TOPIC:

Evert Philippus Serfontein

Burgher, Kroonstad Commando – Anglo Boer War

- Anglo Boere Oorlog Medal to BURG. E.P. Serfontein

Ask anybody in Kroonstad in the northern Orange Free State who the Serfontein’s are and they will tell you; among the principle families and founding fathers of the town. The family, since trekking there from the Cape Colony in 1841, have carved a niche for themselves in the very bedrock of the community and its surrounds.

It was into this illustrious band of pioneers that Evert Serfontein was born on 14 April 1857 the son of Jacobus Hendrik Serfontein, one of the two brothers who started the dynasty, and his wife Aletta Johanna (also a Serfontein and the daughter of Hendrik Serfontein of Koppies). The family was a thriving one in more than merely the financial sense, besides owning many farms, they were also wealthy in the number of children they were blessed with. Evert had no shortage of playmates with Rachel, Jan Lodewyk, Elizabeth Wilhelmina, Aletta Johanna, Carel Rudolf and seven others all in attendance.

Farm life was tough but rewarding and a young Evert would have been exposed to tracking, riding and shooting from a young age, skills which would be of great benefit to him in the years to come. With the end of the 19th century looming large, he was no longer in the flower of his youth, at 43 years of age he was already married to Elisabeth Christina Wilhelmina Serfontein, had children and was a man with responsibilities, running one of the family farms for his own account, when the war clouds that had been looming over the southern tip of Africa finally burst with the deluge that fell coming in the form of war between the Transvaal and Serfontein’s native Orange Free State. These two Boer Republics had a mutual understanding or pact to come to the defence of one or the other, in the event of war.


Serfontein is seated to the right of the insert in the front row of this Orangia Unie photo

On 11 October 1899 the much anticipated day arrived – they were at war with the might of Great Britain and her Empire. As mentioned, this development was not entirely unexpected and the two Republics had placed their Burgers on a war footing several weeks in advance of the event. As per the Boer Commando system, all eligible men from the age of 16 to 60 were required to saddle up, and, together with their own provisions, rifle and ammunition, report to the market square in the centre of the major towns that served the farming communities. Here they were, according to their “Wyk” or Ward, sorted into the Commando they were to fight with. Each Ward had its own designated Veld Cornet, a man voted for by the Burgers themselves. These men would, in turn, report to a Commandant and then to a General and so on.

The men, from near and far around Kroonstad, were served notice on 4 October 1899 that their services were imminently required and all headed into town. Kroonstad was divided into three Wards, Middel Valsch, Onder Valsch and Onder Rhenosterrivier. Serfontein resorted under Kroonstad-Oos, a sub-section of one of the Wards. His Veld Cornet was Philip Wouter De Vos, a natural born leader of men. Having assembled in the town square, the men were given the command “Voorwaarts” (advance) and off they moved in half-sections towards the Natal border, with the ambulance and commissariat wagons trundling behind them. All the various Wards met up just outside the town of Reitz and the column, some six to eight miles long, began to move forward in earnest.


Commandant De Vos is seated to the left of De Wet and Thring

As collectors and researchers we are very fortunate (usually) to be able to pinpoint with a large degree of accuracy where and when a Boer combatant saw action and where he was deployed. This is thanks to the Vorm B each man had to complete when applying for his Boer War medal from 1921 onwards. Aside from having to provide the names (and signatures) of witnesses to the claims being made, every Burgher listed the battles he was involved in. Sadly, in many cases after listing the initial few, the veteran would resort to “ens.” – meaning “etc.” and there the trail would go cold. In the case of Serfontein, we are fortunate to have not only his Vorm B to rely on, but also the history of Kroonstad, written by one of his relatives, Dot Serfontein, who included an entire chapter on the comings and goings of the Kroonstad men on commando in her book, Keurskrif vir Kroonstad. This book, containing eye-witness accounts, has proved to be an invaluable resource in plotting the course of Evert Serfontein’s war.

According to his Vorm B, dated 20 September 1921, Serfontein was then resident on the farm “Goede Hoop” in the Rendezvous Station area of the Orange Free State (Rendezvous Station was the early name given to present-day Viljoenskroon, a town outside of Kroonstad). Confirming that he had been a Burger with the Kroonstad Commando, he added that he had served throughout the war – from October 1899 until 31 May 1902 – and that he had reported to Kommandant P. De Vos (the earlier mentioned Pieter Wouter De Vos) of P.O. Ventersburg. De Vos countersigned his medal claim along with M. Bukes of Kroonstad. Perhaps more importantly were the battles he listed as being engaged in. these were:

- Zwartboschkop (also known as Rietfontein or Modderspruit) – 24 October 1899
- Spionkop – 23 January 1900
- Rooiwal – 7 June 1900
- De Wetsdorp – 23 November 1900
- Springkaannek – 14 December 1900
- Liebensbergsvlei – 28 December 1900

The ubiquitous “ens.” followed this last. Each will be dealt with through the use of contemporary accounts, in some instances, from both sides of the conflict, in order to provide as full an account of the fighting as possible.



Zwartboschkop (Rietfontein) – 24 October 1899

Having crossed over the Drakensberg mountains, the Kroonstad Commando went to ground at Tintwa Inyoni, just outside Ladysmith. Twenty days of false alarms and inactivity followed before the Commandant sent word, while they were having their breakfast, that a large force was on the way out from Ladysmith near the railway line and that they were to take up positions. They galloped off to Mataban Hill. Towards the Nicholson’s Nek end, Vosloo of Kroonstad was stationed with his men to prevent the men from being surrounded or surprised in the rear; on the koppie in the valley were Botha and De Vos of Kroonstad, with their portions of the commando, and on Mataban Hill and on the other side of it, were other commandos. In total there were supposed to be 700 men but there was considerably less.

Maurice, in his account of the battle wrote thus:

It is necessary now to revert to the action which had, on October 24th, been heard in the bivouac by the Waschbank, that action of which a ride of nine miles westward had failed to disclose either the purport or the scene. The arrival on the 23rd of Free State commandos upon the heights north and west of the railway had redoubled Sir G. White's already great anxiety for the safety of the retreat from Dundee. When, indeed, on the morning of the 24th, the Free Staters saw troops issuing from Ladysmith, they believed them to be the combined forces of Generals White and Yule, though the latter was at the moment still actually upon the wrong side of the Waschbank.



Some seven miles north-east of Ladysmith, Rietfontein farmhouse lay by a branch of the Modder Spruit, south-west of a long, low ridge, which descended to the railway line. Beyond the crest line, to the northward, the ground sank, broken only by two rough under-features jutting from the western extremity of the ridge, to rear itself again eight hundred yards beyond into a line of abrupt heights. The southernmost of these, called Intintanyoni (Tintwa Inyoni), leaped up steeply from the hollow. Two grassy pinnacles flanked Intintanyoni. Of these the western looked across a deep and narrow gorge over to Nodashwana or Swaatbouys Kop (Zwartboschkop), of a somewhat greater elevation, whilst below the eastern, deep re-entrants, divided Intintanyoni from the curve of highlands, which terminated west of Elandslaagte.

East of the twin peaks of Intintanyoni, along whose crest lay six Free State commandos waiting for their first battle on the morning of October 24th. To the east, with patrols upon Jonono's Kop, lay the men of Bethlehem, Vrede, and Heilbron; about the eastern peak of Intintanyoni the Winburg commando held the ground, in charge of two pieces of artillery; on their right, occupying the rest of the mountain, the burghers of Kroonstad made ready. Some 6,000 riflemen in all filled the six-mile line of heights. They were commanded by General A. P. Cronje, who had arrived only on this morning, the 24th, to replace de Villiers, who had been in temporary charge.

Sir G. White moved out from Ladysmith at 5 a.m. with some 5,300 officers and men, assuming himself the direction of an operation likely to be extremely dangerous. Moving up the Newcastle road from its rendezvous near the junction of the Free State railway, the force had proceeded six miles when the advanced screen of cavalry came under a dropping rifle fire at 7 a.m. from the heights on their left. Their action was prompt. Pushing rapidly across the Modder Spruit, a squadron of 5th Lancers, supported by two others, drove back at the gallop the small parties of Boers hovering in that neighbourhood, and themselves seized and held this advanced position. The remainder of the cavalry, stringing out along high ground dominating the western bank of the spruit, and facing more to the eastward, formed a strong flank guard towards Jonono's Kop. At 8 a.m., whilst fitful discharges of musketry rose and fell along the widely-extended line of troopers, the infantry had come up to Rietfontein. No sooner had they arrived at a point on the road some five hundred yards east of the Modder Spruit, than a loud report broke from the eastern peak of Intintanyoni, and a shell, bursting on impact, fell into the head of the column. Thereupon the British artillery wheeled out from the route, and in line of batteries trotted towards a level crossing over the railway, some six hundred yards west of the road. Arrived at this defile, and forming column inwards to traverse it, the first gun had scarcely passed the rails, when both the Boer guns on the high green rampart ahead opened upon the point, which had been taken as one of their range marks.

The infantry were already over the railway, and moving forward--Gloucester regiment on the left, Liverpool regiment on the right--up the gentle but protected slope, to the summit of the low ridge of Rietfontein. The 1st Devonshire regiment, in support, lay at the base, whilst the 2nd King's Royal Rifles remained in rear in charge of the baggage. On the appearance of the leading companies upon the crest, firing broke out from the whole length of the crest of Intintanyoni, to which the British infantry, lying prone, replied as vigorously. Of the artillery, the 42nd battery was quickly in action near the centre of the front, whilst the 53rd unlimbered some six hundred yards to the left, and began shelling a rocky underfeature of Intintanyoni, at a range of 1,500 yards. Sharp musketry assailed them. Thus began a severe fire fight at ranges varying from one to two thousand yards. Especially was it hotly contested where the Gloucester on the left of the British opposed the 1,400 Kroonstad men, who, under Nel, maintained the Boer right. Heavy exchanges of rifle fire swept across the valley in this part, and in spite of the steady practice of the artillery, it became necessary to reinforce the attackers. For this purpose, the Devonshire regiment was pushed up on the left of the Gloucester, half the King's Royal Rifles coming from the baggage train to fill its place in support.

The Boers, who for a time had lain quiet under the shrapnel, which searched their position from end to end, at once opened a fierce fusilade. Further advance was impossible. Only with difficulty could both the Gloucestershire and "D." squadron I.L.H., which had joined in the attack, be withdrawn. The enemy, encouraged by this event, still clung to their fastness, and maintained a heavy though spasmodic fire. Sir G. White, anxious for his communications with Ladysmith, called the Natal Mounted Rifles across from his right, sending them on in front of his left flank. The Colonial riflemen went with such skill into the maze of broken ground below the mountain, that they not only succeeded in outflanking the outflankers, but actually drove by enfilade fire all of the Kroonstad commando, who were upon the right of Intintanyoni, far back across the hill to where the Winburgers lay at the eastern extremity.

All danger ceased definitely on this side when two guns of the 42nd battery, turning towards the ridges of Nodashwana, in a few moments cleared it of the enemy, and converted it also into a huge bonfire of blazing grass. At 1.30 p.m. the Boer fire had dwindled all along the main ridge, and an hour later it ceased altogether. At 3 p.m. Sir G. White gave the order for a general retirement. His object was accomplished, with the not undue loss of 114 casualties. Yule was now safe for that day, and he believed the Free State army to have suffered severely enough to keep it inactive on the next, when he intended to assist the Dundee column by other means. But the Boers watched the withdrawal of the British troops with very little despondency.

From the Boer perspective, Davitt in Chapter XIV wrote:

On the Tuesday (October 24) following the battle at Elandslaagte, an engagement, mainly confined to a fight with guns, took place between General White's forces and some Free Staters, about five miles southwest of the scene of Saturday's encounter. The English general had the service of three batteries of artillery, and of some 3,000 mounted troops and infantry. The Free Staters consisted of half the commandoes which General Prinsloo had led across the Drakensberg by Van Reenen's Pass after the declaration of war; 1,500 men, with two Krupp guns and a Maxim-Nordenfelt.

A railway connecting Natal with the Orange Free State runs from Ladysmith northwest to the alpine range of mountains dividing the two countries, and enters the Free State through the famous pass. This vulnerable point in the north eastern frontier of the Free State was guarded since the 1st of October by the burghers belonging to the districts of the Republic from Winburg to Heilbron, and from Harrismith to Kroonstad.

On the 19th of October the greater portion of this force swept down Van Reenan's Pass and took possession, after a slight encounter between outposts, of Besters railway station; a point on the railway line from Ladysmith to the Free State, on the line north to Dundee and Laing's Nek.

The two lines travel northwest and northeast respectively from Ladysmith, branching out somewhat in the form of the letter V for a distance of about a dozen miles, where Elandslaagte is reached on the right hand branch of the letter, and Besters Station on the left hand branch. The distance across from west to east, or point to point, would be some twelve or fifteen miles, and within this V-shaped district Nicholson's Nek may be said to occupy the centre, with Rietfontein and Pepworth to the right, near the line going from Ladysmith to Elandslaagte, and Modderspruit a little to the right still of that line, and running parallel with it.

On Sunday, the 22nd, Commandant Andries Cronje, of Winburg with some 1,500 men moved across in the direction of Elandslaagte to the north of Nicholson's Kop, and took up a position on, some hills at Hobbs' Land Farm extending eastwards towards Rietfontein. Prinsloo remained behind at Besters. The officers who accompanied Cronje were Commandants Christian De Wet, Nel, and Theunissen, of the Heilbron and Kroonstad commandoes. The objective of the Free Staters was to intercept the Dundee garrison, which began its retreat under General Yule on Saturday night, and toiled through the Biggarsberg passes on Sunday and Monday, on its way to the shelter of the British base at Ladysmith. General White moved out from Ladysmith with the guns and men at his disposal on Tuesday morning to meet Yule's retreating columns. On reaching a point west of the railway line near Rietfontein the British cavalry were fired upon and driven back by Andries Cronje's Winburgers, who held a position about a mile eastward of Nicholson's Kop. North of this position, on a higher hill, Commandant Nel, with two Krupp seven-pounders, was posted, while Commandant De Wet, with the Kroonstad and other burghers, held a hill on the left of the Free State lines nearer to Rietfontein. The main English column soon came up with its guns, and an artillery duel between the enemy's batteries and Nel's Krupps continued for several hours. The Boer guns were driven from their first to a second and more secure position by the fire of White's batteries, but beyond this temporary check no injury was done. Two attempts were subsequently made by White to turn the Boer positions, and both ended disastrously. The Gloucester Regiment endeavoured to work round to the left hill occupied by De Wet's contingent, and were met by such a fusillade that over fifty of the British fell before the Boer fire. The remainder bolted down the hill. A retreat was ordered, and White and his force fell back shortly afterwards on Ladysmith.

White had succeeded, however, in forcing an engagement west of the road from Dundee, thus clearing the way for Yule's beaten forces, who streamed past to the right while the fight was in progress, and his object was attained. The British losses were reported at 120 killed and wounded, while the casualties among the Free Staters numbered sixteen only; six killed and ten wounded.

Frikkie Botha, one of the Kroonstad Burgers who afterwards wrote an account of his time in the war stated that:

“That night we were so tired many of us slept on our haunches. The next morning we were wet through from the dew and so stiff that some of us walked doubled over for a while until we could stand up straight.” According to General De Wet, the Kroonstadters acquitted themselves well of their task, having been in the thick of things. He related how most of the British shells had failed to explode and that a shell which lands and doesn’t explode, bounces up like a rubber ball and can land a further 600 feet away. Then the Burghers would shout “That’s my bomb” and everyone would run to claim it for themselves.

The siege of Ladysmith now got under way and the Kroonstadters were kept busy repulsing British patrols. Their commissariat wagons from Tintwa Inyoni only arrived on 13 November, complete with their baggage which allowed them the luxury of sleeping in tents for the first time in weeks. By the time December came round, the Boer forces around Ladysmith were champing at the bit – they were not used to long periods of inactivity. The senior officers couldn’t make up their minds to attack Ladysmith or not. A little-known fact was that, just like in the town itself, many Burghers succumbed to the ravages of fever, dysentery and other illnesses associated with the searing heat and incessant rain. A number of Free Staters were sent back to the Free State to help stem Methuen’s march up the Western Front.

The Kroonstad Commando also played a prominent role in the battle of Wagon Hill (Platrand) but Serfontein makes no mention of it and it cannot be assumed that he was there. In her history of Kroonstad, Dot Serfontein mentions that, “Only a few Kroonstadters took part in the battles of Spionkop and Vaalkrantz. The remainder watched the battles with interest and thereafter went to assist with the removal of the dead and wounded.” Evert Serfontein, who claimed to be at Spionkop, must have been one of the few referred to, but it is not known with which Commando he fought.

On the 27th February, the day of the final battle of Pieters Heights, the Kroonstadters heard that Buller was gaining the upper hand. They were ordered to the front but, as they were about to set off, they were met by Burghers going in the opposite direction, all of whom expressed surprise that they were still there as the other Commandos had all fled. Losing no time, they departed at dusk but were hampered by a hailstorm which delayed their crossing the Dewdorpspruit. Eventually they gained the Colenso heights, black and blue, exhausted and with blood-red eyes from the hail. They stayed at Osspruit (Swinburne) for a week where a Krygsraad (Council of War) was held. Many were upset at the Boers flight from Natal, especially in view of the fact that many good positions had been occupied which they could have held.

Bloemfontein fell on 13 March 1900 and President Steyn and his cabinet fled to their new capital, Kroonstad. Here one of the first orders of business was to regroup and try to improve the morale of the Commando members. It was here that a major Krygsraad took place with most senior Boer officers and both Presidents Steyn and Kruger, in attendance. A post mortem of the campaign was conducted, many harsh words were spoken but, at the end of it all, it was decided to continue the fight, albeit in the form of guerrilla-type operations. General De Wet left the Krygsraad with a new determination to implement the new style of warfare without delay. Officers of the Kroonstad Commando, who had been present, returned to their men to convey the news to them.

On 30 March 1900 the element of the Kroonstad Commando that had fought on the Eastern Front, split into two at Van Reenen’s Pass. 200 Burgers went with Commandant Nel to Sanna’s Post, and an equal number went to bolster the war effort on the Western Front. The rest remained where they were to guard the pass from British incursions into the Free State from Natal. Serfontein, who served under De Vos, would have been one of those who headed for Sanna’s Post but it is not clear if he was in the fighting there or at the next battle of Mostertshoek where the Boers gave the Royal Irish Rifles and the Mounted Infantry a hiding, capturing 12 wagons full of provisions and taking 470 men prisoner. This was for the loss of 4 men killed and 6 wounded on the Boer side.

Together with De Wet, the Kroonstadters moved off to Wepener, where the plan was to launch a surprise dawn attack on General Brabant and his men but, thanks to the normal misunderstandings between the Boer forces, the attempt failed and upwards of 6000 men were caught up in yet another aimless siege. On the 22nd April, many of the men were rushed to the aid of General Froneman who was battling a British force at Aliwal North and De Wetsdorp. They had to ford the Caledon River in flood, with their clothes on their heads and their saddles on a pont in order to get across. When the attack on the British positions should have taken place, there was disagreement among the Boer officers, the majority being in favour of taking the high hills between McNaughton’s Dale and Basutoland. Commandant Olivier raised objections to this and, before they could wipe their eyes out, the British had occupied these positions. Owing once more to the normal misunderstandings that seemed to plague Boer decisiveness, General Froneman, who occupied the best position, took no part in the fight that followed and the rest had to give up the koppies they occupied soon after.

They now tried to regroup but word reached them that General French had left Bloemfontein ahead of an enormous column to cut off De Wet from the Free State. The decision was then taken to flee, firstly back to De Wet’s camp, only to find that he was no longer there but had departed for Dewetsdorp, leaving word that they should follow. After successfully evading the numerous British columns in pursuit of them, they arrived at Thaba ’Nchu five days later, joining the rest of the commando. Actions in which the Kroonstadters now fought took place at Thaba ‘Nchu, Houtnek, Tabaksberg and Sandrivier. At Sandrivier the Transvaalers took over the command and the Kroonstadters pressed on, following the course of the river and getting into the main road between Ventersberg and Winburg, near the drift where General Piet De Wet was awaiting the enemy with guns in position. At the last minute, they were ordered to move up river to assist another commando.

Was this the final straw? Frikkie Botha reported that, “At Ventersberg nobody could stop the Kroonstadters. Everyone wanted to return to their families to decide what to do next. The Commando almost disintegrated in disorder.” The Commando members made for Kroonstad and home. Some of the men were prevailed upon to make a stand at Bosrand on 11 May 1900 but it was too little too late. The men who had returned to their homes and farms had to flee with Kroonstad falling to the British that day. President Steyn and his officials had also made good their escape, in the face of the approaching British forces. A report stated that, “When the last of the Burgers passed through, they set fire to the railway goods shed, stocked with mealies and other stores. It was indeed a woeful sight.”


President Steyn on the Market Square in Kroonstad exhorting his countrymen to carry on the fight using different tactics.

Those Kroonstadters who remained were either imprisoned or signed either the oath of allegiance or of neutrality, this allowed them to return to their farms on condition that they didn’t take up arms again. Those, like Serfontein, who opted to continue the struggle united with their comrades once more under General De Wet in the Eastern Orange Free State – about the only place where they could still move about with relative ease.

Rooiwal (Roodewal) – 7 June 1900

The next battle where Serfontein confirmed he was present was Rooiwal. At about this time the Boers regarded isolated and poorly guarded post office “forward depots” as soft targets, easy pickings for a Boer Commando or patrol and a major disruptor for the British forces who regarded the receiving and despatch of their mail as an inalienable right. The affair which concerns us was the Roodewal Incident which took place on 7 June 1900. Roodewal is 33 miles north of Kroonstad on the main railway line. The account below came from a Sgt. Chapman of the Army Postal Corps who was stationed there on the day of the battle:

Information having been received that De Wet, with his Commando, was in the neighbourhood and likely to attack us, steps were taken to fortify the Station with the materials at our disposal. These consisted largely of mail bags (which I estimate at from 1800 and 2000) bales of warm clothing, boxes of preserved meat and biscuits etc. With these we filled all open spaces, the mails forming two rings at the northern end, a barricade being formed which proved excellent shelter from rifle fire, but of little use against heavy ordnance. Wires had been sent in both directions for assistance but none came, the Derby’s passing through to Rhenoster Spruit on the 6th of June, the day before the attack. A company of the Militia, however, was sent back at sundown to help defend the Station. A company of the Railway Pioneer Regiment arrived late at night bringing our total up to about 190 men.

Early the next morning, having stood to arms for some time, we saw, just as the day broke a considerable force forming up to the eastward, that being the most advantageous position for the attack, as the sun shone full on the Station giving them an excellent target and at the same time shining in the eyes of the defenders. A Boer rode in bearing a white flag and requested the surrender of the garrison and on this demand being refused he galloped back, the attack commencing before he had covered half the distance. The first shell was responsible for two casualties. From this time a stubborn fight ensued, shells bursting in rapid succession and rifle bullets coming like hail to which our handful of men replied with great spirit, without, I am afraid, doing much execution. Heavy firing could be heard all this time down by the river, but at last it ceased and we afterwards found that the Derby’s, after considerable loss, had surrendered. The big guns which the Boers had used against them were now brought up and trained on the western side of the Station, placing us between two fires.

It was now that the critical time had arrived. Not a yard of the whole Station area was safe and after enduring it for some time longer, no assistance arriving, the officers decided to surrender and the white flag was accordingly hoisted. Two or three shells were fired after the flag went up, then they ceased firing and all rode into the Station. This was at noon. We had fought them for six hours, everyone contributing in some way in the defence.


Boers and Brits ransacking the mail at Rooiwal - one hopes that Serfontein wasn't one of those in the photo

The Boers on their arrival soon began to loot. Everything of value or use was taken, the mail bags giving them excellent opportunities of augmenting their kits. They turned the whole of them out, which appeared to give them unlimited satisfaction as they procured innumerable articles that before had doubtless been out of their reach. They also provided themselves liberally with the warm clothing etc. originally intended for the troops at the front. We were immediately marched off to the Boer laager. The work of destruction on the Station then commenced. Although we were about 3 miles away we could distinctly see huge columns of flame and smoke arising, followed by terrific explosions as the large 280 lb shells (scores of which were on the Station) went off. This continued far into the night and resumed the next day.

De Wet, in his memoirs, “Three Years War” devoted an entire chapter to the Roodewal incident, and it is instructive to learn how things were viewed from the Boer perspective. I have borrowed relevant sections from this work, paraphrased below. Much of what he says dovetails with Chapman’s account:

“On the evening of the 6th June I started on my road to Roodewal. At Walfontein I divided my troops into three parties. The third party I commanded myself. It consisted of Commandant Fourie and 80 burghers, with one Krupp; and with this force I pushed on to Roodewal Station. I was informed that there were only one hundred of the English at Roodewal, but that these hundred were very securely entrenched. My information was at fault, for I discovered much later on that there were at least double that number. I arrived at Roodewal very early in the morning of the 7th June. I bought my men up to within 800 paces of the Station and ordered them to place the Krupp in position. As soon as it was light I sent a message to the enemy demanding their surrender. The answer came back, “We refuse to surrender.” I instantly opened a hot fire upon them, bringing the Krupp as well as the Mausers into action. But the reply of the enemy was no less severe.

We had no cover. There was only a shallow pan – so shallow that is scarcely afforded protection to the horses hoofs! Thus it was that the burghers were compelled to lie down in order to afford as little mark as possible to the enemy. When the enemy had been under fire from 3 guns and 80 Mausers for an hour, they thought it best to raise the white flag. We accordingly ceased fire and I rode out towards the station. Before I had reached it, I was met by two of the officers. They told me that they were willing to surrender, on condition they were allowed to retain their private property and the mail bags. I told them they could retain their property but that the letters were a different matter. There was nothing left for the officers to do, for had they hesitated for a moment, I should certainly have stormed the station.

On our arrival at the station we were all filled with wonder at the splendid entrenchments the English had constructed from bales of cotton, blankets and post bags. I had expected that our booty would be large, and my expectations were more than realised. To begin with there were the bales of clothing the English had used as entrenchments. Then there were hundreds of cases of necessaries of every description. I was very sorry that I could not carry away with me the blankets and boots we found in large quantities, but there was no time for this. I was obliged to consign this to the flames but before I did this I gave the burghers permission to open the post bags, and to take what they liked of them. For in these bags were more useful articles of every description such as underclothing, stockings, cigars and cigarettes.”

Fortified with food, clothing and ammunition, the fight continued with the Free State Burgers moving into the Brandwater Basin in the Eastern Free State. It was here, on 30 July 1900 that General Prinsloo surrendered with the majority of those men still serving. Fortunately, De Wet escaped the net with 1500 men of which the Kroonstad Commando was part. At this point many of the men followed De Wet into the Bosveld in the Transvaal. On arrival there some of them joined a larger group of men with the remainder joining a smaller commando under De Vos (now a Commandant). Serfontein was one of this number who returned to the Orange Free State.

Dewetsdorp – 23 November 1900

On 23 November 1900, the battle of Dewetsdorp took place. De Vos and “10 Volunteers shone in the battle where they stormed a fort.” Amery, in Volume V of The Times History of the War (pages 29-32) gave a rather full account from which excerpts have been taken:

The garrison of Dewetsdorp consisted of three companies of the 2nd Battalion of the Gloucester Regiment, one company of the Highland Light Infantry, 50 Mounted Infantry (Royal Irish Rifles and Gloucesters) a few police and other details, and two guns of the 68th Battery; in all 480 men, under the command of Major W. G. Massy, R.A. By concentrating his force on some compact position Massy might have defied attack for an indefinite time, but, with the object of holding the town itself and keeping the enemy out of it, he had taken up a position which was somewhat too extended for the troops at his disposal. De Wet and Lategan conducted the attack on the Gloucester position; Philip Botha assailed the H.L.I, position.

The attack was a signal example of what skilled riflemen, utilising every scrap of cover, and acting independently but to a common purpose, can accomplish against weak defences. Few attempts were made to rush posts by assault, and these few only by night or when the hostile fire had been to a great extent subdued. The far more subtle and demoralising procedure was adopted of stealthy progress from cover to cover, an art in which the Boers had no rivals. The garrison, indeed, was fairly shot out of its positions by the superior field-craft and marksmanship of the foe. A Cossack post had been taken on the night of the 20th, and early on the 21st the Boers worked their way up to both sections of the defence, capturing the small but important post on Lonely Kopje, held by seven Royal Irish Rifles. During the night another Cossack post on the Gloucester side fell, but on the morning of the 22nd it was the H.L.I, position on the south-east which was faring worst. At 8.30 the Crow's Nest, the only post which commanded the deep northern nullah, was evacuated after a not very spirited resistance. In the evening Major Anson, commanding the H.L.I., reported that the position was untenable, and in the night it was evacuated, and the whole force concentrated in the Gloucester position to the west of the town. But this was a move which had never been contemplated and there was not enough trench accommodation.

The day opened badly by the capture, while it was still dark, after stout resistance and heavy loss, of an outlying Gloucester trench north of the town ravine, whence a plunging fire could be directed by the Boers on the main position. The day wore on and ammunition and water ran low but the men could still have held out were it not for the raising of the white flag, on an absurd report that the wounded in the gun-pit were being killed by the Boers. The whole force surrendered. The losses had been 14 killed and 52 wounded, together with 30 slightly wounded, who were able to march away with the prisoners.

Springkaannnek – 14 December 1900

The next skirmish in which Serfontein and his Kroonstad comrades participated was that of Springkaannek where the Commando had to break through the line of blockhouses in order to get to the South. Dominee Kestell in his book Through Shot and Flame, Part II, Chapter XIV, provided context to this action. He wrote:

How slowly we went! Zwartlapberg, which we knew we had to pass, loomed a dark and undefined mass on the distant horizon, and seemed to come no nearer. And we began to fear that we should not be able to pass through Sprinkhaans Nek before daylight. And so it proved. But there was a cause for being at ease. The Bethlehem Commando had gone on ahead, and had passed through. We should no doubt manage the passage. So, without perturbation, the laager went forward, slow but determined, when—Boom!

We hear the thunder of a cannon fired from Zwartlapberg, and a shell bursts on the ground near the front waggons. A second shell soon follows, and then a third and a fourth; and the mounted men and those on foot, the waggons and the carts, immediately wheel from the mountain and race away, scattered and in confusion, all over the plain to the west, to get out of range of the cannon. About three or four miles from the road on which we had been travelling we came to a standstill. We can now collect our scattered senses.

We are certain now to meet with resistance from the forts in front of us. From the rear the English are advancing in great numbers. To the right and left it is just the same, for there too we shall come in contact with the enemy. What is to be done now? Some say we must remain where we are, others that we must get through the nek at all costs. President Steyn declares we must go through, and General Fourie has already expressed the same opinion, and as neither General de Wet nor General Philip Botha are present at the moment, this officer puts himself at the head of the commando and bravely rides on.

The whole commando, waggons and carts, mounted men and those on foot, follow him. Like a great stream they advance, as far as possible from the cannon on Zwartlapberg and as near as possible to the mountains to the west of the nek. There were three English forts on the left (of which two could fire on us), and two on the lowest ridges of Zwartlapberg. We must now pass in between these. We proceed, not knowing what there is in store for us. We think we are going to our death, or at least that we shall be wounded. Some burghers put their spurs into their horses and gallop ahead. They take possession of a Kaffir kraal and open a heavy fire on the right-hand forts.

In the meanwhile, the great laager treks on and approaches to the nek, nearer and nearer. General de Wet, accompanied by General Botha, now appears on the scene and takes on himself the further conduct of the passage. There is a deafening rattle of Mausers, to which the British Lee-Metfords reply. We reach the nek, over which we pass, and find ourselves in reaped wheat-fields, which makes it difficult for the waggons and carts to proceed. Some of the burghers take position behind the wheat-stacks here, and direct a heavy fire on the forts to the right, while the Bethlehem men, who passed through the nek at daybreak, occupy themselves with the forts to the left, and with a force coming from Thaba 'Nchu.

The bullets whistle over our heads and strike the ground all along the route we have to go. The clatter of our rifle fire fills the air. After two hours the great stream of waggons and carts and men has passed through Sprinkhaans Nek. The enemy thought they had hemmed us in, which indeed was the case. They were in front of us and in our rear, to our right and to our left. We had just emerged from the wheat-fields when the English hurled shells at us, but it was marvellous to see how these shells exploded in the open spaces between the burghers, without doing any harm.

At length, at about eleven o'clock, we halted. Here the Bethlehem burghers joined us. They related to us how they had come through the nek early in the morning, before dawn, and had been fired upon, as they were passing close to the forts, with the loss of two of their number. This was a matter of regret to us all; but a feeling of gratitude prevailed, for, excepting these two killed, and two more wounded in making the passage, and a few horses killed and wounded, we had come—it was a marvel to us—unharmed through Sprinkhaans Nek.

De Wet in his Three Years War, Chapter XIII described the Springhaansnek incident thus:

At mid-day, the 13th of December, we took up excellent positions—placed in a line of about eight miles from end to end—on the farm called “Rietfontein," which is in the district of Wepener, north-east of Daspoort. We were so strongly posted that the enemy had to halt and wait for the arrival of the rearguard. I had calculated on this, and knew that darkness would come to our aid before the English were ready to attack us. But in front of us there was a strong line of forts, extending from Bloemfontein through Thaba' Nchu and Springhaansnek to Ladybrand. Through this line we should have to fight our way; this would be difficult enough, and it would never do to have General Knox at our heels, to increase the difficulty. Our only plan, then, was to make a long night march, and thus to get well out of the way.

Accordingly, I gave orders to the men to hold their positions until dark, and to let the enemy see that they were doing so. I had even had schanzes built, so as to impress them with the idea that I intended to attack them the following day if they advanced towards my positions. And just before the night came on, I ordered the burghers to show themselves from behind all our schanzes. Then night fell, and I at once gave orders to march off. The burghers could not understand this, and began to grumble about it—what could their General mean? Why this sudden change in his plans? I said nothing, but thought to myself, ''You shall know why tomorrow."

We marched directly towards Springhaansnek. It was very slow work, for many of the burghers' horses were so weak that their owners had to go on foot. General Philip Botha and I were with the rearguard, and did not expect to reach the line of forts until ten o'clock on the following morning. We had not advanced very far before we were joined by Commandant Michal Prinsloo, who had with him three hundred of the Bethlehem burghers. He had come down from Springhaansnek, and as his horses were in good condition I ordered him to go in advance of us, to pass through Springhaansnek, and then to occupy positions to the north of the lines of forts and east of Thaba' Nchu. My object in making this arrangement was that when on the following morning we were crossing the mountains, he might be able to hinder the enemy at Thaba' Nchu from either checking our advance, or sending reinforcements to the Springhaansnek forts.

And in point of fact, Prinsloo's commando proved to be our salvation; for the English, from their high position at Thaba' Nchu, spied us as soon as day broke, and indeed sent troops to reinforce the point for which we were making. But Prinsloo succeeded in holding them in check, so that when we arrived at Springhaansnek we had to fight against strong positions, but against nothing else—but I must not anticipate. Before it began to be light on the morning of the 14th of December, Commandant Prinsloo passed through the enemy's lines between the forts. The English fired upon him, but he did not turn back. Then a small outpost of the enemy, which lay halfway between the forts, made an attempt to turn the oncoming burghers by shooting at them from the front. The Commandant only gave strict orders that the men must force their way through. The consequence was that two of the enemy, who did not get out of the way in time, were literally ridden over. The burghers thought that these two unfortunate men had been trodden to death by the horses, but it was not likely that any of them would dismount to see if this were actually the case.

As I have already said. General Botha and I were in the rearguard. We knew, however, that Vice- Commandant-in-Chief Piet Fourie—a man whom nothing on earth would stop, if he had once made up his mind—was leading the van, and that he was supported by Veldt cornet Johannes Hattingh, who was as resolute and undaunted as his chief. Fourie did not wait for us to catch him up, but at once went down the mountain side. When we saw this, General Botha and I rode with all speed ahead, telling the burghers to come on more gently with their weary horses. I did not fear thus to leave them behind, because I knew that General Knox was still a long way in the rear.

Just as General Fourie, leading the first storming party, had passed between the forts, we came up with him, our burghers still straggling on behind us. As soon as we had crossed over the first piece of rising ground, I halted my men, and ordered them to leave their horses out of sight of the enemy, and to return to the brow of the hill, so as to be able to fire into the forts on the right and left hand, which were from eight hundred to nine hundred paces from us. From this hill we kept up as fierce a fire as we could, and this to a great extent prevented the enemy in those forts from firing on our burghers who were still coming on in a long train. It is necessary, in order that the reader may understand the task which we had set ourselves to accomplish, to say a few words about Springhaansnek. At either side of the way by which we must pass, there were two strong forts, at a distance of from a thousand to twelve hundred paces from each other. In the space between them there was absolutely no cover; and the distance from the point where the burghers were first visible to the men in these forts, to the point where they again disappeared from view, was at least three thousand paces. Over these terrible three thousand paces our burghers raced, while a storm of bullets was poured in upon them from both sides. And of all that force—eight thousand strong—no single man was killed, and only one was wounded!

Having safely run the gauntlet as it were, the Commando continued its operations, relentlessly pursued by the encroaching British forces.

Liebenbergsvlei – 5 June 1901

The final battle or action which Serfontein makes specific reference to was that of Liebenbergsvlei. Once more we turn to General De Wet for an account of what happened. In Chapter XXXIV of his Three Years War he wrote:

We decided to set out for the Transvaal in order to discuss the matter with the Government; and on the evening of the 5th of June we marched four or five miles from Liebenbergsvlei, to a place opposite Verkijkersdorp. We were, all told, between sixty and seventy men, including the staff and part of the bodyguard of President Steyn, the staff of General De la Rey, and eight of my staff officers. The following morning, an hour and a half after sunrise, a burgher came galloping up to tell us that the enemy had just captured a laager of women. The previous evening, we had received a report of two English camps on the Wilge River: One at Duminy Drift, the other at Steildrift

It seemed impossible to ride over to the rescue of these women, for our horses had still to make the long journey into the Transvaal. I asked our guest, General De la Rey, what he thought about the matter. He at once replied that we must go and liberate the women. As we were already up-saddled in readiness for our march, I had nothing to do but to give the order to start. The President, with his staff and some of the bodyguard, remained behind; while General De la Rey, Commandant Davel and I, with fifty-five men, hurried off. The enemy had marched with the laager on to a hill near the Kaffir kraal, consisting of four or five huts and a building made of sods. We first caught sight of the English when we were at a distance of four miles from them; they were then busy drawing up the waggons of the women in rows of ten or twelve. The women told us afterwards that they had asked to be allowed to retire to a place where they would not run the risk of being shot by us (for the English had taken cover barely one hundred paces behind the waggons and were preparing to fight us from there), but that they were ordered to remain behind the soldiers.

They were thus exposed to the danger of being hit by us, if we shot a little too high. It was, they said, the most terrible day they had ever spent. When we came within range of the English, they opened a hot fire upon us. We had to gallop over ground as smooth as a table with no cover until we were close up to them, and protected by a small hill. We left our horses here, and ran as fast as we could up the incline. At the top we were within forty paces of the place where the English were lying in wait for us. As soon as our heads appeared over the brow of the hill they fired on us; but there was only one round fired, for our reply was so sharp and severe that many of them were at once mowed down. The rest jumped up and retreated behind the last row of waggons, several of them, however, being killed during their flight.

Our men dashed through between the waggons, but the English were the first to reach the kraal. They had made loopholes in its walls, through which they now fired on us. The only shelter we had was a Kaffir hut, which as is well known, always has a round wall. There was no chance for us to make loopholes—the wall was too solid—so that if a burgher wanted to shoot he had to expose his whole body, while the English lay ready behind their loopholes to fire on us. So it happened that eleven burghers were killed and seven wounded. In the meantime, we had got the waggons away, except the row which was nearest to the kraal, and which were too close to the enemy for us to be able to approach them safely.

No sooner had the English taken refuge in the kraal than the women fled with the waggons; and it is astonishing to relate that only one little boy of thirteen years was killed, and a woman and a girl slightly wounded. One of the burghers whom the English had taken prisoner was also killed. I have no exact figure as to the losses of the English, but judging from the number of dead and wounded lying on the battlefield, I should say that their casualties must have been about eighty. The fight lasted from eleven till three o'clock, and then a reinforcement of cavalry, from eight hundred to one thousand men strong, appeared with some guns. The force with which we had been engaged, numbering about two hundred men, belonged to the column which was now coming up. As we could not drive the English from the kraal before the arrival of the reinforcements, we had to give way. Although I had given orders that all the waggons which had managed to escape should be sent on to Reitz, in the actual event only a few carts went there.

The women had left the waggons behind, close to the hill at the foot of the English position, where I could not see them, in order to await the result. They had forgotten what I had told them, namely, that they were to get away as quickly as possible. This order I had given in the expectation that a reinforcement might arrive at any moment. After I had ordered a few men to bring the wounded into a safe place, I retired with the remainder, some forty-five in number. Among these was Veldt cornet Serfontein (could this be our man?) and his burghers. The English now directed their fire upon the women's laager, to compel it to come to a standstill. Whether any of the women and children were killed or wounded I was unable to ascertain, but it was horrible to see the bombs bursting over their heads. Thus the women again fell into the hands of the enemy.

Serfontein continued the fight, laying down his arms at the end of May 1902. A free man, he returned to his farm Bossiesspruit in the Kroonstad district. What met him were scenes of unparalleled and wanton destruction. His pecuniary losses were so severe that he turned to the Burgher Claims Department for financial relief, completing the Claim for War Losses form in mid-1903. A total amount of £5741 was claimed, of which £4054 was recommended. Stating that he was a 46 year old cattle farmer.

The Chairman of the Relief Board, one Leslie Sheffield, commented that, “Claimant owns about three farms and is very well to do. I recommend that this claim be disallowed on that account. He has not received any assistance from the Repatriation Board.”

In his affidavit, Serfontein swore as follows: “I reside on the farm Bossiesspruit. Everything I claim for was mine. Nothing was looted and nothing was recovered. None of the horses claimed for were used on commando. As I was always on commando I cannot speak as to my losses, but I swear that all I claim for was mine before and was lost during the war.”

Serfontein’s wife, Elizabeth, swore under oath that, “I am claimant’s wife. On the 16th August 1900 the British came to Tochtgekriegen, burnt all the buildings on that farm and took 80 horses and 50 thoroughbred ewes and 15 lambs and 10 rams (all thoroughbred) and 9 pigs and 250 fowls and 130 geese and 200 ducks and 20 peacocks and burnt all the furniture in the claim – farming implements, saddles, beans, onions, meal, ox-hides, tools and 60 bags of coffee corn and tobacco and 2 dam scrapers and 250 bags of mealies and 4 spans of trek gear. I know that a receipt for 20 oxen was given to my husband by the late General P.R. Botha but this was burnt same day as my house. In the wagon house was burnt 1 wagon and 2 carts. Captain Brett was responsible for this.”

The claim settled for the recommended amount, Serfontein resumed his farming operations. Being a man of substance, it followed that he would be among the first to join the Orangia Unie (United Orange). This was a political party established in May 1906 in the Orange River Colony under the leadership of Abraham Fischer, Martinus Theunis Steyn and J. B. M. Hertzog. When the colony gained self-government in 1907, the party formed the government. Aside from Serfontein, another early member of the party was Marinus Bukes, the attorney who co-signed Serfontein’s Vorm B.

Serfontein’s son and namesake, Evert Philippus, had been born on 2 September 1895 and was, according to an article written about him, incarcerated in the Kroonstad Concentration Camp. He went on to become a well-known Afrikaans detective novelist and playwright, passing away in Bloemfontein 19 September 1949.

But what of his father, the subject of this work? Evert Serfontein passed away at Soetdoring in the Bainsvlei area outside Bloemfontein on 21 March 1938 at the age of 81. A note in his wife’s estate file is telling, it read thus (translated):

“I beg to inform you that the executor, Mr E.P Serfontein of Bossiesspruit, district Kroonstad, is a very old man and is blind. He is destitute and is incapable of conducting his own affairs. His son-in-law assists him in his dealings.” A sad end to a man who had seen and done so much.