TOPIC:

James Henry Edward May

2 x Wounded in Action – 27 February 1917 & 9 April 1917

Private, Bechuanaland Rifles – Anglo Boer War
Private, 7th Infantry (Kimberley Regiment) – German South West Africa
Private, 1st South African Infantry – Western Front
Driver, South Africa Service Corps – German East Africa – WWI

- Queens South Africa Medal (Cape Colony, Transvaal) to 460 PTE J.H.E. MAY. BEC’LAND RIF:
- 1914-15 Star to PTE J.H.E. MAY. 7TH INFANTRY
- British War Medal to DVR. J. MAY. S.A.S.C.
- Victory Medal to J. MAY. S.A.S.C.



James Henry Edward May was born in Kimberley in the Cape Colony in 1884, the son of James Henry May and his wife Annie, born Halloron. His parents had married in St Mary’s Roman Catholic Church in Kimberley on 27 September 1883 at which time his father was a 29 year old Policeman, not an easy job in the fast-growing and increasingly lawless “City of Diamonds,” whilst his mother was only 18 years old.

James was the oldest of three children born to the couple. His siblings being Albert William, born 1886 and Ethel Elizabeth, born 1893. Sadly the pater familias passed away at the age of 40 in the house of W Russell, Tyburn Street, Kimberley on 9 April 1894. A guard employed at the De Beers Mine at the time of his passing, he left a young widow and three small children to fend for themselves. Very often, the solution to this contretemps lay in a providential marriage and this is the course adopted by Annie May – she wed a Cornwall-born Miner working for De Beers – one Wilfred Eldred Trenery – who became the family’s provider and stepfather to her three children.

As the end of the 19th century drew near the war clouds which had been gathering over southern Africa burst and, on 11 October 1899 the region was plunged into war, between the two Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and her more powerful neighbour, the Transvaal; and Great Britain. James was only a schoolboy when hostilities commenced but he would have been one of the many thousands of civilians who were trapped in Kimberley when the town was laid siege to by superior Boer forces in November 1899. Quite apart from the importance of Kimberley to the Boers, with her rich diamond deposits, there was the added incentive of possibly capturing the hated imperialist Cecil John Rhodes who, it was known, was holed-up in the place.

James’ stepfather, William Trenery was, like most De Beers employees, active either in the Town Guard or, as in his case, a member of the Kimberley Rifle Volunteers where he served until March 1901 as a Corporal with No.30. He would have visited his family whenever possible when able to get away for a night or so and a young James and his brother would have hung on every word he had to utter about the state of the siege and the fighting going on.

Small wonder then that James, when he deemed himself old enough to do so, took up arms as well. At Kimberley on 20 January 1902 an 18 year old James May attested for service with the Bechuanaland Rifles. Providing his address as 46 2nd Avenue, Kenilworth, Kimberley and his next of kin as his mother, Mrs Annie Trenery, he claimed to have no “trade or calling” and was assigned no. 460 and the rank of Private.

When James May went to war the siege of Kimberley was long over and the Boers were very much on the back foot, fighting in small packs in a fragmented way. The continual drives undertaken to hem them in and force their surrender, coupled with the scorched earth policy adopted where their farms were burnt to the ground and their crops and animals captured or destroyed, were beginning to take their toll. Despite this, however, there were a number of highly competent military leaders still among them such as De Wet, Botha, Smuts and De la Ray who kept the faith and made life very difficult for the British High Command.



In January, February, and March 1902 the Bechuanaland Rifle Volunteers were generally with or under Lord Methuen. It will be remembered that the Western Transvaal had been dangerously denuded of troops while the great driving operations were in progress in the eastern part of that country and in the Orange River Colony, hence Lord Methuen was unable to cope with Delarey and other leaders, strengthened as they were by commandos driven from elsewhere.

According to Colonel Hickman in his book “Rhodesia Served The Queen”, the Bechuanaland Rifles were part of a mobile force known as the Division Scouting Corps, and operating in the Western Transvaal. They included two companies of Welsh Yeomanry, the 88th and 89th Imperial Yeomanry, a mounted infantry company of the Bedfordshires and a troop of British South Africa Police, all under the command of Major Cowan of the Bechuanaland Rifles, whose function it was to destroy farm buildings and crops, collect the livestock and round up the Boer detachments.

When the forces in the Western Transvaal had been strengthened, the Bechuanaland Rifles took part in the last great drives which, under the direction of General Ian Hamilton, finally broke Delarey's power. Deployed to the Western Transvaal, they were in the fray in the disaster which befell Von Donop’s Convoy near Wolmaranstad where three of their number were wounded in action. A vicious and unproven rumour did the rounds in the English press at the time which suggested that the Bechuanaland Rifles “comprises a number of men of Dutch origin and we understand that not a few of the men at present belonging to it have been recruited from the concentration camp at Mafeking.”

The Newcastle Journal of March 3rd 1902 contained reference to a letter home from a soldier with the 15th Imperial Yeomanry. As a foreword the article included this comment, “My son who wrote from Klerksdorp under date 6th February 1902 seems to convoy a warning almost prophetic in its character and to suggest the possibility of treachery in the British lines being the cause of the reverse.”

“We had some good fighting coming in here Delarey (sic) and about 700 men were scrapping with us for three days, but he got the worst of it by a long way. The last day he lost 12 killed, besides many wounded. We had two traitors shot belonging to the Bechuanaland Rifles who were caught signalling to the Boers at night with lights. A flying column was going off at twenty to twelve on the 3rd but when these two chaps were caught the orders were changed, and we found, when we came to pass through which the baggage would have travelled that 400 Boers were entrenched, 100 on the right and 300 on the left, but they soon cleared as we were flanking them… The traitors were made to dig their own graves and were shot at daybreak on Tuesday morning (the 4th.)”

Lord Kitchener’s despatch to the War Office, dated 3 March 1902, contained the following detail of the disaster:

“Lt Colonel Anderson who commanded Von Donop’s convoy escort, had arrived at Kraaipan with nine officers and 245 men. The following is a summary of informal accounts so far as they come to hand:-

On the night of February 24th the convoy encamped by Yzerspruit, twelve miles short of Klerksdorp. On the morning of February 25th the march was resumed at 4.20. one company of infantry was in front, one company in the rear, guns and one pom-pom at the head of the convoy. Having reached a point ten miles from Klerksdorp the advance guard received a heavy rifle fire from scrub on the left of the road. Still so dark that only the flashes of the rifles were visible. The guns, pom-pom and infantry drove off the enemy, after a sharp action.

The convoy resumed its march but a second attack was delivered on the left flank. The enemy was determined and got within 100 yards. Our men were unable to prevent some wagons from stampeding, but managed to keep the bulk of the convoy in formation. The infantry drove off the enemy for a second time. These actions took two hours.

The convoy then began again to move towards Klerksdorp, when the rearguard was attacked in force, and begged for a gun. At this moment a force of the enemy, boldly charging, interposed between the left flank guard and the convoy, stampeding the mules in all directions, and thus throwing the infantry into confusion, of which the enemy took advantage by riding down the separated units of the escort.

All accounts speak of the troops fighting gallantly over the two hours, during which the guns and pom-poms fired away most of their ammunition. All the mounted troops, numbering 200, came out with the least possible delay from Klerksdorp on hearing the firing, but were held in check by a force of the enemy in a position between them and the convoy, until, seeing the mules stampeding all over the country, they realised the convoy had been captured.

The enemy were reported to number anywhere between 1200 and 1700 rifles. They consisted of a rapid concentration of almost all the commandos in the Western Transvaal; which was no doubt ordered as soon as the convoy was seen leaving Wolmaranstad; and as these commandos can easily move fifty miles in a night, it seems certain that the enemy came from a considerable distance. Delaray, Kemp, Cilliers, Lemmer, Vermaas, Wolmarans and Potgieter were all seen present.”



Although the presence of the Bechuanaland Rifles gets nary a mention it is known that they were there by the number of killed and wounded in the action- five of each.

The next action in which they participated was that of Klip Drift (or Rooiwal) near Lichtenburg on April 11th 1902 where they had about 9 casualties. There are many versions and accounts of the battle. For the sake of context, two are provided – the first account reads thus:-

On the night of the 10th of April, in accordance with instructions from General Ian Hamilton (who was in supreme command of all the columns operating in the Western Transvaal), Colonel Kekewich's force, composed of Lieutenant-Colonel Grenfell’s and Lieutenant-Colonel Von Donop’s columns, which for some months past had been operating in the Klerksdorp district, occupied a line running west and east along the valley of the Brakspruit and facing south.

Kekewich’s force covered ground from near the farms called Rooiwal and Doombult to Oshoek, where it joined hands with the Imperial Light Horse, who were on the right of Sir Henry Rawlinson’s force. The only information available indicated generally that the majority of the enemy were some distance to the south. General Hamilton’s orders to Kekewich for the 11th of April were to move at an early hour to the junction of the Harts River and the Brakspruit, and thence to make a reconnaissance in a west-northwest direction, while Rawlinson’s and Walter Kitchener’s forces reconnoitred towards the south-west.

Some few days prior to this date, General Delarey had passed through Colonel Kekewich's lines on his way to discuss terms of peace with Lord Kitchener at Klerksdorp, but there was no amnesty between the two armies. Kemp appears to have been in command of all the western commandos during Delarey’s absence, and to have caused a large concentration of his men in the neighbourhood of Wolmaranstad on the 10th of April. He had under him some 2000 of various commandos, the toughest veterans of the Boer forces — men who had been continuously in the field since October 1899. Kemp’s purpose on the 10th of April was to concentrate every available man in close proximity to Kekewich, and then in repetition of the tactics which had recently been so successful, to envelop the British force and rush into close quarters.

Entirely unaware of any impending conflict, at 6 A.M. on the 11th of April Grenfell’s and Von Donop’s columns closed on their right and moved west— Von Donop’s column leading—towards the junction of the Harts River and the Brakspruit.

At 7.30 A.M. the two columns had almost closed up, the head of Von Donop's column having reached the farm of Rooiwal, and his scouts being about a mile and a half ahead. As Von Donop’s column reached Rooiwal a few irregular shots were heard from the left front, followed immediately by three or four loud regular volleys, and almost simultaneously it was noticed that the fan-shaped regularity of the screen was broken and that there was some unaccountable galloping in front.

A few moments later—out of the distant uproar and across the bare stretch of plain and the deserted left front—galloped a hatless horseman straight for Colonel Grenfell. A few seconds later and he was hailed by Colonel Grenfell, and recognised as Percival of the 5th Fusiliers, Colonel Von Donop’s aide-de-camp. “ Those men in front are all Boers" he calmly but emphatically shouted, "Boers—nothing but Boers. I have galloped right through them myself.”

Grenfell looked in the direction indicated and saw against the sky to his left front a thick black line, perhaps a mile away. He realised in a second that he must achieve his own salvation. A second glance at the long black line showed it blacker and longer, and dissipated doubts; it was Boers—and Percival’s information was proving correct. Grenfell had some 1100 rifles, with two guns and a pom-pom, and acting under instructions from Colonel Kekewich, he now gave the following orders :— the guns and pom-pom immediately to come into action facing west; the 1st and 2nd Scottish Horse (460 rifles) to wheel to their left, dismount and advance towards the Boers, seizing some mealie-covered ground which rose slightly towards the enemy—thus covering the south-west; the South African Constabulary (290 rifles) to protect the guns; and the Yeomanry (420 rifles) to come up on the left of the Scottish Horse and face south. The guns at once began firing at about 1100 yards range, and the Scottish Horse under Leader, being at the head of the column, were the first to get dismounted under a very heavy but inaccurate fire, under which horses were freely hit and some stampeded. Leader and the first troops climbed the slightly rising ground and took up the best position they could find, some fifty yards away from the horses, facing west and south-west. The men then extended and opened fire at about 600 yards.

Just as the remaining troops of the Scottish Horse followed Colonel Leader and the first troops into the firing line, so the other units formed on the Scottish Horse; and eventually Von Donop’s column rallied and formed on Grenfell.

The Boers had advanced slowly so as to give their wings time to swing up and envelop the British force, and this cost them the day. For now the crisis was passed; the Scottish Horse were lying along the higher ground with a good field of fire before them.. The range rapidly diminished to five, four, and three hundred yards, but still the Boer line in close order, knee to knee, and two and more deep, moved slowly onward.

Seldom in the history of small-bore warfare have riflemen or gunners had a surer target than that thick crowded line of horsemen. There was no chance of a man mistaking his range; each fired point blank as fast as he could fill his magazine. Still, through this terrific fire-zone, the Boer line surged forward to the charge. Those who had been at Omdurman had seen a similar imposing spectacle; none of the rest of a veteran column had ever beheld so Homeric a sight as the confident onslaught of 2000 mounted men, knee to knee, two, three, and four deep.

The Boer charge was routed and they fled the field in disarray.

The second account:

On 6 April, Kitchener put Colonel Ian Hamilton in command of another drive to try to trap De La Rey's fighters. The plan was to 'squeeze' the Boers against the British mobile columns and a line of blockhouses and entrenchments at Klerksdorp. Colonel Robert Kekewich, who was in command of one of Kitchener's columns, dug in at Rooiwal to strengthen his left flank. Having mistakenly gotten tangled up with another British column under Colonel Henry Rawlinson, Kekewich was ordered by Hamilton to proceed to Rooiwal, where he arrived on 10 April. This change of plan proved to be a fortunate one for the British, because the Boers had scouted the Rooiwal position earlier and found it weakly defended. Dug in on the hillside at Rooiwal were about 3,000 mounted infantry, supported by 6 field guns and 2 pom poms.

The Boers, however, did not know of the British deployment and they still believed that Rooiwal was only lightly held. One of their commandos, under Commandant Potgieter and General Kemp, therefore tried to overrun the British position early on the morning of 11 April, in an effort to escape Hamilton's 'drive'. Potgieter had around 1,700 men, all mounted riflemen.

At around 7:15 am on 11 April, they charged the British position on horseback, firing from the saddle. A British picket of 40 mounted infantry was overrun, taking 20 casualties. Kekewich's position was a strong one, but the sight of the charging Boers panicked some of the inexperienced British troops and a number of Yeoman units fled the scene of the battle and were not stopped until they were a mile away from the fighting. A Lieutenant Carlos Hickie managed to stop the stampede with a mixture of pleas and threats. In addition, a number of the regular British officers on the scene were very critical of the 'wild' shooting of their men.

In spite of this, however, the Boer charge was stopped about 30 metres from the British line by artillery and rifle fire. Fifty Boers were killed outright and more were wounded. Among the dead was Potgieter, wearing a distinctive blue shirt. The surviving Boers made good their retreat. Boer fire, delivered from the saddle, had produced about 50 casualties in the British line.

Ian Hamilton and Rawlinson arrived on the scene just as the fighting was ending. However, Hamilton delayed the pursuit of the beaten Boers as he feared that the retreat was a ruse and that his men would fall into Boer ambushes. At about 9:45, or 90 minutes after the Boer charge had been repulsed, Hamilton sent his mounted troops in pursuit of the enemy. They captured a further 50 Boers and re-captured the artillery lost at Tweebosch.

Kitchener had issued orders that Boers captured wearing British uniforms were to be shot. However, although a number of wounded Boers were indeed wearing captured British khaki, Hamilton ordered that they be spared.

The battle was a setback for the Boers, but their casualties were relatively light and most of their fighters escaped the action unscathed.

Some of the leading Boers came to within 100 yards of the Scottish Horse and even closer to the Constabulary, and then the tornado of lead in which they found themselves was too much even for their determination, and they broke and galloped away, the last shot being fired at about 8.10 A.M.

Men now had leisure in which to realise that the day was won. Away on the right a few parties of the enemy were still trying to get round that flank through the scrub jungle on the hillside. To the left and to the front, near and far, were galloping horsemen and clouds of dust, while immediately before the recumbent British line were over 100 dead and wounded Dutchmen. Close to the Scottish Horse Maxim (which had done excellent service) lay Commandant Potgieter, a big man in a blue suit and jack boots; and near by a lad of fourteen, himself badly wounded, was holding a blanket over a dying old man to shield him from the sun.


Commandant Potgieter's body lying on the Rooiwal battlefield.

The actual result of the fight, some say, was the end of the war in the west. Be this as it may, Kekewich's column had been privileged to witness a wondrous change in the character of their enemy;—the changing of the leopard's spots— the transmigration of the soul of the Dervish into the heart of the Dutchman.

On 31 May 1902 the war ended and May and his comrades wound their weary way home. He had come into the war at the “tail end” so to speak but had, in a few short months, experienced intense fighting as the Boers hurled everything into a last-ditch effort to carry the day.

Returning to Kimberley he resumed his civilian employment and was the happy recipient of a Queens South Africa Medal issued off the roll dated at Mafeking on 12 May 1903. On 23 August 1905 his step-father, Wilfred Trenery, passed away at the De Beers Mine at the young age of 36 leaving his mother widowed once more.

Peace and tranquillity now reigned, allowing the country to set about the business of healing and rebuilding but this was destined not to last – on 4 August 1914 the world was at war with Imperial Germany pitting herself against the United Kingdom. South Africa was called upon by the Home Government for an “urgent Imperial service” – to occupy and destroy the Radio Station in German South West Africa.

On 24 August 1914 May found himself in uniform once again. On this occasion with the 7th Infantry (Kimberley Regiment) where he was assigned no. L5140 and the rank of Private. Providing his mother of 48, 2nd Avenue, Kenilworth, Kimberley as his next of kin, he served in German South West Africa until 28 May 1915 before being returned to the Union prior to the German surrender at Otavi on 9 July 1915. The decision facing all South African servicemen was what to do next. A battalion was being raised to tackle Von Lettow Vorbeck and his Askaris in German East Africa and there was the option of heading to the slaughter fields of the France and Flanders where thousands of lives were being squandered on a daily basis.

May chose the latter course and, on 4 September 1915, completed the attestation papers for service with the 1st South African Infantry at Potchefstroom. Confirming that he was a Diamond Sorter by occupation he added that he had seen service in German South West Africa for 10 months and that he was 30 years old. Physically he was a diminutive 5 feet 3 inches in height, weighing in at 130 lbs. He had a dark complexion, dark brown eyes and dark hair. By way of religious persuasion he was a Roman Catholic. Having been pronounced fit by the Medics he was assigned no. 4788 and the rank of Private with “C” Company of the 1st S.A.I. – his service being reckoned from 14 August 1915.

May was about to have a busy war. He was, along with his Battalion, rerouted to Egypt on arrival in England, to combat the Senussi tribe which, allied to the Ottoman Empire, was making life difficult for the Allies in the Middle East. Having been landed in Alexandra on 29 December 1915, the South African troops finally subdued the foe and sailed for Marseilles and the Western Front on 15 April 1916.

Once on French soil the 1st S.A. Brigade was moved up to the front to take part in the fighting. May was twice Wounded in Action – at duty on 27 February 1917 when the Battalion was engaged in a trench riad (reported on 21 March 1917), and on 9 April 1917 – slight wound to the Head and Back – (reported on 18 April 1917.) The 9th April 1917 was the start of the Battle of Arras with 05:30 in the morning being zero hour, and all four South African regiments advancing under the greatest artillery barrage “ever seen on any battlefield”. By 2 o’clock in the afternoon the SA Brigades objectives were accomplished. Casualties for the first day were 145 killed and 549 wounded (of whom May was one) and missing.


Wounded and dead - Battle of Arras

May’s wounds required treatment at the 1st Canadian General Hospital at Etaples from where, after treatment, he was discharged on 21 May 1917.

On 24 June 1917 he was transferred to England whereafter he sailed for South Africa, and was discharged, being Over Age and Permanently Unfit for general war service, at Wynberg in Cape Town on 28 November 1917. His description on final discharge stated that he had Gunshot Wound scars on his left calf and forehead. May was allowed to claim 2 years and 86 days service and received a Character rating of Very Good.

Having fought in the Boer War, the German South West Africa campaign and the Western Front in World War I, May could have departed for the luxury of home but he was made of sterner stuff. Despite being categorised as “Over age” and “ Permanently Unfit for General Service”, his desire to see further action led him to Army Headquarters at Roberts Heights just outside Pretoria where, on 22 March 1918, he completed attestation papers for service in German East Africa with the Mechanical Transport section of the South African Service Corps.

In an effort to avoid the authorities identifying him as a chap so recently discarded, he employed the use of subterfuge by deliberately using only his first name and neglecting to mention any of the service he had seen on the Western Front. Instead he became plain “James May” who had served in German South West Africa. Now 33 years old he claimed to be an Engine Driver on the mines. In answer to question 11.a. “Have you ever been discharged from any Military force as Medically Unfit?” he glibly stated “No.”

Assigned no. M.T. 7824 and the rank of Driver, May was taken on strength and embarked at Durban aboard H.M.T. “Salam” on 25 June 1918 disembarking at “Mozambique” (probably Lourenco Marques) on 2 July 1918. At this point in the German East African theatre most European troops had, in fact, been repatriated to South Africa suffering with Malaria and other tropical illnesses. May proved almost immune to these with the only health episode recorded in respect of him being treatment for sore neck and an Abscess in the same area on 28 July and 10th August respectively.

With Von Lettow Vorbeck finally surrendering, May and the remaining troops in the region were repatriated to South Africa. In his case aboard H.M.T. “Coconado” sailing from Port Amelia on 15 December 1918 and disembarking at Durban four days later on 19 December 1918.

His Proceedings on Discharge form indicated that he was discharged after 326 days service on 8 February 1919 with a Military Character of Very Good whereafter he returned to Kimberley.

Fortunately the medal clerks were able to spot that May had previous service and “married his SASC card to that of his 1st S.A.I. card, effectively preventing a needless double issue.

Acknowledgements:
- Rooiwal action - A military history of Perthshire, 1899-1902 and the Times History, volume V – First Account
- Wikipedia – Second Account
- Rhodesia Served The Queen Volume II Colonel A.S. Hickman
- Service papers and cards – SANDF Documentation Centre, Irene, Pretoria