TOPIC:

D

From General Sir Redvers Buller to Lieut. General Sir Charles Warren.

Mount Alice,
15th January, 1900.

1.    The enemy’s position in front of Potgieter's Drift seems to me to be too strong to be taken by direct attack.

2.    I intend to try and turn it. by sending a force across the Tugela from near Trichard’s Drilt and up to the west of Spion Kop.

3.    You will have command of that force which will consist of the 11th Brigade of your Division, your Brigade Division, Royal Field Artillery, and General Clery’s Division complete, and all the mounted troops, except 400.

4.    You will of course act as circumstances require, but my idea is that you should continue throughout refusing your right and throwing your left forward till you gain the open plain north of Spion Kop. Once there you will command the rear of the position facing Potgieter’s Drift, and I think render it untenable.

5.    At Potgieter’s there will be the 4th Brigade, part of the 10th Brigade, one battery Royal Field Artillery, one howitzer battery, two 4’7-inch Naval guns. With them I shall threaten both the positions in front of us, and also attempt a crossing at Skiet’s Drift, so as to hold the enemy off you as much as possible.

6. It is very difficult to ascertain the numbers of the enemy with any sort of exactness. I do not think there can be more than 400 on your left, and I estimate the total force that will be opposed to us at about 7,000. I think they have only one or at most two big guns.

7.    You will take 2 1/2 days’ supply in your regimental transport, and a supply column holding one day more. This will give you four days’ supply, which should be enough. Every extra wagon is a great impediment.

8.    I gathered that you did not want an ammunition column. I think myself that I should be inclined to take one column for the two Brigade Divisions. You may find a position on which it is expedient to expend a great deal of ammunition.

9.    You will issue such orders to the Pontoon Troop as you think expedient. If possible, I should like it to come here after you have crossed. I do not think you will find it possible to let oxen draw the wagons over the pontoons. It will be better to draw them over by horses or mules, swimming the oxen ; the risk of breaking the pontoons, if oxen cross them, is too great.

10.    The man whom I am sending you as a guide is a Devonshire man; he was employed as a boy on one of my own farms ; he is English to the backbone, and can be thoroughly trusted. He thinks that if you cross Springfield flat at night he can take you the rest of the way to the Tugela by a road that cannot be overlooked by the enemy, but you will doubtless have the road reconnoitred.

11.    I shall endeavour to keep up heliographic communication with you from a post on the hill directly in your rear.

12.    I wish you to start as soon as you can. Supply is all in, and General Clery’s Division will, I hope, concentrate at Springfield to-day. Directly you start I shall commence to cross the river.

13.    Please send me the 10th Brigade, except that portion which you detail for the garrison at Springfield, as soon as possible ; also the eight 12-pr Naval guns, and any details, such as ammunition column, &c., that you do not wish to take.

REDVERS BULLER, General,

From Lieut-General Sir Charles Warren to the Chief of the Staff.
Hatting’s Farm, 29th January, 1900,

Sir,

I have the honour to make the following report on the operations on the north side of the Tugela, west of Spion Kop, from the 17th to the 27th of January, 1900:-

1.    On the 8th January field orders were published constituting the 10th Brigade of the 5th Division a Corps Brigade, and placing the 4th Brigade in the 5th Division. The 5th Division thus constituted marched from Frere on the 10th instant, arriving at Springfield on the 12th instant.

2.    On the 15th January I received your secret instructions to command a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt’s Drift, to the west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed forward refusing my right (namely, Spion Kop), and bringing my left forward to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop. This move was to commence as soon as supplies were all in, and the 10th Brigade (except two companies) removed from Springfield Bridge to Spearman’s Hill.

3.    I was provided with 4 days’ rations, with which I was to cross the Tugela, fight my way round to north of Spion Kop, and join your column opposite Potgieter’s.

4.    On the 15th January I made the arrangements for getting supplies, and moved the 10th Brigade on the following day ; and on the evening of the 16th January I left Springfield with a force under my command, which amounted to an Army Corps (less one brigade), and by a night march arrived at Trichardt’s Drift, and took possession of the hills on the south side of the Tugela.

5.    On the 17th January I threw pontoon bridges across the Tugela, passed the Infantry across by ponts, and captured the hills immediately commanding the drift on the north side with two brigades commanded by Generals Woodgate and Hart, The Commander-In-Chief was present during part of the day, and gave some verbal directions to General Woodgate.

The Mounted Brigade passed over principally by the drift, and went over the country as far as Acton Homes, and on the following day (18th) had a successful action with a small party of Boers, bringing in 31 prisoners.

During the night of the 17th, and day of the 18th, the whole of the wagons belonging to the force were brought across the Tugela, and the artillery were in position outside of Wright’s Farm.

6.    On the 19th two brigades advanced, occupying the slopes of the adjoining hills on the right, and the wagons were successfully brought to Venter’s Spruit.

In the evening, after having examined the possible roads by which we could proceed, I assembled the General Officers and the Staff, and the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, and Commanding Royal Engineer, and pointed out to them that of the two roads by which we could advance the eastern one, by Acton Homes, must be rejected, because time would not allow of it, and with this all concurred, I then pointed out that the only possible way of all getting through by the road north of Fair View would be by taking 3 or 4 days’ food in our haversacks, and sending all our wagons back across the Tugela ; but before we could do this we must capture the position in front of us.

7.    On the following day, 20th January, I placed two brigades and six batteries of Artillery at the disposal of General Sir C. F, Clery, with instructions to attack the Boer positions by a series of outflanking movements (copy of instructions herewith¹), and by the end of the day, after fighting for 12 hours, we were in possession of the whole part of hills, but found a strongly entrenched line on the comparatively flat country beyond us.

8.    On the 21st the Boers displayed considerable activity on our left, and the Commander-in-Chief desired me to move two batteries from right to left. At a subsequent date, during the day, I found it impossible to proceed without howitzers, and telegraphed for four from Potgieters. These arrived early on the morning of the 22nd, and the Commander-in-Chief, arriving about the same time, directed me to place two of these howitzers on the left, two having already been placed on the right flank. I pointed out to the Commander-in- Chief that it would be impossible to get wagons through by the road leading past Fair View, unless we first took Spion Kop, which lies within about 2,000 yards of the road. The Commander-in-Chief agreed that Spion Kop would have to be taken. Accordingly that evening orders were drawn up giving the necessary instructions to General Talbot Coke to take Spion Kop that night, but, owing to an absence of insufficient reconnaissance, he requested that the attack might be put off for a day.²

9.    On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, the attack on Spion Kop was decided upon, and Lieut.-Colonel aCourt, of the Head-quarter Staff, was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to accompany General Woodgate, who was detailed to command the attacking column. The account of the capture of Spion Kop is given in another report.

10.    On the morning of the 25th January the Commander-in-Chief arrived, decided to retire the force, and assumed direct command. The whole of the wagons of the 5th Division were got down to the drift during the day, and were crossed over before 2 p.m. on the 26th January.

11.    The arrangements for the retirement of the 5th Division were exceedingly well got out, and the retirement was made in good order during the night of the 26th, the whole of the troops crossing to the south side of the Tugela before daylight, and the wagons wrere packed, and the troops bivouacked near the spruit about 2 miles to the east of the pontoon bridges. About 10 p.m., previous to the retirement, heavy musketry was heard to the north of our position, which has been attributed to a Boer commando thinking we were going to make a night attack.

12.    I append reports from Lieut.-General Sir C. F. Clery, K.C.B., on the operations conducted by him on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd, also from Major- General Hildyard, C.B., for his operations on those dates.

12 [sic]. I propose to forward as soon as possible a more detailed report of the movements of brigades and units, and acts of individuals.

C. WARREN, Lieut.-General,
Commanding 5th Division.

1.  See Appendix G

2. 

Hatting's Farm
30th January 1900

The Chief of Staff,

With reference to my report on the operations on the Tugela, already forwarded, will you please attach the accompanying addition.

C. WARREN, Lieut.-General,
Commanding 5th Division.

Hatting’s Farm,
30th January, 1900.

I omitted to state that during the afternoon of the 22nd the Commander-in-Chief proposed an attack upon the enemy’s position on our left flank that night. I summoned at once the General Officers available, namely, Generals Clery, Talbot, Coke, and Hildyard. General Clery, who was in command of the left attack, did not consider it advisable to make this attack, because, if successful, it would commit us to taking the whole line of the enemy’s position, which he considered a hazardous proceeding, as we might not be able to hold it. In this I concurred, more particularly as it was evidently too late in the day to carry the operation out effectively.

C, WARREN, Lieut.-General,
Commanding 5th Division.

I continually proposed to General Warren that he should attack the enemy’s right which was en l'air and not strong, and which it was part of the original programme to try and turn, but I never suggested doing this hurriedly or without adequate forethought and preparation,—R B

(not previously published)

Spearman’s Camp,
30th January, 1900.

Secretary of State,   

In forwarding this report, I am constrained to make the following remarks, not necessarily for publication :—

I had fully discussed my orders with General Warren before he started, and he appeared entirely to agree that, the policy indicated of refusing the right and advancing the left was the right one. He never though attempted to carry it out. From the first there could be no question but that the only practicable road for his column was the one by Fair View. The problem was to get rid of the enemy who were holding it.

The arrival of the force at Trichard’s was a surprise to the enemy, who were not in strength. Sir C. Warren, instead of feeling for the enemy, elected to spend two whole days in passing his baggage. During this time, the enemy received reinforcements and strengthened his position. On the 19th he attacked and gained a considerable advantage. On the 20th, instead of pursuing it, he divided his force, and gave General Clery a separate command.

On the 21st I find that his right was in advance of his left, and that the whole of his batteries, six, were crowded on one small position on his right, while his left was unprotected by Artillery, and I had come out to tell him that the enemy on that flank had received a reinforcement of at least 2,500. I suggested a better distribution of his batteries, which he agreed to, to some extent, but he would not advance his left, and I found that he had divided his fighting line into three independent commands, independent of each other, and apparently independent of him, as he told me he could not move any batteries without General Clery’s consent.

The days went on. I saw no attempt on the part of General Warren either to grapple with the situation or to command his force himself. By the 23rd i calculated that the enemy, who were about 600 stong on the 16th, were not less than 15,000, and General White confirmed this estimate. We had really lost our chance by Sir C. Warren’s slowness. He seems to me a man who can do well what he can do himself, but who cannot command, as he can use neither his staff nor subordinates. I can never employ him again on an independent command.

On the 19th I ought to have assumed command myself; I saw that things were not going well—indeed, everyone saw that. I blame myself now for not having done so. I did not, because I thought that if I did I should discredit General Warren in the estimation of the troops; and that if I were shot, and he had to withdraw across the Tugela, and they had lost confidence in him, the consequences might be very serious.

I must leave it to higher authority whether this argument was a sound one. Anyhow, I feel convinced that we had a good chance on the 17th, and that we lost it.

REDVERS BULLER, General

(2)
(Not previously published)

From Lieut.-General Sir Francis Clery to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Sir Charles Warren’s Force.

Fair View Farm,
20th January, 1900.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward the following report, called for this morning, on the operations conducted by me on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd instant:—

In compliance with your instructions (copy annexed),¹ I moved at 3 a.m., 20th January, with a force of four batteries Royal Field Artillery, 5th Brigade, and 11th Brigade, to occupy the heights to the west and northwest of Spion Kop, The eastern spur of those heights I occupied with two battalions of the 11th Brigade, and the spur immediately to the west of the latter I occupied with the two remaining battalions of the 11th Brigade. I explained in my report on the evening of the 20th that, on occupying these heights, 1 found myself in front of a semi-circular range of heights completely overlooking the heights I had arrived on. The left of this high ridge almost rested on the Spion, the right extended to the spur overlooking Fair-View Farm. The road which we should have to use for wagons in our advance passes on the left end of this position, but the enemy’s position here was very strong, with a glacis reaching down to the heights we were occupying. The ground on the other flank (left) seemed to afford a good deal more cover for advance, and I hoped if I succeeded in occupying that flank of the ridge, to swing round to the right, and take the remainder of the enemy’s position in flank. I accordingly moved up the artillery to the eastern spur, and moved up the 5th Brigade to reinforce the two battalions of the 11th Brigade already on the western spur. I placed the whole of this latter force under Major-General Hart, and directed him to move forward against the left flank of the enemy’s position. This was done, and a series of kopjes was occupied in succession, which brought the force that evening, within reach of storming the enemy’s position.

The enemy evacuated the position that night, and it was occupied by General Hart’s force the following morning. The previous evening two battalions had been detached from the 2nd Brigade to assist the troops on the heights, and I directed them to co-operate with General Hart by attacking the enemy’s right flank.
When the enemy’s position of the previous day had been occupied by our troops, I found that the enemy had fallen back to a second strong position in rear. The advance to this position was over open ground, and entailed a frontal attack. As this was a thing if possible to be avoided, I reported the situation to the General Officer Commanding, and suggested that some action should be taken against the enemy’s right flank.

Two batteries were .ordered by the General Officer Commanding to move from the hill on the right to ground on the left, where they came into action against the enemy’s right flank. A tire was kept up with the enemy all day. but it was not considered advisable to make a frontal attack on his position.

On the morning of the 22nd, four howitzers arrived. Two were brought into action on the height close to the batteries already in action there; the remaining two came into action on the left. They both reached the enemy’s position. Fire was kept up by both sides till about sundown. Both sides retained, generally, the same positions at the end of the day.

FRANCIS CLERY, Lieut.-General.

1 See Addendum G.

(3)
(Not previously published)

Report from Major-General H. Hildyard on the 2nd Brigade Operations on 20th, 21st, and 22nd January, 1900.

Bivouac,
Flat-topped Hill, near Fair View Farm,
23rd January, 1900.

20th January.—During the morning of the 20tb, the 2nd Brigade remained in bivouac at Venter’s Spruit Drift, no orders having been received for its movement. About 1 p.m. there was heavy musketry fire in a north-westerly direction, where the mounted troops were engaged on the left of Sugar Loaf Hill at 4 p.m. The 2nd Bn. Queen’s was moved forward in that direction about 1 \ miles, so as to be in a position to support the mounted troops and protect the left flank of the force.

At 2.50 p.m. some men of the mounted troops seized the top of Conical Hill. This was reported to the Assistant Adjutant-General, 5th Division, and at 3.30 p.m. one company of the East Surrey was sent forward to support them.

At 4 p.m. three companies of the Queen’s were also sent forward, and at 6 p.m. the remaining five companies of the Queen’s. At 5.50 p.m. the 2ud Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment were sent up to the hill east of Conical Hill, in case General Hart, whose brigade was occupying the ground there, required support, with orders to report to him. Both the Queen’s and 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiments were in contact with the enemy during the night. The 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment protected the north-west of the camp with outposts day and night. The 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment placed outposts towards the east of Venter’s Spruit Camp. There were no casualties.

21st January.—At 4.10 a.m. the 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment were ordered to send up four companies to report to Colonel Kitchener in order to secure his left. Two companies of the 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment were sent at 2 a.m. to Trichard’s Drift on escort duty. By the personal order of the General Officer Commanding Field Force, General Hildyard was placed in command of the mounted troops, and was made responsible for the safety of the camp. In consequence of this the Officer Commanding mounted troops was directed to provide for the safety of the camp to the right bank of Venter’s Spruit. The kopje on the left bank was held by the remaining three companies of the 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment. The 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment was ordered up to the Flat-topped Hill, about 1,000 yards southwest of Conical Hill.

At 8 a.m. the remaining three companies of the East Surrey Regiment were ordered up to support the half battalion which was at this time on the western slope of Conical Hill.

At 7.50 a.m. a report was sent to the Chief Staff Officer Field Force, on the dispositions of the 2nd Queen’s on the night of the 20th, and the orders given to the Commanding Officer. It was at the same time suggested that some guns should be sent to the left flank of the general position. Between 11 a.m. and noon, two batteries Royal Field Artillery, under Lieut.-Colonel Montgomery, arrived, and were placed under my orders. A position was selected for them with their left on Venter’s Spruit, and they opened fire about 12.10 p.m. against the right of the enemy’s position. Their fire had the effect of keeping down the enemy’s long-range rifle fire on our left. At nightfall the 2nd Bn. Queen’s and 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment were withdrawn from the firing line into camp and replaced by the 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers, which had been ordered down to support the guns, and placed under my orders by the General Officer Commanding Field Force. About 7 p.m. the firing ceased all along the line.

In accordance with an order from the General Officer Commanding 2nd Division, communicated by Major-General Hart to him, Colonel Kitchener 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment, took command of the force on Sugar Loaf Hill, and against the enemy’s right flank. In this operation the 2nd Bn. Queen’s, 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire, and 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment were engaged. His plan was to work round the western slope of Sugar Loaf Hill with the four companies of the 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment, which had been sent up there at 4.30 a.m., covering their advance by the fire of the 2nd Bn. Queen’s from the neck east of the hill, and to attack the enemy’s right. Simultaneously, two companies 2nd Bn. Queen’s were to advance along the plateau, covered by the fire of the 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment. Two companies of the 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment were to push forward on the left of that portion of the enemy’s position attacked by the 2nd Bn. Queen’s.

The four companies 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment were unable to make headway in face of the fire brought against them from the enemy’s position. They were, consequently, halted on the west face of the Sugar Loaf Hill in a fire position, where they remained. The two companies 2nd Bn. Queen’s had, in the meantime, advanced, at 10.30 a.m., and immediately encountered a heavy fire. As soon as it was reported that the flank attack by the 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment had been stopped they were withdrawn. This advance and subsequent retirement occupied about 4 an hour. The two companies 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment had also advanced when the movement of the 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment was brought to a stand, and Colonel Kitchener then ordered the advanced to be discontinued. One company 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment, which had reached the donga referred to above, remained there till the evening, so as to avoid loss in retiring.

The casualties during the day were as follows :—



22nd January.—The 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment and 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment held the positions occupied on the 21st. The two batteries occupied the same positions as they did on the 21st. At 10.30 a.m. two howitzers arrived to reinforce the batteries, and were placed under my orders.

The batteries and howitzers kept up a steady fire all day, which was replied to by the Boer gun from the Acton Homes position. Towards evening the Boer guns opened a shrapnel fire on our Infantry line. About 8 p.m. all firing had ceased, and the batteries and howitzers were withdrawn to Venter’s Spruit Camp.
The 2nd Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers were directed in Field Force Orders to rejoin the 11th Brigade. Three companies, which had acted during the day as escort to the guns, were relieved by the 2nd Bn. Queen’s, and they bivouacked by Flat-topped Hill. It was too late for the Head-quarters and five companies Lancashire Fusiliers to be called in from the front and rejoin.

H. HILDYARD, Major-General,
Commanding 2nd Brigade.

F
(Not previously published)

Casualties



There are said to have been 243 buried on Spion Kop, so no doubt many of those shown missing were killed.