TOPIC:

Johannes Frederick Wilhelm Mostert

Severely Wounded – Pieter’s Hill (27 February 1900)

Kommandant, Johannesburg (Fordsburg) Commando – Anglo Boer War

- Dekorasie vir Troue Dienst to KOMDT. J.F.W. MOSTERT
- Anglo Boere Oorlog Medal to KOMDT. J.F.W. MOSTERT
- Lint voor Wonden

The enduring question is, just who was Johan Mostert? This question would normally apply to a man who was, as in his case, known variously as Johan, Johannes and even John but, in Mostert’s case, it cuts much deeper and implies much more. How did it come to pass that a man who started (and ended) the war as an Assistant Veld Cornet, have his medals officially issued in the rank of Kommandant? How too did a man who saw no further action and was never a Prisoner of War, claim to have been hospitalised with his wounds until two months after the peace was declared? That he was an enigma there can be no doubt. That he was a brave and interesting man, irrefutable.

Willie Mostert (for thus it appears he was termed by his comrades in arms) was a maverick. His lineage had none of the Transvaal trekkers or the Orange Free State farmers about it, which would allow him to claim, almost as a birthright, the bragging rights to being a Boer. Instead, he was born in Bellville, on the outskirts of that most English - centered of places in South Africa, Cape Town - in what was a most decidedly British colony, on 15 September 1864 to Cornelius Mostert, an Agricultural Farmer of Cape Dutch heritage and his wife, Anna Hermina Mostert, born Durr.

Little of his formative years is known but he would have been raised in the strongly Calvinistic Dutch Reformed Church and received, at the very least, a rudimentary schooling, suitable for the times in which he lived. He certainly wasn’t alone at home, having as an older brother, Jacob Johan Mostert and, as younger siblings, Cornelius Mostert, Johan Hendrik Mostert, Jacobus Michael Mostert, Elizabeth Catherina Mostert, Anna Hermina Mostert, Maria Christina Mostert and Catherina Marguerita Muriel Mostert.

At some point in time, Mostert, lured possibly by the fortunes that were to be made on the Witwatersrand goldfields, decided to seek his fortune outside of the ambit of his family and surroundings, trekking up to Johannesburg where, in 1897, he formally applied to the Transvaal authorities for permission to become a fully-fledged Transvaal Burgher.

Obtaining employment as a Compound Manager on one of the Gold Mines, he immersed himself in the life of his new city, somewhat strangely, given his Cape Dutch background, joining the Fordsburg Lodge of that most English of institutions – the Free Masons. This was on 28 July 1898 and, although there was no outright talk of war on the streets at this time; many would have been speculating as to its eventual outbreak.

But what talk of war was this? Kruger’s Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek had been at loggerheads with the British authorities for quite some time. The major issue concerned the “Uitlanders”, the thousands of men and women (of mainly British origin) who had flooded into the Transvaal once gold had been discovered. The taxes and other revenue derived from these “foreigners” were a welcome boost to the strained coffers of the Transvaal Government but this did not necessarily grant them citizenship, a right to vote or any say at all in the running of the country. Resistance began to grow, culminating in the abortive Jameson Raid of 1896 and, despite the suppression of that ill-conceived endeavor, agitation continued to grow.

Mostert would have been aware of this, and the dinner chat around the port and cigars he would have enjoyed with his Lodge fellows, would have been decidedly anti Kruger and pro-British in sentiment. Did this sit comfortably with him? We didn’t have long to wait to find out, on 11 October 1899 the much anticipated war broke out between Britain and the Transvaal, along with Kruger’s ally, the Orange Free State. Prior to this, there had been a massive exodus of “Uitlanders” from Johannesburg and elsewhere in the ZAR. They fled in many directions to avoid what they knew was coming, primarily heading for Delagoa Bay or streaming south to Durban in Natal.

From the outset, Mostert joined the ranks of the Fordsburg Commando, a part of the larger Johannesburg Commando, with the officers rank of Veld Cornet. Fortunately, when determining where and when a Boer combatant saw service, we have the Vorm B to thank. This form, along with Vorm A and C, were required to be completed in detail by those applying for the issue of medals from 1921 onwards. The applicant had not only to get the signatures of credible eye witnesses to vouchsafe his claims but had also to list the various battles and skirmishes in which he took part. We thus know, with relative certainty, how active, when and where the man was.

In the case of Mostert, he applied for and was awarded both the Dekorasie vir Troue Dienst and the Anglo Boere Oorlog medal – to go with his Lint voor Wonden. Vorms A, B and C were thus completed and processed. As can be expected from a Johannesburg Commando man, Mostert saw service at the battle of Elandslaagte, followed by Pont Drift (Rooi Randjies), Colenso, Spioenkop and Pieters Hill (Vaalkrantz) – all in the Natal theatre of operations.

The commanding officer of the Johannesburg Commando was Commandant Ben Viljoen, the author of “My Reminiscences of the Anglo Boer”, and it is his personal account of many of the battles in which Mostert participated as one of Viljoen’s Veld Cornets, that is quoted from extensively.

Elandslaagte

On the evening of the 29th of September the 900 men of the Johannesburg Commando left in two trains for the Natal front, in preparation for war. The following afternoon Standerton was reached where telegraphic instructions from General Joubert was received to join the commando to that of Captain Schiel, who was in charge of the German Corps – all to be placed under the supreme command of General Jan Kock.


Johannesburg Commando crossing Botha's Pass on the way to Newcastle 16 October 1899

War having been declared on 11 October. The Boer force received orders to invade Natal, crossing the frontier that evening. Close to Newcastle a large number of commandos were encountered, and a general council of war was held under Commandant General Joubert. Here it was decided that Generals Lukas Meyer and Erasmus should take Dundee, while the commandos under General Kock were instructed to occupy the Biggarburg Pass.

Viljoen received instructions from General Kock to proceed with two hundred men and a cannon to Elandslaagte, which was reached at midnight in heavy rain. After scrambling for positions in the dark, they retired to rest for the night.

Viljoen takes up the story. “In the grey dawn of the 21st of October a number of scouts I had despatched overnight in the direction of Ladysmith returned with the tidings that "the khakis were coming." "Where are they, and how many are there of them?" I asked. "Commandant," the chief scout replied, "I don't know much about these things, but I should think that the English number quite a thousand mounted men, and they have guns, and they have already passed Modderspruit."

It was at sunrise that the first shot I heard in this war was fired. Presently the men we dreaded were visible on the ridges of hills south of the little red railway station at Elandslaagte. The awkward way in which many of my men sought cover, demonstrated at once how inexperienced in warfare we youngsters were. We started with our guns and tried a little experimental shooting. The second and third shots appeared to be effective; at any rate, as far as we could judge, they seemed to disturb the equanimity of the advancing troops.

The British guns appeared to be of very small calibre (these were the puny guns of the Natal Field Artillery battery). When the British found that we too had guns, and, what is more, knew how to use them, they retired towards Ladysmith. But this was merely a ruse; they had gone back to fetch more men. Still, though it was a ruse, we were cleverly deceived by it, and while we were off-saddling and preparing the mid-day meal they were arranging a new and more formidable attack. From the Modderspruit siding they were pouring troops brought down by rail, and although we had a splendid chance of shelling the newcomers from the high kopje we occupied, General Kock, who was in supreme command of our corps, for some reason which has never been explained, refused to permit us to fire upon them. I went to General Kock and pleaded with him, but he was adamant.

The British tactics were plain enough. General French had placed his infantry in the centre with three field batteries (fifteen pounders), while his cavalry, with Maxims, encompassed our right and left. He was forming a crescent, with the obvious purpose of turning our position with his right and left wing. When charging at the close of the attack the cavalry, which consisted mainly of lancers, were on both our flanks, and completely prevented our retreat. It was not easy to estimate the number of our assailant's forces. Judging roughly, I calculated they numbered between 5,000 and 6,000, while we were 800 all told, and our artillery consisted merely of two Nordenfeldt guns with shell, and no grape shot.

For a long time, we did our best to keep our opponents at bay, but they came in crushing numbers, and speedily dead and maimed burghers covered the veldt. Then the Gordon Highlanders and the other infantry detachments commenced to storm our positions. We got them well within the range of our rifle fire, and made our presence felt; but they kept pushing on with splendid determination and indomitable pluck, though their ranks were being decimated before our very eyes.

About half an hour before sunset, the enemy had come up close to our positions and on all sides a terrible battle raged. When the sun had set and the awful scene was enveloped in darkness there was a dreadful spectacle of maimed Germans, Hollanders, Frenchmen, Irishmen, Americans, and Boers lying on the veldt. Another charge, and the British, encouraged by their success, had taken our last position, guns and all. My only resource now was to flee, and the battle of Elandslaagte was a thing of the past”.

What followed next was a general and very disorderly retreat. Chased by the mounted Lancers, the remaining Boers, Mostert among their number, scattered in different directions, eventually meeting up at Dannhauser Station where General Joubert had made his headquarters. About 120 stragglers had made it away from the battlefield, the others either dead, wounded or taken prisoner. Here Viljoen was given the order to reorganise his Commando, and to include what remained of the German and Hollander Corps under his command. The Johannesburg Commando now regrouped and reequipped itself at Newcastle. Viljoen continued his account:

“The next day, when the Johannesburg corps turned out, we numbered 485 mounted men, all fully equipped. I then asked for instructions as to where I was to proceed with my commando. The reply I received was as follows: —

"Pitch your camp near Dundee, and maintain law and order in the Province, and see that you are not attacked a second time." Evidently my chief had resolved to keep us in the background; he would not trust our commando in the fighting line. In short, he would not keep his word and give us another chance to recoup our losses. I had, however, made up my mind, and ordered the commando to march to Ladysmith.


Joburg Commando after Elandslaagte

On the 1st November, 1899, we reached the main army near Ladysmith, and I went at once to tell General Joubert in person that my men wanted to fight, and not to play policemen in the rear of the army. After much storming, he grew calmer, and ordered me for the time being to join General Schalk Burger, who was operating near Lombard's Kop in the siege of Ladysmith.

That same evening, I arrived there with my commando and reported myself to Lieut-General Burger. We pitched our tents on the same spot where a few days before Generals White and French had been defeated, and awaited developments.

Meanwhile, it became daily more evident to me how greatly Joubert depreciated my commando, and that we would have to behave very well and fight very bravely to regain his favour. Other commandos also seemed to have no better opinion, and spoke of us as the laager which had to run at Elandslaagte. We were now, however, at any rate at the front. I sent out my outposts and fixed my positions, which were very far from good; but I decided to make no complaints.

A few days after we had arrived before Ladysmith we joined an expedition to reconnoitre the British entrenchments, and my commando was ordered near some forts on the north-westerly side of the town. Both small and large artillery were being fired from each side. We approached within 800 paces of a fort; it was broad daylight and the enemy could therefore see us distinctly, knew the exact range, and received us with a perfect hailstorm of fire. Our only chance was to seek cover behind kopjes and in ditches, for on any Boer showing his head the bullets whistled round his ears. At last, late in the afternoon, came the order to retire, and we retired after having achieved nothing.

After another fortnight or so, we were ordered away to guard another position to the south-west of Ladysmith. Here I was under the command of General Erasmus. We had plenty of work given us. Trenches had to be dug and forts had to be constructed and remodelled. Eight days after my commando had been stationed in my new position under General Erasmus, I received instructions to march to Potgietersdrift, on the Upper Tugela, near Spioen Kop, and there to put myself at Andries Cronje's disposal. Up to the 14th of December, 1899, no noteworthy incident took place, and nothing was done but a little desultory scouting along the Tugela, and the digging of trenches.

Colenso

At last came the welcome order summoning us to action; and we were bidden to march on Colenso Heights with 200 men to fill up the ranks, as a fight was imminent. We left under General Cronje and arrived the next morning at daybreak, and a few hours after began the battle now known to the world as the Battle of Colenso (15th December, 1899).

I afterwards heard that the commandos under General Cronje were to cross the river and attack the enemy's left flank. This did not happen, as the greatest confusion prevailed owing to the various contradictory orders given by the generals. I, however, took the initiative in moving my men up to the river to attempt the capture of a battery of guns on the enemy's left flank which had been left unprotected, as was the case with the ten guns which fell into our hands later in the day. I had approached within 1,400 paces of the enemy, and my burghers were following close behind me when an adjutant from General Louis Botha galloped up to us and ordered us at once to join the Ermelo commando, which was said to be too weak to resist the attacks of the enemy. We hurried thither as quickly as we could round the rear of the fighting line, where we were obliged to off-saddle and walk up to the position of the Ermelo burghers. This was no easy task; the battle was now in full swing, and the enemy's shells were bursting in dozens around us, and in the burning sun we had to run some miles.

When we arrived at our destination, the Ermelo burghers said they were quite comfortable, and had asked for no assistance. Not a single shell had reached them, for a clump of aloe trees stood a hundred yards away, which the English presumably had taken for Boers, judging by the terrific bombardment these trees were being subjected to.

By this time the attack was repulsed, and General Buller was in full retreat to Chieveley, though our commando had been unable to take an active part in the fighting, at which we were greatly disappointed. After I had assisted in bringing away through the river the guns we had taken, and seen to other matters which required my immediate attention, I was ordered to remain with the Ermelo Commando at Colenso, near Toomdrift, and to await further instructions.

A few weeks of inactivity followed, the English sending us each day a few samples of their shells from their 4.7 Naval guns. Unfortunately, our guns were of much smaller calibre, and we could send them no suitable reply. As a rule, we would lie in the trenches, and a burgher would be on the look-out. As soon as he saw the flash of an English gun, he would cry out; "There's a shell," and we then sought cover, so that the enemy seldom succeeded in harming us. My laager had been at Potgietersdrift all this time, and for the time being we had been deprived of our tents. We were not sorry, therefore, when we were ordered to leave Colenso and to return to our camp.

A few days later, we were told to take up a position at the junction of the Little and the Big Tugela, between Spioen Kop and Colenso. Here we celebrated our first Christmas in the field; our friends at Johannesburg had sent us a quantity of presents, comprising cakes, cigars, cigarettes, tobacco and other luxuries. But General Buller had not quite finished with us yet. He marched on Spioen Kop, but with the exception of a feint attack nothing of importance happened then.

Buller's forces seemed at first to have the intention of forcing their way through near Potgietersdrift, and they took possession of all the "randts" on their side of the river, causing us to strengthen the position on our side. We thus had to shift our commando again to Potgietersdrift, where we soon had the enemy's Naval guns playing on our positions. This continued day and night for a whole week. It seemed as if General Buller was determined to annihilate all the Boers with his lyddite shells - certainly we suffered considerably from lyddite fumes.

The British next made a feint attack near Potgietersdrift, advancing with a great clamour till they had come within 2,000 paces of us, where they occupied various "randts" and kopjes, always under cover of their artillery. Once they came a little too close to our positions, and we suddenly opened fire on them. This "feint," however, was only made in order to divert our attention, while Buller was concentrating his troops and guns on Spioen Kop. The ruse succeeded to a large extent, and on the 21st January the memorable battle of Spioen Kop (near the Upper Tugela) began.

Spioen Kop

General Warren, who, I believe, was in command here, had ordered another "feint" attack from the extreme right wing. General Cronje and the Free Staters had taken up a position at Spioen Kop, assisted by the commandos of General Erasmus and Schalk Burger. The fight lasted the whole of that day and the next, and became more and more fierce. Luckily General Botha appeared on the scene in time, and re-arranged matters so well and with so much energy that the enemy found itself well employed, and was kept in check at all points.


Boers at Spioenkop

I had been ordered to defend the position at Potgietersdrift, but the fighting round Spion Kop became so serious that I was obliged to send up a field cornet with his men as a reinforcement, which was soon followed by a second contingent, making altogether 200 Johannesburgers in the fight, of whom nine were killed and 18 wounded. The enemy had reached the top of the "kop" on the evening of the second day of the fight, not, however, without having sustained considerable losses. But General Botha kept his ground like a man, surrounded by the faithful little band who had already borne the brunt of this important battle. And one can imagine our delight when next morning we found that the English had retreated, leaving that immense battlefield, strewn with hundreds of dead and wounded, in our hands.

Vaalkrantz (5 February 1900)

Soon after his defeat at Spioen Kop, General Buller, moved by the earnest entreaties for help from Ladysmith, and pressed by Lord Roberts, attempted a third time to break through our lines. This time my position had to bear the onslaught of his whole forces. For some days it had been clear to me what the enemy intended to do, but I wired in vain to the Commander-in-Chief to send me reinforcements, and I was left to defend a front, one and a half miles in length, with about 400 men.

After many requests I at last moved General Joubert to send me one of the guns known as "Long Toms," which was placed at the rear of our position, and enabled us to command the Vaalkrantz, or, as we called it, "Pontdrift" kopjes. But instead of the required reinforcements, the Commander sent a telegram to General Meyer to Colenso, telling him to come and speak to me, and to put some heart into me, for it seemed, he said, "as if I had lost faith."

General Meyer came, and I explained to him how matters stood, and that I should not be able to check the enormous attacking force with my commando alone. The British were at this time only 7,000 paces away from us. The required assistance, however, never came.

Early in the morning of the 5th February, 1900, my position was heavily bombarded, and before the sun had risen four of my burghers had been put hors de combat. The enemy had placed their naval guns on the outskirts of the wood known as "Zwartkop" so as to be able to command our position from an elevation of about 400 feet. I happened to be on the right flank with ninety-five burghers and a pom-pom; my assistant, Commandant Japie du Preez, commanding the left flank.

The assailants threw two pontoon bridges across the river and troops kept pouring over from 10 o'clock in the morning. The whole of the guns' fire was now concentrated on my position; and although we answered with a well-directed fire, they charged time after time. The number of my fighting men was rapidly diminishing. I may say this was the heaviest bombardment I witnessed during the whole of the campaign. It seemed to me as if all the guns of the British army were being fired at us.

Their big lyddite guns sent over huge shells, which mowed down all the trees on the kopje, while about fifty field pieces were incessantly barking away from a shorter range. Conan Doyle, in his book, "The Great Boer War," states that the British had concentrated no less than seventy-three guns on that kopje. In vain I implored the nearest Generals for reinforcements and requested our artillery in Heaven's name to aim at the enemy's guns. At last "Long Tom" commenced operations, but the artillerymen in charge had omitted to put the powder in a safe place and it was soon struck by a lyddite shell which set the whole of it on fire. This compelled us to send to the head laager near Ladysmith for a fresh supply of powder.


Action scene at Vaalkrantz

On looking about me to see how my burghers were getting on I found that many around me had been killed and others were wounded. The clothes of the latter were burnt and they cried out for help in great agony. Our pom-pom had long since been silenced by the enemy, and thirty of my burghers had been put out of the fight. The enemy's infantry was advancing nearer and nearer and there was not much time left to think. I knelt down behind a kopje, along with some of the men, and we kept firing away at 400 paces, but although we sent a good many to eternal rest, the fire of the few burghers who were left was too weak to stem the onslaught of those overwhelming numbers.

A lyddite shell suddenly burst over our very heads. Four burghers with me were blown to pieces and my rifle was smashed. It seemed to me as if a huge cauldron of boiling fat had burst over us and for some minutes I must have lost consciousness. A mouthful of brandy and water was given me and restored me somewhat, and when I opened my eyes I saw the enemy climbing the kopje on three sides of us, some of them only a hundred paces away from me.

I ordered my men to fall back and took charge of the pom-pom, and we then retired under a heavy rifle and gun fire. Some English writers have made much ado about the way in which our pom-pom was saved, but it was nothing out of the ordinary. Of the 95 burghers with me 29 had been killed, 24 wounded.

When I had a few minutes rest I felt a piercing pain in my head, and the blood began to pour from my nose and ears. We had taken up another position at 1,700 paces, and fired our pom-pom at the enemy, who now occupied our position of a few minutes before. On the right and left of the positions taken by them our burghers were still in possession of the "randjies"; to the right Japie du Preez, with the loss of only four wounded, kept his ground with the rest of my commando.

The next morning the fight was renewed, and our "Long Tom" now took the lead and seemed to make himself very unpleasant to the enemy. The whole day was mainly a battle of big guns. My headache grew unbearable, and I was very feverish. General Botha had meanwhile arrived with reinforcements, and towards evening things took a better turn.

But I was temporarily done for, and again lost consciousness, and was taken to the ambulance. Dr Shaw did his best, I hear, for me; but I was unconscious for several days, and when I revived the doctor told me I had a slight fracture of the skull caused by the bursting of a shell. The injuries, however, could not have been very serious for ten days after I was able to leave my bed. I then heard that the night I had been taken to the hospital, the British had once more been forced to retire across the Tugela, and early in the morning of the 7th of February our burghers were again in possession of the kopje "Vaalkrantz," round which such a fierce fight had waged and for the possession of which so much blood had been spilled.

Our "Long Tom" was a decided success, and had proved itself to be exceedingly useful.

The Battle of "Vaalkrantz" kopje was to me and to the Johannesburg Commando undoubtedly the most important and the fiercest fight in this war, and although one point in our positions was taken, I think that on the whole I may be proud of our defence. About two-thirds of its defenders were killed or wounded before the enemy took that spot, and all who afterwards visited the kopje where our struggle had taken place had to admit that unmistakable evidence showed it to be one of the hottest fights of the Natal campaign. All the trees were torn up or smashed by shells, great blocks of rock had been splintered and were stained yellow by the lyddite; mutilated bodies were lying everywhere—Briton and Boer side by side; for during the short time "Vaalkrantz" had been in their possession the English had not had an opportunity of burying the bodies of friends or foe”.

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, in his work on the Boer War, said of the artillery attack:

"The artillery-fire (the "Zwartkop" guns and other batteries) was then hurriedly aimed at the isolated "Vaalkrantz" (the real object of the attack), and had a terrific effect. It is doubtful whether ever before a position has been exposed to such an awful bombardment. The weight of the ammunition fired by some of the cannon was greater than that of an entire German battery during the Franco-Prussian war." He added:

"Although the rims of the kopje were being pounded by lyddite and other bombs it is doubtful whether this terrific fire did much damage among the enemy, as seven English officers and 70 men were lying dead on the kopje against only a few Boers, who were found to have been wounded."

While I was under treatment in Dr. Shaw's ambulance I was honoured by a visit from General Joubert, who came to compliment me on what he called the splendid defence of Vaalkrantz, and to express his regret at the heavy loss sustained by our commando. I heard from Dr Shaw that after the battle the groans and cries of the wounded burghers could be heard in the immediate neighbourhood of the English outposts. Some burghers volunteered to go, under cover of the darkness, to see if they could save these wounded men. They cautiously crept up to the foot of the kopjes, from where they could plainly see the English sentinels, and a little further down found in a ditch two of our wounded, named Brand and Liebenberg; the first had an arm and a leg smashed, the latter had a bullet in his thigh”. (Despite being present at this battle, Mostert came away unscathed).

Amery in The Times History of the War in South Africa also provided a view of the Vaalkrantz battle, from the British perspective. He stated: -

“But Vaal Krantz was worthless in itself, and the abandonment of the attack on the Green Hill was the abandonment of the whole scheme for turning the Brakfontein position. Buller had lacked the courage to face the issue of his own plan. The battle of Vaal Krantz was lost in the very moment of victory. For there can be very little doubt that even now the attack could have been pushed through without very heavy losses. The small parties on the Boer left under Field-Cornets Mostert of Fordsburg and Du Preez of Jeppestown had done excellent work in hampering the crossing and harassing the right flank and rear of Lyttelton's advance. But they could not have prevented Hildyard's occupation of the Green Hill, and there were no sufficient forces behind to have stopped the field batteries coming up into the defile or the cavalry forcing their way on to the plain. The main part of Viljoen's force clung to the northern portion of Vaal Krantz and to the hills between it and Krantz Kloof.

On the southern portion Viljoen, with barely a hundred men, was endeavouring with desperate courage to check the Light Brigade, now swiftly advancing through the mealies. All the guns in action on and below Swaartz Kop concentrated their fire upon Vaal Krantz, which under this terrific bombardment smoked like a great furnace. A lyddite shell burst over Viljoen's head, stunning him and killing four men close by. When he recovered his senses the Durham Light Infantry were clambering down into a great donga which ran like a moat round the southern and eastern foot of the hill. A moment later the Rifle Brigade joined on to their right, having cleared Hunger's Farm. A few minutes to rest and reform, and then the Durham Light Infantry fixed bayonets and charged the southern point of the hill with a cheer. The Rifle Brigade surged up the eastern side of the hill under a heavy fire from its northern end and from the dongas on their right. At 4.30 P.M. the Durham Light Infantry reached the crest, the Rifle Brigade soon after, and together both regiments swept along the ridge for half a mile.

The Johannesburgers had made a heroic defence, but they now fled, leaving behind a few prisoners and over fifty dead and wounded, Viljoen himself showed great gallantry in getting away a pom-pom from the northern end of the ridge. The losses of the captors were, thanks to the rapidity of their attack and their wide extension, not very heavy”.

At this point it would serve us well to take stock of Mostert’s contribution to the Boers war effort to date. He had been in action at Elandslaagte – surviving that baptism of fire, he had proceeded to Ladysmith where a period of inactivity had set in during the siege. He was one of the men then taken down to Colenso where, as we have seen above, his commando saw little action. From there he had taken full part in the Boer victory at Spioenkop, where the British suffered so severely. It was then on to “Rooi Randjies” – as he termed the Vaalkrantz battle of 5 February. Here, according to his Commandant, Viljoen, the men of the Johannesburg Commando, saw very heavy fighting but it was in Buller’s final push to liberate Ladysmith that Mostert’s luck was to run out. Viljoen’s account continued: -

Pieters Heights (Hill)

After the English forces had retreated from Vaalkrantz across the Tugela, a patrol of my commando under my faithful adjutant, J. Du Preez, who had taken my place for the time being, succeeded in surprising a troop of fifty Lancers, of the 17th regiment, I believe, near Zwartkop, east of the Tugela, and making them prisoners after a short skirmish. Being still in the hospital in feeble health without any prospect of a speedy recovery, I took the doctor's advice and went home to Rondepoort, near Krugersdorp, where my family was staying at the time, and there, thanks to the careful treatment of my kind doctor and the tender care of my wife I soon recovered my strength.

On the 25th of February I received a communication from my commando to the effect that General Buller had once more concentrated his forces on Colenso and that heavy fighting was going on. The same evening, I also had a telegram from President Kruger, urging me to rejoin my commando so soon as health would allow, for affairs seemed to have taken a critical turn. The enemy appeared to mean business this time, and our commando had already been compelled to evacuate some very important positions, one of which was Pieter's Heights.

The next morning, I was in a fast train to Natal, accompanied by my faithful adjutant, Rokzak. My other adjutant, Du Preez, had meantime been ordered to take a reinforcement of 150 men to Pieter's Heights, and was soon engaged in a desperate struggle in the locality situated between the Krugersdorpers' and the Middleburgers' positions. The situation was generally considered very serious when I arrived near the head laager at Modderspruit late in the evening of the 27th of February, unaware of the unfavourable turn things had taken during the day at Paardeberg, in the Cape Colony, and on the Tugela. We rode on that night to my laager at Potgietersdrift, but having to go by a roundabout way it took us till early next morning before we reached our destination. The first thing I saw on my arrival was a cart containing ten wounded men, who had just been brought in from the fighting line, all yellow with lyddite.

Field-cornet P. van der Byl, who came fresh from the fight near Pieter's Heights, told me that these burghers had been wounded there. I asked them what had happened and how matters stood. "Ah, Commandant," he replied, "things are in a very bad way! Commandant Du Preez and myself were called to Pieter's Heights three days ago, as the enemy wanted to force their way through. We were in a very awkward position, the enemy storming us again and again; but we held our own, and fired on the soldiers at 50 paces. The English, however, directed an uninterrupted gun fire at our commandos, and wrought great havoc. Early Sunday morning the other side asked for a truce to enable them to bury their dead who were lying too close to our positions to be got at during the fighting. Many of their wounded were lying there as well, and the air was rent during 24 hours with their agonised groans, which were awful to hear. We, therefore, granted an armistice till 6 o'clock in the evening."


Hand to hand combat on Pieters Hill

"The enemy," continued the field-cornet, "broke through several positions, and while we were being fired at by the troops which were advancing on us, we were attacked on our left flank and in the rear. Assistant-Commandant Du Preez, and Field-Cornet Mostert, were both severely wounded, but are now in safe hands. Besides these, 42 of our burghers were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners; we could only bring 16 of our wounded with us. The enemy has pushed through, and I suppose my burghers are now taking up a position in the "randten" near Onderbroekspruit."

So there it was – Mostert had been severely wounded – fractured jaw caused by shrapnel, bullet wound through left elbow and shrapnel wounds in hip and shoulder. This was enough to put any man out of action and was confirmed in the official hand-written ZAR Casualty Return where it was stated that Mostert, Willie; Veldkornet, aged 34, of P.B. 1049 Johannesburg was admitted to the Hospital at Van Reenen’s Pass/ Harrismith on 3 March 1900. This was confirmed in the ZAR Government Gazette dated 21 March 1900. As mentioned by Du Preez above, Mostert was in safe hands.

But what of the British perspective? Once more Amery, in his The Times History of the War in South Africa provided the answer:

“At dawn on the 27th Irvine started with his pontoons for the river, and at once set to work constructing the bridge, while the artillery opened a slow fire. Before 10 a.m. a bridge, 100 yards long, was completed, and Barton's two battalions began to cross. As they crossed, the tidings of Cronje's surrender was passed round, and in the true British spirit of emulation Buller’s men resolved that Roberts should not be alone in enjoying the credit of making the day a decisive one in British history.

Joined by the Dublins on the left bank, Barton's battalions turned to the right and moved along in single file at the foot of the steep slope, in places almost a cliff, with which the Pieter's plateau descends to the Tugela. The movement was seen by the Piet Retiefers on Eagle's Nest, and the gun behind them fired a few shells without doing any damage. Any other detection of or interference with their movements was prevented by the artillery, who kept the Boers in their trenches, and by the riflemen and maxims on the right bank, whose continuous fire effectively prevented any patrols or snipers working near enough to the river to see anything. Soon after noon, in a great wave of khaki, they surged up the steep hill-side, the guns keeping up their fire in front of them to the last, and swept on to the summit.

At the same moment Kitchener at last let slip the South Lancashires, whose colonel, McCarthy O'Leary, had for the last half hour been straining desperately at the leash. Up leapt the South Lancashires, and in one wild, glorious rush raced for the great trench, which ran along the level between Railway and Inniskilling Hills. Never checking once, or even pausing for breath, they swept over the broken ground and were into the trench—their gallant and impetuous colonel falling as they reached it—before the Boers had time to run away. A few of the Boers were bayoneted; some 50 or 60 were made prisoners.


Map of Pieters Hill

Meanwhile at the very moment of the assault the Johannesburgers on Railway Hill had been reinforced by a contingent of their own commando, summoned in hot haste from the Upper Tugela. As the West Yorks, now joined by some of the South Lancashires, pushed across the summit they met with a heavy fire from the far side. But they were not to be stopped and swept right over the top, capturing a maxim and several prisoners. Then manning the Boer sangars they poured a heavy fire after their retreating enemies (5 p.m.). The Royal Lancasters had further to go, and had not drawn level when the assault was delivered.

Their two leading companies had only one officer each; both had already been wounded, and, for want of leading, the attack hung fire. But, seeing their comrades on the right charging home, the men would not be denied, and sprang forward. As they did so they came under heavy fire from Inniskilling Hill, which was much nearer to them. Ignorant or forgetful of their proper objective, or perhaps realising that Railway Hill was already practically won, some 50 or 60 of them turned to their left, and charged straight up the steep slope to the summit, killing and capturing a few of the enemy, and securing a lodgment on the crest, whence they brought a cross fire to bear on the Boers in the main trench, now fully busy with the assault of Norcott's battalions.”

Undeterred by their defeat in other portions of the field, the Boers still stood stubbornly at bay on the last kopje of Pieter's Hill. Barton, who, from their strength and the recent arrival of reinforcements, feared a counter-attack, determined to make a last effort to take the kopje. At 6 p.m. he withdrew three companies of Irish Fusiliers, under Major Hill, from the left, which was no longer menaced, and launched them at the kopje, under cover of a heavy fire from the companies of Dublins already established close up to it.

In spite of a furious fire the Irish Fusiliers pushed on. Losing a third of their numbers, and all their officers killed or wounded, they reached the southern end of the kopje. But even now they had not dislodged their obstinate enemy from the northern end of it. Unable to push on further, they put up cover, and at midnight found that the Boers had departed”.

Mostert’s war was now over, or was it? His Vorm B claimed service from “before October 1899 until his wounding on 27 February 1900. Where then was he until peace was declared more than two years later, on 31 May 1902? We will revisit this but first, back to the ebb and flow of his life.

He now turned his attention to matters of the heart. No longer a young man at 38, he tied the marital knot with 26 year old Anna Susanna Elizabeth Boshoff at Johannesburg on 23 December 1902. The ceremony was conducted in the Dutch Reformed Church, Witwatersrand Goldfields District, and the bride hailed from the farm “Modderbult” in the Heidelberg District of the Transvaal, although both she and Mostert lived in Braamfontein. This marriage sadly ended with Anna’s untimely death in the house of Mr Mangold in Heidelberg on 10 December 1904 – less than two years after the marriage.

Not one to remain single for long, Mostert married again – on this occasion at Heidelberg on 4 July 1906. Now 40, his bride to be, Sara Maria Elizabeth Viljoen, was a 28 year old spinster who had been born in Graaff Reinet in the Cape Colony, but who now resided in Heidelberg. Interestingly, the Widower Mostert’s address was provided as “Verwachting”, Frankfort, Orange River Colony. He had taken up the pursuit of farming, the tranquil nature of which kept him occupied for many years.

The Great War came round on 4 August 1914 and Mostert, not one to shirk his duty, saw service with the Carolina Commando, with the rank of Major. His only involvement was in the suppression of the 1914 Rebellion, which saw scattered Boer combatants take up arms, in Commandos, against the decision by Louis Botha’s Government to enter the war on the side of Great Britain. Mostert served in this capacity from 6 October 1914 until 14 February 1915 at which point the threat had dissipated with the quelling of the internal revolt. He received no medals for what was home service only.

Mostert’s father had passed away in Cape Town on 9 June 1909 and this was to be followed by the death of his mother, at her residence – Villa Marie, Fairfield, Bellville – on 16 July 1921. This year was also worthy of note for an entirely different reason – the South Africa Government had, at last, authorised the minting and issue of war medals to Boer combatants from the Anglo Boer War. Mostert was among the first to apply for his medals and this is where the controversy began. In order to best describe what followed, I refer to the excellent summary of Mostert’s applications for his awards and decorations (in September 1921), provided by Henk Loots.

On Vorm A (Dekorasie vir Troue Dienst) he stated his rank as Field Cornet, changing this status to Vecht Generaal, when wounded. He also stated under Date of Service “1 October 1899 till 27 February 1900, adding “when wounded and in hospital (Natal) till 2 months after peace.”

On his Vorm B (Anglo Boere Oorlog Medal) he had the same claim as to rank but amplified his medical woes: “Severely wounded at Peters Heights 27 February 1900, from there to Harrismith Hospital and thence to Pretoria Hospital. Later sent to Merebank Camp. Discharged 2 months after peace.

This is where some of the anomalies surfaced – granted, the applications were made almost 20 years after the last shot of the war was fired and memories can fade BUT, we know that Mostert was never a Prisoner of War and was, in Du Preez’s words, in safe hands, first at Van Reenen, at Harrismith and then at Pretoria, all Boer medical facilities at this time. Merebank, outside Durban, was a concentration camp where Boer women, children and old men were sent to wait out the war. It is hardly conceivable that Mostert would have been there in the first place.

The Medal Advisory Board, perhaps surprisingly given the above scenario and unusual medical history, approved of the award of the DTD, ABO and the LvW in the rank of Veldkornet and this was duly published in the Government Gazette No 1191, dated 11 November 1921.

On 7 February 1922 Mostert acknowledged receipt of his awards but expressed disappointment at the rank inscribed on the rims of the medals. He stated that he at least expected the rank of Commandant and repeated that he was a Vecht Generaal when wounded on 27 February 1900. The Board reassessed his claim and asked Mostert, on 25 July 1922, to return the awards for the rank to be altered to Kommandant, asking him at the same time, to supply service dates regarding his three claimed ranks. He replied on 2 August 1922, “I was acting in the position of the late General Ben Viljoen from the battle of Pontdrif/Rooi Randjies (Vaalkrantz – 5 February 1900) when he suffered bomb shock to his head and went to hospital, up to when I was wounded.”

The amended awards were sent to Mostert under cover of a letter dated 6 October 1922. The DTD having been skimmed and officially re-impressed and a freshly named ABO issued. These amendments were published in the Government Gazette No. 1270 dated 13 October 1922.

One wonders if the Board would have acceded to his request had they been privy to the facts contained in two contemporary publications in circulation before they came to their decision. The first, My Reminiscences of the Anglo Boer War by Ben Viljoen, has been alluded to many times above. Published in 1902, Viljoen makes specific mention in Chapter X, pages 91-92, to the fact that “….my faithful adjutant, J Du Preez, who had taken my place for the time being…” How then could that honour have fallen to Mostert as claimed by him?

The second publication was even more damming – Dr J. Fessler, one of the German Doctors treating the Boer wounded, wrote in “Onder de Roode Kruis in Transvaal” – published in Amsterdam in Dutch from the original German in 1904, on pages 146-147 – “Among the wounded, that we encountered during the Boer retreat on 28 February, were the Acting Commandant of the Johannesburg Commando, Du Preez from Krugersdorp, and Field Cornet Moustard (sic) of the same Commando; both severely wounded.”

Fessler then recounts how the two men managed to find their way via Van Reenen’s Pass to Harrismith where they were attended to by another Medic, Dr Schelkly, (of the Second Dutch Ambulance) who removed the bullets from Du Preez’ chest, and mentions that both wounds were completely healed. He added:

“By chance, some weeks earlier, I saw Field Cornet Moustard (sic) in the Grand Hotel in Krugersdorp. His jaw, which was treated, initially by Dr Schelkly and later by the First Dutch Ambulance in Pretoria, had healed completely as was the case with his elbow, which he could bend again. He also did not return to the battlefield and was quite curt and aloof when I recognised and spoke to him. He was elegantly dressed.” Dr Fessler was a very creditable source. He had come out to South Africa with the Second German Ambulance in January 1900 and had joined the hospital in Varley's Hotel in Krugersdorp under Dr Von Borne.

But there were no flies on Mostert, in November 1937, many years after he had bamboozled the Medal Board, he requested a Military Pension in the rank (and amount) of Commandant. The Commissioner of Pensions, in writing to the Secretary for Defence on 25 November 1937, stated that:

“I beg to inform you that a claim has been received from the above named (Mostert) for payment of pension at the rate applicable to the rank of Commandant. Mr Mostert stated that he was first appointed Field Cornet, then Commandant, and in the fight at Pieters Hill was in command of Krugersdorp, Johannesburg and Pretoria Commandos, under General Lukas Meyer.

He states further that he was wounded at Pieters Hill, and after a month in hospital at Harrismith, was transferred to hospital at Pretoria (Staats Meisjes Skool) for about five months. In support of his contention he produced medals inscribed “Kommandant J.F.W. Mostert”.

In contradiction of the foregoing, however, I would like to point out that no record of his promotion to Commandant can be found in the Union Buildings’ Archives, which reflect that in the fight at Pieters Hill he was under the command of Commandant Ben Viljoen. The signature of Mr Mostert further appears in the list of Field Cornets in the register which contains the signatures of Officers who took part in the Anglo Boer War.” The matter seems to have been settled in Mostert’s favour with the Central Medal Board confirming that they had issued the medals to Mostert in the rank of Commandant.

We will probably never know why he felt the need to “embroider” his contribution and resort to falsehoods.

But life continued on for Willie Mostert, on 29 June 1939 he was widowed for a second time when his beloved Sara passed away on the family farm “Twyfelaar” in the District of Carolina (Transvaal) – she had borne him two sons – Cornelis Mostert and Johannes Frederick Wilhelm Mostert.

At the age of 75 he married for the third and last time – on this occasion to a 51 year old widow, Catherina Maria Gertruida Johanna Borchards (born Durr) – Durr was his mother’s maiden name which would suggest he married a relative. The nuptials took place on 14 September 1940 at Rondebosch in Cape Town. Mostert was described as a Retired Farmer living at Kromboom Road in Newlands, Cape Town whilst his bride hailed from 6 Camp Street in the same city.

After a long (and eventful) life, Mostert passed away at his residence “Caro” on the corner of Wakefield and Kromboom Roads, Rondebosch on 16 June 1954 at the age of 89 years and 9 months. The cause of death was Hypertension and Cardiac Failure. He is buried in the Maitland Cemetery. He bequeathed a monthly income of £10 to his wife, with the balance of the estate of £18 216 going to his two sons.

His name lived on in the form of son, Johan Mostert (his namesake) who, having qualified as a Medical Doctor, retired as the Senior Medical Superintendent of the Outpatient Department of the world-renowned Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town. He passed away on 6 March 1976.


Mostert in old age with his namesake and second wife who was mother of his children.

It's quite uncanny to see what is still "out there" when it comes to Boer War memorabilia/ephemera etc. A chance glance at a FB page I belong to produced a photo of the Mauser rifle that once belonged to Mostert. I have asked the gentleman who posted the image the whereabouts of the rifle but I suspect it is in a museum here in the UK somewhere.

I wonder when Mostert was dispossessed of his rifle?

Rory, the large captures of boer rifles were at Paardeberg, Brandwater basin, and Pieter's Hill.
I have a Pieter's captured Mauser, and the carved Mauser of Edward Wertheim - Fordsburg Commando - which has been discussed here www.angloboerwar.com/forum/pow-w/29946-e...hannesburg-cdo#70155 was also captured at Pieter's.
Thus I think it most probable that Mostert's Krag (serial number 70) was captured at Pieter's.
Once the guerilla phase began, Krag ammunition would have been hard to find.

As a footnote, carved Mausers seem to have been preferentially chosen as souveniers by British troops, who sent them back in large numbers. Many, many examples are found in the UK, and almost never found in SA. Krag-Jorgensen rifles were much admired, and their 'survival rate' is way in excess of what would have been expected (perhaps only 100 Boer Krags were bought). A carved Krag would have been thought a great souvenir.

Thank you for that reply Rob and for referring me to your post iro Wertheim. I had quite forgotten my comment there.

Regards

Rory

Rory, have a look at this thread
www.angloboerwar.com/forum/21-uniforms-b...ition?start=54#81398

What do you think of this?
"He was also awarded the Lint Voor Wonden (LVW - Wound Ribbon) which states that his lower jawbone was shot away, he lost an arm which was amputated below the elbow and received a bullet 'through is back'."
In your photo of him in later life with his wife and his son he looks intact!

Hi Rob

We know that Mr Mostert was given to a bit of hyperbole.... but the direct translation made from his Lint Voor Wonden application is not, with respect to those who translated it, very accurate. I don't have my papers to hand, thus don't have sight of the relevant foms which were sent to me with the medals but, a more accurate translation would be:

"Mostert had been severely wounded – fractured jaw caused by shrapnel, bullet wound through left elbow and shrapnel wounds in hip and shoulder."

With the above it can be seen that Mostert's jaw, in later life, had made a recovery and had not been "shot away"

Regards

Rory