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Petrus Hermanus Swart

Burger, Vrede Kommando – Anglo Boer War

- Anglo Boere Oorlog Medal to Burg. P.H. Swart

Petrus Swart was a Free State Boer who owed allegiance to President Steyn of the Orange Free State (as opposed to the Transvaal Boers who owed allegiance to “Oom Paul” Kruger, the President of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek).

According to the records he was born somewhere in the Transvaal on 4 November 1871 and, at some point in time, moved to Vrede, a small town in the eastern Orange Free State (the word Vrede translates to Freedom in English) where he settled down to the pursuit of farming.

The Boer people were of Dutch extraction and, no matter where they found themselves in the southern tip of Africa, one of the many things they had in common with one another was a strong Calvinistic faith. They were a God-fearing nation with a strong sense of church and an equally strong belief that their success and future prosperity lay in the strength of their community. The Dutch Reformed Church was the instrument which catered for their spiritual needs and was the glue that bound them together.

It was into the Vrede Parish of this church that a 21-year-old Swart was accepted as a member on 7 April 1893 when he was 21 years old. He also married Catharina Johanna Elisabeth Uys at some point and started a family with Dina Maria Margharita being born on 6 January 1897. Her baptism took place in the same church on 30 November 1897 and, as he stood in church, dressed in his Sunday best, looking at the smiling faces around him, he would have had not the faintest notion that he, and many of the young men of his “Gemeente” (congregation) would be at war in three years time.

Trouble between the Transvaal’s President Kruger and Great Britain had been brewing since the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in the 1880’s. the grievances were many and varied and Kruger, sensing that things would come to head, sought an ally in his Boer neighbor to the south of his border – President Steyn of the Orange Free State. A pact was signed whereby, were the Transvaal to go to war against the British Empire, the O.F.S. would follow suit by taking up arms against the Empire as well.

On 11 October 1899 the bluff and bluster was over and war was declared. As per the agreement, a reluctant Steyn joined the fray. Both Boer Republics had been gearing up for war for some time before the first shot was fired – the Transvaal moving Commandos to the Natal border and their western border with the Cape Colony and the Free State Commandos massing to the east, on their side of the Drakensberg mountain range with Natal. Both were poised to strike when the great day arrived.

The Vrede Commando, with whom Swart had enrolled, pitched their camp at Van Reenen, next to the railway line near to Harrismith, and within a short sprint (or gallop) over the pass into Natal. On 13 October the Free State Commandos, the Vrede Burghers among them, crossed into Natal. Most of them missed out on the two initial clashes of Talana (near Dundee) and Elandslaagte as these were fought by the Transvaal forces in the main, but were in on the action at Rietfontein (Modderspruit) near Ladysmith.


A map showing Vrede in relation to where Swart fought

Fortunately for the writer, Burghers were required to apply for their medals from 1921 onwards via the completion of “Vorm B” – this form required the applicant to list, in as much detail as possible, the battles and campaigns in which he participated. The Burgher wasn’t necessarily taken at his word – he was required to obtain the signatures of as many as three fellow combatants or officers with whom he had served as proof that his version of events was truthful.

Swart completed his Vorm B only in 1941, by which time many of his comrades would have passed away. He did however secure the signatures of a J.F.H. Swart and D.M.M. Jordaan, both of whom were able to confirm that he saw action at Platrand (Wagon Hill), Colenso, Doornberg, Vrede and Harrismith Districts. These were principally under the command of General Phillip Botha and Veldkornet Janse Van Rensburg.

To strengthen his claim, Swart included a letter from the widow of his late Veldkornet who was “well acquainted with my duties and obligations as a Burgher”. Mrs Van Rensburg wrote, under oath that, “I, surviving spouse of the late Veldkornet Marthinus J.J. van Rensburg, am aware that Burgher P. Swart served under my husband during the Boer War of 1899-1902, and that he was on the battlefield at all times”.

Ladysmith, before Yule’s men from Dundee had retired on it, was the third most important place in Natal, ranking next after Durban and Maritzburg. It had a white population of some 3,000, with 2,000 natives and some Indians and, of course, Sir George White’s garrison of Regular Army and Colonial troops numbering some 6000. These numbers were swelled by the 4000 men under Yule and, after 1 November 1899, after the Boers had surrounded Ladysmith, she was under siege.

The town is situated on the Klip River, a tributary of the Tugela, and lies part in a hollow and part on the side of a ridge within a semicircle of surrounding hills. The Klip winds its way from the west by the south and east side of the town, with banks standing twenty or thirty feet above the level of the stream. These steep banks naturally played an important part in General White's plans for the defence of his garrison. Hills and ridges encircle the town at a distance of four or five miles towards each point of the compass. The hills dominated the place and gave to the Boer Commander Joubert's two large Creusot six-inch guns positions from which Ladysmith was easily shelled.

Ridges south and west of the town gave White strong natural positions on which to build redoubts and other protection for his naval guns, while equally well-sheltered places were found for the smaller field artillery. Huge stores of ammunition and other war material had been accumulated, along with adequate food provision for emergencies, and, thus situated and provided for, General White was enabled to withstand even the long siege to which his well-equipped garrison was subjected.

Joubert's chief positions in his lines of investment arc roughly indicated in the points of the compass. Pepworth Hill, north of the town; Lombard's Kop, east; Onderbroek Kop, south; and a series of strong ridges to the west—the average distance from Ladysmith being four or five miles. Bulwana Hill, to the southeast, and Surprise Hill, to the northwest, were a little out of the compass bearings, but the guns on each of these hills played a very prominent part in the siege, being some 7,000 or 8,000 yards' distance from the town.

Joubert's head laager was at Modderspruit Station, behind Pepworth Hill. His commandoes were those with which he had invaded Natal, and fought the engagement at Modderspruit on the 31st of October; less, however, by the forces lent to Botha for the dash on Estcourt, and for the subsequent and brilliant campaign on the Tugela against Buller.

The besieging forces were roughly divided into four main laagers, corresponding in location more or less to the points of the compass, the guns being distributed accordingly—Joubert to the north, Schalk Burger east, Lukas Meyer south, and Prinsloo, with the Free State contingent (including the Vrede Commando), to the west.

After a number of small skirmishes, a period of relative inactivity had set in, if the Boers were to free up much-needed manpower for other fronts on which they were engaged, they would have to make an almost last-ditch attempt to take Ladysmith. After a Council of War, it was finally agreed to make a surprise attack upon the Platrand which was the key to Ladysmith. This elevated ridge is flat-topped in formation, two or three miles long, 600 or 700 feet high, sloping up from the town in the south eastern direction, with the Klip River running between its eastern end and the two hills of Lombard's Kop and Bulwana.

It was strongly fortified with redoubts, chanzas, and rifle-pits, and defended by the naval guns, and by White's strongest posts. On the reverse, or southern side, it sloped down in the direction of one of the Boer laagers, and was approached by a deep spruit running north from Grobler's Kloof into the Klip River, and also by several narrow valleys formed by the southern spurs of the " Platkop," as the Boers named the long hill. A body of men from Lombard's Kop, on the east, was to move south of the English hospital camp, cross the railway, and make for the Fouries' Spruit alluded to, where another force from the laager at Grobler's Kloof, and also from Botha's camp on the Tugela, would be met. These men would ascend the spruit behind Caesar's Camp, and rush the first English entrenchments, which, if gained, would mask the assailants against the English guns further west on the hill.

Simultaneously the Free Staters of the west laager, under De Villiers and Nel, were to advance on Wagon Hill, the extreme western height of the Platrand, and repeat the attack to be made at the other extremity. The Pretoria laager, to the north of Ladysmith, was to cooperate as occasion might require, the object being to carry the assault from positions south and west which offered the best cover for the advancing burghers. The assault was to be delivered under the shelter of darkness on the early morning of the 6th of January, and every, precaution was taken against knowledge of the intended coup leaking out.

The two extremes of the Platrand were usually held by a few detachments of White's men, secure in the belief that the Boers would only continue their long range artillery fire in the day, and would not attempt to storm at night without bayonets. On the night previous to the attack being delivered, both the positions at Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill were reinforced by guns and men;
indicating that General White had learned of the contemplated assault on his southern defences.

By two o'clock on the morning of the 6th of January the burghers chosen for the assault had all reached their respective rendezvous. The Utrecht men, with some Standerton and Wakkerstroom burghers, under the east slope of the Platrand; the men from Heidelberg were round to their right, a mile from the English hospital; and 1,000 of the Vryheid commando and 100 German Uitlanders had marched from Colenso to the spruit below Bester's Farm, having the Free State contingent under Wagon Hill, to their left.

The attack was made at the three points almost simultaneously, the Vryheiders leading and advancing up the slope of the hill from the south. The enemy was in no way taken by surprise, and the first burghers who cleared the crest fell before a well-directed fire from behind the outer lines of the British positions. But the burghers did not waver. They fired lying in many places within fifty yards of the Tommies, making gaps behind the chanzas wherever a head offered a target for an aim.

The Free Staters had likewise captured the west end of Wagon Hill, led by the brave De Villiers, of Harrismith, and by four o'clock, as the light began to make all things visible, the lower part of the Platrand from east to west was in possession of the burghers.

Thus the first line of the enemy's position on the hill was gallantly captured and held, but the English were by no means beaten off. They fell back to other entrenchments, nearer their guns, and clung to them with dogged tenacity until reinforcements came from the town below, and from other posts within the besieged area.

The flat top of the hill became a scene of the most determined fight which had taken place since the siege began, the combatants in several places being separated by only a few yards. The defenders of the hill had the service at close range of their naval and field guns, and it was this great advantage, coupled with a failure on the part of the Pretoria Commando to succour the Free Staters on Wagon Hill, which enabled White ultimately to beat off the determined assault of his opponents. The fight at this end of the Platrand had been hot and furious from the beginning, the Free Staters repulsing every attempt made to break their hold on the hill. White hurled several detachments of Highlanders, King's Royal Rifles, and Imperial Light Horse against Commandant Nel and his brave men but, though subjected to a terrific fire from two batteries, a naval gun, and fully 2,000 of White's garrison, the Harrismith, Heilbron, Vrede, and Kroonstad burghers heroically withstood the onslaught, and maintained their position for fully ten hours. Four times in succession during the continuous struggle on and around Wagon Hill did the English pluckily rush forward to recapture their ground, only to be shot back remorselessly by the intrepid burghers, until the hill in front of them was almost covered with dead and wounded Tommies.

The Boer guns from Bulwana rendered very little effective service to the burghers engaged in holding the west end of the Platrand. The distance, except to the eastern slope, where the Utrecht men easily held their ground under cover of Long Tom's shells, was too great for accurate shooting, while the enemy's whole batteries were on and around the Platrand within close reach of the men who had climbed and held the hill. During the afternoon a furious storm of rain swept across the battle-field, drenching both sides, but in no way abating the fury of the fight for the possession of the hill.

There can be no denying the courage and tenacity with which the garrison fought for the retention of the Platrand. Their fifty guns were, however, almost all employed, and to this overwhelming artillery fire was mainly due the repulse of the attack. The conviction is general among the Boer officers who led the assault, that, had the needed assistance from the north laager been given to the Free Staters, they could have held that end of the hill, and from thence have captured the town.

The moral effect of the storming of the Platrand was very marked on the English, who were cured by it of the superstition about Boers dreading a close encounter, and fearing to face fixed bayonets. The lesson learned on the Boer side from the fight was confirmatory of Joubert's view, that the Boer forces were not numerically strong enough for plans of assault requiring big battalions for the success of riskiest enterprises, and for the certain losses which victory or defeat in attempting them always demand.

The attempt to storm the Platrand was the last serious engagement in or around Ladysmith until its relief was effected in February.
The official lists of Boer losses, as published in the " Volksstem " of January 10 and 12, 1900, give the killed as 55, and the wounded as 135. The lists are exhaustive in supplying the names, full home address, and the commandoes of the men killed and wounded. The Free Staters were the heaviest losers, the Utrecht, Wakkerstroom, and Heidelberg burghers coming next in proportionate losses.

As can be seen from the above account the Free State Commandos, Swart’s among them, had played a pivotal part in the battle.

Ladysmith was relieved on the 28th February 1900 and the Boer forces were allowed to make good their escape – the British forces too exhausted to pursue them. After the Free State Boers retired from Natal a large number of them were ordered to go to the western theatre of conflict in an endeavour to oppose Lord Roberts and his immense army from penetrating further into the Free State. Gen Sir J French relieved the siege of Kimberley on 15 February 1900 and Gen P Cronjé surrendered with some 4 000 men at Paardeberg on 27 February 1900. Roberts entered Bloemfontein on 13 March 1900 and two months later annexed the Free State for the British Crown, renaming the territory the Orange River Colony.

The commandos of Harrismith, Vrede and Heilbron, who were subsequently called away from Ladysmith, were however, assigned to the defence of the Drakensberg passes from Oliviershoek to De Beers. The action at Vaal Krantz in early February followed next - the state of the Boer military machine at this point was precarious – many Burghers, with the approval of their Commandants, had obtained leave and returned to their farms, there was no one clear overall leader and various Commandos were left to their own devices.

Everyone knew that Buller was planning another attack to relieve Ladysmith but there was a lethargy that enveloped the Boer forces and no clear plans were evident to combat it. The only reinforcements, besides a few guns, that was sent to the Upper Tugela before 5 February were 350 Heidelbergers who were camped at Doorn Kloof. The total Boer strength on the Upper Tugela was about 4000 men – from the Twin Peaks to Krantz Kloof the main position was held by Ermelo, Senekal, Vrede, Frankfort and Zoutpansberg Commandos in that order. Operations commenced but, largely owing to Buller’s lack of appetite for battle, British defeat was snatched from the jaws of victory through Buller’s indecisiveness.

From Natal the army under Buller ascended the Drakensberg further to the north via Botha's Pass and Laing's Nek, and eventually advanced into the Transvaal. Meanwhile the Harrismith and Vrede men, after remaining inactive until mid-July, were ordered to proceed to Naauwpoort, a mountain pass in the lofty Rooiberge mountains near Bethlehem towards which a large British Force had been advancing.

The country before Naauwpoort Nek was occupied by elements of the Bethlehem, Vrede and Harrismith commandos. Two British columns swept down from Bethlehem. The Boers, after offering considerable resistance on 26 July, withdrew through the pass and advanced eastward towards Golden Gate. Realising that the Boers could escape, the British endeavoured to guard both Naauwpoort and Golden Gate but arrived too late. Only slight opposition was encountered, the Boers having escaped, heading northwards towards Harrismith.

On the 24th August 1900, Swart and comrades from the Vrede Commando joined the Harrismith Commando and others at Doornberg in the Winburg/Ladybrand area - the little force now comprising some 2000 Burghers. The village of Ventersburg had been reoccupied by the British and was being reinforced by them once the presence of a Boer force in the district had become known. The reinforcements turned back when they saw the Boers and were pursued by the Vrede Commando who had come up from the east, but when the British began to fire shrapnel at them, they ceased the pursuit and returned to Laager.

Meanwhile De Wet made further plans for the revival of the war. Men were recruited from their farms, while the commandos of Harrismith (under Phillip Botha) and Vrede (under Hattingh) met De Wet at Heilbron in September 1900. Having learnt from experience that wagons were a hindrance to mobility, De Wet informed the burghers that these were to be abandoned and only horse commandos would be allowed. He then headed westwards with the Heilbron commando and some faithful men from Harrismith and Vrede.

Kestell’s “Through Shot and Flame” carried an account of what happened next:

‘On Saturday, 8 September we separated. From Commandant Haasbroek we parted at Korannaberg, whilst General Fourie hastened forward with 100 men to interview General De Wet personally. De Wet’s order was not carried out by the men of Vrede and Harrismith. They considered that they could not do away with their waggons; but nevertheless resolved to proceed to the Chief-Commandant, and then, when they should arrive where he was, to act according to circumstances.

It was one of the most monotonous journeys imaginable. We were under the command of General Hattingh and from the 8th to the 18th September did nothing but trek some distance every evening. Proceeding on our way, we first heard that the enemy had hemmed in Commandant Haasbroek at Doornberg, and that afterwards he escaped with the loss of nearly all his waggons and his field-guns. We heard later on that the enemy had been in full strength under General Hector MacDonald, and that Haasbroek had escaped with all his men, but that MacDonald had captured 16 of his waggons at Vet River on the 13th and 18 at Doornberg on the 17th September.

The cannon did not however, fall into the hands of the enemy. Commandant Haasbroek concealed them in a dam so as not to have the trouble of dragging about with him guns for which he had no ammunition.” (Swart would have been with Haasbroek at Doornberg according to his Vorm

A “bitter einder” (a Burgher who fought throughout the war until its conclusion), Swart took part in many other skirmishes and, like his comrades, would have spent a large part of his war in the saddle and on the run from the British forces who were omnipresent. He laid down his arms on 10 June 1902 in his home town of Vrede.


An extract from the Claim Compensation form

Once back on his farm, Wagenpad, Swart started the process of picking up the pieces of his life. On 9 December 1902 he completed the Form of Claims for War Losses wherein he confirmed that he was now 31 years of age and farmed on Wagenpad, in the Kliprivier district of Vrede. His claim was in respect of sheep, goats, furniture and building materials – either taken by the British or damaged beyond repair when his farmhouse and outbuildings were burnt during the “Scorched Earth” policy. It read as follows: -

‘Petrus Hermanus Swart – Burgher Compensation - Claim No. 280

Evidence – Claimant
Petrus Hermanus Swart duly sworn in the Dutch form states:

I am married and have two children. I was a Burgher of the late O.F.S. I was on Commando. I surrendered at Trekoppies 11 June 1902. I have signed an undertaking to sign the declaration. I am not a landowner. I do not expect any inheritance. I possess at present 10 sheep. I owe £40 to £50. There is nothing owing to me. I have no other claim than the present. I have received no consideration against same. I had nine horses on commando, and my cart and my wagon.

There is no booty in claim. Nothing in claim was lost in battle, nor died, nor was stolen from me. All was my lawful property before the war. I acknowledge Annexures A and B. I received these receipts on the dates mentioned on same and I delivered the sheep at the same time. The sheep were my own. I acknowledge Annexure C. I received this note in full payment of ten bags of mealies supplied to Transvaal Burgers.

I acknowledge Annexure D it is correct. The horses, sheep and cattle were all my own property before the war. I acquired nothing during the war. Part of the stock was my own handling and part was acquired before the war for work done. The wagon I received from my father during the war. The cart I bought from J.N. Uys before the war for £20. The poultry and pigs my wife had before the war. The furniture consisted of two tables, chairs, crockery etc. The building material was not in my house; it was kept on the farm of J.N. Uys. He told me I could take some with me whenever I left the farm.

I now have nothing of the above left. I lost all during the war. In February 1902 my sheep (150 in all) were taken by the troops. I did not see them taken. They were with my father. In February 1902 five horses and three cattle were taken in the drive. …. saw them the day before…… The horses were being ridden and led, 3 under one native and 2 under another. In April 1902 three horses were taken and my wagon and cart. The cart and wagon were destroyed at the house. Two horses were also taken then and one escaped out of hand to the British camp.

One was a riding horse and the other two were trained mares. In November 1901 the fowls and pigs were taken and the house was destroyed. When the war began I possessed fully 200 sheep also 15 cattle, nine horses including five riding horses. I lost 12 cattle during the war from rinderpest. A few sheep also died but they also lambed during the war.

Signed

P.H. Swart’


One of the "chits" provided to Swart on requisition of livestock or supplies

Witness statements were also required as per the one below: -

First Witness
Petrus Johannes Loock duly sworn in the Dutch form states:

I reside on Wagenpad. I know P.H. Swart. He is my cousin. We reside about a quarter of an acre from each other. I know he possessed before the war fully 160 sheep, 3 cattle, 9 horses including 4 riding horses. 1 cart, 1 wagon and furniture. He has now nothing of the above left. He lost all during the war. In February 1901 fully 160 sheep were taken by the troops. The day after the troops left I was at the farm and saw these had been taken.

The same month, no later, four horses were taken. I saw these taken from a distance. In 1901 I do not remember the month, 3 cattle were taken. At most 5 days elapsed between the time I saw this and returned to the farm after the troops had passed, to find they were gone. The same year I cannot say what month, the furniture value about £11 was taken. A few days afterwards I was at the house and saw it was gone. He had four horses on commando.’

At some stage Swart left farming and moved into the town of Piet Retief, it was from his residence at 32 Draad Street, that he submitted is application for his medal. He passed away at the age of 76 on 3 March 1948, in the Moolman district of Piet Retief, from Chronic Nephritis and an Enlarged Prostate and is buried in the cemetery of the town.