TOPIC:

Charles Harry Robertson

Missing in Action, Blood River Poort, 17 September 1901

Bombardier, 69th Battery, Royal Field Artillery – Anglo Boer War

- Queens South Africa Medal with clasps Talana, Defence of Ladysmith, Orange Free State, Transvaal and Laing’s Nek to 5906 BOMB: C.H. ROBERTSON, 69: B, R.F.A.
- Kings South Africa Medal with clasps South Africa 1901 & 1902 to CORPL. C.H. ROBERTSON. R.F.A.

Charles Robertson was born in the parish of St. Margaret’s in Leicester, County Leicestershire on 13 January 1878, the son of William Robertson, a Hosier by occupation, and his wife Susanna, born Craythorn. At the time of the 1881 England census, 3 year old Charles was resident with his family at The Cottage in Gresham Street, Leicester. Apart from his parents, he was joined in the house by 9 year old brother William.

Ten years later, at the time of the 1891 England census things had changed and not for the better – I have been unable to track down the circumstances leading up to what happened, but a 13 year old Charles was an inmate of the Leicester Industrial School for Boys in Ratby, Leicestershire. The fact that he wasn’t there voluntarily is confirmed by the designation “Boys under order of detention” – what had transpired? How had he got himself into this fix? Perhaps we will never know.


Leicester Industrial School for Boys - a now derelict edifice.

But what of the school? The Leicester School Board had built what was later named, the Desford Boys School. It was an industrial school - a boarding school for juvenile delinquents who had not yet got into serious trouble. The idea was to provide a place for problem youths other than sending them to an adult prison. The children were generally poor and neglected. The act authorized magistrates to remove disorderly children from their home environment and placed in a boarding school. They were called industrial schools because the curriculum focused on providing the boys a trade. Desford was one of these schools. Charles was one of about 16 boys put to work in the Kitchen.

What of his family? Where were they whilst he was in formal detention, most likely for a trivial crime which would attract almost no punishment in this day and age? His mother, Susanna, was recorded as a married Seamstress living alone at 36 Bedford Street, Leicester. His father appears to have abandoned the family and, according to the 1901 England census, was “single” and a Boarder living in Market Harborough, Leicestershire. His brother William, 20 years old in 1891, was a Lodger in St. Margaret’s, Leicester. The family had fragmented, was a young and impressionable Charles a victim of this discord?

Having being released from his detention, one assumes on completion of his schooling, Robertson did what many young men in his position did, he enlisted with the army – 7 years with the Colours and 5 years with the Reserve – completing the attestation forms at Weedon on 24 September 1894. Now 18 years and 3 months old, he was a Groom by way of occupation; claiming militia service with the 3rd Leicestershire Regiment.

Physically a small man at 5 feet 4 inches, he weighed a slender 129 lbs, had a fresh complexion, grey eyes and brown hair and was a member of the Church of England. By way of distinguishing features about his person he sported faint tattoo marks on his left forearm. Having been passed as fit by the Medico, he was assigned no 5906 and the rank of Driver with the 41st Field Battery, R.A.

On 10 September 1895 he was posted to the 44th Battery, Royal Field Artillery – a promotion to Acting Bombardier followed on 28 June 1896. On 1 May 1897 he was posted to the 69th Battery – perhaps the joy that this occasioned proved too much and the celebrations too vigorous as, a mere two weeks later, on 14 May 1897, he was reverted to the rank of Driver for Misconduct. Back in the Battery’s good graces again, he was promoted to Acting Bombardier on 19 November 1898.

Unbeknown to Robertson, in less than a year from this date he and thousands of his comrades would be fighting for their lives under the blazing African sun. Long simmering tensions between the United Kingdom and two obscure Boer Republics on the southern tip of far away Africa were coming to a head. Paul Kruger of the Transvaal and his ally, the Orange Free State, were severely discombobulated by what they perceived to be British plans to unseat them in their quest for colonial expansion and had reached the end of their collective tether with what they regarded as British deception and prevarication.

Things came to a head in October 1899 when, on the 11th of that month, an ultimatum to withdraw all Imperial troops from the borders of the two Republics was met with the expected silence. War followed and, the next morning, Boer Commandos crossed the borders on the British colonies of the Cape and Natal. Initially the Imperial effort stuttered, indeed faltered, and the Boers swept through with almost no military presence to check their progress. The main Boer army to invade Natal was that of General Erasmus that came down the main north-south road through Newcastle. General Kock took a smaller force on a parallel route to the west of Erasmus, while Commandant Lucas Meyer entered Natal via its eastern border from Utrecht.

The first major engagement of the war was fought in Natal at Talana Hill, an eminence which looms large over the small town of Dundee where General Sir William Penn-Symons, almost in defiance of his superior, General Sir George White who had wanted him to fall back on Ladysmith to strengthen the garrison there, insisted that he could weather the initial Boer onslaught with the 4000 men at his disposal.


Fawkes Battle of Talana Hill Map

Robertson, who with his 69th Battery comrades had been in South Africa since 15 May 1897, was in the firing line when the Boers, in the very early morning of 20 October 1899 appeared out of the mist, creating a long outline of men on the very summit of Talana. This was at around 5am when the Boer commando of General Meyer appeared on Talana Hill, following a night march.

The British, having spotted figures moving on Talana Hill, were surprised as it was expected that the first Boer incursion would arrive from the direction of Newcastle. It was thus assumed that these figures were members of the Dundee town guard. At 5.40am the Boer artillery opened fire from Talana Hill on Dundee and the British camp. The games had begun.

General Penn Symons had not been impressed by the readiness of the British troops in Natal and worked them hard. His battalions were falling in for a day’s training when the first artillery rounds came in from three 75 millimetre guns, the first of Joubert’s new European acquisitions.

Although confusion reigned briefly in the British camp, discipline and training soon prevailed although there was a delay before fire could be returned, the British artillery horses being at water. The batteries harnessed up and hurried through Dundee, coming into action in the open ground beyond the town, quickly silencing the outnumbered Boer guns. The 67th artillery battery immediately opened fire on Talana Hill but at 3 230 metres distant it was slightly out of range.


British gun line Talana

Within 15 minutes the 69th and 13th batteries had limbered up and advanced to a knoll just south of the town from where they promptly opened fire on Talana Hill.

As his artillery bombarded the Boers, Penn Symons prepared to attack their positions on Talana Hill with his infantry, forming with the Dublin Fusiliers massed in the front rank, the Rifles in support behind them and the Royal Irish Fusiliers in the third rank. Penn Symons insisted his regiments attack in conventional close order, an unrealistic tactic against an enemy armed with modern magazine rifles.

Having initially stalled under withering and accurate Boer rifle fire, the British infantry attack regained its momentum and continued up Talana Hill, gathering below the peak for the final assault. As the troops stormed the top of the hill the Boers retreated.

One of the British batteries, firing from the open ground outside Dundee, failed to identify the troops on the top of Talana as British and continued to fire on the crest, inflicting unnecessary casualties and hindering the assault. Several senior British officers were killed or seriously wounded by British artillery fire. The Boers could be seen mounting their ponies and streaming away across the valley on the far side of the hill. Penn Symons had sent the 18th Hussars and Mounted Infantry around Talana Hill to take advantage of just such a situation, but there was no sign of them.

A contemporary account of the action taken by the 69th Battery was contained in letters home to his wife by Frederick Percival Churcher, a Sergeant with the Battery. He wrote: -

“On the 19th (October) we turned out at 4 a.m. and waited till daybreak, but as nothing unusual was reported we turned in again, on the 20th we had orders to again turn out, everybody was shouting about the unnecessary loss of sleep etc, and still more so when at daybreak we were again ordered to turn in, the horses were sent off to water and everybody started getting their kits etc off, then the band played - guns opened on us from a very strong position beyond Dundee the artillery camp being their point of attack, I suppose they thought if they annihilated us they hadn’t much else to fear, the horses or rather most of them stampeded mine in the lead and all was excitement for a short time.

I lost all my kit, but managed to catch a wheel horse with harness on, I put my range-finding instruments over my shirt and so went into action, in a short time we knocked their guns out, and we advanced to take the hill, in camp we had no casualties but as soon as we advanced young Trumpeter Horn the youngest in the Battery was the first to be killed, death was instantaneous as the shell struck him in the forehead. We again advanced to within 1400 yards of them and the hill was gained and Majuba avenged about 4 p.m. I went up on top of the hill to fetch down some Boer ammunition but did not stop there long as the effect of our shell was not very nice to see.

On the Saturday we were compelled to leave camp as another Boer column had taken up a very strong position with heavy siege guns, we did not get back again, so we lost our tents etc. On Sunday night we were compelled to leave Dundee and march night and day to Ladysmith we had to go almost into Zululand and the longest rest we got was 4 hours, it rained almost every day and the Boers were following us up all the way, we however had a good start and gave them the slip, the Infantry threw away their cloaks and blankets and everything except their rifles and ammunition. I don’t think I shall every forget that march.”

One of the casualties of Talana was Penn-Symons. With his death command passed to General Yule who, as we can see from Churcher’s letter, ordered the immediate evacuation of Dundee. After an epic march, the men arrived in Ladysmith, chilled to the bone and having narrowly escaped the Boers who were in pursuit.


Fawkes Map of Lombards Kop

There was to be little respite for the 69th Battery however as, on 30 October they were pressed into action at Lombard’s Kop, the first British defeat of the war and the last action before the encirclement of Ladysmith by the Boer forces. Sir George White strategy, in an almost last-ditch attempt at staving off the Boers, was to keep their armies separate, to drive the Transvaal Boers from the range of hills to the north of Ladysmith and to cut off their retreat, thereby enabling him to inflict on them a decisive defeat.

White divided his army into three forces. Two of these would mount attacks on the Boer positions on Pepworth and Long Hills.

White assuming the Boers would remain in position while he advanced on them. General Yule, sick after his harrowing march from Dundee, handed over command of his brigade to Lieutenant Colonel Grimwood. Grimwood’s force comprised the 1st Leicesters, 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1st and 2nd King’s Royal Rifle Corps and 1st King’s Liverpools with two batteries of guns, the Royal Field Artillery 13th and 69th Batteries. Grimwood, backed by French’s cavalry, was to ascend Lombard’s Kop a hill to the east of Ladysmith forming part of the ridge of hills and turning to the north-west to attack the left flank of the Boer force on Long Hill and then Pepworth Hill.

The battle was to begin with an artillery bombardment of Long Hill and Pepworth Hill. Hamilton would mount the attack frontally on Pepworth Hill from Ladysmith while Grimwood worked his way along the ridge from the right.

These attacks began at dawn when the first shots were being fired on Tchengula. The Boer artillery on Pepworth Hill began to bombard Ladysmith. The British Royal Field Artillery guns attempted counter-battery fire, but found it difficult to work out the positions of the Boer guns, although for a time they managed to force the Boer gunners off the Long Tom siege gun.

Many of the accounts of the battle attribute the difficulties of the British gunners to the use by the Boers of smokeless ammunition. The British gunners had little experience of counter-battery fire, being more used to action against native tribesmen, as in the Sudan and on the North-West Frontier of India. They had the added difficulty that they were firing from the open plain against concealed Boer guns.

During the night Grimwood marched his force out of Ladysmith and onto Lombard’s Kop at Farquhar’s Farm where he waited for dawn. With daylight Grimwood found that part of his force including his two batteries of guns was missing and French’s cavalry was not positioned to support him. Once these problems were sorted out Grimwood’s men moved along Lombard’s Kop to attack the supposed Boer flank on Long Hill.

As Grimwood’s men moved forward the Boers opened a heavy fire into their right flank, taking the British troops by surprise and causing considerable confusion. Instead of conducting an attack along the ridge and rolling up the Boer flank the British found themselves in a desperate struggle to maintain their position on the hill under a withering fire from hidden Boer riflemen.


Royal Art at Lombards Kop

Thoroughly unnerved by the failure of Hamilton and Grimwood to take the hills and the steady fire of Long Tom, together with rumours of an impending attack on the town by the Orange Free State Boers, White ordered his commanders to disengage and retire into Ladysmith. By mid-afternoon, the action was over and the British troops were streaming back into Ladysmith, other than those who had been taken prisoner, on their way by train to Pretoria. Within days the Boers cut the railway line south of Ladysmith and the siege of the town began.

Again, Sgt. Churcher’s letters home prove illuminating: -

“We arrived in Ladysmith on the Thursday and the following Monday fought the battle of Lombards Kop. We were in a very tight place there but up to the present we have only had 2 killed and 10 wounded in our battery. We had Melton Prior, the War Correspondent of the Daily Graphic round our guns, so you ought to get a glowing description of how we manned our guns out of action there. Since then we have been undergoing a siege with very little to do. I am now in charge of one gun and we continually fire and then run under cover, quite Boer tactics.”

The daily grind of a garrison under siege now became the order of the day. As the siege continued with no end in sight, the depravations of the population, both military and civilian, began to tell on their health. The biggest killer was now not Long Tom or the daily artillery bombardment by the Boers, but Enteric Fever as the poor diet and dirty water supply began to play havoc with the besieged.

Sgt. Churcher’s trusty epistles home come to the rescue: -

“Up to the present no news of Buller. We have been doing a good deal of firing at our gun today (26th December) we have to contend with four guns of the enemy so we have our work cut out. Our Major has altered considerably lately, he is very fretful and fidgety and it is a very difficult thing to do anything right for him.

I know myself I shall be very glad when this siege is raised, we get very little of good food to eat and we have all the elements to battle with. We have been 3 months without shelter except an old cover which lets the rain in like a sieve and attracts the heat like Uncle's greenhouse, we can’t have it very high or the Boers would make a target of it, we only have one blanket, so I don’t think our life is an enviable one. I have snatched a few hours broken rest leaning against a tree in the pouring rain, and when we have been standing at our gun all night I have dozed standing, soaking wet through to the skin standing in water up over the boots.”


69th Camp

I suppose you had detailed accounts of how we repulsed the Boers in the beginning of January Wagon Hill, 6th January 1900)) so I won’t say much about that except that we were in the trenches of our gun pit from 5a.m. till dark wet thru and very miserable with cold etc. we were at it the whole time firing as hard as we could so you can guess we had a lively time, the Infantry caught the brunt and got it very rough over 120 killed but all’s well that ends well and we kept em out thank God.

I have since been released from the posts on the hills and I am now in charge of the batteries horse lines, I may say that we have only 65 horses in the battery now out of 140 having used them up for food, these few we have left live almost on grass as they are only allowed 2 lb of grain a day so we lose 3 almost every day if they once get down they are not strong enough in the back to get up again so they receive a bullet and finis.”

Finally, after three unsuccessful attempts, Buller broke through to Ladysmith, liberating the town on 1 March 1900 – three months after the siege had begun. The battery, Robertson in tow, and now promoted to Bombardier with effect from 5 March 1900, moved north with General Buller to Volksrust, and was present at the turning of Laing's Nek. On 10 July 1900 he was made a Corporal.
In Lord Roberts' despatch of 10th October 1900, para 27, the 13th and 69th were said to have distinguished themselves at Amersfoort. They also earned the clasp to the action at Laings Nek where the Boers were finally expelled from Natal.

In January 1901, the battery was stationed at De Jager’s Drift near Dundee, Natal, on the Tugela River. The battery was under canvas or rather 2 sections of it (each of 2 guns) were at H.Q. the third section being detached to 'Nqutu, in Zululand.

After a month or so at De Jagers, the battery was put on to convoy work. A series of convoys was being organized between Dundee and Vryheid, one of the posts in the Eastern Transvaal, and four days march from Dundee, the route passing through De Jagers Drift. The two sections of the 69th Battery and two sections from the 67th Battery at Dundee, used to constitute the escort, with various cavalry and infantry added. The work lasted about 6 weeks. Occasionally a small party of Boers would be spotted in the far distance.


69th Battery R.F.A. at Ladysmith

About this date, reports began to come in that certain Dutch farmers in the neighborhood, who had been known to have assisted the Boers during the early invasion of Northern Natal in October 1899, were now harbouring arms and ammunition, in defiance of the regulations forbidding this practice. As a result, raids were made from time to time, often with success. When the battery was detailed for this duty, it usually turned out a party of mounted drivers, armed with carbines, under a subaltern.

Early in September, rumours reached the battery of a projected raid into Natal by Louis Botha, who was said to be manning forces for this purpose on the Transvaal - Natal border. As a result, the 69th Battery was ordered to send a section of 2 guns up to Vryheid, to strengthen the forces there. This was the prelude to the disastrous Battle of Blood River Poort on 17 September, an action in which Robertson was to be taken P.O.W. for a short while.

Major J.F De Fonblanque Shaw, R.F.A. in an excerpt from his "Twenty-two years of Soldiering in Peace and War" takes up the story: -

“Captain Tapp decided to send Lieut. Charles section to Vryheid, and to accompany it himself, with the requisite battery staff. On the afternoon of the following day, we were reinforced by the arrival of Gough's Mounted Infantry, comprising three companies of regular Mounted Infantry, taken from the 60th Rifles, the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), and Royal Irish Fusiliers respectively. The unit was commanded by one Major Gough, of the 16th Lancers.

Next morning at the appointed hour, the column started off. I took with me the two guns, one ammunition wagon, and one baggage wagon, the latter carrying rations, blankets, waterproof sheets, etc. Such luxuries as tents were of course left behind, as we were intended to bivouac each night in the open. Total about 26 horses, and some 30 N.C.O.s and men.

Our first line of advance lay practically due North. The pace was rapid, alternately walking and trotting, but with a decided tendency towards the latter pace. About midday, a halt was called, to rest and water the horses. When we moved off again, we changed our direction to the Westward, proceeding at a continuous trot, by order of the Column Commander.

After an hour or so of this, a fresh halt was ordered. And now Gough for the first time proceeded to explain his plan to me. He had had information from native spies, it so appeared, that a small force of the enemy lay concentrated in the Blood River Poort, a valley penetrating into a low outlying spur of the Schurveberg Mountains and some 8 miles to the N.E. of our present position. And so his scheme was to advance, take them by surprise and "Bag the lot."

Another 30 minutes brought us abreast of a low ridge of hills, to our left, and about 1400 yards distant. There Gough, who was riding with me, indicated the entrance to the Poort, about a mile ahead.


An image of Blood River Poort today

He had hardly done so, when rifle firing broke out suddenly upon us from the rocky ridge on our left. I was ordered to bring the guns onto action at once, but had to do so at first with only one gun, the other one having dropped behind some 200 yards, owing to the exhaustion of the horses. We opened fire on the rocks on the summit of the ridge and where I imagined the enemy to be, though as usual, not a sign of a Boer was to be seen. Meanwhile the Mounted Infantry, (less one section left as escort to the guns) were working their way up the Poort. Gough, however, remaining close to the guns.

The rifle firing from the ridge continued but the bullets were all going high, and we suffered no casualties so far. After about 10 or 15 minutes by which time the M.I. Companies must have been well into the Poort, a large and scattered body of horsemen suddenly emerged from the mouth of the Poort at full gallop, spreading out as they came along towards my two guns. The subaltern in command of the M.I. escort indicated these to Gough, and suggested that they were Boers.

But the Major only responded, "No they are our men returning". But a minute later, as it became perfectly plain that they were Boers, Gough shouted to me to retire the guns 1000 yards, and then to bring them into action again. So I mounted my horse, and ordered in quick succession: "Cease firing, prepare to retire, rear lumber up, gallop" and off we started, but I had not gone more than 50 yards or so before on looking round, I saw the section was not following, being in serious difficulties and unable to move, many of the horses being hit by the Boers who were firing from the saddle as they advanced. By the time I had regained the guns, the Boers were tight on top of us, and a regular melee was in progress.

I was dragged off my horse, relieved of my revolver, ammunition, and accoutrements, and so stripped of my boots, gaiters breeches jacket and helmet. As also were all the other officers. In the section, we had more [than] half the horses killed or wounded, one gunner killed and two drivers wounded. Sergeant Dorly the "No.1" of one of the guns, successfully disabled the breech mechanism of his gun, before capture, thus rendering it useless to the enemy! The Mounted Infantry suffered severely with 14 killed and 25 wounded.

The Boers were commanded by General Louis Botha in presence, and their numbers have been variously estimated at from 2000 to 2500, but judging from the numbers I saw in their camp next day, I should say that the latter figure was nearer to mark. (Most reports put General Botha’s total force at less than 1,000.)

All unmounted artillery riding or draught horses, were now harnessed to the guns, which were taken off by the Boers. Also, our ammunition and baggage wagons, were in addition captured, with all stores, baggage, etc.

We were then mustered, and ordered up the Poort to a farm. All I needed was my trousers back! On the way up to the farm, I walked alongside a mounted Boer, who told me that we would in all probability not be detained longer than a day or two, since the Boers did not look forward to feeding so many extra mouths having, in fact not too much food for themselves.

On reaching the farm, the wounded were made as comfortable as circumstances admitted, by both the British and Boer medical services, each of whom had administered First Aid, so far as possible, before leaving the field of action. On arrival we were relegated to the farm buildings for the night. There, we were given a little food. Gough, however, contrived to evade his guards, and to escape on the way up to the farm. Having been stripped like the other officers, he eventually got back, footsore and weary, to De Jagers Drift next day.

We were kept where we were all next day, the main feature of which was considerable activity on the part of the Boers, who were continually mustering in parties of from 50 to 100, and riding away.

Next morning, about 10 am, a convoy of British Ambulances arrived, under a flag of truce, from Vryheid, and the dead and wounded having been placed in them, the rest of us were told that we could get into Vryheid (about 15 miles distant) as best we could.

As I personally had to do it all in my stockinged feet, it was fortunate that the "going was good" and nearly all over grassland. As it was, I was considerable sore, by the time we reached Vryheid!

On the 23rd September, we proceeded to return to De Jagers. We had lost 26 horses, 2 guns, 1 ammunition wagon, in addition to all stores and baggage. Gough, of course, had been entirely deceived by false information regarding the enemy movements and dispositions. Doubtless, the native spies whom he employed were in 'Boer pay as well.' However, this was a case of frequent occurrence in the South African War.”


Daily News 25 September 1901 - list of POW’S

Robertson, as has been mentioned, was one of those, along with Shaw, who were detained, denuded of their clothing, and sent back to Vryheid on foot (literally).

The 69th also had two guns in the fight at Fort Itala, Zululand, when that place was attacked on 26th September. On that occasion the section lost 1 officer and 4 men wounded. Five non-commissioned officers and men gained mention for conspicuous gallantry: of these, Driver Bradley gained the VC for rushing out and carrying in a wounded man, then volunteering to take ammunition to a post up the hill; the 4 others were awarded the distinguished conduct medal. Unfortunately, no record has been kept of who manned the two guns – it is thus impossible to confirm or deny Robertson’s presence there.

The battery sailed for India in November 1901 but Robertson wasn’t with them – he was posted to the 21st Battery on 25 October 1901 and continued service in South Africa until 15 October 1902 when he returned home. He was placed on the Army Reserve on 12 November 1903. Now home, he wed Mary Alice Broadley in Blackburn, Lancashire on 24 December 1902.

Having been discharged from the army on 23 September 1906, he returned to South Africa at some point. He took up residence in, of all places, Ladysmith where, at the age of 57, he passed away on 26 July 1935 from Influenza and Pneumonia. He was the Caretaker (Steward) of the Railway Institute at the time of his passing. An affluent man (for the times), he bequeathed £3 247 to his wife along with his Ford de Luxe Fordor sedan (V8), registration no. NL 216.

Excellent article. Thank you very much for posting it!