TOPIC:

In a small convolute of ABW paperwork there was an interesting field note dated (Wednesday) 7 February 1900 relating to Buller’s third failed attempt to relieve Ladysmith. The message was sent from Buller’s headquarters and captioned “Very Pressing & Urgent.”
Some background (the following is more or less verbatim copied from Chapter 8 of Scott’s book “the Boer Invasion of Natal” as serialized on this platform)
“The following week passed quietly, the men taking a much-needed rest after the exceptionally heavy and protracted fighting on and around Spion Kop. On Sunday afternoon, February 4th, (1900 )however, it became evident that General Buller was contemplating another move, for a portion of the infantry and artillery marched towards Potgieter's Drift and bivouacked for the night. On Monday morning they crossed the river at the drift and advanced towards the enemy's front or central position on the Brakfontein Ridges. The naval guns on Zwartkop commenced a heavy fire of lyddite shells at 7 a.m., to which there was no response until the field batteries and the Lancashire Regiment had advanced to within range of the Boer rifles, when a deadly fusilade of shot and shrapnel was poured into them. A halt was made, and the artillery, although exposed to the heavy fire of the enemy, commenced to rake the Boer trenches with bursting shells. This was kept up until 1.30 p.m., when the order was given to retire, which had to be carried out under a tremendous cross-fire ; fortunately, however, comparatively few casualties occurred.
This frontal attack had, however, only been a feint on the part of General Buller to occupy the attention of the Boers while the real attacking party crossed the river at Skiet's Drift, to the east of Zwartkop. At this point, during the morning, the Engineers had rapidly constructed a pontoon bridge, over which the Durham Regiment passed and proceeded north wards to attack the enemy's positions on the eastern extremity of the Brakfontein Ridges, called Vaal Krantz, and also the Krantz Kloof Kopjes. The Durhams, who formed the advance party of General Lyttleton's Brigade, and who were supported by the Rifle Brigade, now pushed rapidly on towards Vaal Krantz, being subjected the while to a deadly rifle fire. They pressed steadily on, disregarding the whistling bullets and shrieking shells, until at last, fixing bayonets and cheering at the top of their voices, they charged the enemy on the top of the hill crest. The Boers, however, would not wait for the cold steel, but bolted precipitately to their main position on the Brakfontein. A few wounded and unwounded Boers were captured, and the remainder in their flight were subjected to a hot fusilade from the Durhams. The Devons also advanced and captured an adjoining kopje, driving the Boers before them. As night fell the British hearts were hopeful, feeling that they had now established themselves with a firm footing on the north side of the Tugela River.
The gallant soldiers on the captured positions did not rest during this Monday night, although they were tired with the hard day's fighting, for they knew that on the morrow they would be attacked by the enemy. The night was therefore spent in erecting schanzes and making shelters for protection from artillery fire.
The Boers also were preparing for the morrow. During the night they moved a number of heavy guns and machine guns from the west to positions commanding the captured hills; so that on the return of daylight next morning the British infantry found they were exposed to a terrible cross-fire of shot and shell opened upon them. But nobly unheeding the withering fire, they advanced during the day and took another kopje.
At four o'clock the same afternoon a brave attempt was made by 600 of the enemy to recapture the lost positions, but they were repulsed with heavy loss. The artillery fire during the day had been working havoc among the infantry. The enemy had fixed a disappearing gun on Doom Kloof Hill, to the east, which fired a too-pound shell, and which defied the British gunners on Zwartkop to locate its position; but during the afternoon a column of smoke shot up into the air, like a great waterspout, indicating that its ammunition magazine had been blown up by a shell from the naval guns.
On Wednesday morning the position remained unchanged, the soldiers having again to endure a hot cross-fire from the enemy. General Buller, finding that the Boers were so strongly entrenched in a semicircle round the captured hills, decided to withdraw, as, although it might be possible to force a passage through to Ladysmith, it would cost probably 4,000 lives, which would be too great a sacrifice. It would also require a very strong force to keep open the Lines of Communication unless the Boers were completely routed and cleared from the district. During Wednesday night, therefore, the troops were withdrawn from Vaal Krantz—the position which had been won so bravely—and brought across the river. The withdrawal was successfully performed, every transport waggon crossing the river safely. It is needless to say that the disappointment among the men was bitter, but General Buller was acting wisely, as subsequent events proved.”

The message was written on a page ripped from a standard-issue soldier’s notebook and relates directly to the withdrawal from hard-earned positions across the Tugela referred to in the final paragraph. It was penned by, then, Major P.J.T. Lewis of the Army Service Corp employed on Buller’s Staff. Lewis was subsequently promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and acted as a Deputy Assistant Adjutant General (D.A.A.G.). His name appeared in the official publication of the British government, The London Gazette, on February 8, 1901.




The “Urgent and Pressing” message was sent late on Wednesday night (7 February 1900) to the Camp Commander, who received it at 11.30 pm. Timing, script and underlined content illustrate an atmosphere of anxiety in Buller’s HQ at yet another failed attempt to permanently remove sauteed Horse with nettle sauce from the menu in Ladysmith.