TOPIC:

Adriaan Hendrik Du Preez

2 x Wounded in Action

Veld Kornet, Zoutpansberg Commando – Anglo Boer War

- Anglo Boere Oorlog Medal to VELDKORNET. A H DU PREEZ
- Lint voor Verwonden

Adriaan Du Preez was born on 3 August 1867 at Schoemansdal, a small settlement outside Louis Trichardt in what is known as the Soutpansberg region of the Far-Northern Transvaal. He was the son of Frans Johannes Jacobus du Preez, a farmer by occupation, and his wife Adriana Hendrina Aletta du Preez, born Pretorius. He was only three years old when his mother passed away. His father wed again and continued to be, even by late Victorian standards where families were large, prolific when it came to the children department. Adriaan certainly never lacked for playmates growing up in the isolated and very rural Soutpansberg with Johannes Lodewikus; Gerhardus Petrus; Frans Johannes Jacobus; Gesina Catharina Aletta; Henrietta Wilhelmina; Gezina Catharina; Susarah Cecilia; Hendrik Lodewyk and half brothers and sisters Stephanus Andries; Roelof Jacobus; Heila Johanna Maria; Wynand Frederik; Petrus Christiaan; Hester Adriana and Susanna Magdalena making up the numbers – 15 children in total.

Given his upbringing and surroundings it was no wonder that Adriaan initially turned his hand to farming as he grew older. This changed though in early 1888 as the discovery of gold in the Northern Transvaal led to a rush with hundreds of prospectors heading for the area to stake their claims and make their fortune. Perhaps Du Preez was one of these fellows? He was certainly in the area on 1 October 1888 where, at Smitsdorp in the Marabastad Goldfields and at the youthful age of 21, he wed Jessie Gear Morrison who, at 16, was required to have her parents permission to cement the union. The ceremony was conducted by the Mine Commissioner, Mr Rabe.


A contemporary map showing the Marabastad Goldfields in relation to Pietersburg and Potgietersrus.

As the couple went about the making of a family they were not to know that, as the 19th century drew to a close, they and their countrymen would be embroiled in a war for their sovereignty and survival. As residents of the Soutpansberg, the Du Preez’s were burghers (citizens) of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek or Transvaal under President Paul Kruger. Much further to the south of where the Du Preez’s lived was the capital city of Pretoria and, some 50 miles further south, the epicentre of the Gold Mining industry and source of tremendous wealth for many (and abject poverty for not a few) – the city of Johannesburg.

In late 1896 the infamous James Raid had taken place with Cecil Rhodes’ friend Dr Leander Starr Jameson and about 500 men of the Bechuanaland Border Police (and others) riding on Johannesburg from Pitsani on the Bechuanaland border. The plan was simple but ill-conceived and poorly executed – march on Johannesburg, be met by the Reform Committee who were supposed to have drummed up support among the Uitlanders in the city, and topple the Kruger government. The Reform Committee failed to show up and, worse still, the Transvaal government was tipped off about the ”Raid” – the outcome was never in doubt, Jameson and his men were routed before they got close to Johannesburg and the “Raid” was over. The shenanigans left an understandably bitter taste in the mouths of Kruger and his people and had the unfortunate result of breaking what little trust there existed between the British authorities and the Transvaal.

A massive armament campaign took place in its wake with the Transvaal and its ally, the Orange Free State, equipping their burghers with 30 000 Mauser rifles secured from Germany. In addition several artillery pieces, far superior to anything the British Army had in South Africa at the time, were ordered from and delivered by Krupp of Germany and Creusot of France. Burghers were placed on standby and the Commando system, the Boer army formation, was tightened up with men being warned to assemble in their Wards at market squares throughout the land when summoned to do so.

This call came in about mid-September 1899 when temperatures between the two opposing sides were reaching boiling point. All able-bodied men were informed of their duties in the two regionally based commandos the Zoutpansberg Commando in the north (about 1 287 men); and the Waterberg Commando in the north-west (732 men). These commandos were placed under the joint command of Assistant Commandant-General F A Grobler. His position was not an easy one as there was considerable friction between the commandos and an even greater reluctance to cross the border into Rhodesia in force when the need arose.

Fortunately for the collector, applicants for the Anglo Boer War medal (for Boer combatants) authorised in 1921, had to complete a Vorm B which, quite apart from providing their personal details, required the listing of all battles in which they had participated and under whose command. Should they have been wounded in action, a Vorm C was completed which specified where the wound was received and in which battle. This allows us to build a comprehensive picture of a mans war.


Vorm B

In Du Preez’s case, he listed the following battles in which he participated as a member of the Zoutpansberg Commando under the leadership of Commandants’ Tom Kelly, Van Rensburg and Rossouw – all under General Beyers:-

- In Rhodesia, near Tuli
- Colenso
- Spioenkop
- Magaliesburg and many other places.

His Vorm C – Du Preez was twice Wounded in Action – informs us that he received his wounds at: -

- Pienaars River - (he couldn't recall the date) where he was "slightly wounded in the chest with shrapnel” and at
- Potgietersrus on 24 January 1902, where he received "a bullet wound under my eye and in my leg".

These two actions can thus be added to where he fought.

Backdrop to war

As early as 1 October, Imperial reconnaissance reported that some members of the Zoutpansberg commando were forming a laager on the Brak River, while outlying parties were already noted at all of the drifts along the Limpopo/Crocodile River. In the final days prior to the Declaration of War, all the eligible men were called to camp. The Zoutpansberg Commando came together on 11 October 1899 at the Brak River Store, some 50km south of the Limpopo on the western end of the Soutpansberg Range, while the Waterberg Commando, members of which were very disinclined to action, gathered near Nylstroom.

After receiving news, on 12 October, of the Declaration of War, Grobler joined the Zoutpansberg Laager to discuss strategy. It was agreed that the Waterberg men, with Grobler going south to join them at the Limpopo-Palala confluence and to spur them on, would move directly west to destroy the railway in central Bechuanaland. In the meantime, the Zoutpansberg Commando would move across the dry plains of the Limpopo to face Plumer.

The Zoutpansberg men were placed under the command of Assistant-General H C J van Rensburg and large groups began arriving on the Limpopo from the 15th, reaching full commando strength by 19 October. Their main camp was on a farm called Hendriksdal on the Transvaal side of Rhodes' Drift. This was under Veld-Kornets J Kelly and H W Alberts.

Both sides glared at each other, but no shots were fired. On 16 October, it was reported that fifty Boers on the Transvaal side had passed the British outpost at Pont Drift and that one had called out that they would soon make the British 'sit up'. A similar number of Boers were said to have crossed at Baines' Drift and were marching towards the settlement of Macloutsie in north-west Bechuanaland. This threat, however, proved to be a rumour.

Fort Tuli

Late in the afternoon of 1 November 1899 a small column of six wagons carrying the necessary supplies set off from Fort Tuli with twenty-four men drawn from both the British South Africa Police (BSAP) and 'A' Troop of the Rhodesia Regiment.

While this was going on, there had been significant changes in the Boer camp. A select detachment from Waterberg Commando brought renewed enthusiasm to the men of the Zoutpansberg Commando. They had arrived on 31 October and were commanded by Police Commandant S P Grobler. The next day, they were joined by Commandant S Eloff, a grandson of President Kruger. He brought, from Pretoria, a further two Maxims. Spurred on by the newcomers, the Zoutpansberg commander, Assistant-General H C J van Rensburg, previously so indecisive, was encouraged to act. It was decided that there should be a concerted Boer push into Rhodesian territory, the Rhodes' Drift camp would be destroyed, Fort Tuli captured, and Plumer put to flight.

Accordingly, three to four hundred burghers crossed the Limpopo near Rhodes' Drift early on the morning of 2 November, taking with them the guns. The blustery, drizzly conditions prevalent at the time served to conceal all noise. Once in Rhodesian territory, the Boer force divided into two sections with the aim of outflanking Colonel Spreckley's camp. Du Preez’s section, under van Rensburg, Grobler and Veld Kornet J Kelly, together with the Maxims, made their way through the bush to positions to the east of Spreckley's camp. The other section, under Eloff and AZA Briel and HW Alberts, taking with them the heavy artillery, moved along the main road to the west. This led to Bryce's Store, although their aim was to secure Spreckley's western flank.

The Rhodesians remained totally oblivious to these developments. Early on the morning of 2 November 1899, Captain Glynn and his 'E' Troop men were reconnoitring the Fort Tuli-Rhodes' Drift telephone line that had been cut yet again. They noted a fair amount of unusual activity in the Boer camp at Pont Drift, but they could not make out what was happening, so they proceeded. However, they soon heard heavy fire coming from the direction of Bryce's Store and Glynn returned to the Rhodes' Drift camp, reporting the matter to his commander, Colonel Spreckley. The fights at Bryce's Store and at Rhodes' Drift had begun.


Map detailing the Rhodesian incursion and Fort Tuli

The unexpected Boer forces (numbering about two hundred) suddenly came across this Rhodesian party. As a result, they began to take positions on the various hills that surround the store, which, although on a slight rise next to the Pitsane River, was in a depression with little strategic value. Two Rhodesian scouts then galloped in, reporting unknown movements along the road. The wagons were drawn into a laager and the men took cover both in the store and between the wagons. A message to Fort Tuli was attempted but the telephone line had already been cut. Initial rifle fire then came from a hill some distance away, but with no impact. A mounted group of Boers then approached the store from the north, along the Fort Tuli road showing two flags, one white, and one white and red, which was most prominent. Mistakenly identifying them as Spreckley's men, the Rhodesians emerged and cheered. At about 150 to 200 yards (140 to 180. metres), the Boers dismounted, took cover behind a small stream bank which cut through the road, and commenced firing on the bewildered defenders who retreated back into the store. At this point, the heavy gun, now positioned on the hill to the rear or south of the store, began shelling. The second projectile hit the store, blowing off the roof and causing the walls to crumble. A retreat into the bush was ordered, but the message failed to reach Lieutenant Haserick in the store. He and his men continued to resist until finally forced to surrender.

One of the defenders got away on horseback and galloped back to Fort Tuli, reaching it about midday. Rumours soon began to circulate that everyone had been killed or captured, while the size of the enemy force and his firepower was exaggerated.

The nearby Rhodes' Drift Camp was next. When Colonel Spreckley received word of a fight at Bryce's Store, he took precautions at the drift but did not realise that he, too, was being surrounded. In this broken country, it was easy for the Boers to creep through the gullies around the small undulating ridge on which the camp was built and then attack it from all sides. Once in position, the burghers opened fire, initially with the Maxim and rifles, and later, after the action at Bryce's Store, they brought the heavy artillery into play. The guns were positioned on a wooded kopje 800 yards to the north-west.

Thus began a constant bombardment that lasted from midday to sundown - nearly six hours. Some of the first shots hit the ambulance wagon, which was, fortunately, empty. Others were aimed at the animal lines, killing, maiming, or stampeding every horse and mule except one.

Firing and shelling continued at a heated pace. At about 15.30, Colonel Spreckley sent a black runner to Fort Tuli with a message reporting his predicament and indicating that he intended to retreat that night. After dark, the Boers sent off a final volley, one shell landing in the camp, to which the Rhodesians replied firing randomly into the darkness. Thereafter, both sides settled into an unnerving silence. In fact, Assistant General van Rensburg, rather than push the matter, retired for the evening with most of his men to their camp at Hendriksdal in the Transvaal. They took with them their dead and four injured men.

Being seriously outnumbered and outgunned, Spreckley decided to withdraw. The Rhodesians abandoned everything but their rifles. At 20.00 they quietly stole away, heading in single file north-east through a thorny and rock-strewn landscape towards the Shashi River. After a twelve-hour march, the Rhodesians reached the Shashi, and after a short break for breakfast, they trudged a further four hours upstream towards Fort Tuli, reaching a place known locally as 'Crocodile Pools', a few kilometres short of their destination. Here they came to a halt.

Meanwhile, back at Fort Tuli several patrols had been dispatched in various directions so as to ascertain what had happened. All of these patrols were unfruitful. In the meantime, Glynn, using the only horse that 'E' Troop had secured in their flight, rode ahead of Spreckley's weary men to Fort Tuli to ask for help, arriving there at 10.25. In response, a delighted Major A F Pilson and the men of 'A' Troop rode out to Crocodile Pools, offering their horses to allow 'E' Troop to ride the remainder of the distance. Spreckley had returned with all his men, but he had lost his stores, a second military telephone, several wagons, and all of his horses and mules, although some of the horses that had stampeded in the heat of the battle, and which had not been captured by the Boers, later made their own way back to Fort Tuli.

Early on 3 November, the Boers returned to the Rhodes' Drift camp, but they were unaware that it had been deserted. They resumed shelling the ridge and this lasted for some time before they realised their error. For the Boers, the actions at Bryce's Store and Rhodes' Drift had been successful. They had captured much needed stores, a total of nine wagons, an ambulance, a cart, fifty-six horses, seventy-nine mules, and eighteen oxen, and they had driven the enemy from the Limpopo.

Police Commandant Grobler now felt he could take Fort Tuli and beyond with only 400 men, but his more senior officer, van Rensburg, was apprehensive. In fact, the Boers soon took fright when, at about noon on 3 November, a rumour of a substantial Rhodesian counter-attack sent the men scurrying back to the Transvaal, abandoning their artillery and ammunition on Rhodesian soil. This panic followed the sighting of a huge cloud of dust that was seen approaching from the direction of Fort Tuli. The Boer commanders misconstrued this as the approach of a large Rhodesian column, but it was later found to have been a huge swarm of locusts.

So ended the two major skirmishes in the Northern Transvaal. The Boers may have won the day, but their failure to follow up cost them the war on this front. In retreating as they did, the Boers left the north-western flank of the Transvaal Republic open, and Lieutenant-Colonel Plumer and the men of the Rhodesian Regiment could now redeploy towards the besieged Mafeking to recapture the occupied territories in Bechuanaland and the Cape Colony.

It was now extremely hot and dry in the Limpopo Valley and both sides crept around each other, but there was little action between them. This was soon to change. A party of 78 Boers with fifteen wagons had been sighted at Baines' Drift heading northward. This was Commandant-General FA Grobler, commander of the wider northern front. He had spent most of the war further to the south-west with the Waterberg Commando. The tying down of Grobler in the south-west effectively deprived the Zoutpansberg Commando of any real military leadership.

This column arrived at Hendriksdal on 12 November 1899. Grobler gave serious consideration to Van Rensburg's plan to attack Rhodesia, again contacting the High Command in Pretoria with details of a full-scale invasion. However, this was not to be. A rapid response from the State Secretary rejected all plans. Pretoria felt that the men and artillery were needlessly tied up and could be used to better effect elsewhere.

Accordingly, the North-West Commando was split. A small detachment was left to guard the entire length of the Limpopo. The remaining and larger proportion of the initial force, including almost all of the commanders, was recalled to Pretoria; there, they were again split into two groups, the larger section, under Grobler, being sent to Modder River, and one hundred men under Van Rensburg going to Colenso.

Colenso

Du Preez was one of the hundred men who were sent to the Natal theatre. Here he and his colleagues formed part of the Boer army tasked with keeping Buller at bay. General Louis Botha, in his official report on the battle of Colenso, provided a succinct view of how matters unfolded from the Boer side on the 15th December 1899.

“At one o'clock in the morning we observed many lights in the enemy camp and at the break of day we saw that the enemy had moved out of their camping area in large masses. This area appeared to us to be divided into three camps, pitched in the nearest koppies to the south of the Tugela, south-west of Colenso and approximately three to four miles from our defences.

We had taken up our positions all along the river, from the great hill south (on the opposite side therefore) of the Tugela and east of Colenso, and in the koppies and the plain west of that hill and on this side (north) of the river. The koppies were entrenched by the packing of stones and sand-bags, while in the plain trenches were dug for the protection of our burghers against the enemy fire. The enemy divided themselves into three distinct formations, and formed a left and right flank and a centre.

The most westerly flank marched forward in full array in a northerly direction towards the bend in the river near where Doorn Spruit falls into the Tugela, straight towards the trenches held by Comdt. C. Botha of Swaziland and his men. To the right of Comdt. C. Botha lay Comdt. Van Rensburg of Soutpansberg and his men, and still a little higher up Comdt. Grobler of Ermelo and some of his men. This flank of the enemy marched under the protection of a full battery to a distance of about 2 000 yards from our positions where the battery unlimbered, and then, under cover of a heavy shell-fire from this battery, the infantry began the attack.

Our burghers as well as our artillery allowed the enemy to advance unmolested to a range of about 1 500 yards with their guns, and having allowed the infantry to approach to approximately 500 yards, they suddenly unleashed a heavy fire. The enemy had orders to cross the river at this point, and although they stormed repeatedly, the fire of our burghers and artillery was so well directed and had such good effect that only a captain, two lieutenants and a few men were able to reach the river bank. Here the enemy suffered a tremendous loss in dead and wounded.

The leading battery had meanwhile been transferred in a westerly direction to a cluster of trees approximately 1 500 yards from the Ermelo positions in the ditch. On the mountain right behind these positions stood our two Creusot guns, and on these pieces the enemy battery directed its fire - however without any effect. Our burghers soon perceived that this most forward English battery was within range of the Mausers. It was thereupon subjected to such a severe and accurate fire with Mauser and Creusot that it had to withdraw precipitately, leaving one gun behind, as we discovered later - although unfortunately too late - when the enemy suddenly dragged the piece away again with a team of horses. The two Creusots, one of which was sited rather more behind the Soutpansberg positions, were of very great assistance to our burghers with their Mausers and inflicted awfully heavy losses upon the enemy, hurling their shells upon the advancing troops rather than engaging the hostile batteries.

The enemy's centre advanced in extended order in such a way that it could at any time, if necessary, render assistance to either the left or right flank. At the same time two full batteries moved in a more easterly direction to just opposite Colenso, probably with the intention of taking up position there. But when they found that they were not being fired on, they advanced further and took up position in line with the railway bridge and east of Colenso, probably in order to provide cover for the troops who were marching on the wagon bridge, i.e. the enemy's right flank.

As soon as the guns had been unlimbered and had taken up position and opened fire, our burghers blasted the batteries with their Mausers, while the big Maxim, the Krupp and the Howitzer, which stood in our centre, supported them vigorously. The fire of our burghers, namely the Krugersdorp commando under Acting Comdt. Oosthuizen and the Heidelberg commando under Comdt. Buys, was now so heavy, so well-aimed and excellently sustained, and, in addition, so splendidly supported by our artillery, that the gunners soon had to abandon the guns.

In the afternoon and while the battle was still in progress Field-cornet Emmett with 15 men and some Krugersdorpers crossed the river in order to take possession of the guns, etc. The guns, ammunition wagons and caissons were now quickly taken in hand by our burghers and pulled into the mimosas near the railway bridge, from where they were hauled with mules, etc. over the wagon bridge to our positions and lined up in our centre behind the hill on which the Krupp gun was mounted.

A force consisting of infantry, cavalry and one battery moved in an easterly direction in support of the enemy's right (eastern) flank. A part of this force, so it proved later, had instructions to take possession, if possible, of the hill on the opposite side of the river, held by Comdt. Joubert (J.A.) of Wakkerstroom and Comdt. Muller of Standerton, assisted by Field-cornet Gouws of Olifants River, Middelburg district, Field-cornet Strydom of Soutpansberg and Acting Field-cornet Steyn of Ermelo with their men. Our burghers here allowed the enemy, who were apparently unaware that the hill was occupied by us, to approach to approximately 60 yards and then opened fire on them. It need hardly be said that this fire was highly effective and immediately put to flight what was still left of the enemy. At about three o'clock in the afternoon the enemy, having been repulsed at all points, began to retreat along the entire length of the front under cover of their big naval guns, leaving behind on the battlefield their dead and many of their wounded.”

From the start it was obvious that Botha's plan for Colenso was to allow the British during their attack to approach well within rifle range. There was to be no response to the usual heavy artillery preparations. During the actual assault the burghers and gunners were to hold their fire until he himself gave the signal with a shot from the big howitzer. But Botha did not contemplate a purely defensive action. When the enemy had become fully engaged on his front, the Boksburg and Soutpansberg field-cornetcies on Hlangwane Hill (650 men in all) were to counter-attack from the left. Simultaneously a composite force of Johannesburgers, Middelburgers and Free Staters on a spur of Red Hill (1 500 men in all) was to cross the river and attack from the right.

Despite all his careful preparations, however, Botha's position tactically was not a strong one. The weakest link and true key to it was Hlangwane Hill, held by only 650 jittery volunteers, and extremely vulnerable because of its isolation on the opposite bank of the river. Once the British established themselves on this hill the rest of Botha's positions could be enfiladed by artillery and rendered untenable.

Just over a month later, on 23 January 1900, Du Preez and his Soutpansberg comrades were involved in the epic battle of Spioenkop where the Boers, almost unbeknown to them, secured a victory having initially abandoned their positions – only to find, the next morning, that the British forces had deserted the summit and were trailing back to Colenso.

Magaliesburg

Du Preez claims to have participated in actions in the Magaliesburg – there were as many as ten battles and skirmishes fought in this area and, it being impossible to determine in which he participated, I have elected to omit this section from the account of his movements.


Vorm C

Pienaar’s River

Pienaars River is another of those places just to the north of Pretoria which, by virtue of its geographical position, was not only a forward base of operations for the British forces, but also one where the Boers were very operational at various times during the war. Du Preez was Wounded in Action here “in 1901” as he put it on his application for the Lint voor Verwonding – this probably relates to the fight at Rooiberg / Pienaar's River on the 1st and 2nd of June 1901 where, due to the reported southward advance of Gen Beyers’ Commando from the Waterberg district in May 1901, Lt Col Grenfell tasked two columns (the one under Lt Col A E Wilson at Naboomspruit and the other under Maj H McMicking at Nylstroom) with the protection of the railway line to Pretoria. Wilson’s column (540 strong, including 300 Kitchener’s Fighting Scouts) acted on intelligence reports about Boer commandos in the Warm Baths vicinity and moved down to Roodeberg to round them up.

On 1 June two of Wilson’s squadrons had a sharp engagement with 500 Boers under Commandants Uys and Pretorius. Both sides suffered significant losses but in retreating the Boers came within reach of the rest of Wilson’s column.

According to The History of the War in South Africa”, Vol IV, p441: “He fell upon them heavily on the 2nd, and after a stubborn combat which continued all day, utterly routed them, killing and wounding many and taking forty prisoners, with loss to his own force of only eleven.”

The incident is not mentioned in the Times History of the War but is fully covered in “After Pretoria: The Guerilla War” Vol II, p608-610, albeit with highly inflated numbers of Boer casualties.

I have been unable to trace any account of the action in which he was wounded at Potgietersus. This occurred, in all probability, in one of the interminable skirmishes between Brit and Boer which characterised the northern theatre of operations as the war wound to a close in early 1902.

Hostilities ceased on 31 May 1902 and Du Preez, now regarded as a “Bitter einder” – someone who had fought right through to the end – was able to try and pick up the pieces of his life. Joy that the war was over would have been tempered by the knowledge that his father, Frans Johannes Jacobus Du Preez, had been interned in the Refugee Camp at Pietersburg. He had surrendered at Louis Trichardt on 10 May 1901 and, together with 1 cow and 1 calf (all that was left of his farm stock); his wife and six of his children, had been assigned to tent no. 97 upon his arrival on 18 May 1901.

A frail man at 73 he had passed away a month later from malaria and pneumonia on 27 June 1901.

An added concern was that the farm Du Preez was returning to, Verzamelhoek in the Louis Trichardt area, had been raised to the ground. He lodged a claim for compensation with the authorities on 2 October 1903 in an amount of £1281.13.6 of which only £51.16 was awarded from the Ex-Burgher Fund. In his statement he declared that: -

“I was a Burgher on Commando and surrendered on the general surrender. I was at my farm about 15 months before peace and everything was then alright. I bred the two beasts sold to the Z.A.R. I also bred the two cows. The 2 horses were those I rode on commando. They died on commando. For the bedstead and feather bed I gave a cow and a calf. The dwelling house was 12 x 30 – burnt brick with iron roof 2 rooms, 2 doors (panelled), 2 sash window, no floors. Built 2 years before the war. Nothing but the foundation is left.”


Compensation Application

Under a claim made with the completion of an Application for Assistance from the Repatriation Commission for the District of Zoutpansberg, he mentioned that he intended to farm again but “required assistance”. His farm was about 20 Morgen in size and fully under irrigation with crops being oats, wheat, barley, potatoes, mealies etc. This claim was dated 8 August 1902.

Having re-established himself, Du Preez began to take an interest in the affairs of his community. The Sporting Times of 5 March 1904 reporting under the banner “Boer Congress, Pietersburg, Friday afternoon” that: -

“A meeting of the recently formed Boere Vereeniging assembled at Pietersburg today. In the early morning the town was crowded with black-veldt Boers, who discussed the political situation with great animation.” On the question of representative government, “Field Cornet Du Preez said he was a free man. He had a mouth, eyes, ears and head, and he had a right to make his views known. He would however prefer to remain in the thraldom of Downing Street than be handed over to the tender mercies of the capitalists.”

Adriaan Du Preez passed away at his residence, 54 Kruger Street, Louis Trichardt, on his birthday, the 3rd August 1953 at the age of 86. Like his father before him, he had been prolific in the children department – fathering 12 children. The cause of death was old age and cirrhosis of the liver.

His family remember being told that he, along with two other Veld Kornets, were in a battle where they overpowered a British patrol who surrendered by waving the white flag. When Du Preez, to accept their surrender, moved closer, (it was mentioned as 200 metres), the British opened fire again, killing two of his men and wounding him. This incident was believed to have happened at Pienaars River.