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This has not been previously published.

Addendum to despatch dated 30th January,1900 [No. I].

30th January, 1900.

This report was received as the mail was being closed. In the absence of the General Commanding-in-Chief, I enclose it with the other papers.


F. W. STOPFORD,
Military Secretary.

Military Secretarv, 30th January, 1900.

Herewith copy of portions of my despatch which you have called for by telegram.

C. WARREN, Lieut-General.
Commanding 5th Division.

Copy of Instructions issued to Lieut.-General Sir C. F. Clery, dated 19th January, 1900.

General Officer Commanding 2nd Division,

I shall be glad if you will arrange to clear the Boers out of the ground above that at present occupied by the 11th Brigade, by a series of outflanking movements. In the early morning an advance should be made as far as the Hussars reconnoitred to-day, and a shelter-trench there made across the slope of the hill. A portion of the slopes of the adjoining hill to the west can then be occupied, the Artillery assisting, if necessary, in clearing the western side and upper slopes. When this is done I think that a battery can be placed on the slopes of the western hill in such a position that it could shell the seances of the Boers on Spion Kop and the upper portion of the eastern hill. When this is done a further advance can be made on the eastern hill, and artillery can be brought to bear upon the upper slopes of the western hill. It appears to me that this might be done with comparatively little loss of life, as the Boers can in each turn be outflanked. The following Cavalry are at your disposal—two squadrons Royal Dragoons and 5th Divisional Squadron.

C. WARREN,
Lieut.-General

20th January, 1900.

After successfully carrying some of the hills, General Clery reported that he had now reached a point which it would be necessary to take by frontal attack, which he did not think would be desirable.

To this I replied—

“ I quite concur that a frontal attack is undesirable, and that a flank attack is more suitable. I intended to convey that we should hold what we get by means of entrenchments when necessary, and not retire, continuing the advance to-morrow if it cannot be done to-night; frontal attack, with heavy losses, is simply playing the Boer game.”

C. WARREN.

II

From the General Officer Commanding, Natal, to the Secretary of State for War.
(By the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chiefs Cape Town.)
Spearman’s Hill,
30th January, 1900.

Sir,

In forwarding Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren s report on the capture and evacuation of Spion Kop, I have the honour to offer the following observations. The figures in my report refer to those in margin :—

1. Sir C. Warren, is hardly correct in saying that he was only allowed 3 1/2 days’ provisions. I had told him that transport for 3 1/2 days would be sufficient burden to him, but that I would keep him filled up as he wanted it. That he was aware of this is shown by the following telegram which he sent on the day in question. It is the only report I had from Sir C. Warren :—

(Sent 7.54 p.m. Received 8.15 p.m.)

“To Chief of the Staff,
“Left Flank, 19th January.
“ I find there are only two roads by which we could possibly get from Trichard’s Drift to Potgieter’s, on the north of the Tugela—one by Acton Homes, the other by Fair View and Rosalie ; the first I reject as too long, the second is a very difficult road for a large number of wagons, unless the enemy is thoroughly cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some special arrangements which will involve my stay at Venter's Laager for 2 or 3 days. I will send in for further supplies and report progress.—C. Warren.”

The reply to this was that 3 days’ supply was being sent.

2. I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd. I pointed out to him that I had no further report and no intimation of the special arrangements foreshadowed by this telegram of the 19th ; that for four days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill ; that the position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a panic or a sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his left. He said that he had the night before ordered General Coke to assault Spion Kop, but the latter had objected to undertaking a night attack on a position, the road to which he had not reconnoitred, and added that he intended to assault Spion Kop that night.

3. I suggested that as General Coke was still lame from the effects of a lately broken leg, General Woodgate, who had two sound legs, was better adapted for mountain climbing.

4. As no heliograph could, on account of the fire, be kept on the east side of Spion Kop, messages for Sir C. Warren were received by our signallers at Spearman, and telegraphed to Sir C. Warren; thus I saw them before he did, as I was at the signal station. The telegrams Sir C. Warren quotes did not give me confidence in its sender, and, at the moment, I could see that our men on the top had given way, and that efforts were being made to rally them. I telegraphed to Sir C. Warren : “ Unless you put some really good hard fighting man in command on the top you will lose the hill. I suggest Thorneycroft.”

5. This is a mistake. See A in Sir C. Warren s report. Colonel aCourt was sent down by General Woodgate almost as soon as he gained the summit.

6. I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in hand, entrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place brought under regular military command, and careful arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the scattered fighting line, the hills would have been held, I am sure.

7. But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have been ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one succeeded him ; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that guns were coming up, and generally there was a want of organization and system that acted most unfavourably on the defence.

It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the greatest gallantry throughout the day, and really saved the situation. Preparations for the second day’s defence should have been organized during the day, and have been commenced at nightfall.

As this was not done, I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion.

Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, but the enemy admitted to our doctors that theirs were equally severe, and though we were not successful in retaining the position, the losses inflicted on the enemy and the attack generally have had a marked effect upon them.

I cannot close these remarks without bearing testimony to the gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops, the endurance shown by the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex Regiment, and Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry was admirable, while the efforts of the 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles and 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifles were equally good, and the Royal Lancasters fought gallantly.

I am writing to catch the mail, and have not any particulars yet to enable me to report more fully on details.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
REDVERS BULLER.

If anyone is interested...…





Mike

Report by Lieut.-General Sir Charles Warren. K.C.B., upon the Capture and subsequent Evacuation of Spion Kop.

1. Sir Charles Warren’s report to Comrnander-in-Chief.
2. General Woodgate to Sir Charles Warren.
3. Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft’s reports during the fight.
4. Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycrofi’s report after evacuation.
5. General Coke’s report to Sir Charles Warren.
6. Commanding Royal Engineer’s report.
7. Reports from Officers on supplies,

1. Capture and Evacuation of Spion Kop.

Chief of the Staff,

I make the operations against Spion Kop in a separate report, because they did not enter into my original plans.

Under the original instructions of the General Officer Commanding-in- Chief of 15th January, 1900, I was to act as circumstances required, but according to instructions, was generally to continue throughout refusing my right, and throwing my left forward until I gained the open plain north of Spion Kop.

Upon the 19th of January, on arrival at Venter’s Laager, I assembled all the General Officers, Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers of Divisions, and Staff Officers together. I pointed out to them that, with the three and a half (3|-) days’ provisions allowed, it was impossible to advance by the left road through Acton Homes. In this they unanimously concurred. I showed them that the only possible road was that going over Fair View through Rosalie, but I expressed my conviction that this could not be done unless we sent the whole of our transport back across the Tugela, and attempted to march through with our rations in our haversacks—without impedimenta.

The hills were cleared on the following day, and very strong entrenchments found behind them. The Commander-in-Chief was present on the 21st and 22nd January, and I pointed out the difficulties of marching along the road, accompanied by wagons, without first taking Spion Kop.

Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke to occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation might be deferred lor a day in order that he might make a reconnaissance with the Officers Commanding battalions to be sent there.

On 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and told me that there were two courses open—(1) to attack, or (2) to retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the previous day.

The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed Lieut.-Colonel aCourt to accompany him as Staff Officer.

The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion of Thorneycroft’s Horse, and half company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the Imperial Light Infantry, the latter having just arrived by Trichardt’s Drift.

The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful. General Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th, reported that he had entrenched a position and hoped he was secure, but that the fog was too thick to permit him to see. The position was rushed without casualties, other than three men wounded.
Lieut.-Colonel aCourt came down in the morning and stated that everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started on his return to head-quarters when a heliogram arrived from Colonel Crofton (Royal Lancaster). The message was : “ Reinforce at once, or all lost. General dead.”

He also sent a similar message to head-quarters. I immediately ordered General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take command of the troops.
He started at once, and was accompanied by the Middlesex and Dorsetshire Regiments.

I replied to Colonel Crofton : “ I am sending two battalions, and the Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must hold on to the last. No surrender.”

This occurred about 10 a m.

Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, ordering me to appoint Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to the command of the summit. I accordingly had heliographed : “With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I place Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of the summit, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.”

For some hours after this message I could get no information from the summit. It appears that the signallers and their apparatus were destroyed by the heavy fire.
I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state h:s view of the situation. At 1.20 p.m. I heliographed to ascertain whether Colonel Thorneycroft Lad assumed command, and at the same time asked General Coke to give me his views on the situation on Spion Kop. Still getting no reply, I asked whether General Coke was there, and subsequently received his view of the situation (copy attached). He stated that, unless the artillery could silence the enemy’s guns, the men on the summit could not stand another complete day’s shelling, and that the situation was extremely critical.

At 6.30 p.m. I asked it he could keep two battalions on the summit, removing the remainder out of reach of shells; also whether two battalions wrould suffice to hold the summitt. This was in accordance with a telegram on the subject sent me by the Commander-in-Chief. Later in the evening I made arrangements to send two (Naval) 12-prs. and the Mountain Battery Royal Artillery to the summit, together with half company Royal Engineers (and working parties, two reliefs of 600 men each), to strengthen the entrenchments and provide shell covers for the men. I may here mention that the 17th Company Royal Engineers proceeded at the same time as General Wood- gate’s force, and were employed until daylight upon the entrenchments, then upon road making and water supply.

Sandbags were sent up early on the 24th instant.

While Colonel Sim was, with this party, ascending the hill, he met Colonel Thorneycroft descending, having evacuated the position. For the remainder of the account of the proceedings I attach the reports made to me by Colonel Thorneycroft and by General Coke, together with reports on the supply of food and water rendered by Officers thus engaged. The supply ot ammunition was ample.

I wish to bring to notice that I heard from all but one expression of the admirable conduct and bravery shown by Officers and men suffering under a withering artillery fire on the summit of the slopes, and also of those who, with so much endurance, persisted in carrying up water and food and ammunition to the troops during this day.

During the day a Staff Officer of the Head-quarter Staff was present on the summit, and reported direct to the Commander-in-Chief.

At sunset 1 considered that the position could be held next day, provided that guns could be mounted and effective shelter provided. Both of these conditions were about to be fulfilled, as already mentioned.

In the absence of General Coke, whom I ordered to come to report in person as to the situation, the evacuation took place under orders, given upon his own responsibility, by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. This occurred in the face of the vigorous protests of General Coke’s Brigade-Major, the Officer Commanding the Middlesex Regiment, and others.

It is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether there should be an investigation into the question of the unauthorized evacuation of Spion Kop.

CHARLES WARREN, Lieut.-General

(2)
Copy of a letter from General Woodgate to Sir C. Warren.

Spion Kop,
24th January, 1900.

Dear Sir Charles,

We got up about 4 o’clock, and rushed the position with three men wounded.

There were some few Boers, who seemed surprised, and bolted after firing a round or so, having one man killed. I believe there is another somewhere, but have not found him in the mist.

The latter did us well, and I pushed on a bit quicker than I perhaps should otherwise have done, lest it should lift before we get here. We have entrenched a position, and are, I hope, secure; but fog is too thick to see, so I retain Thorneycroft’s men and Royal Engineers for a bit longer. Thorneycroft’s men attacked in fine style.
I had a noise made later to let you know that we had got in.

Yours, &c.,
E. WOODGATE.