TOPIC:

Petrus Cornelius Slabbert

A Natal Rebel convicted of High Treason

Burgher, Dundee Commando – Anglo Boer War

- Anglo Boere Oorlog Medal to BURGER P.C. SLABBERTS

Piet Slabbert was one of those rare individuals who turned out for the Boer side in the Anglo Boer War despite living as a British subject in the Colony of Natal. He was to pay dearly for his, some would say, misguided loyalty.

Born in Harrismith in the Orange Free State, just over the border from Natal, on 24 August 1883 (some records say he was born in Natal); he was the son of Jasper Johannes Slabbert and his wife Elsie, born Strydom. Jasper Slabbert had an impressive pedigree – born in 1833 he came to Natal as a Voortrekker at the age of 18 with Piet Retief and was an 81 year old Farmer on the farm Goedekeus (“Well chosen” in English) in the Umsinga district near Dundee when hostilities broke out.


Goedekeus is circled in Green - the Red circles denote places identified in High Treason trial

Growing up Piet would have had plenty of playmates to keep him company and help him with chores around the farm – he had three older siblings, Jasper Johannes Stephanus, born 1870; Mynerd Jacobus, born 1872 and Gerhardus, born 1875 whilst those younger than him were Hendrik Lodewyk, born 1884 and Johannes Stephanus, date of birth unknown. This left Mrs Slabbert the only feminine voice in a family of seven men.

Being in the minority in a British Colony, as the Slabbert’s were as the end of the 19th century neared, was an unenviable place to find oneself. Being Dutch-speakers, the Slabbert’s identified themselves, culturally and ideologically, with their brethren to the west and the north – in other words those who were citizens of the two independent Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, both bordering on Natal.

When, as happened on 11 October 1899, war was declared between the Orange Free State, the Transvaal and Great Britain, British subjects living in Natal were expected to either turn out for service with the Colonial forces or, should they find this unpalatable, remain neutral and not provide, in any way, shape or form, assistance to the Boer cause. The Natal Afrikaners – another term for Dutch-speakers in Natal – faced this dilemma the minute the border was crossed by Boer Commandos heading for Durban and the sea.

Although a small and somewhat scattered community, the Natal Afrikaners identified with the Boer struggle to remove the British presence from South African soil and many allied themselves with the Boers as a result. This decision was justified, many claimed, when the Boer General Joubert issued a proclamation that Northern Natal was now incorporated into the Transvaal – thus freeing them from the yoke of being British subjects. However, once they had made the conscious decision to do so, they became “Natal Rebels” who, by the act of taking up arms against representatives of the Queen, were committing High Treason.

Piet Slabbert was one of these men, and he wasn’t alone, his 81 year old father and his younger brother Hendrik Lodewyk both took up the cudgels and fought against the British, knowing full-well that, should they be captured, their offence was punishable, potentially, by death.

Those Burghers who did not either surrender of sign an oath of allegiance to the Crown were eligible to claim the Anglo Boer Oorlog medal which was only authorised by the South African Government in 1921, after representations had been made requesting a medal for those who served on the Boer side. Applications were made on a Vorm B, which, thankfully for the collector, required the combatant to provide the Commando with whom he served; names of those under whom he served and, most importantly, the battles and skirmishes in which he took part. Unlike the British regulars and their Colonial allies, the Boers, completing the latter section of the form, were actually confirming that they “were there,” as opposed to being “in the vicinity” because their regiment was part of a formation known to be in a certain place at a certain time.



Making application for the ABO medal was, initially, viewed with scepticism by many “oud stryders” and the process dragged on well into the 1940’s and beyond. In Petrus Slabbert’s case, he was a late claimant for his medal – it being forwarded under cover of a memorandum to his then address – Langestraat 179, Muckleneuk, Pretoria – on 7 November 1941.

The Vorm B makes for interesting reading and details where he saw action. In Slabbert’s case he claimed to have served with the “Dundee Commando” – the town of Dundee being in Natal this is a misnomer – the closest Boer Commando would have been either Wakkerstroom or Vryheid and he would have allied himself with one of the other. This makes sense when one looks at where he was in action. He lists the following battles which were common to both the aforementioned Commandos who were active in the Natal theatre of the war:

- Colenso 15 December 1899
- Spioenkop – 20-24 January 1900
- Vryheid

He completed this section with the word “ens.” – which means “and so on,” implying that there were other actions he fought in which he failed to make mention of. As far as his superiors were concerned he mentions that he served under Veldkornet D. Uys, a fellow Natal Rebel, and Kommandant A. Ferreira.

He also confirmed, importantly, under period of service “From the beginning of the war until 9 months before the end of the war. Then detained in the Pietermaritzburg Jail as a Natal Rebel until after peace was declared.”

Slabbert was, therefore, in the field from 12 October 1899 until being taken prisoner on or about September 1901 (peace was declared on 31 May 1902) The battles he fought in were epic and, for the most part, gave General Sir Redvers Buller, the Commander-in-Chief and Officer Commanding the forces in Natal, a bloody nose.

Stott, in Chapter XI - Natal During The War of his book The Boer Invasion of Natal wrote that: -

The reader has, up to the present, been following carefully the operations of the main army of the Boer forces, and also of Sir George White's Field Force, as well as of the Relief Column under General Sir Redvers Buller ; but there are many other incidents of interest in connection with the war which occurred in Natal, and which should be related. As previously stated, a force of about 80 of the Umvoti Mounted Rifles, under Major Leuchars, was stationed at Tugela Ferry, to guard the main road from Dundee to Greytown. Although they had a comparatively uneventful time, the work performed by them was of the greatest importance, for they were a check upon raiding parties 'trying to enter Umvoti County.’

On November 23rd they were attacked, from the north side of the river, by a force of Boers, 200 strong, but after a plucky fight drove them off, only losing one man wounded, the enemy's loss being unknown. This party of Boers had taken possession of the village of Helpmakaar, and then came on to Pomeroy, where they had looted every building, and burnt down the gaol, post-office, hotel, and sundry other buildings ; but, as stated, they were checked at the Tugela River from continuing their depredations further south.

It can be supposed that Slabbert was one of those who participated in the attack and subsequent looting of Pomeroy. This because, at his treason trial in March 1902, it was alleged that he “Assisted in looting of stores and in the commandeering of property of local residents. Involved in manoeuvrers at Pomeroy, Paddafontein, Jobs Kop and Tugela Ferry. Paddafontein was the location of the Judith Dutch Reformed Church, half-way between Dundee and Helpmekaar.



But this was in the early stages of the war in Natal. What followed were the pitched battles in which he took part. The first of which was Colenso.

Colenso, fought on 15 December 1899, was poorly planned and poorly executed. The Boer forces under the young and extremely able Louis Botha, had entrenched themselves on the banks of the mighty Tugela River and lay in wait as Buller and his many thousands of men, the Irish Brigade and South Africa Irregulars among them, marched out under a blazing sun for what proved to be Buller’s first attempt to relieve Ladysmith.

Guided by a local native who, it was claimed, knew the best spot to ford the Tugela, the British troops marched into a loop in the river which was not only unfordable but played right into the hands of the Boer marksmen concealed in their trenches. Unseen, they opened a withering fire on the massed British Regulars who were bottled up in the loop, inflicting casualties with gay abandon. The troops knew not where to turn, some tried to ford the river but were carried away downstream by the current. Colonel Long’s Artillery batteries who had also, foolishly, advanced too close to the river banks, were cut down in swathes with the survivors withdrawing to a nearby donga where they waited it out under the harsh sun.

Eventually the order to withdraw was sounded and the British troops, parched and exhausted from a full days fighting an unseen enemy, straggled back to their lines in the rear. The Boers used the opportunity to cross the river and capture most of the guns which had been left behind.

General Botha, in an official dispatch sent to Commandant-General Piet Joubert on 19 December 1899 reported on the Colenso battle thus:

At one o'clock in the morning we observed many lights in the enemy camp and at the break of day we saw that the enemy had moved out of their camping area in large masses. This area appeared to us to be divided into three camps, pitched in the nearest koppies to the south of the Tugela, south-west of Colenso and approximately three to four miles from our defences.

We had taken up our positions all along the river, from the great hill south (on the opposite side therefore) of the Tugela and east of Colenso, and in the koppies and the plain west of that hill and on this side (north) of the river. The koppies were entrenched by the packing of stones and sand-bags, while in the plain trenches were dug for the protection of our burghers against the enemy fire. The enemy divided themselves into three distinct formations, and formed a left and right flank and a centre.

The most westerly flank marched forward in full array in a northerly direction towards the bend in the river near where Doorn Spruit falls into the Tugela, straight towards the trenches held by Comdt. C. Botha of Swaziland and his men. To the right of Comdt. C. Botha lay Comdt. Van Rensburg of Soutpansberg and his men, and still a little higher up Comdt. Grobler of Ermelo and some of his men. This flank of the enemy marched under the protection of a full battery to a distance of about 2 000 yards from our positions where the battery unlimbered, and then, under cover of a heavy shell-fire from this battery, the infantry began the attack.

Our burghers as well as our artillery allowed the enemy to advance unmolested to a range of about 1 500 yards with their guns, and having allowed the infantry to approach to approximately 500 yards, they suddenly unleashed a heavy fire. The enemy had orders to cross the river at this point, and although they stormed repeatedly, the fire of our burghers and artillery was so well directed and had such good effect that only a captain, two lieutenants and a few men were able to reach the river bank. Here the enemy suffered a tremendous loss in dead and wounded.

The leading battery had meanwhile been transferred in a westerly direction to a cluster of trees approximately 1 500 yards from the Ermelo positions in the ditch. On the mountain right behind these positions stood our two Creusot guns, and on these pieces the enemy battery directed its fire - however without any effect. Our burghers soon perceived that this most forward English battery was within range of the Mausers. It was thereupon subjected to such a severe and accurate fire with Mauser and Creusot that it had to withdraw precipitately, leaving one gun behind in the agaves, as we discovered later - although unfortunately too late - when the enemy suddenly dragged the piece away again with a team of horses. The two Creusots, one of which was sited rather more behind the Soutpansberg positions, were of very great assistance to our burghers with their Mausers and inflicted awfully heavy losses upon the enemy, hurling their shells upon the advancing troops rather than engaging the hostile batteries.

The enemy's centre advanced in extended order in such a way that it could at any time, if necessary, render assistance to either the left or right flank. At the same time two full batteries moved in a more easterly direction to just opposite Colenso, probably with the intention of taking up position there. But when they found that they were not being fired on, they advanced further and took up position in line with the railway bridge and east of Colenso, probably in order to provide cover for the troops who were marching on the wagon bridge, i.e. the enemy's right flank.

As soon as the guns had been unlimbered and had taken up position and opened fire, our burghers blasted the batteries with their Mausers, while the big Maxim, the Krupp and the Howitzer, which stood in our centre, supported them vigorously. The fire of our burghers, namely the Krugersdorp commando under Acting Comdt. Oosthuizen and the Heidelberg commando under Comdt. Buys, was now so heavy, so well aimed and excellently sustained, and, in addition, so splendidly supported by our artillery, that the gunners - those who had survived - soon had to abandon the guns.

Concerned that the enemy, who now charged repeatedly in an effort to recapture the guns, might force their way through sheer weight of numbers into the entrenched hill of Field-cornet Van Wyk of Krugersdorp, which lay nearest the two enemy batteries, I sent Field-cornet Emmett of Ward 2, Vryheid district, with his men (about 80 in number) to that position as a reinforcement - under heavy artillery-fire - and later also Lieut. Pohlman of the mounted police of Van Dam's commando, likewise with 80 men.

A most violent action thereupon ensued along the whole length of our positions against the enemy's right flank, which was pressing forward towards the bridge and part of which attempted to relieve the guns, bringing along with them fresh limber teams. Under cover of the naval guns and of another battery stationed along the road to Weenen, east of Colenso, the infantry charged no less than five times, but in vain. At length the enemy succeeded in limbering up quickly and taking away two guns, but not without having suffered heavy loss, including 32 artillery horses. In addition to the 10 guns, the enemy here left behind many dead and wounded, and were completely defeated and repulsed.

In the afternoon and while the battle was still in progress Field-cornet Emmett with 15 men and some Krugersdorpers crossed the river in order to take possession of the guns, etc.

A force consisting of infantry, cavalry and one battery moved in an easterly direction in support of the enemy's right (eastern) flank. A part of this force, so it proved later, had instructions to take possession, if possible, of the hill on the opposite side of the river, held by Comdt. Joubert (J.A.) of Wakkerstroom and Comdt. Muller of Standerton, assisted by Field-cornet Gouws of Olifants River, Middelburg district, Field-cornet Strydom of Soutpansberg and Acting Field-cornet Steyn of Ermelo with their men. Our burghers here allowed the enemy, who were apparently unaware that the hill was occupied by us, to approach to approximately 60 yards and then opened fire on them. It need hardly be said that this fire was highly effective and immediately put to flight what was still left of the enemy. At about three o'clock in the afternoon the enemy, having been repulsed at all points, began to retreat along the entire length of the front under cover of their big naval guns, leaving behind on the battlefield their dead and many of their wounded.

……And herewith I think I have discharged what I considered to be my duty, namely to provide you with a reliable and true report of the battle of Colenso, the battle in which it must again have been clear and obvious to the most blinded that the Lord of Hosts fought this battle for us, thereby enabling a small force of not quite 3 000 men with five guns not only to resist, but to defeat - even with great loss - a strong and powerful enemy of 23 000 men with 36 guns, including some of the largest calibre, and armed with lyddite and dum-dum.”

Buller now took time to regroup and plan for a second attempt at relieving the now despairing garrison in Ladysmith. It is not my intention to go in the minutiae of the four-day long battle of Spioenkop which culminated in the rout of the British troops on what they thought was the summit of the hill on 24 January 1900, only to find, once the morning fog had lifted, that they were short of the mark and in the firing line of the Boers ranged above them, were sitting ducks. The ground was shale and men were unable to entrench themselves leaving them exposed to a murderous Mauser fire.

Once again Slabbert would have been in action on the summit of Spioenkop, possible pouring lead into the helpless Tommies below. A little-known fact, which was made known after the battle was lost by Buller as his men streamed downhill under the cover of darkness, was that the Boers had actually, likewise, departed down the other side. It was only early the next morning that Botha realised that the hill was unoccupied and sent his reluctant men back up.

Slabbert, again, emerged unscathed from this battle and went on to fight in and around Vryheid as the Boers were driven remorselessly over Allemans Nek and out of Natal. Like many of his comrades in arms he drifted over the border out of Natal into the Transvaal to reappear again in the vicinity of Vryheid – once Transvaal territory but now in the hands of the British.



The Vryheid district, in the then Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR), had been one of the springboards for the Boer invasion of the colony of Natal in October 1899. By 18 September 1900, when British troops occupied Vryheid, the formal chapter of the war had closed. Earlier that year, in March, when the Boers defended the Biggarsberg Range, some 80 km south-west of Vryheid, the Vryheid Commando had been sent to patrol its home district. Following the successful British offensive at Helpmekaar and the Boer evacuation of the Biggarsberg line, Boer families in the Vryheid-Utrecht region were urged to retire deeper into the ZAR, while the Vryheid Commando helped to defend the Doornberg.

The Boers lacked sufficient strength to hold Vryheid and strong British garrisons were installed there and at Wakkerstroom and Utrecht, connected by a series of subsidiary posts at Scheeper's Nek, Blood River and De Jager's Drift. The Vryheid garrison was deficient in troops and the Boers long gone by the time reinforcements arrived. The Boers had retired towards Piet Retief or to the mountains and forests east of Vryheid but in October 1900, as elsewhere, they underwent a re-awakening with a new offensive, originating in the Eastern Transvaal, under the overall direction of Louis Botha, commencing. What started as a series of small, almost undocumented attacks on the three garrisons referred to were preliminaries to a serious attack on Vryheid. This led to the Battle of Lancaster Hill and a defeat for the Boer forces and another withdrawal from Natal for Botha and his men.



It was after this that, according to official records, Slabbert was captured, along with his aged father and younger brother, in the Utrecht district towards the end of 1901 (no specific date is provided either by Slabbert or the authorities.) As were most Natal Rebels, he was treated differently to normal Prisoners of War and was sent to the Pietermaritzburg Jail where he awaited his trial.

On 4 March 1902 he was found guilty of High Treason and Theft and sentenced to two years imprisonment of which 9 months were to be Hard Labour. Still only 19 years old this was a stiff penalty in comparison to his compatriots and to his father and brother who were each sentenced to six months imprisonment for High Treason with, in the case of his younger brother, the first 3 months to be with Hard Labour.



There was nothing for it but to take the strong medicine meted out and there is no record of his sentence being reduced or clemency being given. Both the Military and Colonial authorities wanted to send a stern message to those recalcitrant who opposed them.

The Boer War over and his time served, Slabbert returned to what he knew best, farming. At Klein Waterval in the County of Klipdrift, Parish of Ladysmith on 4 August 1905 he wed Anna Christina Wilhelmina Venter, a 19 year old young lady from the district. He was 23 years old and a Farmer from Waschbank, between Dundee and Ladysmith. Interestingly Slabbert would appear to have been illiterate, he was only able to provide “his mark, “ an “X” in the place of a signature in the wedding register.

At some point he gave up the land and moved to Pretoria where, as we have seen, he applied for his medal in 1941, by which time he had learned the basic skill of a signature, albeit in a very shaky hand.

This old veteran passed away at the age, reputedly, of 67 on 25 October 1950 at the Pretoria General Hospital as a result of a fractured rib with internal haemorrhaging received in a motor vehicle accident. His home address was provided as 373 Tram Street, New Muckleneuk, Pretoria. He was described as having been a General Labourer.

Acknowledgements:

- Stott, Chapter XI, The Boer Invasion of Natal
- SANDF Archives for Vorm B and correspondence
- South African Military History Society for General Louis Botha’s Dispatch 19 December 1899 (translated from the Dutch)
- The Museum of the Boer Republics Bloemfontein for POW details.
- KZN Heritage Preservation Project for photos of Natal Dutch Prisoners
- Natal Rebels, Prof. J.M. Wasserman