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Christiaan Rudolph Erasmus

Prisoner of War – Bankkop, near Amsterdam, Eastern Transvaal on 4 January 1902

Burger, Vryheid Commando
Burger, Swaziland Commando – Anglo Boer War

- Anglo Boere Oorlog Medal to BURGER C.R. ERASMUS.

Christian Erasmus’ war was in two halves – the first half, from the commencement of the war, was spent with the Vryheid Commando. The second half, after the formal phase of the war was over and the guerilla phase had been embarked upon, was spent with the much fabled Swaziland Commando - until he was taken Prisoner of War.

Born on 5 May 1884 in Ermelo, Transvaal, he was the son of Petrus Johannes Erasmus, a Farmer, and his wife Leonora (Helena) Debora Carolina, born De Wet. Christiaan was the oldest of three children – his siblings being Machiel Coenraad and Maria Christina Magdelena Gertruida. His parents had married in Kroonstad in the Orange Free State.

Despite what many thought, the average Boer or farmer was not a wealthy man – he eked out a living on the land either as the outright owner or as a “bywoner” – a tenant farmer for his own account on land owned by another. The Erasmus’ appear to have fallen into the latter category and, as was the case with many like them, they tended to move around quite a bit. This could account for the fact that, as the 19th century drew to a close, Christiaan Rudolph was living in the South Eastern Transvaal.

On 11 October 1899 the expected war between the Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State and Great Britain broke out. For several weeks before hostilities commenced, the Boers had been busy with their preparations. These included a call-up of all Burgers between the ages of 16 and 60 with the instruction to gather in the market square of their nearest town with their horse, rifle and bandolier containing bullets and enough in the way of provisions to last them for more than a week (this would have been strips of biltong (dried meat) and beskuit (rusks).

Sorted into Commandos per “Wijk” (Ward), they reported to a Veld Kornet who would have been voted by them as their leader. Once word had filtered through that war was imminent, the Commandos moved off, either by train or mounted, to the border with Natal or the Cape Colony awaiting the order to cross over into enemy territory.

Erasmus – 16 years old when the war started – joined the ranks of the Vryheid Commando – a Commando which was quite literally on the doorstep of Natal. He was to see action right up until his capture a few months before the war ended in 1902. Fortunately for the researcher, Boer combatants, when applying for their Anglo Boer War medal on the Vorm B form designed for the purpose, from 1921 onwards, were required to provide the details of who they fought with (under whom they reported) and in what actions/battles they participated. This enables us to pinpoint, with a large measure of certainty, where they were in the war.

Erasmus was no different, he was a late claimant – only putting pen to paper in 1941 – to claim his medal. By this time comrades in arms who were required to confirm by their signatures that his claims were correct, had long passed. His Vorm B contained a wealth of information – firstly that he was a Burger with the Vryheid Commando from 1899 to 1900 and then with the Swaziland Commando from 1900 until he was taken POW in early 1902.


Vorm B

Secondly, he confirmed that, as far as he was aware, all his officers had died and that he had been taken prisoner “the day General Opperman was shot dead near to Ermelo.” – this reference is important as it tells us that he was in the Battle of Onverwacht on 4 January 1902 and was taken prisoner there – despite official casualty lists stating that he was POW on 3 January 1902)

Thirdly, he confirmed being present at the following battles: -

- Dundee (Talana) – 20 October 1899
- Colenso – 15 December 1899
- Spioenkop – 24 January 1900
- Blaauwbank (Ladysmith district)
- Scheepersnek (Vryheid district) – 20 May 1900
- “En veelmeer andere” – “and many more”, which was, frustratingly, the way most Burgers completed their forms.

In addition to the above, which will be dealt with later, Erasmus provided additional information on his Vorm B. This read as follows (translated from the Afrikaans to English): -

“P.S. 3 January 1902 – taken prisoner and transported to India (Ahmednagar). Returned November 1902. The day that General Opperman was shot dead, that night of the breakthrough, I was taken prisoner with 10 Burgers and Mr. J.J. Coetser, at that time the Justice of the Peace for Amsterdam, on the farm Bankop and was never in Swaziland again thereafter.”

Talana – 20 October 1899

The first Natal-theatre battle of the war was at Talana just outside Dundee. The Boers had streamed across the border, moved through Newcastle and were heading for Dundee which was defended by Penn-Symons and 4000 men. General Lucas Meyer’s force were already atop Talana Hill when the first grey light of dawn cast its shadow over proceedings on the 20th October 1899. As the mist lifted the Boers could be discerned by the British in the camp below as they stood in a row silhouetted against the early morning sky. They were ready for battle.

According to Breytenbach, Chapter 1, “These last two hills, Talana Hill and Lennox Hill were General Meyer’s objective. After he had driven the British guard post over Smith’s Nek, he occupied them with 1500 men of his total force of 2900 which were comprised of the Utrecht, Middleburg, Wakkerstroom, Vryheid, Piet Retief, Krugersdorp and Bethal Commandos. 900 men were placed on Talana Hill with the balance spread over the neighbouring hills.” For reasons best known to their commander, the Vryheid men were placed on Lennox Hill and did not see much of the fighting although, according to Amery Volume II page 60, the Boers on Lennox Hill “had been growing steadily more aggressive and had begun to come down to some kraals and small plantations at the foot of the hill, whence they poured a hot fire into the wood and on the guns.”

Talana was a pyrrhic victory for the British – they might have chased the Boers off the mountain and down the other side but the Boers got away and, leaving their commanding officer dying in a makeshift Dundee hospital, General Yule, who had assumed command after Penn-Symons was mortally wounded, made the decision to abandon Dundee and to fall back on Ladysmith where he would join hands with Sir George White and the garrison there. Dundee was occupied by the Boers a day later whence followed an orgy of looting and boozing which somewhat delayed any Boer attempt to cut Yule off from reaching the comparative safety of Ladysmith.

From the 3rd November 1899 Ladysmith was besieged. The encircling commandos from the Orange Free State and the Transvaal had joined hands and surrounded the town, occupying all the major hills around it. This effectively cut off any retreat the British the British may have contemplated and, with the exception of the odd skirmish which relieved the monotony and little else, neither side, Boer or Brit, made a concerted effort to break the stalemate. With Buller’s arrival in Natal in November, his army moved ponderously upcountry to relieve Ladysmith and, with nothing of consequence happening in that town, Boer Commandos were freed up to be sent to check his advance. The first battle that took place was at Colenso.

Colenso – 15 December 1899

The Boer historian, Breytenbach, wrote extensively about the Natal campaign. He was also privileged to have access to both men and documents from the Boer side to provide a counter view to that provided by the often jingoistic British reporting. In Chapter X he wrote, in the build-up to the Colenso action (translated here as elsewhere where he is quoted, from the Dutch/Afrikaans to English): -

“It was decided that operations must be “improved and more effective”, and with this objective in mind he (General Joubert) suggested that a force of 1500 men from the Transvaal Commando’s Standerton, Middelburg, Vryheid and Utrecht, with two French cannon and one Maxim-Nordenfeldt, supported by a Free State Commando of 1600 with one cannon, should advance over the Tugela River and attack and occupy Colenso. The remainder of the Burgers were to remain in Ladysmith, where Commdt. Trichardt, supported by General Erasmus with 800 to 900 men, had to maintain their position.”

In Davitt, a pro-Boer Irish politician’s book ‘Boer Fight For Freedom’ – Chapter XXII he relates that: -

“Botha's centre extended from Fort Wylie to the wagon bridge, about a mile west from the railway bridge. On Fort Wylie he placed men of the Krugersdorp commando, under Field Cornet Van Wyk, and Vryheiders (Botha's own commando), under his brother-in-law, Cherrie Emmet. These men lined the trenches on the sides and the top of the hill overlooking the river. The Heidelberg commando came next in position, westward. Next to these, and about midway between the two bridges, Acting-Commandant Oosthuizen, of Krugersdorp, and Field Cornet Kemp were posted on a round ridge, with another picked body of riflemen. Near this latter position Pretorius had two quick-firing Krupp guns. It was from the right of his centre near the positions held by Oosthuizen, that Botha directed the operations of his small army.

Colonel Long's brigade division had been previously engaged in helping the right flank of Hildyard's attacking columns in their effort to reach the wagon bridge near the Boer centre. His guns "had moved while thus employed within the zone of Mauser fire, and were driven back, despite all the fury of their fire, which Villebois-Mareuil described derisively as "much money expended in smoke, without any results."
Beaten from this point in the English plan of attack, Long, for some reason not yet fully explained, went one worse in artillery recklessness by galloping his two batteries from his previous position across the open space, right in front of the village of Colenso, and within some 500 yards of the spot from whence the Krugersdorp and Vryheid commandoes had already decimated the foremost lines of Hildyard's column with their fire.”

The Vryheid Commando were in the trenches directly opposite the approaching British troops who marched, as if they were on a parade ground, in closed order towards the river bank and right into the barrels of the Vryheid men’s Mausers.

Amery, in his official -The Times History of the War – page 430 wrote thus: -

“The centre of the position, on which the main Boer force was massed, was formed by the Colenso kopjes. These were seamed with trenches, the lowest tier cut in the very bank of the river, with loop-holes pierced through it, the highest a hundred feet above. "West of the railway the kopjes were held by the Middelburg, Heidelberg and Boksburg commandos, and the Johannesburg Police, while Vryheid and Krugersdorp were intrenched on Fort Wylie.”

On Page 455: - “The Boers made no attempt to interfere with the retirement, and only crossed the river several hours later, towards 5 P.M., when everything was clear, to pick up stragglers and take away the abandoned guns. Crossing the road bridge with a few wagon teams, a number of Vryheid and Krugersdorp burghers and Johannesburg Police, under Field-Cornet Emmett, Botha's brother-in-law, went to fetch the guns.

This was the first rout Buller faced and the first of three unsuccessful and costly attempts he made to relieve Ladysmith.

Erasmus and his Vryheid comrades, brought back from Colenso, also took part in what was, effectively, the only Boer attempt to break the deadlock and occupy Ladysmith.

The Siege of Ladysmith – Platrand/Wagon Hill 6 January 1900

Davitt, in Chapter XXIV wrote: -

“By two o'clock on the morning of the 6th of January the burghers chosen for the assault had all reached their respective rendezvous. The Utrecht men, with some Standerton and Wakkerstroom burghers, under the east slope of the Platrand; Villebois-Mareuil being a spectator, but not a participator; the men from Heidelberg were round to their right, a mile from the English hospital; and 1,000 of the Vryheid commando and 100 German Uitlanders had marched from Colenso to the spruit below Bester's Farm, having the Free State contingent under Wagon Hill, to their left.

The attack was made at the three points almost simultaneously, the Vryheiders leading and advancing up the slope of the hill from the south. The enemy was in no way taken by surprise, and the first burghers who cleared the crest fell before a well-directed fire from behind the outer lines of the British positions. But the burghers did not waver. They fired lying in many places within fifty yards of the Tommies, making gaps behind the chanzas wherever a head offered a target for an aim. The Utrecht men rushed the trenches in front of them, and poured a volley into the troops behind, who fled to the rear and were shot down as they ran, the burghers taking and holding the vacated trenches. Both here and in front of the Vryheid men Colonial troops were located. They hailed the burghers in the Taal, and told them "Not to shoot at your own people." This ruse did not, however, succeed, as the answering rifles gave the replies which in each place decided the immediate occupation of the crest-line of the Platrand.

Breytenbach, in Chapter 2 added the following: -

“A strong section of the Heidelberg, Wakkerstroom and Utrecht commandos climbed the eastern slope with the aim of attacking the British left flank and the Burgers from Vryheid, followed by the German Corps, the southern slope. Last mentioned had not been tasked by the Krysgraad with a role in the attack and thus only drew near in order to act as a reserve at the foot of the hill, should they be required. They also, according to the Times History, did not depart the scene before daybreak, because they first had to make emplacements for the guns coming from Colenso.

The pickets standing guard on the south and south-east espied the Burgers from Vryheid who had climbed Caesar’s Camp, under the command of Commdt. Salmon Grobler, from the south, at 3.15 in the morning and stopped them in their tracks with concentrated rifle fire. The Burgers made themselves at home behind the many stones and between the scrub and thorn bushes on the slope and shot at the enemy, those they could see on the edge of the slope.

Their shooting in the dark was however ineffective and was regarded by Ian Hamilton as more of a nuisance and something that didn’t bother him. He was sure that the Manchesters would be able to repel this attack on their positions from the south with ease. Therefore he, as already reported, with two-thirds of his reserve at Fly Kraal, moved off to the western point of Platrand to counter the enemy attack from that side.

The continuous fire from the Burgers from the east kept the troops so busy that the Burgers from Vryheid succeeded in reaching the crest from the south enabling them to keep everything on the eastern side under a heavy across fire, which made the position of the British occupation on the mountain highly unsafe. They had to use all their strength to hold back the Boers.

According to Commdt. Theunissen he would have maintained his position for longer, but with the evening fast approaching, he received a report from General S.W. Burger to withdraw the Utrecht and Vryheid Commandos from their positions on Caesar’s Camp. He also ordered his Burgers to fall back.”

There was no doubting the very active role that Erasmus and his comrades played in the Wagon Hill/Platrand attack – the British garrison was able to withstand the Boer assault. No further attempt of any importance was made to break out of Ladysmith or to take her by force. The Boers preferring to play a waiting game and let sickness, disease and starvation rations do their work for them.

Buller, meanwhile, having licked his Colenso wounds, determined on another attack to relieve the town. This led to the battle of Spioenkop. The Vryheid Commando, elements of which, Erasmus included, were hurried from the hills around Ladysmith to take part in the battle.

Spioenkop – 23 January 1900

Once more we turn to a variety of contributors to tell the story of this battle in so far as the Vryheid Commando’s role is mentioned. Davitt, in Chapter XXVII, had the following to say: -

“During this interval Botha had watched and waited at Colenso, ready for the next move of his adversary. His force had varied in strength according to the situation around Ladysmith. Men were constantly riding from one position to the other, and regular heliographic communication was kept up between Joubert and his young lieutenant while holding two English armies at bay. When, as on the occasion of the assault on the Platrand on the 6th of January, the entire Vryheid commando left the Tugela to cooperate in the attack, Buller had no more than 4,000 men in front of his 30,000. The British general was only ten miles south of the river, while a third of his opponents had gone fifteen miles north to attack the garrison which the Commander-in-Chief of Natal was to rescue from its investment. No thought of or attempt at a dash forward, however, suggested itself to the general (Buller) who was to have eaten his Christmas plum-pudding in Pretoria. So the Vryheiders returned after their unsuccessful mission, and continued to wait for the development of their enemy's further plans.”

Breytenbach, in Chapter VI – the Battle of Spioenkop – wrote: -

Spioenkop, a mountain with a triangular summit which extended like a table in a north-west, north-east and north direction from the south-west spur and then began to descend gradually for about 200 yards before the slope suddenly became very steep on the north, east and west sides fell steeply down, was poorly occupied by the Boers, viz. only with a part of the commando Vryheid under the command of Asst. Commdt. Salomon Grobler. On 21 January 1900 General Louis Botha submitted a request to General S. W. Burger to have the summit inspected with the aim of determining whether a cannon could not be placed on it to fire at the enemy on the southern summit of Tabanyama, to both shoot them in the rear and bomb their camp to pieces. Further to that, on 22 January, Major J.P. Wolmarans, commander of the Staats Artillerie, selected a position for a 75 mm Krupp and some 25 men from the German corps were tasked with building the cannon redoubt - and apparently also other redoubts.

According to H. Jannasch, one of the men from the German corps, in a very readable article published in 1902, the head was occupied on the night of the 23rd by a total of about 195 men. Of these, 25 were members of the German corps, busy throwing up redoubts on the upper slope of the head. To the left of them on the peak of the mountain which extended like an equilateral triangle with the angles to the north, east and west, 70 men of the Vryheid commando were posted on night watch and to the right of the small group of Germans on the slope of the head the rest of the Vryheid commando lay down, about 100 men strong. By one o'clock in the morning the Germans had completed the entrenchments and gone to sleep.

The Burgers of the Vryheid commando, on either side of them, were also deep in dreamland, except for 15 or so of the night watch at the top of the crest who stood guard. They too were half asleep and did not notice the crawling enemy approaching before they were practically upon them. It was just after 3.30 am. and everything was pitch black. The summit of the mountain was shrouded in a thick fog. Suddenly one of the night watchmen heard a shuffling through the grass. "Who's there", he called out twice and when someone shouted "Waterloo", he and his comrades started firing frantically down the slope while the English lay dead still.

For a minute or two fierce shooting continued, before the Burgers magazines were empty. The Burgers were heard to cock the bolts of their rifles to reload. “Charge!” shouted Thorneycroft and his men sprang up from the grass and rushed forward. Jannasch says that he was startled awake by the shooting. There was a confused tumult of shouts by both the English and Boers, and then a roar of hooray mingled with the groans of the wounded. The Vryheid burghers fled headlong down the slope shrieking cries of "Run, burghers, the English are on the hill!" Jannasch himself fled, while behind him he heard the English shouting jubilantly: "Revenge for Majuba-Hill!" "Majuba, Bronkhorstspruit!" It roared after them as they made their way down. With the Burgers driven from the summit, the troops raised three loud cheers to inform Warren that they had captured the summit. The miss was viz. so dense that they could not warn him of it with a signal lamp. Afterwards, the cannons at Drieboomkop fired star grenades to notify all the troop camps of the British success, and then the cannons began a heavy bombardment of the Boer positions they were targeting.”

Erasmus, no doubt, also played a role in both Vaalkrantz and Pieter’s Heights – the remaining two attempts by Buller to break through to Ladysmith which was ultimately successful on 28 February 1900. The Boer forces surrounding the town had begun to retreat a day or two before he entered the town. The Free State commandos making their way back over the Drakensberg and the Transvaal commandos making their way back via the Biggarsberg and Dundee to their territory.

The next battle or action Erasmus was in was that of Scheeper’s Nek – a small-scale action in the grand theme of things but one which has become popularised over the years.

Scheeper’s Nek – 20 May 1900

This action was very well described in an article by Robin W Smith, in Volume 16 No. 5 of the Military History Journal – June 2015 – under the title “The Ambush of Bethune’s Mounted Infantry. Although his focus was on the BMI, great insight is given into the role all parties played in the conflict. He wrote: -

“Travelling to Vryheid along the R33 highway from Dundee, there is an enclosure in a field on the left of the road. Within this fenced area is a monument to those men of Bethune's Mounted Infantry (BMI) killed in a Boer ambush on 20 May 1900 during the Anglo-Boer War.


Map detailing the action and positions at Scheeper's Nek

Once Buller's army started its march towards the Transvaal border, Bethune's MI advanced from Greytown northwards towards Helpmekaar. Buller's plan was to outflank the Boers and advance along the Biggarsberg from Helpmekaar towards Newcastle and Laing's Nek. By 11 May, Buller had crossed the Waschbank River and bivouacked at Vermaak's Kraal.

The main body of the Boers retired northwards but a small number under Christiaan Botha moved back eastwards towards their homes around Vryheid: Still watching Buller's right flank, Bethune's detached command was sent eastwards to Nqutu. No Boers were found there but the magistracy was re-established. Bethune's orders were to march to Newcastle but intelligence was gained from local Africans near Blood River who reported that they might find a few Boers, forty or fifty perhaps, just outside Vryheid. Bethune's orders were for Captain William Goff and 'E' Squadron to advance cautiously to Vryheid, keeping well to the rear of the scouts and giving them ample time to reconnoitre. The scouts were given their orders and left Blood River at 15h00 followed by Goff leading 'E' Squadron and followed by Captain Ford and 'D' Squadron at ten minute intervals. Goff and his men were 'nearing a hollow when six Boers came forward, firing a few shots at them and then retiring.' This was a decoy and the British spurred forwards over the rise and into, a trap.

The road curved around a little hollow a short distance from where it breasted a rise between two pieces of high ground - Scheeper's Nek. To the right of the road was a rocky outcrop behind which the main Boer force was sited. At farmhouses at either end of the hollow were more Boers. Goff's men were assailed from three sides and not a single man escaped unscathed. De la Warr gives the casualty count as 'thirty killed, twenty-eight wounded and thirteen prisoners', but the casualty list gjves considerably more than this. Ford's 'D' Squadron attempted a rescue but were driven back by heavy fire. As it was becoming dark, Bethune judged that it was prudent to withdraw and return to Nqutu. There is no record of even a single casualty on the Boer side although Ford's squadron opened fire and landed a few well-directed shots among the enemy' with two Hotchkiss guns. The dead were buried by the Boers in a field a short distance from where the fight took place. The wounded who were their prisoners were taken into Vryheid and were 'well cared for.’


The monument at Scheeper's Nek

The Northern Natal News of 3 June 2018 carried the following account: -

“It is a chilly, early Sunday morning, on May 20, 1900, at Scheepersnek near Vryheid. About ninety Boers are gathered in silence. It is only the voice of Dominee Edwin Cheere Anderssen that can be heard. The commander of the Boers has chosen their position very well. It is a rocky outcrop, about 50 metres from a natural water spring, and slightly higher than the transport route from Dundee to Vryheid, which passes them close by. Here the route passes through a rocky area on both sides, an ideal “Killing field”. Scouts are out there, a few hundred meters away, being on the lookout for enemy approach. About midway through his sermon, the preacher is rudely disrupted by the abrupt arrival of a scout in among the group of “Church goers”, hat in his hand, rifle in the other.

Boer General, Chris Botha, issued an instruction to Commandant Blignaut of the Swaziland Commando, together with eighty Burghers, to occupy the Scheepersnek area and to await the British advance to Vryheid.

The Burghers, who were camped at Scheepersnek, consisted mainly of members of the Swaziland Commando, under the command of Commandant Jacobus Daniël “Koot” Opperman, and a handful of Boers from Vryheid. Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, consisting of 356 British Soldiers, two artillery guns, under the command of Colonel Edward Cecil Bethune were advancing to Vryheid from Nqutu. Other officers in the group were Captain Goff, Captain Ford, Lieutenant McLachlan and Lieutenant Lanham. The British were informed that the Boer Forces had already left Vryheid, and the British column was advancing to Vryheid to clean up whatever may be left in Vryheid of the Boer force and capture any needed supplies. Against the orders of Colonel Bethune, and overeager to carry out his orders to raid Vryheid, Captain Goff moved too far ahead of the rest of the advancing column and thereby isolated his squadron.

The Boers were lying in wait. The morning winter sun also in their favour, shining directly into the faces of whoever would be a traveller to Vryheid at that point. Folklore has it that Dominee Anderssen had right there exchanged his Bible for a rifle, and was in among his fellow Burghers, waiting for the British to arrive.

It was an intense battle that lasted less than an hour. The first to be gunned down were the British officers who were on horseback at the very front of the column. The British withdrew, with haste, in the direction of Nqutu. On the Boer side, only Cornelis Ferreira was killed, one other was wounded and one was taken prisoner.”

Scheepers Nek was one of those rare but decisive battled where the Boers, pouncing on a mistake by a British officer, were able to carry the day. Incidents like this one were to prove vital to Boer morale as the war dragged on with no end in sight – despite the loss of both capitals, Bloemfontein and Pretoria – the fighting continued, not in a formal pitched battle sense but in a “hit and run” guerilla-type offensive, ideally suited to the Boer way of waging war.

As has been mentioned, Erasmus saw part of his service with the Vryheid Commando and part with the Swaziland Commando – it was at about this time that he switched from the one to the other.

De Wet, in his Three Years War mentioned that: - “General Christiaan Botha (Swaziland) then reported on the condition of the Swaziland commando. They had no provisions in hand, and were simply living by favour of the Kaffirs. They had no women there. His commando of one hundred and thirteen men was still at Piet Retief. As there was no grain to be had, they were compelled to go from kraal to kraal and buy food from the Kaffirs, and this required money. Yet somehow or other they had managed to keep soul and body together.”

The above probably best describes the day-to-day operations, trials and tribulations of most of the Commandos left in the field. It also illustrates, graphically, the hardships undergone by Erasmus (and others) in their efforts to keep up the fight. The Swaziland Commando, living off the land as it was required to, enjoyed an enviable reputation for the fight it took to the British in the Eastern Transvaal and during Botha’s second invasion of Natal where it was in action at Itala.


Map detailing Bankkop in relation to Onverwacht and Ermelo

But probably the most telling battle in which Erasmus fought was that of Onverwacht.

Onverwacht (Known by the British as Bankkop) – 4 January 1902

The Battle of Onverwacht was hailed as the last great clash of the war between the Boer and British forces on the Eastern Transvaal Highveld. Blockhouse lines stretched in the north from Barberton to Wonderfontein, in the west from Wonderfontein through Ermelo to Standerton and in the south from Standerton through Volksrust to Piet Retief. General Bruce Hamilton with a force of 15,000 was busy pinning down the remaining Boer Commandos in the area against the Swaziland border. General Louis Botha with a force of 750 guerrillas tried to prevent this.

On 1 January 1902 General Bruce Hamilton moved out of Ermelo in a north-easterly direction to corner General Louis Botha's Commando. His force consisted of three columns.

Major J M Vallentin of the Somerset Light Infantry was the Commander of one of the three corps. His corps consisted of companies of the Buffs Mounted Infantry, Hampshire Mounted Infantry, a company of Yeomen and 110 privates of the 5th Queensland Imperial Bushmen under command of Major Frederick W Toll. Vallentin's columns served as an advanced patrol for the columns of General Plumer.

A strong west wind was blowing when Major Vallentin's corps reached the hilly terrain of Onverwacht's ridges. He set the Buffs Mounted Infantry the task of occupying the heights at Bankkop in expectation of the arrival of General Plumer's main force. Meanwhile Major Vallentin and his corps advanced another mile. There he decided to remain and place his force in a half-circle of 3 miles long. The Yeomen were placed in the middle, supported by 25 men of the Hampshire Mounted Infantry slightly behind the Yeomen. The 5th Queensland Imperial Bushmen were placed on the flanks.

Shortly after they had come to a halt, they noticed about 50 Boers on the right flank of a small ravine. Without waiting to familiarize himself with the unknown terrain, Vallentin decided to chase the 50 Boers. They had hardly advanced half a mile when they were surprised by 300 Boers under the command of General Koos Opperman. The superior power of the Boers forced Vallentin's forces back. The Boers could then concentrate on trying to seize the Pom-Pom cannon. The lightning-fast action of the Hampshires and the 5th Queensland Imperial Bushmen prevented this. Upon orders of Major Vallentin the Pom-Pom cannon fell back and resumed firing.

The Boers then surrounded the flank of the British forces and succeeded in placing the draft-horses of the Pom-Pom cannon out of action. The Pom-Pom cannon landed in a gully. The Boers could not succeed in capturing it. In the meantime Major Vallentin spurred the rest of his force on to make a last attempt to prevent a defeat. Major Toll of the 5th Queensland Imperial Bushmen had to retreat on foot with his men and together with Major Vallentin and the remaining Hampshires they made a last desperate attempt on a bare ridge. But the superior force was too big - approximately 500 Boers at the time. Major Vallentin was killed in action. Just such a telling loss to the Boers was the death of General Koos Opperman. General Koos Opperman is regarded as one of the bravest and best commanders of General Louis Botha's army.
The battle was won by the Boers.

The Boers had thus ambushed the British. A Boer eyewitness, C O Stolp, said "It was a fierce battle and one I shall never forget as to see 500 armed Boer riders recklessly attacking the enemy. It is a sight to make your hair rise and send a chill down your spine."

Seventy-nine British soldiers were taken prisoner. The Boer forces did not have much time to celebrate their victory. There was just enough time to seize horses, weapons, ammunition, clothes and footwear before they had to make themselves scarce. General Plumer arrived on the battlefield with reinforcements and the Boers had to sound the retreat.


Detailed map of the action

Robin Smith in the S.A. Military History Journal, Vol 13 No 2 - December 2004 in his article “THE BATTLE OF ONVERWACHT” provided a more detailed account: -

On 4 January 1902, on a ridge overlooking a fertile valley on the farm Onverwacht, the advance guard of a British column settled down for a midday meal. The commander of the detachment of 110 men of the 5th Queensland Imperial Bushmen, together with a company of mounted infantry of the Hampshire Regiment and some Imperial Yeomanry, was Major John Maximilien Vallentin of the Somerset Light Infantry.

Vallentin had halted his men on a flat area on the summit of the Bankkop range of hills, 30km east of Ermelo. In order to prevent being caught by surprise, Vallentin placed pickets along the ridge running a few hundred metres to their front in a line stretching about three kilometres. This was a very strong position, secure from attack in front by the steep ridge while behind them were the soldiers of the Hampshire Regiment and the rest of the 19th Company of Imperial Yeomanry, Scots from the Lothian and Berwickshire. Attack from behind across the flat ground was thus highly improbable. Not far away, in the direction of Ermelo, was the column of Brigadier General Herbert Plumer, nearly a thousand men with mounted infantry and artillery. Even closer, to the east of them, was another column of similar strength commanded by Scots Guardsman Colonel William Pulteney.

On 1 January 1902, the three British columns headed south-east out of Ermelo. Spens returned to Begin-der-Lyn to guard the blockhouse line between Ermelo and Standerton, while Plumer and Pulteney moved along the Piet Retief road. On the night of 2 January these two columns, comprising more than two thousand men with guns and transport, camped on the farm Maviristad, uncertain of the precise whereabouts of their enemy. The Boer force was not far away, camped on the farm Windhoek.

The next morning patrols were sent out into the hilly surrounding countryside, its kloofs and gullies affording ideal hiding places for the Boer commando. One of these patrols, consisting of men of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, was surprised and surrounded by Boers from General Opperman's (Swaziland) commando on the farm Rotterdam. Twenty-eight were captured, disarmed and released.

On the morning of the 4 January, Plumer's column marched north along the Vaal River while Pulteney followed the lower road that would take him past the farms Waaihoek and Vlakplaas and onto the eastern edge of the Bankkop range of hills. The intention was to encircle the Boers in the Bankkop hills.

The Boers had spent that night on the farm Schimmelhoek, where there is a sheltered kloof. Five or six hundred horsemen and their mounts were easily accommodated there. In the morning, General Botha told Brits, Opperman and Chris Botha that he had received information that the advance guard of a British column was approaching and he advised withdrawal. His generals were not in favour and advocated a strike against the enemy. In true Boer democratic fashion, the three juniors prevailed over their commander and Brits planned the attack and the placing of the commandos. They were from Wakkerstroom (Chris Botha), Swaziland (Koot Opperman), Standerton (Brits) and Ermelo (Commandant Bosman).


Onverwacht/Bankkop

The trap was carefully planned and as Vallentin's force arranged their pickets along the ridge, General Brits deployed the Boer force. About 500 men were hidden in a kloof. In other ravines to the south-east were other Boer forces. Below the ridge where the British pickets were watching for any sign of Botha's force was a flat shelf about a kilometre square. There were ravines on two sides and the western edge dipped down to the small river running north westwards to join up eventually with the Vaal River.

A decoy was arranged, comprising fifty cattle with a few Boers to herd them along the flat ground and down over the rim towards the stream. The Boers in the kloofs remained out of sight of the Queensland men on the ridge, but the decoy was spotted and reported to Major Vallentin who decided to investigate. Leaving some of the men on the ridge in a secure position, the rest headed off down a roadway leading over the ridge and down onto the lower level. The decoy disappeared over the edge of the plateau just over a kilometre away and Vallentin's force chased after them with the Yeomanry as the advanced screen. The Queenslanders followed with orders to support the Yeomanry. Suddenly, from the right flank, the Boers opened fire and emerged from the ravine where they had been hiding. They made for the pom-pom but Lieutenant Reese of the QIB was ordered to dismount his men and form a defensive line. They opened fire with the pom-pom, but it jammed after firing only five shots. Lieutenant H R Johnstone of the Yeomanry was shot and Major Vallentin was hit as they tried to get the pom-pom away. Two of the gun horses were shot, but QIB Sergeant Major Frank Knyvett rallied the men in its defence and the gun was dragged back up the road and hidden in a small donga.

Major F W Toll of the QIB, then the senior officer present, managed to organise a defensive line and send some of the horses back up the ridge. A group of men on the left flank, under Lieutenant B W Cook, were taken prisoner, but the rest of the force was pushed back up the ridge to a spur on the north-east. The Boers heavily outnumbered the Queenslanders, the few Yeomanry, and some of the men of the Hampshire Regiment who had arrived to assist. On the right, some of the QIB managed to retire up the ridge and join those who had remained on the right of the picket line. A galloper was sent to summon the columns; Colonel Pulteney's column on Bankkop to the east was closer than Plumer's who had followed the line of the Vaal River.

Major Toll and his men were then cut off from the rest of the force. The Hampshires had left their horses in a little hollow behind the spur, but the Boers managed to work their way around and attack from the rear. There was absolutely no cover and, with nine of the Bushmen and eight of the Hampshires killed and the Boers managing to get in close, further resistance was suicidal. On the Boer side, in spite of heavy losses and it being only a matter of time before more than 2 000 men from the British columns arrived, the attacks were pressed home with great bravery and even desperation.

General Koot Opperman was killed, shot in the forehead as he urged his men forward. His body lay on the field and his adjutant, M W Coetzer, and Willem Collins battled to load the 120kg body onto a horse. By then, the British columns were arriving at the top of the ridge and the Boers now became subjected to artillery fire. In spite of all their efforts, they failed to recover the general's body which was left on the field.

By then the balance of Vallentin's force, perhaps forty Queensland Imperial Bushmen and a number of Hampshire Regiment had rescued the pom-pom from the donga and, unjamming it, they opened fire on the Boers retreating down the valley towards the farmhouse of Onverwacht. The advance element of Pulteney's column had arrived on the scene, having ridden in from the east over the Bankkop hills. Again, the Boers charged the Queenslanders, but again they were driven away by Pulteney's Victorian Mounted Rifles under Major Vialls. Shortly afterwards, Brigadier-General H Plumer and Lieutenant Colonel F Colvin and the remainder of the columns arrived from east and west.”

A victory for the Boers, but they didn’t have it all their own way – over and above Opperman’s death, they had 23 killed in action and a number of men taken Prisoner of War – one such was Christiaan Erasmus, as confirmed by his written note on his Vorm B. For him the war was over – he was transported to India on 13 February 1902 where he languished until his return in November of that year.

The war over and the country returning to normality, Erasmus joined the Police Force. It was as a Politie Dienaar (Police Serviceman) that he wed Petronella Catherine Susanna De Wet in the Dutch Reformed Church of Lindley in the Orange Free State on 20 August 1912. He was 29 years old and living in Lichtenburg in the North West Transvaal whilst his 18 year old bride was local to Lindley.

He was living at 41 St. Fillans Lane, Mayfair West, Johannesburg when he applied for his medal in 1942.

Christiaan Rudolph Erasmus passed away at the age of 73 years and 10 months at the General Hospital, Johannesburg on Tuesday, 5th March 1957. He was survived by his wife and six children – Petronella Catherina Susanna Ellis; Petrus Johannes Erasmus; Pieter Jacobus Erasmus; Leonora Debora Carolina Mynhardt; Anna Catherina Cecilia Scholtz and Christiaan Rudolph Erasmus. He was the ex-Caretaker of the Baragwanath Hospital.

Acknowledgments:

- The Australian Boer War Memorial - Onverwacht
- Amery's Times History of the War
- Davitt's Boer fight for Freedom
- De Wet's Three Years War
- Breytenbach - Boer War History
- Elne Watson Various maps and input
- SANDF Archives - Vorm B and related correspondence
- Anglo Boer War Museum, Bloemfontein for POW information
- Robin Smith - S.A. Military History Journal