The Battle or Spion Kop by an Officer (of the KRRC)
On the night of the 22nd January, 1900, the 3rd Battalion K.R.R., who had been bivouacking for about a week with the remainder of the Light Brigade (General The Hon Neville Lyttelton's) on Potgieter's Kopjes, received orders to recross the Tugela and proceed to Mount Alice, to replace, as guard to the Naval guns, a portion of General Talbot Coke's Brigade, who had received orders to reinforce General Sir Charles Warren.
The night of the 23rd, while on outpost duty, we were told there was to be a big battle on Spion Kop on the morrow. At dawn on the 24th we heard a good deal if fring in the direction of Spion Kop, but were able to make out but little owing to a heavy mist which hid the action from us. About 9 a.m. we were relieved by the Royal Scots Fusiliers, and returned to a bivouac on a kopje about half a mile in rear of the Naval guns. Shortly after our relief, Colonel Riddell, of his own initiative, gave the order that the men were to cook their dinners, as we might have to move off at a moment's notice.
Lucky that he did so, for they had just finished when an orderly rode up with the result that the Battalion fell in. About noon we started, not knowing the reason of the movement nor our objective, and wended our way to a ford across the Tugela, lying between Trichard's and Potgieter's drifts. We had a brief halt before crossing, during which we saw the Scottish Rifles cross at this drift and move to the left along the northern bank. We then crossed, the water being up to our knees, and on arrival at the other side took off our rolled great coats by companies and left them under guard, a very wise precaution, as had we not done this we could have never climbed up the slopes we had to. Colonel Riddell then explained to the officers what was to be done. Briefly it was that the Battalion was to be broken up into two Half-Battalions, and to attack the two northern slopes of the Spion Kop, the Right Half-Battalion to take the right spur, the Left Half-Battalion the left. Thabanyama is, I believe, the correct name of the hill we took; Spion Kop was applied to so many features, that I think there was a good deal of diversity of opinion as to which particular hill was Spion Kop. Our Spurs, however, were to the north-east of the Spion Kop range and on the Brakfontein side of the position, they were two very high rocky peaks, and had frequently caught our eyes as nasty places to negotiate during the days of waiting at Potgieter's Kopjes. I think none of us knew the real reason why we were sent; many of us thought out object was to confirm by a flank attack, a frontal success by Sir Charles Warren; any how we all believed we were intended to get to the top, and we meant getting there.
I can only describe the action of the Right Half-Battalion, as we were fully half a mile distant from the Left Half-Battalion, and my account, I fear, is very sketchy, but a company officer with his company extended to ten paces and bullets flying about, has his time too much occupied to take in much of what is going on round him. The order of the two Battalions was :—
Left Half-Battalion
Right Half-Battalion
Major Bewicke Copley
Colonel Buchanan Riddell.
E, F, G & H companies
A, B, C & D companies
We were allowed to move along the valley to the foot of our respective spurs without any notice being taken by the Boers. On our commencing the ascent, however, the enemy were quick to begin business, and we had a very hot frontal and flanking fire poured into us. Little harm was done by this fire, however, until we had gone about one third of the way up the hill. Here there was a plateau about 200 yards in width, and the right company (A) found it impossible to cross, losing heavily in the attempt, owing to a severe flanking fire. B Company on their left, however, were more successful, and, under Major Kays, had the honour of being the first to reach the top after about two hours' hard climbing and fighting. They fixed swords at the top, but could put them to very little use owing to the hasty retirement of the Burghers. D Company were close on B Company's heels, and some of them I fancy reached the top with B Company, while close on their heels were C and A Companies, whom Colonel Riddell had ordered to file to the left and follow in B Company's wake on discovering than an advance across the ground attempted
by A Company would be disastrous. At the top of the hill the Right Half-Battalion gradually collected, and after taking about two hours in the ascent. It may be wondered why they 'gradually collected' and be urged that officers could not have had much hold over their men; but any one who has seen the country will, I hope, bear me out in saying that, apart from the fight altogether, it was no mean mean performance to have got close on 400 men up such a place in the time that was taken.
Again, the necessarily wide extension made the section leader's control over his men a task of considerable difficulty. In many cases men would climb in couples, 0ne holding the rifles while the other swung himself up. But the steepness of the spur had its good point, for the amount of dead ground afforded by this steepness caused our losses to be less than they would have been had our attack been up a gentle slope.
The Boers had not taken the trouble to entrench themselves on the top of the spur, that they had in other places, probably because an attack from the quarter from which we delivered it was deemed improbable; but the great rocks made the position one of enormous natural strength. On the flanks on the other surrounding features they were strongly entrenched. This portion of the position we discovered afterwards to be under Schalk Burgher's command.
On arrival at the top of the hill we found that a few Boers had retired down the further slopes and were making terribly good practice against any of our riflemen who showed theirs heads over the sky line. It was than that Colonel Riddell, who all through the attack had worked wonders by his example, stood up to try and discover where these sharpshooters were located, with the result which has been do much deplored by all who knew him.
There is not much more to tell. Darkness came on, and a sangar was commenced in the expectation that we should recommence work in the morning; however, we received the order to retire on to a pontoon bridge at the foor of Naval Gun Hill, and then to recross the Tugela; the rest of the force on Spion Kop had retired and our position was considered untenable.
It was a disheartening order, as some of us had seen the Boers in evident confusion in the valley beyond Spion Kop. However, down we had to come, feeling a bit humiliated at having to toboggan down the side of the hill on the seats of our breeches, but this was the best, in fact, only mode of progression for a great part of the way. One great consolation we had, however, and that was that next morning the spurs showed just as much wear as our trousers.
As to the success of the attack of the 3rd Battalion K.R.R. on that memorable 24th January, there is no better testimony than an extract from the diary of Commandant Edwards, Chief of the Staff to Botha, which was published in the Manchester Guardian of 24th August, 1901. In it he emphatically declares that our operations against those spurs and the capture of Schalk Burgher's position had defeated Botha; and this statement was confirmed by telescopes in Ladysmith.
I wish I could give an account of the action of the Left Half-Battalion, but beyond the fact of their being successful in capturing a peak higher than that captured by the Right Half-Battalion, I know nothing.
Finally, I must apologise for so poor an account of so great an action, but can only plead the fact of having to write so long after the event as some excuse for the many deficiencies.
