I have read General Warren's synopsis, or defense of his decision-making regarding this battle; plus books by Creswicke, Churchill, Doyle, and Farwell that relate to this battle. Here is my take on it:
1) Warren did not seem to be on good terms with Buller from the outset, seems like a personality conflict. This likely contributed to communication breakdowns.
2) Buller says he offered Warren as much Food and Forage as necessary to make the flanking movement via Acton Homes.
3) Warren says he did not have enough rations to take the Acton Homes route, so had to take the road to Fair View which meant he had to capture Spion Kop first. Buller, for some odd reason, agreed with the attack on Spion Kop.
4) Warren says Buller did not provide him enough heavy artillery saying it was being used at Potgeiters Drift for the diversionary attack. But in looking at the Order of Battle of his division, he did have the 4.7in Naval Guns.
5) It would appear no one thought of sending recon up to Spion Kop or a nearby position, if they did so they would have clearly seen the physical geography at the top of the kop, thus never been surprised like they were.
6) Warren launched his attack on Spion Kop prematurely without waiting for the Naval Guns (or even his Maxims) to be in position to support those at the top. They arrived towards evening, after the battle had been going on all day,
7) In mid-battle, almost at random, Buller orders the appt of LtCol Thornycroft (Acting) as the commander. Warren appears to accept this without question and simply relays the message without notifying anyone else of the change in command at the top. What kind of General would do this? I thought it logical for Warren to at least question Buller about this order.
8] Warren knew the battle was going badly, yet he never took command himself or even ventured close to the top of Spion Kop.
9) Thornycroft clearly made an unauthorized withdrawal, in clear violation of orders. Despite the fact the British had already won a Pyrrhic Victory.
Clearly a complete mess with a total breakdown in tactical and operation command. If only someone had the frame of mind to do a thorough recon of the hill in the daytime before the attack!
What are your thoughts?
