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QSA: CC, OFS, TR – 3361 Sjt. H. Britton, 1 Suffolk Regt.
KSA: SA01, SA02 – 3361 Sjt. H. Britton, 1 Suffolk Regt.
LSGC EVII – 3361 C Sjt. H. Britton, Suffolk Regt
PoW Colesberg 06/01/1901


Three: Colour Sergeant H. Britton, 1st Battalion, Suffolk Regiment, who was taken prisoner of war at Colesberg, 6 January 1900

Queen’s South Africa 1899-1902, 3 clasps, Cape Colony, Orange Free State, Transvaal (3361 Sgt H. Britton, 1st Suffolk Regt); King’s South Africa 1901-02, 2 clasps, South Africa 1901, South Africa 1902 (3361 Serjt: H. Britton. Suffolk Regt); Army L.S. & G.C., E.VII.R. (3361 C. Sjt: H. Britton. Suffolk Regt)

Harry James Britton was born in Sudbury, Suffolk, and attested for the Suffolk Regiment at Colchester in October 1892. He advanced to Corporal in December 1895, and to Sergeant in November 1899. Britton served with the 1st Battalion in South Africa from November 1899 to September 1902, and was taken prisoner of war at Colesberg on 6 January 1900. He rejoined his Battalion on 30 September later that same year, and advanced to Colour Sergeant in May 1904 (awarded L.S. & G.C. in 1911). Britton was discharged in October 1913, after 21 years’ service with the Colors. He re-enlisted in the 5th Battalion, Suffolk Regiment on 1 June 1915, only to be invalided out of service as medically unfit on 2 October 1916.



Background and an account of the battle from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Great Boer War, London, Smith, Elder and Co, 1902

Arundel was weakly held, and French advanced up to it, and established his camp there towards the end of December, within ten kilometres of the Boer lines at Rensburg, to the south of Colesberg. His mission - with his present forces - was to prevent the further advance of the Boers into Cape Colony, but he was not strong enough yet to make a serious attempt to drive them out. Before the move to Arundel on 13 December his detachment had increased in size, and consisted largely of mounted men, so that it attained a mobility very unusual for a British force. On 13 December there was an attempt upon the part of the Boers to advance south, which was easily held by the British Cavalry and Horse Artillery. The country over which French was operating is dotted with those singular kopjes which the Boer loves - kopjes which are often so grotesque in shape that one feels as if they must be due to some error of refraction when one looks at them. But, on the other hand, between these hills there lie wide stretches of the green or russet savanna, the noblest field that a horseman or a horse gunner could wish. The riflemen clung to the hills, French's troopers circled warily upon the plain, gradually contracting the Boer position by threatening to cut off this or that outlying kopje, and so the Boers was slowly herded into Colesberg. The small but mobile British force covered a very large area, and hardly a day passed that one or other part of it did not come in contact with the Boers. With one regiment of infantry (the Berkshires) to hold the center, his hard-riding Australians and New Zealanders, with the Scots Greys, the Inniskillings, and the Carabineers, formed an elastic but impenetrable screen to cover the Boer advance into the Cape Colony. They were aided by two batteries, 0 and R, of Horse Artillery. Every day General French rode out and made a close personal examination of the Boers' position, while his scouts and outposts were instructed to maintain the closest possible touch.
On 30 December the Boers abandoned Rensburg, which had been their advanced post, and concentrated at Colesberg, upon which French moved his force up and seized Rensburg. The very next day, December 31st, he began a vigorous and long-continued series of operations. At five o'clock on Sunday evening he moved out of Rensburg camp, with R and half of 0 batteries RHA, the 10th Hussars, the Inniskillings, and the Berkshires, to take up a position on the west of Colesberg. At the same time Colonel Porter, with the half-battery of 0, his own regiment (the Carabineers), and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, left camp at two on the Monday morning and took a position on the Boers' left flank. The Berkshires under Major McCracken seized hill, driving a Boer picket off it, and the Horse enfiladed the Boers' right flank, and after a risk artillery duel succeeded in silencing his guns. Next morning (2 January 1900), however, it was found that the Boers, strongly reinforced, were back near their old positions, and French had to be content to hold them and to wait for more troops.

These were not long in coming, for the Suffolk Regiment had arrived, followed by the Composite Regiment (chosen from the Household Cavalry) and the 4th Battery RFA. The Boers, however, had also been reinforced, and showed great energy in their effort to break the cordon which was being drawn round them. Upon the 4th a determined effort was made by about a thousand of them under General Shoemann to turn the left flank of the British, and at dawn it was actually found that they had eluded the vigilance of the outposts and had established themselves upon a hill to the rear of the position. They were shelled off of it, however, by the guns of 0 Battery, and in their retreat across the plain they were pursued by the 10th Hussars and by one squadron of the Inniskillings, who cut off some of the fugitives. At the same time, De Lisle with his mounted infantry carried the position which they had originally held. In this successful and well-managed action, the Boer loss was ninety, and we took in addition twenty-one prisoners. Our own casualties amounted only to six killed, including Major Harvey of the 10th, and to fifteen wounded.


Encouraged by this success an attempt was made by the Suffolk Regiment to carry a hill which formed the key of the Boers' position. The town of Colesberg lies in a basin surrounded by a ring of kopjes, and the possession by us of any one of them would have made the place untenable. The plan has been ascribed to Colonel Watson of the Suffolks, but it is time that some protest should be raised against this devolution of responsibility upon subordinates in the event of failure. When success has crowned our arms, we have been delighted to honor our general; but when our efforts end in failure our attention is called to Colonel Watson, Colonel Long, or Colonel Thorneycroft. It is fairer to state that in this instance General French ordered Colonel Watson to make a night attack upon the hill.


The result was disastrous. At midnight four companies in canvas shoes or in their stocking feet set forth upon their venture, and just before dawn they found themselves upon the slope of the hill. They were in a formation of quarter column with files extended to two paces; H Company was leading. When half-way up a warm fire was opened upon them in the darkness. Colonel Watson gave the order to retire, intending, as it is believed, that the men should get under the shelter of the dead ground which they had just quitted, but his death immediately afterwards left matters in a confused condition. The night was black, the ground broken, a hail of bullets whizzing through the ranks. Companies got mixed in the darkness and contradictory orders were issued. The leading company held its ground, though each of the officers, Brett, Carey, and Butler, was struck down. The other companies had retired, however, and the dawn found this fringe of men, most of them wounded, lying under the very rifles of the Boers. Even then they held out for some time, but they could neither advance, retire, or stay where they were without losing lives to no purpose, so the survivors were compelled to surrender. There is better evidence here than at Magersfontein that the Boers were warned and ready. Every one of the officers engaged, from the Colonel to the boy subaltern, was killed, wounded, or taken. Eleven officers and one hundred and fifty men were our losses in this unfortunate but not discreditable affair, which proves once more how much accuracy and how much secrecy is necessary for a successful night attack. Four companies of the regiment were sent down to Port Elizabeth to re-officer, and the arrival of the 1st Essex enabled French to fill the gap which had been made in his force.