TOPIC:

(5.)

From Officer Commanding Troops, Frere, to Chief of Staff

Frere,
24th January, 1900.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that, on the 23rd instant, I co-operated with Major-General Barton in a demonstration in front of Colenso, with troops from Frere, as per margin.*

Under instructions from General Barton, I reconnoitred with the mounted troops, vid Hussar Hill, towards Hlangwani Mountain.

Having cleared the ridges in front bv scouts of the South African Light Horse and Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, the guns came into action on Hussar Ridge, and shelled the trenches on Hlangwani and slopes to the south-east, supported by a half squadron 14th Hussars. At the same time the South African Light Horse, Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, and Mounted Infantry 4th and 5th Brigades, advanced and reconnoitred the enemy’s position. The latter came on in considerable force, and after closely reconnoitring the enemy’s position, the Colonial troops and Mounted Infantry were compelled to fall back, and I retired on Chieveley. The reconnaissance was completely successful in compelling the enemy to disclose their positions, and showed that Hlangwani Mountain is held in considerable strength. A small party of Bethune’s Mounted Infantry was for a time isolated in a kraal somewhat far advanced, and in covering their retirement, the following casualties occurred in the forced from Frere : —

Killed.

4th Brigade, Mounted Infantry : 3 privates.

Wounded.

Royal Army Medical Corps : 1 Officer.
4th Brigade, Mounted Infantry : 1 private.
Bethune’s Mounted Infantry : 2 privates.

Missing.

Bethune’s Mounted Infantry : 11 privates.
4th Brigade, Mounted Infantry : I private.

I regret to say that Captain de Rougemont, of the South African Light Horse, from Chieveley, was dangerously wounded and is since dead. Captain Dalton, R.A.M.C., proceeded in the most gallant manner to his assistance, but was severely wounded whilst attending him.

I have the honour to be.
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
H. BLAGROVE, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding Troops, Frere.

* Mounted troops, 175; Guns, Royal Artillery, 2 ; Infantry, 400.

(6.)

Camp, Potgieter’s,
25th January, 1900.

Chief of Staff,

I have the honour to report ass follows : —

On my return from the kopjes at 10 a.m., I received a telegram from Sir C. Warren, marked A. This appeared to be so urgent that I ordered two squadrons of Bethune s Mounted Infantry, the Scottish Rifles, and the King’s Royal Rifles, to cross at the Kaffir Drift, under Naval Gun Plateau, with these orders, the two first to join Sir C. Warrens extreme right and place themselves under the orders of the General Officer Commanding at that point. Message B was received at 10.15 a.m. The first corps crossed—Bethune’s at 11.45 a.m., Scottish Rifles, 12.30 p.m., and Kings Royal Rifles at 1 p.m. As the first parties were crossing, I noticed that strong reinforcements were reaching Sir 0. Warren’s right, which was unduly crowded with troops. ’ It seemed unnecessary to send more men then, and with a view of creating a diversion, I directed Colonel Riddell to move his battalion against Sugar Leaf Hill, and the hill between it and the right of the main position. I had mis- givings that there was too wide an interval, and in instructing Colonel Riddell verbally, I told him to use extreme caution, sending out scouts and only extending two companies, and having a half battalion in reserve. I told him I could not give him definite instructions, and must leave a good deal to his discretion. At about 2 30 p.m. I received message C from Major Bayly, and at once ordered, by signal, the Officer Commanding King’s Royal Rifles to retire slowly until further orders. See message D. This order was again repeated by signal at 3.30 p.m. (message E), and by mounted orderly at 4.50 p.m. (message F). Considerable delay appears to have occurred before any of these were received, the hills being some distance in rear of the battalion, and it was not till 5 p.m. that I received helio message G. At 5.15 p.m. I saw that a portion of the battalion had reached the top of the hill, and at 6 p.m. I received flag message H from Officer Commanding who was at top of Sugar Loaf. At 6 p.m. I sent message K by mounted orderly, ordering him to retire under cover of darkness, which was done without loss ; I had no idea that the battalion was anywhere near the top of the hill. The advance was wonderfully well carried out, and the ascent of the precipitous hillside was a very fine feat, of which the battalion may be justly proud. I greatly regret the losses incurred, but I do not think they were fruitless. I haye learnt that the men J on Sir C. Warren's right say that without this diversion they could not have] held their position, and I have heard from Sir C. Warren (message L) that my assistance had been most valuable.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant.
N. G. LYTTELTON, Major-General,
Commanding 4th Infantry Brigade.

COPIES OF Telegrams, &c., of 24th January, 1900.

A.
From Sir Charles Wavren to General Lyttelton. (Received 24th January, 1900, 10 a.m.)

“ Give every assistance you can on your side. This side is clear, but the enemy are too strong on your side, and Crofton telegraphs that if assistance is not given at once all is lost. I am sending up two battalions, but they will take some time to get up.”

B.
From some person unknown to General Lyttelton. (Received 24th January, 1900, 10.15 a.m.)

“We occupy all the crest on top of hill, being heavily attacked from your side. Help us. Spion Kop.”

C.
From Major Bayly, Staff Officer to General Lyttelton. (Received 24th January, 1900, 2.30 p.m.)

“ Very hot fire here, near flag, which is our observing station ; only lust holding our own, Bethune’s and Scottish Rifles are now coming up. Do not think that King’s Royal Rifles can get up on right ; it is held by Boers. We are only holding up to your left of saddle. A heavy fire from Boers on our north-west, where they have a gun, which is causing daraage. Cannot see left of our line or the Boers. Water badly wanted.” 

D. —From Brigade-Major, 4th Brigade, to Officer Commanding King’s Royal Rifles (by heliograph). (Sent 24th January, 1900, 3 p.m.)

“ Retire steadily until further orders.”

E.
From Brigade-Major, 4th Brigade, to Officer Commanding King’s Royal Rifles (by heliograph). (Sent 24th January, 1900, 3.30 p.m.)

“ Retire steadily till further orders. Please say how last message was transmitted.”

F.
From Brigade-Major, 4th Brigade, to Officer Commanding King’s Royal Rifles (by mounted orderly). (Sent 24th January, 1900, 4.50 p.m.)

“No. 141. Unless the enemy has retired you -will fall back, under cover of darkness, to the bridge just made, which is near the ford you crossed at, and where a fire will he lit, after dark, to guide you. Keep this orderly if of any use. Manners is at ford, with stretcher bearers, if you want any. Hope all is well.”

G.
From Officer Commanding King’s Royal Rifles to Brigade-Major (by heliograph). (Received 24tli January, 1900, 5 p.m.)

“ If 1 can recall the advanced sections I will do so, but it is difficult to communicate, and the hill is fearfully steep. I have two or three wounded to help down.”

H.
From Officer Commanding King's Royal Rifles to Brigade-Major (by flag). (Received 24th January, 1900, 6 p.m.)

“We are on top of the hill. Unless I get orders to retire I shall stay here.”

K.
From Brigade-Major to Officer Commanding King’s Royal Rifles (by flag), (Received 24th January, 1900, 6 p.m.)

“Retire when dark.”

K.
From Brigade-Major to Officer Commanding King’s Royal Rifles (by mounted orderly). (Sent 24th January, 1900, 6 p.m.)

“No. 144. I am sending you a signal lamp. The General Officer Commanding considers you could not hold the Sugar Loaf unsupported, and having no troops to support you with, he orders a retirement across the foot-bridge below ford, and bivouac on Naval Gun Plateau. Please report when you get in. I have rum, tea, and wood ready for you,”

L.
From General Warren to General Lyttelton (by wire). (Received | 24th January, 1900, 0.50 p.m.)

“The assistance you are giving most valuable. We shall try to remain in statu quo during to-morrow. Balloon would be of incalculable value.”

VI.

From the General Officer Commanding, Natal, to the Secretary of State for War.
(By the Field-Marshal Commanding-in -Chief, Cape Town.)

Spearman's Hill Camp,
30th January, 1900.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter of this date,! I have the honour to enclose two additional reports from Major-General Barton, as.under :—

1. Report dated 24th January, relative to the action of a party of the enemy in firing upon and severely wounding Captain Dalton, R.A.M.C., whilst attending to a wounded Officer.

2. Report dated 25th January; relative to the same, and to the death of Captain de Rougemont, South African Light Horse.

This is a regrettable circumstance. As a rule the enemy treat our wounded with great kindness.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
REDVERS BULLER, General.

(1.)

Camp, Chieveley,
24th January, 1900.

The Chief of the Staff, Head-quarters,

I have the honour to make the following report for information of the General Commanding in Natal.

I have just seen Surgeon-Captain Dalton, R.A.M.C., who was brought in wounded this morning, and he made the following statement to me, viz. :—

“I was out with a squadron of the 14th Hussars yesterday, and during the engagement near Hlangwani, Lieut.-Colonel Blagrove pointed to a man on the ground, and said, ‘There’s a wounded man.’ I went across and found an Officer [Captain de Rougemont] of the South African Light Horse, and four men of the Mounted Infantry, who had carried the wounded officer to the spot for safety from fire. I dismounted, and was attending to the wounded Officer, when some Boers rode up from the flank to within about 100 yards. I gave my white handkerchief to one of the men, and told him to wave it, which he did. I told another to take the Geneva Cross armlet off my arm and hold it up, which he did. In spite of this, they opened fire and shot two of us, myself and one of the men.”

Apart from the signals made, there cannot possibly have been any shadow of doubt as to the meaning of the little group of men, kneeling and bending over the prostrate form of the dangerously wounded Officer.

I fear that Captain Dalton’s wound is very dangerous, as he was struck in the abdomen. He is a. fine and gallant Officer, wearing, besides war decorations, the medal of the Royal Humane Society. j

I refrain from making any comment on the dastardly conduct of the Boers on this occasion.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
G BARTON, Major General,
Commanding at Chieveley.

(2.)

Chief of the Staff, Chieveley,
25th January, 1900
.
In continuation of my letter of the 23rd instant, I regret that my casualties on that date amounted to one Officer and three men killed, one Officer and five men wounded, and 12 men missing, according to attached list.

It appears that as the Officer of Bethune’s Mounted Infantry (Lieutenant Coke) had returned from the kraal referred to in my letter, Colonel Blagrove had been informed that the Officer and seven men had escaped. This, however, was not the case, as 11 of Bethune’s Mounted Infantry are missing, and were no doubt taken prisoners.

As regards the other casualties, Captain Dalton’s condition being more favourable, I again questioned him as to what occurred when he was wounded, and he has supplied the following further information:—

“When the Boers fired upon the party attending to Captain de Rougemont, it appears that of the four men who had carried that Officer away, one was killed, two were wounded, and one was taken prisoner. When the Boers came up to them, they took from the men’s pockets all they required and went away. Of the two wounded men, one afterwards died.”

Owing to the above circumstance, I deeply regret to say that Captain de Rougemont was not found until the following morning.

Captain Dalton, however, said that the wound was very dangerous, and the case hopeless from the first, and it appears that the deceased Officer became delirious soon after he was wounded, and remained so until he died in the ambulance on his way to camp.

The Medical Officers with lanterns were searching the ground until a late hour on the 23rd to find Captain de Rougemont, not knowing that all his attendants were hors de combat.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
G. BARTON, Major-General,
Commanding at Chieveley.

CASUALTIES in action near Colenso on 23rd January, 1900.
Chieveley, 25th January, 1900.

Captain de Rougemont, South African Light Horse, killed.
Captain C. Dalton, Royal Army Medical Corps, severely wounded.
No. 42 Trooper E. Basterfield, South African Light Horse, wounded.
Bugler H. Adlard, South African Light Horse, wounded.
Trooper Burton, Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, wounded.
Trooper O’Hara, Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, wounded.
No. 3244 Private William Fothergill, Scottish Rifles, wounded.
No. 521G Private Harry Russell, Scottish Rifles, killed.
No. 4003 Private Frederick Kiernan, Scottish Rifles, killed.
No. 7019 Samuel Davis, King’s Royal Rifles, killed.
No. 5008 Private William Foster, Scottish Rifles, missing.
Regimental Serjeant-Major Freeman, Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, rnissing
Trooper Freeman, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, missing.
Trooper Kane, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, missing.
Trooper Edwards, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, missing.
Trooper Thomas, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, missing.
Trooper Hyams, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, missing.
Trooper Rosenthal, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, missing.
Trooper Bridgwater, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, missing.
Trooper Stewart, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, missing.

J. MacBEAN, Captain,
Brigade-Major, 6th Brigade.

Hatting’s Farm,
30th January, 1900.

The Chief of Staff,

With reference to my report on the operations on the Tugela, already forwarded, will you please attach the accompanying addition.

C. WARREN, Lieut.-General,
Commanding 5th Division.

Hatting’s Farm,
30th January, 1900.

I omitted to state that during the afternoon of the 22nd the Commander-in-Chief proposed an attack upon the enemy’s position on our left flank that night. I summoned at once the General Officers available, namely, Generals Clery, Talbot, Coke, and Hildyard. General Clery, who was in command of the left attack, did not consider it advisable to make this attack, because, if successful, it would commit us to taking the whole line of the enemy’s position, which he considered a hazardous proceeding, as we might not be able to hold it. In this I concurred, more particularly as it was evidently too late in the day to carry the operation out effectively.

C, WARREN, Lieut.-General,
Commanding 5th Division.

I continually proposed to General Warren that he should attack the enemy’s right, which was en Vaal and not strong, and which jt was part of the original programme to try and turn, but I never suggested doing this hurriedly or without adequate forethought and preparation.

Boer commando on Spion Kop


After the battle, the British dead


Panoramic view of Spion Kop from the Boer side