TOPIC:

SOUTH AFRICA

THE SPION KOP DESPATCHES

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From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War.

Army Head-quarters, South Africa,
Camp, Dekiel Drift, Riet River,

13th February, 1900.

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit, for your Lordship’s information, despatches from General Sir Redvers Buller, describing the advance across the Tugela River on the 17th and 18th January, 1900, and the capture and evacuation of the Spion Kop position on the 23rd and 24th January, as well as certain minor operations between the 19th and 24th January on the right or eastern line of advance.

2. The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the accompanying documents themselves that the original intention was to cross the Tugela at or near Trichard’s Drift, and thence by following the road past “ Fair View ” and " Acton Homes,” to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop, the Boer position in front of Potgieter’s Drift being too strong to be taken by direct attack. The whole force, less one brigade, was placed under the orders of Sir Charles Warren, who, the day after he had crossed the Tugela, seems to have consulted his General and principal Staff Officers, and to have come to the conclusion that the flanking movement which Sir Redvers Buller had mentioned in his secret instructions was impracticable on account of the insufficiency of supplies. He accordingly decided to advance by the more direct road leading north-east, and branching off from a point east of “ Three Tree Hill.” The selection of this road necessitated the capture and retention of Spion Kop, but whether it would have been equally necessary to occupy Spion Kop, had the line of advance indicated by Sir Redvers Buller been followed, is not stated in the correspondence. As Sir Charles Warren considered it impossible to make the wide flanking movement which was recommended, if not actually prescribed, in his secret instructions, he should at once have acquainted Sir Redvers Buller with the course of action which he proposed to adopt. There is nothing to show whether he did so or not, but it seems only fair to Sir Charles Warren to point out that Sir Redvers Buller appears throughout to have been aware of what was happening. On several occasions he was present during the operations. He repeatedly gave advice to his subordinate Commander, and on the day after the withdrawal from Spion Kop he resumed the chief command.

3. In his note on Sir Charles Warren’s report, accompanying despatch of 30th January, 1900, Sir Redvers Buller expresses a very adverse opinion on the manner in which Sir Charles Warren carried out the instructions he had received. Without a knowledge of the country and circumstances it is difficult to say whether the delay, misdirection, and want of control, of which Sir Redvers Buller complains, were altogether avoidable; but, in any case, if he considered that his orders were not being properly given effect to, it appears to me that it was his duty to intervene as soon as he had reason to believe that the success of the operations was being endangered. This, indeed, is admitted by Sir Redvers Buller himself, whose explanation of his noninterference can hardly be accepted as adequate. A most important enterprise was being attempted, and no personal considerations should have deterred the Officer in chief command from insisting on its being conducted in the manner to which, in his opinion, would lead to the attainment of the object in view, with the least possible loss on our side. 

4. As regards the withdrawal of the troops from the Spion Kop position, which, though occupied almost without opposition in the early morning of the 24th January, had to be held throughout the day under an extremely heavy fire, and the retention of which had become essential to the relief of Ladysmith, I regret that I am unable to concur with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion in ordering the troops to retire. Even admitting that due preparations may not have been made for strengthening the position during the night, reorganizing the defence, and bringing up artillery—in regard to which Sir Charles Warrens report does not altogether bear our Sir Redvers Buller s contention— admitting also that the senior Officers on the summit of the hill might have been more promptly informed of the measures taken by Sir Charles Warren to support and reinforce them, I am of opinion that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft’s assumption of responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night the enemy's fire, if it did not cease altogether, could not have been formidable, and, though lamp signalling was not possible at the time, owing to the supply of oil having faded, it would not have taken more than two or three hours at most for Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to communicate by messenger with Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren, and to receive a reply. Major-General Coke appears to have left Spion Kop at 9.30 p.m. for the purpose of consulting with Sir Charles Warren, and up to that hour the idea of a withdrawal had not been entertained. Yet almost immediately after Major-General Coke's departure Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft issued an order, without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole plan of operations, and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which had already been made to carry it into effect.

On the other hand, it is only right to state that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very gallant manner throughout the day, and it was doubtless due, in a great measure, to his exertions and example that the troops continued to hold the summit of the hill until directed to retire.

5. The conduct of Captain Phillips, Brigade-Major of the 10th Brigade, on the occasion in question, is deserving of high commendation. He did his best to rectify the mistake which was being made, but it was too late. Signalling communication was not re-established until 2.30 a.m. on the 25th January, and by that time the Naval guns could not have reached the summit of the hill before daybreak. Major-General Coke did not return, and Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft: had gone away. Moreover, most of the troops had begun to leave the hill, and the working parties, with the half company of Royal Engineers, had also withdrawn.

6. It is to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren did not himself visit Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening, knowing as he did that the state of affairs there was very critical, and that the loss of the position would involve the failure of the operations. He was, consequently, obliged to summon Major-General Coke to his head-quarters in the evening in order that he might ascertain how matters were going on, and the command on Spion Kop thus devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft; but Major-General Coke was not aware of this. About mid-day, under instructions from Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Warren had directed Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to assume command on the summit of the hill, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, but this order was not communicated to Major-General Coke, who, until he left the position at 9.30 p.m., was under the impression that the command had devolved on Colonel Hill, as senior Officer, after Colonel Crofton had been wounded. Omissions or mistakes of this nature may be trivial in themselves, yet may exercise an important influence on the course of events; and I think that Sir Redvers Buller is justified in remarking that “ there was a want of organization and system which acted most unfavourably on the defence.''

7. The attempt to relieve Ladysmith, described in these despatches, was well devised, and I agree with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that it ought to have succeeded. That it failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy—probably also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the Officer in supreme command to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a subordinate Officer.

8. The gratifying feature in these despatches is the admirable behaviour of the troops throughout the operations.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant,
ROBERTS,
Field-Marshal,
Cummanding-in-Chief. South Africa.

From General Sir Redvers Buller to the Secretary of State for War.

(Through Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief, Cape Town.)

Spearman's Hill,

30th January, 1900.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that General Sir Charles Warren’s Division having arrived at Estcourt, less two battalions, 10th Brigade, which were left at the Cape, by the 7th January, it moved to Frere on the 9th.

I attach a copy of Natal Army Orders of the 8th January (A), giving full I particulars of the intended move and organization ( of the force.

The column moved as ordered, but torrents of rain fell on the 9th, which filled all the spruits, and, indeed, rendered many of them impassable for many hours. To forward supply alone took 650 ox wagons, and as in the 16 miles from Frere to Springfield there were three places at which all the wagons had to be double spanned, and some required three spans, some idea may be formed of the difficulties, but these were all successfully overcome by the willing labours of the troops. I attach a statement (C) of the supply trains. The 4th Brigade reached Springfield on the 12th, in support of the mounted troops who had surprised and seized the important position of Spearman's Hill, commanding Potgieter’s Drift, on the 11th.

By the 13th all troops were at Springfield and Spearman’s Hill, and supply was well forward.

On the 16th, a reserve of 17 days’ supply having been collected, General Sir C. Warren, in command of the 2nd Division, the 11th Brigade of the 5th Division, the Brigade Division Royal Field Artillery, 5th Division, and certain corps troops, including the Mounted Brigade, moved from Springfield to Trichard’s Drift, which is about six miles west of Potgieter’s.

I attach a copy (D) of the orders under which Sir C. Warren acted, and I enclose his report of his operations (E).

On the night of the 23rd, General Warren attacked Spion Kop, which operation he has made the subject of a special report. On the morning of the 25th, finding that Spion Kop had been abandoned in the night, I decided to withdraw General Warren’s force ; the troops had been continuously engaged for a week, in circumstances entailing considerable hardships, there had been very heavy losses on Spion Kop. General Warren’s dispositions had mixed up all the brigades, and the positions he held were dangerously insecure. I consequently assumed the command, commenced the withdrawal of the ox and heavy mule transport on the 25th ; this was completed by midday the 26th ; by double spanning the loaded ox wagons got over the drift at the rate of about eight per hour. The mule wagons went over the pontoon bridge, but all the mules had to be taken out and the vehicles passed over by hand. For about 7 hours of the night the drift could not be used as it was dangerous in the dark, but the use of the pontoon went on day and night. In addition to machine guns, six batteries of Royal Field Artillery, and four howitzers, the following vehicles were passed :—Ox wagons, 232 ; 10-span mule wagons, 98 ; 6-span, 107 ; 4-span, 52 ; total, 489 vehicles. In addition to these, the ambulances were working backwards and forwards evacuating the sick and wounded.

By 2 p.m., the 26th, all the ox wagons were over, and by 11.30 p.m. all the mule transports were across and the bridge clear for the troops. By 4 a.m., the 27th, all the troops were over, and by 8 a.m. the pontoons were gone and all was clear. The troops had all reached their new camps by 10 a.m. The marches averaged for the mounted troops about 7 miles, and for the Infantry and Artillery an average of 5 miles.

Everything worked without a hitch, and the arrangements reflected great credit on the Staff of all degrees ; but I must especially mention Major Irwin, R.E., and his men of the Pontoon Troop, who were untiring. When all men were over, the chesses of the pontoon bridge were so worn by the traffic, that I do not think they would have lasted another half hour.

Thus ended an expedition which I think ought to have succeeded. We {have suffered heavily (for casualty return, see F), very heavy losses, and lost many whom we can ill spare ; but, on the other hand, we have inflicted as great or greater losses upon the enemy than they have upon us, and they are, by all accounts, thoroughly disheartened ; while our troops are, I am glad and proud to say, in excellent fettle.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
REDVERS BULLER,
General Officer Commanding.

A

NATAL ARMY ORDERS

Frere Camp,
8th January, 1900.

1. A memorandum, giving the organization of the Field Army, is issued herewith.

2. The following moves will take place under the orders of Lieut.-General Sir C. F. Clery, K.C.B., on the night of the 9th and 10th January, 1900 :—
2nd Division and attached troops—

(a) Major-General Hildyard’s Column—
Mounted Brigade: 400 of all ranks (including one squadron 13th Hussars).
2nd Infantry Brigade.
Divisional Troops : a battery, Royal Field Artillery.
Corps Troops : two Naval 12-pr. guns.
To move from Chieveley by the south of Doom Kop to the camp already selected in the vicinity of Pretorious Farm. 

(b) Major-General Hart’s Column—
Mounted Brigade : 400 of all ranks.
5th Infantry Brigade.
73rd Battery, Boyal Field Artillery.
17th Field Company, Royal Engineers.
Corps Troops : six Naval 12-pr. guns.
To move from Frere by the Frere—Springfield road to the camp selected south of Pretorious Farm.

(c) Head-Quarters and Divisional Troops, 2nd Division—
Mounted Brigade: head-quarters and main body supply column (from Frere), Medical unit.
Divisional Troops: a battery, Royal Field Artillery, ammunition column, supply column (from Frere) field hospital (from Frere).
Corps Troops : two squadrons 13th Hussars, two guns 66th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, two Naval 4'7-inch guns, supply column (from Frere).
To move from Chieveley (except where otherwise mentioned) by the Frere—Springfield road to the camp selected south of Pretorious Farm, except that one squardron L3th Hussars for the 5th Division and two guns 66th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, will be left at Frere.

3. 5th Division and attached troops.

The following troops will move on the evening of the 10th January, 1900, from Frere to Springfield, under the orders of the Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren, K.C.M.C., K.C.B.

5th Division.
- 4th Infantry Brigade.
- 11th Infantry Brigade.
- Divisional Troops.

Corps Troops :—

10th Brigade—

Artillery—
- 61st Battery, Royal Field Artillery (howitzer).
- 78th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
- Ammunition Column.

Engineers—
- Pontoon Troop.
- Balloon Section.
- Section Telegraph Division.

Supply Park.
4. Ammunition.
(a) Ammunition will be taken as follows :—
15-pr.—
- With batteries 150 rounds per gun
- With ammunition column 150 rounds per gun
= Total 300 

5-inch howitzer—
- With batteries 88 rounds per gun
- With ammunition column 130 rounds per gun
= Total 218 rounds per gun

4'7-inch Naval gun—
- With gun 250 rounds per gun
- With ammunition column 100 rounds per gun
= Total 250 rounds per gun

12-pr. Naval gun—
- With gun 250 rounds per gun
- With ammunition column 50 rounds per gun
= Total 300 rounds per gun

Small-arm ammunition, according to war establishment.

(b) A small ammunition park will be held in readiness at Frere, with 1,260 rounds of 15-pr. ammunition, 300 rounds of 5-inch howitzer, and 125,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition.

The park will be organized under an Officer and 20 non-commissioned officers and men, Royal Artillery, to be detailed from the general dep6t by the General of Communications.

5. Medical arrangements.

(а) The Corps Troops will avail themselves of the nearest Divisional field hospital.
(б) No. 4 Stationary Hospital will accompany the force to receive such sick and wounded from field hospitals as may be directed by the Principal Medical Officer of the force.
(c) The Volunteer Ambulance Corps (European), divided into four companies, will be attached to Brigade field hospitals of the 2nd and 5th Divisions.
The Officer Commanding of the corps will accompany and take his instructions from the Principal Medical Officer.
(d) 100 men of the Ambulance Corps (native) will accompany No. 4 Stationary Hospital, the remainder will stay at Estcourt until further orders.

6. Supplies.

The arrangements for supplies will be in accordance with a memorandum which is issued herewith to General Officers Commanding Divisions and Corps Troops.

7. Transport equipment.

The following will be carried in regimental transport wagons ;—

Tents, one blanket for every two men, one waterproof sheet per man, 50 rounds of ammunition per Infantry soldier, 3 days’ rations less 1 day’s meat, 750 lbs. wood to make up 3 days’ supply, 3 days’ grain ration, officers’ baggage, and such regimental stores as may be considered necessary, not to exceed 3,000 lbs.

By order,
A. WYNNE, Colonel,
Chief of Staff.

Arrangements for Supplies

The supply columns will carry 4 days' and the supply park 4 days’. Springfield will be filled up with reserve rations and forage as follows :—

1st day.—Supply park to Pretorious Farm, off-loads, and returns to Frere. The force at Pretorious Farm will be rationed by regimental wagons drawing daily from Frere.
2nd day.—All supply columns to Springfield and off-load. Supply park to Pretorious Farm, off-loads, and returns to Frere.
3rd day.—All supply columns from Springfield to Pretorious load and return to Springfield. Supply park from Frere to Pretorious and remain loaded ready to march next clay.
4th day.—Supply columns from Springfield to Pretorious load and return to Springfield. The supply park from Pretorious to Springfield.

The troops at Springfield will draw on their regimental wagons, replenishing from the depot there. The force at Pretorious will join at Springfield with full regimental wagons.

By order,
A. WYNNE, Colonel
Chief of Staff

Frere Camp,
9th January, 1900.

1. The General proposes to effect the passage of the Biver Tugela, in the neighbourhood, of Potgieter’s Drift, with a view to the relief of Ladysmith,.
2. Forces (already detailed), will be left at Chieveley and Frere to hold these points, while the remainder of the Army is operating on the enemy’s rteht hank.
3. Springfield will be seized and occupied, and the march of the main body and supplies to that point will be covered by a force encamped about Pretorious Farm.
4. With reference to Field Orders, dated 8th instant, paragraph 2 (a), the primary duty of Major-General Hildyard’s column is to protect the march of the troops from Frere to Springfield during the formation of a supply depot at Springfield, but he will also operate so as to induce the enemy to believe that our intention is to cross the River Tugela at Porrit’s Drift.
5. As stated in paragraph 2 (b) and (c) of the Field Order above quoted, the remainder of Lieut.-General Clery’s force will encamp south of Pretorious Farm. Major-General Hart will, under General Clery’s orders, assist in every way the supply columns as they pass his camp, and he will also be prepared to support Major-General Hildyard, if necessary.
6. On the afternoon of the 10th instant, General Clery will send a sufficient force from the Mounted Brigade, with Artillery, to reconnoitre, and, if possible, occupy Springfield.
7. The force under General Warren’s command [(Field Order, dated 8th instant, paragraph 3) will reach Springfield on the morning of the 11th instant, in support of the mounted troops referred to in paragraph G of this order,
8. It is anticipated that the supplies intended to be put into Springfield will be completed on the 13th instant, when General Clery’s force will march to Springfield.
9. The Commanding Royal Engineer will arrange for a field telegraph between Frere and Springfield, with an office in General Clery’s camp, south of Pretorious Farm.
10. The General Officer Commanding 10th Brigade will provide a party of signallers under the Brigade Signalling Officer with Field Army Headquarters,
11. The General Commanding-in-Chief will proceed to Springfield on the 11th instant.

By order,
A. WYNNE, Colonel,
Chief of Staff

B.  Organization.

The following organization of the troops now at the front has been approved:

Mounted Brigade
Commanding—-Colonel Lord Dundonald.

1st Royal Dragoons.
Mounted Infantry—
- 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, company.
- 2nd Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers, section.
One squadron Natal Police.
One squadron Natal Carbiniers.
One squadron Imperial Light Horse.
Bethune’s Mounted Infantry.
Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry.
South African Light Horse,
Supply column (No, 6 Company, Army Service Corps).
Medical unit.

2nd Division
Commanding—Lieut.-General Sir C. F. Clery, K.C.B.

2nd Brigade—
Commanding—Major-General Hildyard, C.B.

2nd Bn. Royal West Surrey Regiment.
2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment.
2nd Bn._ West Yorkshire Regiment,
2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment.
Supply column (No. 16 Company, Army Service Corps).
Bearer Company (No. 2 Company, Royal Army Medical Corps).
Field hospital (depot companies, Royal Army Medical Corps).

5th Brigade—
Commanding—-Major-General A. F, Hart. C.B.

1st Bn, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
1st Bn, Border Regiment.
1st Bn, Connaught Rangers,
2nd Bn, Royar Dublin Fusiliers,
Supply column (No. 4 Company, Army Service Corps),
Bearer Company (No. 16 Company, Royal Army Medical Corps).
Field hospital (No. 10 Company, Royal Army Medical Corps).

Divisional troops—
Squadron 13th Hussars.
Brigade Division Staff, Royal Field Artillery.
7 th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
64th Battery, Royal Fie'd Artillery.
73rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
Ammunition column.
Regimental Staff and 17th Company, Royal Engineers.
Supply column (one auxiliary company, Army Service Corps).
Field hospital (five companies, Royal Army Medical Corps).

5th Division
Commanding—Lieut.-General Sir Charles Warren, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.

4th Brigade—
Commanding—Major-General Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, C.B.
2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles.
3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps.
1st Bn. Durham Light Infantry.
1st Bn. Rifle Brigade.
Supply column (No. 14 Company, Army Service Corps).
Bearer company (No. 14 Company, Royal Army Medical Corps).
Field hospital (No. 14 Company, Royal Army Medical Corps).

11th Brigade—
Commanding—Major-General Woodgate, C. B., C.M.G.
2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment.
2nd Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers.
1st Bn. South Lancashire Regiment.
1st Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment.
Supply column (No. 25 Company, Army Service Corps).
Bearer company (No. 6 Company, Royal Army Medical Corps).
Field hospital (depot companies, Royal Army Medical Corps).

Divisional Troops—
Squadron 13th Hussars.
Brigade Divisional Staff, Royal Field Artillery.
19th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
28th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
Ammunition column.
Regimental Staff and 37th Company, Royal Engineers.
Supply column (No. 27 Company, Army Service Corps).
Field hospital (No. 16 Company, Royal Army Medical Corps).

Corps Troops
Cavalry—
- Headquarters and squadron 13th Hussars.
Artillery—
- 61st Howitzer Battery, Loyal Field Artillery. 78th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
- Two Naval guns, 4'7-inch.
- Eight Naval guns, 12-pr.
- Ammunition column.
Engineers—
- Pontoon Troop, Royal Engineers.
- Balloon Section, Royal Engineers.
- Section Telegraph Division, Royal Engineers,

10th Brigade—
Commanding—Major-General J. T. Coke.
2nd Bn. Somersetshire Light Infantry.
2nd Bn. Dorsetshire Regiment.
2nd Bn. Middlesex Regiment.
Supply column (No. 32 company, Army Service Corps).
Bearer company (No. 10 Company, Royal Army Medical Corps).
Field hospital (No. 11 Company, Royal Army Medical Corps).

Army Service Corps—
Supply column (two auxiliary companies, Army Service Corps).
Supply park.

Garrison at Chieveley
Commanding—Major-General Barton, C.B.
200, all ranks, Mounted Brigade.
Four Naval guns, 12-pr.

6th Brigade—
2nd Bn. Royal Fusiliers.
2nd Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers (less half battalion).
1st Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
2nd Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Supply column (No. 24 Company, Army Service Corps).
Bearer company (No. 17 Company, Royal Army Medical Corps).
Field hospital (No. 11 Company, Royal Army Medical Corps).

Garrison at Frere
Commanding—Lieut.-Colonel Blagrove, 13th Hussars.
400, all ranks, Mounted Brigade (including Mounted Infantry companies, 4th and 5th Brigades).
Two guns, 66th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
Two Naval guns, 12-pr.
Half battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Detachment, King’s Royal Rifle Corps.
Detachment Rifle Brigade.

By order,
A. WYNNE, Colonel,
Chief of Staff.

C

Assistant Adjutant-General, 19th January,1900.

The transport used to convey the 16 days’ supply from Frere to Springfield Bridge was as follows :
Supply park - 164 wagons.
Supply column - 160 wagons,
Total 324


Each did two treks = 648 wagons and carried—
464,000 rations for men.
64,000 rations for horses.
56,000 rations for mules.
55,000 lbs of hay.

Note on the first trip.

Twenty supply park wagons were used to take on supplies to Cavalry Brigade at Spearman’s, and were replaced on second trip by a similar number of regimental transport wagons from 2nd Division. A further 17 regimental wagons brought as far as Pretorius Camp, from Frere, 11,700 lbs. hay, 28,000 rations of biscuit and groceries, and eight Frere local transport wagons brought out additional rum, lime-juice, disinfectants, bran, and hay; total weight, 44,000 lbs.

Summary

Frere to Springfield Bridge.

No. of wagons: 618a
Rations, men: 464,000
Rations, horses and mules: 120,000
Rations, hay, at 5 lb: 11,000
Weight in lb.: 3,575,000b

a Average weight, 5,517 lb. gross.
b Men’s ration calculated at 5 lb., including cases and 1/4 lb. wood per man carried in addition.
          
Frere to Pretorious.        

No. of wagons: 17c
Rations, men: 28,000d
Rations, horses and mules: (None)
Rations, hay, at 5 lb: 340
Weight in lb.: 99,700e

c Average weight, 5,865 lb.
d Less meat.
e Men’s rations, less meat, calculated at 3 1/2 lb.
                
Frere to Spearman's.

No. of wagons: 8 (Average weight, 5,500 lb.)

Rations: Lime juice, rum, disinfectants, bran, hay.  Weight in ib.: 44,000

No. of wagons: 673
Rations, men: 492,000
Rations, horses and mules: 120,000
Rations, hay, at 5 lb: 11,340
Weight in lb.: 3,718,700

The weight loaded on the wagons was adjusted in accordance with the distance to be covered.

H. G. MORGAN, Major,
Director of Stores.