TOPIC:

(3) Copy of letter from Lieut.-Colonel Thorneyeroft to Sir C. Warren.

Spion Kop,
24th January, 1900, 2.30 p.m.

To Sir C. Warren.

Hung on till last extremity with old force. Some of Middlesex here now, and I hear Dorsets coming up, but force really inadequate to hold such a large perimeter. The enemy’s guns are north-west, sweep the whole of the top of the hill. They also have guns east; cannot you bring artillery fire to bear on north-west guns ? What reinforcements can you send to hold the hill to-night ? We are badly in need of water. There are many killed and wounded.

ALEC. THORNEYCROFT.

If you wish to really make a certainty of hill for night, you must send more Infantry and attack enemy’s guns.



Spion Kop,
24th January, 1900.

3 p.m.—I have seen the above, and have ordered the Scottish Rifles and King’s Royal Rifles to reinforce. The Middlesex Regiment, Dorsetshire Regiment, and Imperial Light Infantry have also gone up, Bethune’s Mounted Infantry (120 strong) also reinforce. We appear to be holding our own at present.

J. TALBOT COKE, Major-General.



From Colonel Thorneyeroft to Chief Staff Officer to Sir Charles Warren.
24th January, 1900.

The troops which marched up here last night are quite done up—Lancashire Fusiliers, Royal Lancaster Regiment, and Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry. They have had no water, and ammunition is running short. I consider that even with reinforcements which have arrived, that it is impossible to permanently hold this place so long as the enemy’s guns can play on this hill. They have the long-range gun, three of shorter range, and one Maxim-Nordenfelt, which have swept the whole of the plateau since 8 a.m. I have not been able to ascertain the casualties, but they have been very heavy, especially in the regiments which came up last night. I request instructions as to what course I am to adopt. The enemy, at 6.30 p.m., were firing heavily from both flanks with rifles, shell, and Nordenfelt, while a heavy rifle fire is kept up in front. It is all I can do to hold my own. If casualties go on occurring at present rate I shall barely hold out the night. A large number of stretcher bearers should be sent up, and also all water possible. The situation is critical.

ALEC. THORNEYCROFT, Lieut.-Colonel.



Note from Colonel Thorneyeroft to Sir C. Warren.

24th January, 1900. Regret to report that I have been obliged to abandon Spion Kop, as the position became untenable. I have withdrawn the troops in regular order, and will come to report as soon as possible.

ALEC. THORNEYCROFT, Lieut.-Colonel

(4)
From Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Thorneycroft, Tlhorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry,
Commanding on Spion Kop, to the Chief Staff Officer to General Sir C. Warren,

Camp, Trichard's Drift,
26th January, 1900.

Sir,

On the night of the 23rd January, 1900, I rendezvoused with 18 Officers and 180 men, Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, 2nd Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers, 2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment, and half company Royal Engineers, the whole under the command of General Woodgate. At 9 pan. we started to march to the top of Spion Kop. I led the way with a small advanced party, crossed the dongas and advanced up the hill; on reaching the first plateau the force closed up in formation, and went on again. As the front broadened I got the Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry into line, right across the hill, and the remainder followed in successi ve lines up the last slope, when we were suddenly challenged. I had ordered the men to He down when challenged ; they did so. The Boers opened fire from magazines, when I thought that they had emptied their magazines I gave the order to charge ; an Officer on my left gave the order to charge also, and the whole line advanced at the double and carried the crest line at 4 a.m., when I halted and re-formed the line. There were about 10 men wounded altogether. Orders were immediately given by General Officer Commanding to form a trench and breastwork. There was a mist on the hill, and in the darkness and mist it was difficult to get the exact crest line for a good field of fire, and the boulders made it difficult to dig, but we made a rough trench and breastwork. At 4.30 a few Boers came up and began firing. The men lined the trench, but the picquets in front replied to the fire, and firing ceased for a time. The Boers then returned with strong reinforcements from their camp, which lay concealed in a hollow on the side of the hill, and which was obscured in the mist ; we sent out men in front to enable them to get a better field of fire ; with two lulls in the firing, the mist rose about S a.m., when the rifle fire on both sides became heavy and the Boers opened fire from three guns and a Maxim-Nordenfelt. The shrapnel fire was very accurate and burst well, sweeping the whole plateau. General Woodgate was wounded early in the action and Colonel Blomfield assumed command, but he, too, was wounded. At this time I was directing the movements of the Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, and sent out reinforcements to the firing line which was in advance of the trench ; word was sent to me that General Sir C. Warren had heliographed that I was to assume command. I sent out more men to the flanks as the Boers were working round, and the replacing of casualties gradually absorbed all the men of the force. The firing became hotter on both sides, the Boers gradually advancing ; twice the men charged out from the entrenchments in the centre and kept them back, but at length the entrenchment became the firing line in the centre (the left maintained their advanced position).

The Boers closed in on the right and centre. Some men of mixed regiments at right end of trench got up and put up their hands ; three or four Boers came out and signalled their comrades to advance. I was the only Officer in the trench on the left, and I got up and shouted to the leader of the Boers that I was the Commandant and that there was no surrender.

In order not to get mixed up in any discussion I called on all men to follow me, and retired to some rocks further back. The Boers opened a heavy fire on us. On reaching the rocks I saw a company of the Middlesex Regiment advancing, I collected them up to the rocks, and ordered all to advance again. This the men did, and we reoccupied the trench and crest line in front.

As the companies of the Middlesex arrived I pushed them on to reinforce, and was able to hold the whole line again. The men on the left of our defence, who were detached at some distance from the trench, had held their ground. The Imperial Light Infantry reinforced this part. The Boers then made a desperate endeavour to shell ns out of the position, and the fire caused many casualties. The Scottish Rifles came up, and I pushed them up to the right and left flanks as they arrived. There was some discussion at this time as to who was in command, and the Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles said he would go and see General Talbot Coke, who was reported to be at the foot of the hill, to get orders. Up to this I had issued the orders, but as I only got a verbal message I did not understand that I had the temporary rank of Brigadier-General. I continued to direct operations while the Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles went to see General Talbot Coke. General Coke said that Colonel Hill was in command, but I could not find him. The heavy fire continued, and the Boers brought a gun and Maxim-Nordenfelt to bear on us from the east, thus sweeping the plateau from the east, north, and northwest, and enfilading our trenches. The men held on all along the line, notwithstanding the terrific fire which was brought to bear on them, as the enemy’s guns (which now numbered five and two Nordenfelts) were absolutely unmolested. When night began to close in I determined to take some steps, and a consultation was held. The Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles and Colonel Crofton were both of opinion that the hill was untenable. I entirely agreed with their view, and so I gave the order £or the troops to withdraw on to the neck and ridge where the hospital was. It was now quite dark, and we went out to warn all to come in. The enemy still kept up a dropping fire. The regiments formed up near the neck, and marched off in formation, the Scottish Rifles forming the rear guard. I was obliged, owing to want of bearers, to leave a large number of wounded on the field.

In forming my decision as to retirement I was influenced by the following:—

1. The superiority of the Boer artillery, inasmuch as their guns were placed in such positions as to prevent our artillery fire being brought to bear on them from the lower slopes near camp, or indeed from any other place.

2. By my not knowing what steps were being taken to supply me in the morning with guns, other than the mountain battery which, in my opinion, could not have lived under the long-range fire of the Boer artillery, and their close-range rifle fire.

3. By the total absence of water and provisions.

4. By the difficulty of entrenching on the top of hill, to make trench in any way cover from artillery fire with the few spades at my disposal, the ground being so full of rocks.

5. Finally, I did not see how the hill could be held unless the Boer artillery was silenced, and this was impossible.
Lieutenant Winston Cnurchill arrived when the troops had been marched off.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
ALEC. THORNEYCROFT, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry.

(5)
Report of Major-General Talbot Coke, Officer Commanding 10th Brigade.

(Attack on Spion Kop, 23rd, 24th, 25th January, 1900.)

Pontoon Bridge,
25th January, 1900.

In accordance with your orders, General Woodgate assumed command of the column for the night attack, and settled his rendezvous near the Royal Engineer bivouac, for 7 p.m., 23rd instant. I bivouacked on the hill upon which the Connaught Rangers’ picquets are south of Three Tree Hill.

The first shots were fired at 3.40 a.m.

The valley between my position and Spion Kop, and also the top of that feature itself, Was enveloped in mist until about 8 a.m., when it could be seen that our force held the schanzes on the summit. Shortly after it was seen to be exposed to a frontal fire from rifles, and to shell fire from its left front. 

In accordance with orders communicated to me by you, to send a battalion to reinforce, a signal message was sent to the Imperial Light Infantry, which occupied a covering position towards Wright’s Farm to proceed at once to support, moving by the right flank of the kop. The 2nd Bn. Dorsetshire Regiment was ordered to the place vacated by the Imperial Light Horse.

The position of Spion Kop was now seen to be exposed to a cross fire of artillery, and by your instructions I sent the Middlesex Regiment in support.

About 11.10 a.m., in consequence of the regrettable news about General Woodgate, at your order I proceeded to the kop myself. On arrival there, I found the track leading up very much congested, and, from information received, I formed the opinion that too many men were getting into the trenches and stone cover above, and becoming exposed to the artillery fire; I accordingly checked reinforcements. Soon after this, on my way up, an urgent message was received from Colonel Hill, who commanded at this time on the right, calling for reinforcements, as his line had actually fallen back before, and lost some prisoners to the Boers, who were pressing on in front. I accordingly sent up the rest of the Imperial Light Infantry available.

I now met Major Bayly, a Staff Officer, from the 4th Brigade, and he informed me that an urgent message for help had been received from Colonel Crofton, who commanded on Spion Kop, after General Woodgate was wounded. General Lyttelton had accordingly despatched the Scottish Rifles as an actual reinforcement, and a battalion of the King’s Royal Rifles against the hill to the north-west of Spion Kop. It was on the further slope of this hill that one of the Vickers-Maxim guns was placed. (This battalion worked its way some distance up the hill, but its action did not materially affect the situation.)

I now again received an urgent appeal for support, this time for the centre and left. I sent the Scottish Rifles.

I now had only as a reserve Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and the Dorsetshire Regiment. These I retained and they were not engaged at the actual front.

The shell fire was most galling, and was aimed not only at the summit, but at the crest of the spur leading up, along which reinforcements and parties bringing back wounded had to pass. The fire came—

1. From field guns firing shrapnel and common shell, situated, as I endeavoured to point out in a signal message to you, north-west of our position.

2. From a Vickers-Maxim, in about the same direction.

3. From a similar gun to the north-east.

All these were beyond the effective rifle fire, and our supporting Artillery on and about Three Tree Hill and on the Dragoon’s Maxim position apparently could not see them, consequently they poured, unchecked, an uninterrupted cross fire on to our position from about 8 a.m. till dark—10 hours.

Losses were very heavy, owing to the numbers necessarily assembled to hold back the Boer frontal attack, established under cover, and in which they showed gallantry in pushing forward to our lines. Colonel Crofton was now reported wounded, and the command of the troops in front devolved on Colonel Hill, Commanding 10th Brigade.

So the situation continued until 6 p.m., when I wrote a report and despatched it to you by Colonel Morris, A. A.G. (I request that this document, to save labour, may be attached). I first showed this to Colonel Hill, and he concurred, even taking exception to my reference to a retirement. I had no doubt that the Infantry, which had so gallantly held its own all day, would be able to continue to do so when the shell fire abated at nightfall.

I accordingly went back to my reserves, having personally handed over command at the summit to Colonel Hill.

About 9.30 p.m., in consequence of your orders, I left for your camp, leaving a Staff Officer (Captain Phillips) behind. The narrative must now be his.
About 11.30 p.m. this Officer, who was sleeping, was awakened by the sound of men moving, and found a general retirement proceeding.

He allowed no one to pass after this, stopped the Scottish Rifles, and collected a large number of stragglers of the Dorset, Middlesex, and Imperial Light Infantry. Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and the bulk of the Dorsets remained in position as posted in support to the front line. The other corps had gone down the hill.

He then published memorandum (v), attached, to all companies, except Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, who had gone on; but they did not act upon it, urging that they had had distinct orders from Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, who, as far as I knew, was only assisting Colonel Crofton in a portion of the front line, to retire.

We now held the spur to within about 300 yards of the summit, but the summit itself was evacuated. Signal communication could not be established at the moment, as the lamp which the signalling Officer counted upon ran out of oil, and some time was lost in obtaining another.

About 1.30 a.m. a person, not by his speech an Englishman, was brought in on suspicion by a picquet. He made a statement to the effect that a Naval gun would shortly be brought up, and requested that it might not be fired on. This was the first intimation of any Naval gun coming to Spion Kop.

About 2.20 a.m. a Naval Officer reported that he had one 12-pr. gun below Spion Kop, near the donga on the west. He said he had orders to take this up to the summit. When asked whether he could do so before daylight, he said he could not. As it would be impossible to move the gun in any line after daybreak, on account of hostile fire, he was told to stand by in a place of safety. Signalling communication was now opened, and the attached sent.

As Captain Phillips got no instructions, about 2.30 a.m. he ordered vehicles back to place of safety. All regimental wagons had been sent across by the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General B, 5th Division.

Shortly after 4 a.m., there still being no orders, and a mass of transport, small-arm ammunition carts, &e., at the donga, steps were taken to cover this passage, and, with the concurrence of the Officer Commanding Dorsetshire Regiment, and Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles, certain dispositions were made with the latter battalion and about half the former. The other half of the Dorsetshire Regiment were employed in carrying away a large number of boxes (about 80) of small-arm ammunition, brought back from the front and elsewhere.

The Imperial Light Infantry, Middlesex, and Thorneycroft’s had apparently gone home. Bethune’s were dismissed.

It was now light, and Boer “sniping” commenced. Captain Phillips reported to me at the donga, about 4.45 a.m., when I was in possession of your order as to the pontoon crossing.

TALBOT COKE, Major-General,
Commanding Right Attack.

(i)
Officer Commanding 10th Brigade, or any Officer,
Clear out left flank.
W. J. BONUS, Brigade-Major

(ii)
There are enough on the kopje, direct the others round the sides of the hill, 3.45 we hope to charge, at any rate at nightfall.
W. J. BONUS.

(iii)
To General Talbot Coke, 24th January, 1900, 5.5 p.m.
We have now plenty of men for firing line, but the artillery fire from our left (west) is very harassing, I propose holding out till dark and then entrenching.
AUG. W. HILL, Lieut.-Colonel

(iv)
Officer Commanding Imperial Light Infantry,
Withdraw, and at once. 2 a.m.
W. J. BONUS, Brigade-Major

(v)
Officers Commanding Dorsetshire and Middlesex Regiments, Scottish Rifles, Imperial Light Horse.

This withdrawal is absolutely without the authority of either Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren.

The former was called away by the latter a little before 10 a.m.

When General Coke left the front about 6 p.m. our men were holding their own, and he left the situation as such, and reported that he could hold on.

Someone, without authority, has given orders to withdraw, and has incurred a grave responsibility. Were the General here, he would order an instant reoccupation of the heights.

H. E. PHILLIPS,
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

(vi)
Spion Kop, 25th January, 1900, 2.30 a.m.
General Officer Commanding Three Tree Hill,
Summit of Spion Kop evacuated by our troops, which still hold lower slopes. An unauthorized retirement took place.
Naval guns cannot reach summit before daylight; would be exposed to fire if attempted to do so by day.
PHILLIPS.

(vii)
Regimental Transport Officers,
25th January, 1900, 2.30 a.m.
All vehicles should be withdrawn to a place of safety, either towards Wright’s Farm, or up the gully across the drift.
By order,
D. PHILLIPS.

(6)

Extract from Commanding Royal Engineer’s Diary, bth Division, 24 th January.

Hatting’s Spruit, 28th January, 1900.

About 3 a.m. (Commanding Royal Engineer, 5th Division) I was ordered by General Officer Commanding to take the second half company of the 17th Company Royal Engineers to Spion Kop, to make zigzag roads up the steepest parts for mules to take up water and the Mountain Battery.

The half company, under Captain Hediey, R.E., and with Lieutenant Neill, R.E., crossed the valley, and started work at dawn from the bottom of the slopes. I went to the top with Captain Hediey to choose out the best places, and on arrival we found the first half company, under Major Massey, R.E., had almost completed their intrenching work, and he sent back all but a sub-section to assist in the road making. As the party was collecting tools and falling in, though the hilltop was in a thick cloud, the enemy opened musketry fire, and all troops took cover; the fire was not replied to and ceased after about 10 minutes. I then took the Royal Engineer party down. I also found water from small springs about halfway up the hill, and some men were set to collect it on the side of the hill that was not exposed to fire. Broad slides were also made down some of the boulder slopes up which guns might be dragged by hand. I returned to camp at 10.30 a.m.

At 10.30 Captain Buckland, R.E., was sent to 17th Company to get sandbags taken to the hill. These (about 2,000) were taken by a small cart to the drift, and thence a rear company of a battalion going across (Dorsetshire Regiment), and the company native drivers of 17th Company Royal Engineers, carried about 1,000 up the hill, the remainder were left as a reserve at the drift to be taken up later. Captain Buckland returned to camp about 12.

At 12.30 Captain Buckland went to Venter’s Spruit to procure three coils of 3-inch cable from 17th Company wagon, to enable the Naval guns to be hauled up the hill at night. This was deposited at 17th Company camp about 2.30, to be ready for the guns when passing that way.

About 5 p.m. General Officer Commanding showed me a. letter from Sir B,. BulSer, of which the following is an extract:—

“ If you send up either mountain guns or 12-pr. they should make some “ very strong epaulments, 8 feet thick, covering the gun from the line of its “ extreme fire, thus—



“ If this is done, any gun to attack it must come in front of it.”

General Officer Commanding ordered me to be ready to do this, and also to take working parties at night to deepen the trenches on Spion Kop, so that
they might screen the defenders from shell fire, being made 4 feet deep and sloping backwards inside, in the same form as the Boer “ schanzes ” are made.



I arranged with Officer Commanding 17th Company for the tools and for the half company that was now on Spion Kop to remain there, so that the Officers and non-commissioned officers might superintend the working parties. At 9 p.m. General Officer Commanding ordered me to proceed and make epaulments for two Naval guns (12-pr.), each to be 23 feet diameter, and to give 4 feet 3 inches cover ; also epaulments as above for the Mountain Battery, and to improve the trenches. He gave me also a letter to Colonel Thorneycroft, urging him to hold the hill, and explaining the work I had been ordered to do. To carry the tools across a party of 200 Somersetshire Light Infantry was detailed, and two reliefs, of 600 each, for the work were to be drawn from the reserve battalions on Spion Kop rear slopes.

About 12 p.m., when I (with Capiain Buckland, R.E.) had led the toolcarrying party about quarter the way up the slopes of Spion Kop, we met Colonel Thorneycroft coming down, having ordered a retirement. I gave him General Officer Commanding’s letter, and he said it was too late, as the men, unsupported by guns, could not stay. He ordered me to take my party back. I sent them back with Captain Buckland, and then went forward to ascertain if the retirement was general. Finding it so, I walked up the valley to warn the Officer in command of the Naval gun of the altered situation, and prevent him risking his gun by moving it to the evacuated hill top.

The 37th Company Royal Engineers had been telegraphed for from Spearman’s about 4 pm. It started at once, and arrived at the 17th Company camp about 1.30 a.rn. (25th). It then moved off with tools for Spion Kop, but was met by Captain Buckland, B.E., who informed the Officer Commanding of the retirement. After proceeding a short distance, Major Cairnes, R.E., Commanding, halted, and sent Captain Harper to the hill for information and orders. I found the company on my return about 2.30 a.m., and ordered it to bivouac where it was, and await further orders.

J. H. SIM, Lieut.-Colonel, R.E,,
Commanding Royal Engineer, 5th Division.

(7)

From Major H. N. Sargent, D.A.A.G. B, 5th Division, to General Officer Commanding, 5/A Division.
28th January, 1900.

Sir,

With regard to the water supply on Spion Kop, I have the honour to report that the arrangements made were as follows :—

All the available pack mules which could be procured—viz., 25—were utilized in carrying biscuit tins, filled with water, up the hill, the tins being refilled from water carts placed at the foot of Spion Kop. Each tin contained 8|- to 9 gallons of water. An Officer was placed in charge of the water carts, and had a plentiful supply of spare tins, in addition to those carried by the mules. The mules were divided into two sections, each under an Officer. These two sections of mules conveyed to the troops up the hill at each trip 425 gallons of water.

The water supply was kept going continuously during the day and late at night, with the exception of one break, caused by an order being given for one section of mules to bring up ammunition. In addition to the water conveyed on mules, there was a spring at the top of the hill, under Royal Engineer charge, which yielded a fair supply. I superintended generally the water supply myself, and made frequent enquiries as to whether the troops were getting sufficient quantity on top of the hill, and was told they were. A little delay was occasioned in the early part of the morning in looking for packalls, which I was told were in the camp, but which could not be obtained.

With regard to the food supplies, as soon as ever the drift near Spion Kop was made passable for our wagons, I collected the regimental wagons at the foot of the hill and instructed the regimental officers in charge to communicate with their units as to getting the supplies up the hill, which was done, and the boxes of biscuit and meat were taken up by hand.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
H. N. SARGENT, Major,
D.A.A.G. B.


From Major E. J. Williams, D.A.A.G., to the General Officer Commanding,
5th Division.

Springfield Camp,
28th January, 1900.

Sir,

I have the honour to report for your information that, on the 24th January, I undertook to take water to the troops engaged at Spion Kop Hill. I guided 12 mules loaded with water to the trees near the top of the hill, arriving there about 12 noon. It was my intention to take the water to the field hospital on the top, but just as 1 arrived it was destroyed by shell fire, and the Medical Officer requested me to deposit the water where it was. The mules then made a second trip, and a water depot was established. After this all mules were seized to convey ammunition to the firing line. The Royal Engineer company dug for water, which was found three-quarters of the way up the hill; it was thick, but fairly plentiful. At 3 p.m. I impressed some more mules, and from that time to 8 p.m. I continued to hurry up water to the water depot ; also men were sent up with filled water bottles for distribution to the firing line. At 8 p.m. it was too dark for the mules to work, and although several fell over the cliff in getting up, there were at this hour several full boxes of water at different spots on the hill.

Supplies of all kinds were plentiful at the foot of the hill, and in conjunction with the water, I impressed all mules, horses, and straggling men to carry up rations before darkness came on, but it is impossible to say if these actually reached the front line, as it was impossible to see what was going on, owing to the troops going up and the stretcher bearers coming down.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
E. J. WILLIAMS, Major,
D.A.A.G.


From Colonel A. W. Morris, A.A.G., 5th Division, to General Officer Commanding, 5th Division.
28th January, 1900.

Re the water supply on Spion Kop, I beg to report as follows :—

I accompanied General Coke up Spion Kop, about 11 a.m., 24th instant. About half way up the hill, just by the trees on the Kop, we came across a dep6t water supply, under a non-commissioned officer ; I should say there were some 20 tins of water under this non-commissioned officer’s charge. Numbers of men asked this non-commissioned officer for water, but he said it was reserved for the wounded. On this General Coke ordered a certain number of tins to be placed aside for the unwounded men, this the non-commissioned officer did at once ; I think he set aside for the unwounded about five tins. No doubt many of the tins under his charge were empty, but I cannot say, as I was anxious to get further up the hill. However, when I got further up the hill, I saw several men bringing up by hand tins of water to the firing line. When I arrived at the firing line mules, loaded with ammunition, came up, and the General ordered the ammunition to be unloaded, and the mules sent back to the water supply depot to bring up more water tins. Whether these ever arrived I cannot say, as I shortly afterwards went down the hill to carry a letter to the General Officer Commanding, 5 th Division.

Personally, I do not think the men were suffering very badly from want of water. I consider that, under the circumstances, nothing could have been better than the very difficult arrangements made for water supply ; it was not plentiful, but sufficient for the purpose required.

A. W. MORRIS, Colonel,
A.A.G., 5th Division.

III

From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War.
Army Head-quarters, South Africa,

Camp Jacobsdal, 17th February, 1900.

My Lord,

In continuation of my letter, dated 13th February, 1900, I have the honour to forward the enclosed telegram from General Sir Redvers Buller, requesting that certain words may be inserted in his despatch describing the operations at Spion Kop.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant,
ROBERTS, Field-Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief, South Africa.



From the General Commanding-in-Chief, Natal, to the Military Secretary,
Cape Town.
Spearman’s Camp,
31st January, 1900, 1.20 a.m.

I posted my report on operations, 7th to 30th January, yesterday, when you receive it, will you please insert after the words “ enclose his report of his operations,” the following words

“ As Sir Charles Warren does not allude to it, I may mention that on the 21st reinforced him by the 10th Brigade, made up to four complete battalions by the addition to it of the 2nd Bn. Somersetshire Light Infantry and the Imperial Light Infantry, a local corps 1,000 strong, for whose services he particularly asked.”—Buller.