TOPIC:

Arthur William Scandrett

Trooper, Imperial Light Horse – Anglo Boer War

- Queens South Africa Medal (Relief of Mafeking, Elandslaagte, Defence of Ladysmith, Transvaal) to 566 TPR: A.W. SCANDIETT. (sic) IMP: LT HORSE

Arthur Scandrett was born in Queenstown in the Eastern Cape of South Africa on 4 August 1873 the son of George William Scandrett, a Watchmaker and Jeweller, and his wife Margaret, born Fuller. As was almost the norm for Victorian families, he was not an only child.

According to the family bible he had the following siblings – Catherine Margaret (born 16 February 1867); Harriett Jessie (born 9 March 1868); Alison Maria (29 April 1869); George Peter (born 18 July 1870); Mary Gambelton (born 5 December 1871); Ann (born 18 October 1875); Alex Benjamin (born 17 November 1876); Edith May (born 7 September 1878) and Herbert John (born 29 August 1879); Kate Nellie Ella and Beatrice Evelyn. Quite a handful for Mrs Scandrett to raise and manage, especially when a child was born (almost) every year.

Mr Scandrett passed away in the Buffalo Hotel in East London on 2 March 1886 at the age of 47 when Arthur was barely a teenager at 13. This probably plunged the family into disarray with the breadwinner now departed from the scene and many young mouths to feed. Mrs Scandrett, as one does, pushed on and, as the 19th century wound down to a close, found herself back in Queenstown.

The last few months of 1899 were interesting for an entirely different reason – war, which had been threatening since the abortive Jameson Raid of 1896, finally broke out on 11 October 1899 between the two Dutch-speaking Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State and the might of the British Empire. As the war clouds gathered most of these people were expelled from the Witwatersrand – heading either for Lourenco Marques in Portuguese East Africa and working their way down to Durban or per train to Natal, via Charlestown, where they assembled in large numbers, with their families, in Pietermaritzburg. Many, their patriotic flame burning bright, enrolled with a newly constituted regiment that was then forming in Natal’s capital to assist the Regular Army with taking the fight to the Boers. This outfit, soon to become a highly distinguished one, was the Imperial Light Horse.

One such was Arthur William Scandrett, prior to the declaration of war he had found himself in the Transvaal and had, along with many of his English-speaking compatriots, worked his way down to Pietermaritzburg where, on 2 October 1899, he enlisted with the I.L.H. and was assigned no. 566 and the rank of Trooper. His attestation papers confirmed that he had two years pre-war service with the Queenstown Rifle Volunteers which he had resigned from “on leaving the district.” (He is not on the roll for the Cape of Good Hope General Service Medal). Physically he was 5 feet 8 inches in height and weighed 158 lbs with a fair complexion, blue eyes and fair hair. His next of kin was his mother of Ebden Street, Queenstown.


The family home was here in Ebden Street, Queenstown

Moving up to Ladysmith with the regiment, he had only recently arrived when one of the first actions to be fought in the Natal theatre, that of Elandslaagte, got underway.

Elandslaagte

On 21 October 1899 General Sir George White, holed up with his garrison in Ladysmith, sent Major General French to conduct a reconnaissance to Elandslaagte to investigate reports that the Boers had cut the railway and telegraph to Dundee – General Yule being about to commence his arduous withdrawal from that town as he fell back on Ladysmith. French arrived in the vicinity of Elandslaagte with the 5th Dragoon Guards, the 5th Lancers, five squadrons of the Imperial Light Horse, the Natal Field Battery and a half battalion of the 2nd Manchester Regiment, the infantry travelling by train.

He observed that the Boers were indeed in possession of Elandslaagte Station and had pitched camp in the hills to the south-east of the station. French’s guns bombarded the Boers in the station area and then fell back to the Modder Spruit, calling for re-enforcements from Ladysmith through the railway telegraph. The Boer force in Elandslaagte was the Johannesburg Commando headed by the aged Commandant Kock. This small force was far in advance of the main Boer army, in breach of General Joubert’s carefully laid plans.


Map of Elandslaagte showing I.L.H. disposition

General Sir George White immediately dispatched an infantry brigade from Ladysmith, commanded by Colonel Ian Hamilton, comprising 1st Devons, the second half of the 1st Manchesters and 2nd Gordon Highlanders, a further squadron of the 5th Dragoon Guards and two batteries of Royal Field Artillery with twelve 15 pounder field guns. The infantry travelled in two trains, led by an armoured train, while the cavalry and guns took the road.

Hamilton’s infantry detrained just to the north of the Modder Spruit, where French and his troops were waiting for them. French was now in command of the whole force of 1,630 infantry, 1,314 cavalry and 552 gunners with 18 guns. He faced a Boer force of some 1,000 men and 3 guns, the Johannesburg Commando being reinforced by a further five hundred foreign volunteers.

Kock’s Boers were in position on a curved ridge with a central hill to the east of the railway line. French deployed his infantry so that the Devons would advance on the Boer front, attracting their fire, while the remaining infantry, 1st Manchesters and 2nd Gordons with the dismounted Imperial Light Horse, circled around to the right and attacked onto the Boer left flank. The cavalry were divided. Four squadrons of 5th Dragoon Guards and 5th Lancers took the left flank, ready to encircle the Boer right, by riding around the ridge once the infantry attack succeeded in pushing the Boers off the ridge. Two squadrons of the two cavalry regiments, one from each, were positioned on the right flank to protect the flank and rear of the attacking British infantry. The gun batteries remained in the centre.

As the British force approached Elandslaagte the cavalry drove the Boers back to their hill-top position on the ridge, so that the infantry were enabled to remain in the trains until they reached close to the start point for the attack.

The British guns came into action at around 1.15pm, bombarding the Boer positions on the ridge, while the infantry detrained and formed up for the advance.

In open order formation (three yards between each man) the Devons advanced under a heavy Boer fire to the base of the ridge where they took cover and waited, returning fire. Major Park, commanding the Devons, instructed his company officers that Hamilton’s orders were that the Devons were not to push in with their final attack on the Boer positions on the ridge until the flank attack by the Manchesters, Gordons and Imperial Light Horse was well established.

On the right flank the Manchesters encountered Boer positions forward of the ridge. Here the Boer fire held up the advance for some time until their riflemen withdrew onto the ridge. The Manchesters were then able to resume their advance up the hillside, moving around the end of the Boer flank with the Gordons and the Imperial Light Horse on their right.

The Gordon’s encountered a heavy fire which struck down several of their officers including the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Dick-Cunyngham. Their advance was impeded by wire fences on the hillside.

The scene was now set for the engagement proper to start – for a more detailed account of the battle proper, the official history, the Story of the Imperial Light Horse in the South African War by George Fleming Gibson is referred to. He wrote, from page 31- 40, on the action, an abridged account being provided here: -

“About 4.30 p.m. on the afternoon of the 21st October the infantry attack had commenced. The Devons across the open in very extended order, made a frontal attack on the Boer position, while the Gordons and Manchesters were working around to the right against the Boer left flank. The Devons advanced steadily through the artillery and Mauser fire to within 800 yards of the summit of the hill occupied by the Boers. Here they lay under an appalling fire for over half an hour waiting for the flank attack to develop and the order to advance.

As the infantry began their advance, Scott-Chisholme, full of zeal and enthusiasm , refused to accept the passive role of spectator and approached General French, asking if he could “take the hill.” On the right flank the Manchesters and Gordons were pressing on to the attack where they were joined by the I.L.H. who dismounting, double out and extended on their right – they were eager to kill and willing to be killed. Still further on the right, “B” Squadron of the 5th Lancers waited their opportunity.


I.L.H. storming the kopjie at Elandslaagte

As the infantry reached the foot of the hill, a violent storm, which had been threatening for some time, burst, and in a few moments had drenched everyone to the skin. In the falling light, no enemy was visible, but all could feel that the small kopje was bristling with small bore rifles, for a hail of bullets met the troops as they rose to the order for the final phase of the attack. Stumbling forward among the stones, jumping over bodies of their comrades who had fallen before them, the line pressed on. A barbed wire fence partially checked the attack and men and officers fell in numbers as they crowded towards the gaps. More than half way was won, but there was no slackening of fire from the kopje although shrapnel rained upon it continuously.

Colonel Schiel and a handful of Germans came up from a farm behind the Boer position and made a gallant and well-timed attempt at a flank attack. Describing the fight, the Adjutant of the Regiment, Captain Barnes, writes: -

“The enemy were strongly posted on their left flank end of the ridge, which the Imperial Light Horse attacked, not realising the opposition in front of them, and the increasing and unexpected severity of the Boer fire as they advanced by rushes up the hill. I must express my admiration for the coolness and determination of the men amongst whom I advanced – to this day I can see vividly the men shooting deliberately in the halts between rushes.”

At last from the valley below, the Devons bugle rang out the “Charge.” The call spread along the line, and with a cheer and a great rush the frontal and flank attacks were pressed over the remaining murderous yards and the hill was taken, while the Boers either surrendered or went streaming down the reverse slopes. The “Cease Fire” now sounded and the action was apparently over.

Suddenly, however, a party of Boers headed by General Kock, delivered a counter attack against the soldiers crowded on the ridge which came very near to being successful. Men, perplexed by the “Cease Fire,” and staggered by the sudden fury of the attack, fell back, uncovering the captured guns, which the leading Boers seized, and again opened fire. Bewildered and angered by what was perceived as treachery, the I.L.H. leapt forward and re-attacking went berserk, the infantry rallied and again advanced. The Devons stormed a detached conical hill on the left of the position; for another mad minute the fight raged anew and the attack swept on, until Devons, Manchesters, Highlanders and Light Horse, fighting hand-to-hand with wild fury, using bayonet or clubbed rifle, recaptured the crest of the hill and pursued the retreating Boers.

During the final charge, the I.L.H. on the extreme right flank, swinging round the enemy’s left, surrounded a farm house, a “strong point,” and after a short encounter, stormed it, capturing 21 prisoners.

Immediately prior to the renewed attack the I.L.H. were able to assist their Regular comrades, whose casualties had been severe, particularly among the officers. Captain Charles Herbert Mullins, Lieutenant Robert Johnstone and Lieutenant A.E. Brabant, seeing for themselves the predicament in which some of the Regulars found themselves for lack of command, instantly rushed across to their aid, assumed their leadership, rallied them and reformed their line. For this singular act of leadership at a critical moment of the fight, all three of these officers were recommended for the Victoria Cross which was awarded to two of them.

At 5.30 p.m. came the famous charge of the cavalry and the Boers, routed, fled the field. The Imperial forces spent a cold and wet night on the battlefield before returning to Ladysmith the next day. The War Correspondents of the great London Dailies wrote very appreciative comments of the regiment in this battle, one of which is here quoted: -

The Morning Post – “The Imperial Light Horse behaved with splendid recklessness. The final charge was magnificent. I was behind the Gordons and Imperials and saw it all. I consider it was the finest close fighting the world has ever known.”

Back in Ladysmith there was to be no respite. On 24th October Sir George White fought at Rietfontein in order to occupy the attention of the enemy and so prevent them falling on General Yule, who had on the death of General Penn-Symons succeeded to the command of the troops in the north of the colony, and finding that after the battle of Talana Hill there was danger of being cut off from Ladysmith, had decided to retreat to that town. The engagement at Rietfontein was successful in obtaining for Yule's force a retreat unharassed by the enemy. The I.L.H., along with the 5th Lancers, did good service in the action in seizing the ridges south of the Modder Spruit, and they thus protected Sir George's right flank.

At Lombard's Kop, on the 30th, the regiment was again engaged, this time chiefly in the centre under Colonel Ian Hamilton, whose troops had little to do except to cover the retirement of Grimwood's Brigade on the right. In this action Sir G. White found that he was not strong enough to drive back the enemy, and the result was that his troops were surrounded in Ladysmith. A siege was inevitable as the Boer Commandos encircled Ladysmith, tying a noose around her proverbial neck and closing off any means of escape.

Wagon Hill

After a bleak Christmas the stalemate continued – the Boers were, however, champing at the bit for some decisive action which would bring about the capitulation of White’s garrison. After a Krygsraad was held, it was decided that an all-out attack would be embarked upon. The date decided on was 6th January 1900.

From the 30th November the Imperial Light Horse had provided two (dismounted) Squadrons for the defence of Wagon Hill, and to act as a escort to the two Howitzers, Castor and Pollux. These guns had, however, been removed by the 6th January. The two Squadrons were relieved every 48 hours just before dawn, so that on alternate days four squadrons of dismounted men were on the hill, or in close proximity at a time when an attack might be.

Before dawn on 6th January 1900 the Boers commenced their very determined, but fortunately unsuccessful, attempt to carry Ladysmith by storm. The attack was mainly developed on the southern defences, at Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill. The usual garrison of Wagon Hill was composed of three companies 1st King's Royal Rifles and a squadron of the ILH. On the evening of the 5th a detachment of the Natal Naval Volunteers, with a 3-pounder Hotchkiss gun, had been sent to Wagon Hill. Two naval guns had also been taken to the foot of the hill, and some sailors, Royal Engineers, and men of the 2nd Gordons had accompanied the latter guns.

The attack commenced at 2.30 am. "It fell directly on the squadron of ILH, under Lieutenant G Mathias, and the Volunteer Hotchkiss detachment, under Lieutenant E N W Walker, who clung most gallantly to their positions and did invaluable service in holding in check till daylight the Boers who had gained a footing on the hill, within a few yards of them. The extreme south-west point of the hill was similarly held by a small mixed party of bluejackets, Royal Engineers, Gordon Highlanders, and Imperial Light Horse, under Lieutenant Digby-Jones, RE.

The remainder of the hill was defended by the companies of 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifles. At one time the Hotchkiss detachment was driven from their gun. Lieutenant Mathias gallantly ran forward and with the assistance of two of his men pulled the gun under cover.

The first reinforcements ordered to Wagon Hill were the remainder of the ILH. These reached the hill at 5.10 am and were at once pushed into action. They pressed forward up to and over the western edge of the flat crest of the hill, to within a few yards of the enemy, who held the opposite edge of the crest. They thus afforded a most welcome relief to the small garrison of the hill, but they themselves suffered very severely in occupying and maintaining their position. Other troops arrived, and several attempts were made to clear the hill, but these failed. Never during the whole war did the Boers show finer courage.

About mid-day the fighting slackened, but at 1 pm a fresh assault was made with great suddenness on the extreme south-west of the hill, our men giving way for a moment before the sudden outburst of fire and retiring down the opposite slope. Fortunately, the Boers did not immediately occupy the crest, and this gave time for Major Miller-Wallnutt of the Gordons, Lieutenant Digby-Jones, RE, Lieutenant Fitzgerald, ILH, Gunner Sims, Royal Navy, and several NCO's of the ILH, to rally the men. The top was reoccupied just as the three foremost Boers reached it - the leader being shot by Lieutenant Digby-Jones, and the two others by No 459 Trooper H Albrecht, ILH.

At 4.45 pm, during a storm of wind and rain, our troops were again driven from the south-west point of the hill, but they were again rallied and reoccupied it. At 5 pm Lieutenant Colonel Park, with three companies of the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment, finally cleared the hill by a magnificent bayonet-charge. Sir George White added "I desire to draw special attention to the gallantry displayed by all ranks of the ILH, some of whom were within 100 yards of the enemy for 15 hours, exposed to a deadly fire.

Their losses were terribly heavy, but never for one moment did any of them waver or cease to show a fine example of courage and determination to all who came in contact with them". Towards the close of his despatch Sir George, again, said: "Of the Imperial Light Horse, specially raised in Natal at the commencement of the war, I have already expressed my opinion. No praise can be too great for the gallantry and determination which all ranks of this corps have invariably displayed in action". The accounts given by 'The Times' historian and other writers regarding the attack of 6th January bear out all that Sir George White said as to the unsurpassable conduct of the corps.

There were to be no more concerted attempts to either “take” Ladysmith or to “break out.” The besieged, including the I.L.H., settled down into the humdrum daily routine of trying to survive both the daily bombardments from Long Tom and the ever reducing rations on offer. Eventually, on 28 February 1900 Buller made it through and the siege was lifted. On the 2nd March arrangements were made for the Regiment to proceed from Ladysmith to Hilton just outside Pietermaritzburg where they were to recuperate from the privations they had endured.

On the 20th March Headquarters asked when the Regiment would be ready to take the field- the date provided being the first week of April. Those in the know knew that the Relief of Mafeking was in the planning stages and that there was a chance that the I.L.H. might be allowed to form part of the Relieving Force. on 2nd April the Regiment entrained at Pietermaritzburg for Elandslaagte. On arrival in Ladysmith they were detrained, their destination being changed at the last minute. They were also placed under the command of Lord Dundonald. Six days later they received orders to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to the Cape Colony.

Relief of Mafeking


Insert Colonel Mahon’s Relief force approaching Mafeking

Arriving in Durban, the major portion of the Regiment embarked for Cape Town aboard the “Urmston Grange” where, on arrival, they departed for Kimberley to join General Hunter’s force for Mafeking. The Mafeking Relief Column was entrusted to Colonel Mahon and comprised 1200 men in total, part of which was the I.L.H. On the 4th May the historic march commenced.

After many miles of hard riding with almost no Boers sighted, a serious engagement now took place on 13 May against an attack by 600 Burghers of the Potchefstroom Commando under Commandant Liebenberg. “A”, “C” and “D” Squadrons were able to beat off and follow up those of the enemy who attacked the advance. “B”, “E” and “F” Squadrons, protecting the right flank were more sharply engaged. The bush afforded the enemy excellent cover. Firing took place at close range and lasted about three-quarters of an hour. When the artillery gunners found the enemy with their shrapnel the Boers gave up the fight and withdrew.

No serious opposition was encountered thereafter and the way into Mafeking proved open. The Column entered the town on 17 May 1900 – the siege was over. Scandrett had been a Defender in one siege and a Reliever in another. An honour that, together with his presence at Elandslaagte, fell to very few men.

Arthur Scandrett was not the only active one of his family in the war – the East Anglian Times of 26 June 1900 reporting in “Our South African Letter” that: -

“As for the younger Colonists, history bears witness to their splendid record of hard service gone through gladly and cheerfully at their country’s call. There is hardly a loyal family of any standing in the Cape Colony or Natal that has not at least one representative at the front.

A noticeable instance, which can be vouched for, is that of three brothers, of the name of Scandrett, one of whom was with the besieged in Mafeking, another with Colonel Plumer’s northern relief column, and the third in the Imperial Light Horse, attached to General Mahon’s southern relief force. The three brothers met at Mafeking, and were able to wire to their mother that they were “all well.”

Witklip

The last action of any consequence in which Scandrett took part was that of Witklip in the neighbourhood of Bronkhorstspruit. Gibson’s history covers this engagement, in which it was felt that the I.L.H. were, undeservedly, given a bad rap, quite extensively. Scandrett also warrants a special mention in the account: -

On the 6th July Brigadier Mahon was ordered to gain contact with the enemy who were reported to be laagered in the vicinity of Olifantsfontein. The Times History reported that “owing to some bad scouting by the I.L.H., Mahon, after marching for 8 miles unmolested, walked into a trap, prepared for him by the Boers. The I.L.H. retrieved their mistake by two gallant charges up the ridge from which the Boers commanded the column, nevertheless Mahon was forced to retire on Rietfontein with a total loss of 35 men.”

Gibson takes issue with this, blasting the account as “inaccurate and singularly unfair to the I.L.H.” and provided a different account which, in part, read thus: -

“On the 5th Mahon’s column which included the I.L.H. marched in the direction of Olifantsfontein where they arrived about midnight. Being too cold to sleep, the men walked about nearly all night in an effort to keep warm. The following morning the column started off at five; and turning from the main road, came into touch with a strong Boer outpost and drove them in. After that the column advanced against 200 Boers lining a ridge with a narrow rocky neck in it. They were dispersed by our artillery.

A glimpse of pilcher’s column was caught on the extreme left, that is the north. Mahon then turned south and at about 4 p.m. met General Hutton who had under him 2200 men, mostly infantry; camp was made in a hollow among a group of farms; water was scarce, a very poor site. On the 7th Hutton sent Mahon along the Natal road to Witklip. “C” Squadron was advance guard, scouting a mile in advance in extended order. “C” reported seeing some mounted Boers on a hill on the left flank. About 10 a.m. “C” was relieved and the advance guard was taken over by “A” Squadron. Captain Currie, commanding “B” Squadron, then received orders from Colonel Woolls-Sampson to occupy the hill on the left flank on which the enemy had been seen by “C” Squadron.

“B” Squadron had no sooner started off when they met some of “A” Squadron scouts. These had been sent out earlier in the morning, especially to scout on the left flank. They reported to Captain Currie that they had been fired on by Boers on the hill, which was his objective. Captain Gilfillan of “A” Squadron, in advance, on seeing “B” Squadron starting to cross the deep valley on the left flank, sent a Trooper off at a gallop to warn Mahon and Colonel Woolls-Sampson that his scouts on the left had at that moment had been driven in and reported that the Boers were in force on the left.

Unfortunately the Trooper could not reach the General in time to stop the advance, but his report must have shown the General what an impossible task had been set “B” Squadron, and what the result would be, unless it was strongly supported.

So soon as Captain Currie received his orders he extended his squadron in open order and advanced at a trot in the direction indicated, and sent out at a gallop, as advance scouts, widely extended, Corporal Hopley and Troopers Ben Bolt, Buncombe and Scandrett. These four men, after they had galloped about 400 yards, and were nearing the crest of the hill, came suddenly upon a party of six Boers, some mounted and some dismounted, who appeared to be surprised to see the scouts at such close quarters. The Boers immediately opened fire and killed Bolt’s horse. The scouts at once dismounted, and returning the fire, killed one of the Boers, the range being 50 to 60 yards. The scouts were then able to obtain some cover in an old road, which ran parallel with the crest of the hill. They returned the Boer fire. Captain Currie continued his advance and the remainder of the squadron dismounting, took up positions to the right of the scouts.

The firing soon became heavy, it was obvious the Boers had been reinforced considerably. It became almost impossible to raise a hand without getting a bullet through it. A fierce engagement followed at this deadly range, no quarter was asked or given. Captain Currie and Lieutenant Kirk were killed soon after the engagement commenced.

The men however, though severely pressed, appeared to be holding their own, when another and a larger party of Boers opened fire on them, at about 600 yards range, from higher ground on their right flank, enfilading them and causing many casualties. “B” hung on grimly, firing as opportunity occurred.

At this period, to add to their difficulties, and to make their already critical position tragic, their own artillery opened fire on them. As it was impossible to signal to the gunners Trooper Hardy was instructed to crawl back and get in touch with the O.C. Artillery. He succeeded in doing this and told him that he was shelling the I.L.H., and pointed out to him the two positions held by the Boers.”

The order for “B” Squadron to retire was now given but there were no officers left to execute the order.

“Had they attempted to retire they would all certainly have bene killed or wounded, but instead they continued a determined defence. How so many of these men survived the ordeal was a mystery as a hail of bullets was rained on them for hours. This raised clouds of dust about them, and it was thought, by the breathless spectators, that the whole squadron had been obliterated.

… the Artillery made such good practice with their shrapnel that the enemy’s rifle fire died down and the remnants of “B” Squadron were then able to retire. They got back to their horses and found that a large number of them had been shot. S their were not sufficient mounts to go round, some of the horses carried two men. The small weary and dejected cavalcade made its way back to the column. They were, however, compelled to leave behind their devoted officers and 8 brave N.C.O’s and men dead, and seven N.C.O’s and men wounded. The engagement had lasted from 12 midday to 3.30 p.m.

It will be seen from the foregoing that there was no question of “Bad Scouting” or “Walking into a Trap.” The position was that “B” Squadron was ordered to occupy a hill and did their best to do so, but while the Boers supported their Burghers to an extent of some 250 to 400 men, the I.L.H. squadron received no support and was compelled to fight it out alone against these very great odds. There were no better scouts, there were no more gallant or experienced men in the field.”

The Aberdeen Weekly Journal of 5 September 1900, carried a letter under the banner With The Imperial Light Horse – Aberdonian’s Experience” from “A young gentleman of Aberdeen, while serving with B Squadron of his regiment” which provided a more graphic account of the Witklip engagement. The letter is dated from Pretoria on 13 July 1900 : -

“The regiment is at present camped here but is likely to move to some other place soon. In fact we are always on the move now. About a week ago we came in touch with a party of Boers, and B Squadron came in for the brunt of, or rather all, the fighting. The squadron was flanking the guns, and at the time were in a dip between two sloping ridges. Suddenly our scouts on the outside ridge sighted Boers and started firing. The squadron then went up the ridge to their support, and, when about 800 yards from the top, was fired on by the Boers, who seemed to be in considerable force.


Map of Witklip

We dismounted and returned their fire, but their numbers increased every moment, and before we knew what was happening we were treated to a tremendous rifle fire from both flanks, as well as from our front. By this time we were lying as tight to the ground as we could, and returning the fire. This was at 600 yards. We got the range to a nicety by watching where our bullets struck. No. 2 troop were in advance of ere this and were subjected, in consequence, to a hotter fire.

They were nearer the end of the ridge than we and suffered more therefore. Our guns were now, from the ridge behind us, shelling the Boers with shrapnel, and you can gather how close we were to them from the fact that the shells were bursting round us as well as the Boers. After some time of this sort of work, the enemy seemed to be clearing from the top of the ridge, and then our squadron charged up to the summit, getting cover under a slight ridge of stones about six inches high – not much in the way of protection, certainly, but it was better than lying on the slope of the hill with absolutely no cover at all, even the grass having been burned.

You couldn’t imagine a more exposed position, the ground sloping evenly upwards. At the summit some of our fellows were near enough to the Boer guns to hear the Boer gunners speaking to one another, and the rifle fire was such that we hardly dared to raise our heads, over our slight shelter. Altogether, we were in a most precarious position, with hardly any cover and almost no supports whatsoever. Two squadrons were sent to our support, but had to retire before they got within 1000 yards of us. We were then ordered to retire, in face of the fire, and we accordingly made our way down the hill as best we could. There was not one of the fellows who could run right away, but we managed to run a bit, and then walk a bit more. We were all so exhausted that after the first 200 yards had been covered none of us could raise a run at all.

In fact we had reached such a stage that we did not care whether we were hit or not. Our horses were about three miles away, and my rifle and bandolier seemed like ton weights upon me. We found, on getting back to the column, that we were never meant to go up the ridge, and the general came up and expressed surprise at seeing us, saying that he thought we had all been cut up. For the past two weeks we have been fighting off and on. Two days ago our column made an attack upon another part of the same ridge on which we had previously fought, and drove the Boers into the hands of General French. You;; get some conception of the work we have ben doing of late when I tell you that for about a week not a man in the column except, perhaps, officers, had time to wash even his hands.”

Scandrett, walked away physically unscathed by his experience under heavy fire – he was, after all, a veteran of Elandslaagte, Wagon Hill and the Relief of Mafeking!

His Term of Engagement was now coming to an end. On 12 October 1900 he took his discharge from the Imperial Light Horse and returned to his civilian pursuits. Whether or not he immediately returned to Johannesburg is unknown – The city was under British control by this time and the “Uitlanders” had started to return, to pick up the pieces of their livelihoods. For his considerable efforts he was awarded the Queens Medal with some of the desirable of the many clasps on offer.

On 15 April 1911 he married 45 year old widow Charlotte Louise Carroll, born Taylor, in St. Mary’s, Johannesburg. He was 37 years old and in the employ of Goldstick & Co., Catherine Avenue, Johannesburg. An Accountant by profession, he made a trip to England aboard the R.M.S. Britain on 14 August 1915, sailing from Cape Town. This could not have been for military purposes as he returned to South Africa aboard the Walmer Castle on 4 December 1915.

The Government Gazette of 20 April 1923 reported that his appointment as a Commissioner of Oaths for Germiston had been cancelled. The same publication of 11 February 1927 carried an item wherein Scandrett was mentioned in his capacity as Liquidator of Lime LTD., a company placed by the courts in liquidation.

His wife, Charlotte, eclipsed him in terms of a public persona – the S.A. Who’s Who recording that, although a Housewife, she was a member of the Rand Women’s Club, Honorary Life Vice President of the National Council of Women and the International Representative of the International Council of Women for Public Health in South Africa. She was also President of the Lady’s Executive of the 1820 Settler’s Memorial Association.

Arthur Scandrett passed away at 73 Twickenham Avenue, Auckland Park, Johannesburg on 20 July 1939 at the age of 66. He was a Secretary of Companies at the time of his death from Cardiac Failure and Chronic Nephritis. He had no children of his own.

Acknowledgements:

Within the body of the above work but specifically:
- El Ne Watson for Witklip map
- Gibson's official history of the ILH
- Various newspaper articles
- Ancestry for medal rolls etc.
- TNA for attestation papers (Kevin Asplin)

An excellent set of clasps to the ILH accompanied by an equally excellent write-up.