of the defence on both his flanks with but little difficulty. I therefore concentrated the whole force at Vogelstruispoort with a view of attacking Bergendal the following day...'

Skirmishes between the Boer forces and various British units occurred throughout, and were quite severe. Buller's baggage convoy was delayed, and Howard's Brigade and Dundonald's regiments were attacked. However, the British did succeed in advancing close to the Boer positions. In telegrams sent to President Kruger, Botha reported that fighting had occurred along the whole Boer defence line, resulting in the ammunition being exhausted. The Boers still succeeded in tormenting Buller's advance, however, and apart from getting closer to the Boer defence line, no other successes were achieved, and it does seem that by the end of the day many burghers had abandoned their positions. The main battle would only take place on the following day.

Early on the morning of 27 August, the 2nd Brigade under Colonel J F Brocklehurst, the 'A' Battery under Major L G F Gordon, and the 4th Division Mounted Infantry under Captain H K Steward, were to cover the advance of the Natal Field Army's regiments. On the kopje, Commandant Oosthuizen, the commander of the ZARPs, and Lieutenant S van Lier inspected the Boer positions. At this stage, it seemed that their ammunition was low. Then a mule wagon carrying supplies arrived - the British Bombardment started soon after.

At 11.00, the three-hour, uninterrupted bombardment of the kopje began. The shells ploughed up the land and filled the air with yellow smoke, shrapnel and fragments of rock. The British artillery had the upper hand, as the Boer guns were too far away to have any impact on Buller's men.

After three hours, the ZARPs still held their positions on the kopje. Buller then ordered the infantry onslaught, General Kitchener directed Lieutenant-Colonel Metcalfe to take up a position across the main east and west ridges of the kopje under cover of gunfire. His men were to attack from the west. Lieutenant-Colonel Payne was instructed to march the Inniskilling Fusiliers down the face of the gun ridge. Their assault would be from the south. The 1st Devonshire Regiment was positioned to support the left centre, while the right attack was supported by the Gordon Highlanders.

As the British infantry reached the foot of the kopje, bayonets were fixed and the final charge began, with 1 500 British attacking what was left of the ZARP contingent. The ZARPs maintained steady and accurate fire from the time the British infantry began their advance across the open terrain until they were upon them. In his report to Roberts, Buller describes the final stages of the battle as follows:

'The enemy stood their ground with great gallantry, and only left their positions when the Rifles were among them and the Inniskilling Fusiliers on their flank, between 20 and 30 of them keeping up the fire until actually made prisoners.'

Knox, the medical doctor, who was present at the battle, and afterwards attended to the wounded, gives his impressions of the battle as it draws to a close:

'Bayonets glitter as the infantry double across the plain... The Boers stand up in their trenches emptying their rifles to the last moment. But they are doomed. The majority break and fly, some on horseback, some on foot... Time shrapnel is burst with beautiful and most accurate precision over the fugitive band that breaks across the railway line. Men on foot and men on horses caught in that hail are seen to stumble and fall'

The day belonged to the British artillery, who started the attack, and the infantry, who completed the victory. The British regiments had to advance on the kopje across open grassland without any cover. During the onslaught, the Rifle Brigade's colonel was wounded. However, the troops reformed and 'swept on their own initiative up the plateau carrying all before them'.

Le Roux and his Commando lived to fight another day although it is not known where, specifically, he found himself after the action at Dalmanutha. According to the Prisoner of War list, he was captured on 19 September 1900 – three weeks after his last engagement – at an unlikely spot, the Nigel Gold Mining Company, to the south-east of Johannesburg. The fact that he hailed from nearby Heidelberg may indicate that he was close to home when captured. Quite how many chaps were taken prisoner here is unknown save for the fact that Pieter Andries le Roux (possibly his brother) was captured at the same spot on the same day.

A report in the Yorkshire Post of 28 August 1900 read that: -

‘The London office of the Nigel Gold Mining Company has received information that the mine secretary has returned from the mine, and reports that the property is uninjured, the machinery in splendid order, and everything ready for commencing operations as soon as circumstances will permit.

The Boers commandeered mealies and coal of the value of £630, but with this exception the stores at the mine are intact. The Boers also took about 780 oz of amalgam and about 106oz of bullion from the mine. During the operations consequent on General Hunter’s advance shells passed over the property, but without doing any injury, although some of the plants of the adjacent mines were wrecked”.

Le Roux was sent to Ceylon on 2 October 1900. On his return he went back to farming on his farm “Roodepoort” in the Heidelberg district. In July 1903 he submitted a Burgher Claim for Compensation in an amount of £31.20. His statement read as follows: -

‘I live on the farm Roodepoort, I was a full burgher of the Free State by birth, I was on commando from the beginning until September 1901 (sic) when I was captured and sent to Ceylon as a P.O.W. I declare that my claim is correct and all the articles thereon my lawful property before, and lost during the war.

I had 60 sheep and goats which were taken from my farm in September 1900 also 3 riding horses, one was taken at Roodepoort the other two I used on commando. The pigs, poultry and harness was taken at the farm Roodepoort, also the furniture, about 6 bags of mealies and 2 ½ bags of beans were taken’.

Le Roux claimed his medal on 12 August 1921 from his address, P.O. Kliprivier Stasie. He passed away at the age of 72 on 21 September 1925, still on the farm Roodepoort, and was survived by wife, Catharina Cornelia, and his many children.

In my quest to "map" the location where my men either saw action and/or were taken POW/KIA or WIA I have enlisted the support of master sleuth El Ne Watson - 'tis she who found the location of the Nigel Gold Mining Company where Le Roux was captured. I provide two maps - one a close-up and the other where the position is shown in relation to larger towns/settlements.





Regards

Rory