TOPIC:

IV

From General Sir Redvers Buller to the Secretary of State for War.
2nd February, 1900.

Secretary of State,

I forward this. It is certain that General Warren did receive the message in the terms he quoted, I saw it myself, and he also repeated it to General Lyttelton, who has quoted it in his report. The signal station was not in or very near the firing line.

I have an impression that the message referred to by Lieutenant Martin was sent as well as that quoted by General Warren, but I have not been able to verify this idea.
One thing is quite clear, about the time this message was sent one portion of the front line did propose to surrender, and it was Colonel Thorneycroft, and not Colonel Crofton, who refused the surrender and rallied the men.

REDVERS BULLER,
General Officer Commanding.



Hatting’s Farm, 1st February, 1900.

Chief of Staff,

With reference to my despatch on the “ capture and evacuation of Spion Kop” already sent to you, I have now to forward a statement made by Colonel Crofton, Commanding 2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment, regarding the message which was signalled to me from the summit of Spion Kop, and which (as I have already reported) reached me in these words : “ Reinforce at once, or all lost. General dead.”

It seems certain that no message was written down at the transmitting station on Spion Kop, and the only written record is that of the message received at the receiving station with me.

C. WARREN, Lieut.-General,
Commanding 5th Division.



(1)
From Colonel Crofton, Commanding 2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment, to the Brigade-Major, 11th Brigade.
Hatting’s Farm, 31st January, 1900.

Sir,

I beg most strongly to protest against the message reputed to be sent by me from Spion Kop on the 24th, stating “ All is lost.” Such a message was never sent by me, nor did it ever enter my thoughts to send such a message, as the circumstances did not call for it. My message given to the Signalling Officer (Lieutenant Martin, Royal Lancaster Regiment) was : “ General Woodgate dead; reinforcements urgently required.” This I considered necessary, as the Boers were increasing in numbers every minute, and I had no means of ascertaining the numbers of the reserves that they had to draw upon.

I very much feared some error had occurred from the returned message, directing me under no circumstances to surrender, and I felt most deeply being superseded during the engagement by an Officer so very much my junior.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
MA.LBY CROFTON, Colonel,
Royal Lancaster Regiment. 



(2)
Hatting's Farm,
31st January, 1900.

Officer Commanding Lancaster Regiment,

It would strengthen your case if you attached the message handed to Lieutenant Martin for despatch, and also call upon the signallers who signalled the message wrongly sent in your name to account for having despatched a message not properly authenticated by signature.

A. WYNNE, A.A.G.,
Commanding 11th Brigade.



(3)
Brigade-Major,
31st January 1900

Lieutenant Martin’s statement herewith.

MALBY CROFTON, Colonel



(4)
Lieutenant Martin, Signalling Officer,
31st January, 1900.

Be good enough to let me have a full report hereon of the message I gave you to send from Spion Kop on the 24th, relative to General Woodgate’s reported death, and asking for reinforcements.

MALBY CROFTON, Colonel



(5)
To Colonel Crofton, Commanding 2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment.
Hatting’s Farm,
31st January, 1900.

Sir,

On 24th instant, soon after firing began, I was looking for some signallers, you met me, and said, “I must have a signaller ; ” I said, “ I am looking for them.”

You replied : “Get them at once, and send a message to Sir Charles Warren and say General Woodgate is dead, and ask for reinforcements at once.”

I called for signallers, and two men of 2nd Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers ran up. We went to a spot that I selected, and found that there was already a signaller there, Private Goodyear, of the West Yorkshire Regiment (he was with Lieutenant Boomer, R.A., observing the effect of artillery fire).

I said to Private Goodyear, “You might send a message for me whilst the helio is being put up.”

I told him to call up “ G.O.C.” the station I wished to communicate with, and to say, “General Woodgate is killed ; send reinforcements at once.” I did not write the message down, as I had no paper.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
A. R. MARTIN, Lieutenant,
2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment.



(6)
Hatting’s Farm,
31st January, 1900.

A A.G., 5th Division.

Forwarded. It is unfortunate that the message was not written. I believe the order is that signallers should not accept any message that is not written and signed.

A. WYNNE, Major-General,
Commanding 11th Brigade.

V.

Prom the General Commanding-in-Chief, Natal, to the Secretary of State for War.
(By the Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief, Cape Town.)
Spearman’s Hill Camp,
30th January, 1900.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward to you the enclosed reports relative to recent operations in the vicinity of the River Tugela :—

1. From Major-General G. Barton, Commanding troops, Chieveley, on action towards Robinson’s Drift on 19th January.
2. From Major-General N. G. Lyttelton, Commanding 4th Brigade, on action near Potgieter’s on 20th January.
3. From the Officer Commanding Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, on operation towards Swartz Cop on 20th January.
4. From Major-General G. Barton, Commanding troops, Chieveley, of a reconnaissance towards Colenso on 23rd January.
5. From the Officer Commanding troops, Frere, on his co-operation with Major-General Barton in the operation of 23rd January.

I ordered these operations to be undertaken on the eastern line, in order to free me as much as possible whilst operating on the western line.

I also forward a report from Major-General the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, on the action taken by him during the operations of 24th January, but this should be read in connection with Sir C. Warren’s of that day.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
REDVERS BULLER, General.

(1.)

The Brigade Major, Fusilier Brigade,
Chieveley Camp, Chieveley,
19th January, 1900.

With reference to this day’s operations towards Robinson’s Drift, as the Mounted Infantry under my command got into difficulties down by the river, I beg to report, for the information of the General Officer Commanding, my orders to that unit.

Lieutenant Renton, two other Officers, and 40 non-commissioned officers and men reported themselves to me at 5 a.m. here. I told Lieutenant Renton, who had been out towards the drift with the General Officer Commanding and myself the previous evening, that I was going to move down with my Infantry and guns towards the drift, and that I wanted him to cover my advance and protect my flanks with his Mounted Infantry. I said, “ Information is what I want, as I can tackle the enemy should they come on.” I told him I should like one Officer and 15 men for each flank, and that 10 men would do very well for the front; on this he went away, and sent his men out. I told him my formation with Infantry and guns, and where I should be ; I received no reports from him, but some two hours after, when I eventually arrived with my extended line on a ridge of hills overlooking the river and Robinson’s Drift, some 3,200 yards from it, I met Lieutenant Renton, who reported to me that the enemy were not our side of the river, and that one or more of his men had been down to the drift and said it was unfordable. I then told him I much wanted to know for certain about the drift, and anything that could be seen of the enemy or their defences the other side, and suggested a place for a cossack post, where his men would be under cover and out of sight, and to try from there to get the information, but I repeated several times, “ I do not want your men to get fired upon.” Lieutenant Renton went down to this place, reported it suitable, and posted his men. About that time I got the report of 1,000 of enemy on my left flank, which caused me to send Lieutenant Renton off to his men on that flank, and myself to watch it and give sundry orders ; this report turned out to be false, and during this time we had seen the Boers moving down the hill the other side of the river and occupy different places. It was then that I found out that there were several Mounted Infantry scouts with their horses along the river in my front; they were, I believe, some of the 10 men who had covered my front in the morning, extended to some 200 yards, had gone down to the river and remained there ; the Boers having come down towards the river they were in a very awkward position, as they could not withdraw without being under Boer fire. The difficulty was to extricate the men, I ordered up the two Mountain Battery guns and got them into action, and also requested the Naval guns to shell a certain donga, which they did ; further, my machine guns got into action, and tried some long-range volleys. The two latter methods were no good, but under cover of the guns several were got away ; eventually, Lieutenant Renton reported to me that he had, as far as he could make out, four of five men away and three horses, I left Lieutenant Renton and a sufficient force of Mounted Infantry to watch for his men, as I expected they would get away when the Boers retired back from the river or else under cover of darkness. I never gave Lieutenant Renton to understand he had to hold the river line or seize the drift; 10 men would not have been much good for such an undertaking, The cossack post from which I thought he could have reconnoitred the drift should, in my opinion, have been done by one or two men dismounted.

I commend the pluck of the men who came back from the river, two of them under a very hot fire. One man on foot made his way back across the open, and Lieutenant Jones, of the 8th Hussars, galloped down, picked him up, and brought him in on his horse, a plucky action, though, as it happened, he was not hotly fired on. Further, two men on the right, galloping on their horses, fell; one was left without a horse, and appeared to be wounded. Captain and Adjutant Braithwaite at once galloped out and picked the man up; he had damaged his foot, but had not been shot.

C. THOROLD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding 1st Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

Camp, Chieveley,
20th January, 1900.

Chief of Staff,

Transmitted. I have communicated the same to General Officer Commanding Lines of Communication, Maritzburg.

I very much regret these most unnecessary casualties. It was distinctly explained to Captain Renton, and by him to his men, that they were going out to reconnoitre, not to fight.

It was not necessary for the scouts to go right down to the river bank, as a bare ridge overlooks the river at about 1,000 yards from the bank.

Having reached the river bank, however, the scouts should have withdrawn to high ground, as Colonel Thorold thought they had done. I have carefully questioned the serjeant who was in command of the scouts in front, and he says that five or six of his men dismounted on the bank and took good cover. He went along the river to examine the drift, and after a long time the Boers opened fire, and he shouted out to retire, and he and four of his men galloped back, being hotly fired upon. Two of the men led their horses wounded, and returning on foot, were helped back by two mounted Officers. The remaining men apparently kept under cover, and lost their opportunity of retiring.

After the force had withdrawn, three Boers were seen to leave the trenches and go down to the bank, and the six men, South African Light Horse, were seen all together, and taking off their coats on the south bank. Shortly after, nine or ten men were seen on north bank moving away from the river towards the hills. It is concluded our men waded across and surrendered, and they were not wounded.

G. BARTON, Major-General,
Commanding at Chieveley.

Names of Men, South African Light Horse, missing—all of "A” Squadron :—

451 Corporal J. Eustace.
371 Trooper H. W. Eldred.
450 Trooper J. Joliffe.
81 Trooper H. E. Gilbanks.
2G Trooper A. W. M. Brown.
803 Trooper C. F. F. Lilly.

(2.)

REPORT of Action near Potgieters, 20tli January, 1900.
Camp over Potgieters Drift.

Sir,

Having received a telegram from Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren early in the morning of the 20th instant, that lie was attacking the enemy north of Fair View, and that a demonstration by me against the Boer position opposite the drift might create a useful diversion, I ordered the 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifles to advance and occupy some small kopjes on the left and a farmhouse on the right, about midway between my position and the Boers. 'This was accordingly done at about 10 a.m., and the balloon was also sent forward, in order to get a nearer and a better view. There was a donga to the right front of the farmhouse, about 300 yards in advance, which was occupied by one company, Captain Beaumont’s. This company immediately came under a sharp fire at comparatively short range, and the party in the farmhouse were also fired on to a lesser degree. For some hours the damage done was quite trifling, one man only had been hit by 3 p.m. ; but later on, one if not two machine guns were brought up, and casualties began to occur. It was very difficult to say from whence the fire came until the machine guns opened, probably from small parties concealed behind rocks and banks. To relieve the former, fire was opened by two Naval 12-prs. and two howitzers, assisted by the two 4’7-inch guns, and at about 5 p.m. the 64th Field Battery moved out and opened fire at about 2,400 yards from the Boers. The fire appeared singularly effective, searching the hillsides thoroughly, and the Boers were seen bolting in every direction from the shells. Their fire was promptly silenced, and there is good reason to believe that two machine guns were knocked out. As usual, it is impossible to say what loss the Boers suffered, but judging from their inability to face the shell fire and the accuracy of our fire, there must have been some ; moreover, an ambulance was seem moving along the position. At 5.30 p.m. the 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles and the 1st Bn. Ride Brigade moved out covered by artillery fire, and the whole force eventually withdrew under cover of night. I should add that the force on the left was also fired upon, but only one or two men were hit. It is hoped that the demonstration had some effect in forcing the enemy to their trenches, and preventing them from assisting the force fighting Sir C. Warren, which was the object aimed at. The King’s Royal Rifles had a long and trying day, and I was quite satisfied with their behaviour.

The balloon was hit by a bullet, and Captain Phillips, R.E., also had a narrow escape while in the car. Useful work in investigating the Boer position and in directing our fire was done by the balloon Officers.

I enclose a list of casualties.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
N. G. LYTTELTON, Major-General, Commanding 4th Infantry Brigade

RETURN of Casualties in Action at Potgieter’s (River Tugela) on 20th January, 1900,

Summary,

Officers : One killed ; non-commissioned officers and men : two killed, 13 wounded, and one missing (all belonging to 3rd Bn, Ring’s Royal Rifles).

Wounded.

Captain Phillips (balloon Officer), very slight, graze on forehead.

Killed : Non-commissioned officers and men,
(3rd Bn, King’s Royal Rifle Corps,)

No, 6899 Private J, Jones,
No, 6648 Private J, Smith,

Wounded : Non-commissioned officers and men,
(3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifles.)

No. 9399 Corporal E. A. Etheridge, dangerous.
No. 9183 Corporal S. Taylor, severe.
No. 7165 Lance-Corporal H. Somerfield, slight.
No. 6685 Private A. Ellis, slight.
No, 5667 Private A. Tillotson, slight.
No. 1786 Private A Pincher, severe.
No. 5683 Private C. Murphy, severe.
No. 7144 Private W. Simper, severe.
No. 9632 Private W. Turner, very severe.
No. 1439 Private H- Hollings, dangerous,
No. 561 Private T. Griffiths, dangerous
No. 7065 Private J. Tow, severe.
No, 6372 Private Arthur Green, severe.

Missing : Officers and men.
(3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps.)

No. 5446 Private W. Grady.

(3.)

From Officer Commanding Bet kuneh Mounted Infantry to Brigade-Mayor, 4th Brigade.
Potgieter’s Drift,

21st January, 1900.

I moved out yesterday with two squadrons of my regiment in the direction of Swartz Kop, and skirmished towards the hills on the east of the enemy’s position, opposite Swartz Kop. We drew the enemy’s fire, and made them expose themselves. There were about 300 to 400 men on the hill. We killed one Boer and wounded me horse. Ammunition expended, 325 rounds. No casualties on our side. Returned to camp 7.15 p.m.

The squadron that went over Wagon Drift reports that a heavy engagement was going on. A shell burst among them, killing one horse and wounding two others. Three rifles were lost by this squadron while crossing the river. I have ordered a Court of Enquiry to enquire into the matter.

E. BETHUNE, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding Bethune’s Mounted. Infantry.

(4.)

Chieveley,
23rd January, 1900.

Chief of Staff,

Such persistent reports have reached the Intelligence Department at Head-quarters, from various sources, regarding the Boers having left Ciugol, Hlangwani, and even Colenso, that I determined to clear up the matter to-day by a reconnaissance in such force as I could muster. For this purpose (as I have only two battalions here) Colonel Blagrove brought from Frere 120 mounted men and two guns, and 400 men of the Rifle battalion, who were railed over.

I moved two guns (Naval 12-prs.) to the advanced gun position west of railway, escorted by 300 Riflemen ; left flank covered by 50 South African Light Horse.
Colonel Blagrove, with 170 mounted men and two field guns, moved to Hussar Hill to reconnoitre. I supported him with 10 companies of Royal Fusiliers and Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and two Naval 12-prs., which I moved forward far enough to the right front to shell Hlangwani and the Boer camp between Nat Hill and Bloy’s Farm.
Work was continuing in the trenches about Colenso, and these were shelled.

A pout and ferry boat were discovered above Colenso road bridge, and a landing stage ; Boers were seen to cross to the south side, and they w7ere shelled with effect.

Colonel Blagrove reconnoitred from the right in a masterly manner, and located a considerable number of Boers, who opposed him in trenches, which were peppered effectually by the field guns.

Unfortunately, a young Officer of Bethunes Mounted Infantry, while reconnoitring, got 10 men into a stone kraal, and they were being surrounded when Colonel Blagrove succeeded in extricating the Officer and seven men. Three appear to have been captured, as they are missing. The Boers showed considerable determination, and followed up the mounted men when withdrawing, but I was able to check their Offensive movement by shell fire from the 12-prs., which were ably handled by Lieutenant Richards, R.N. It is estimated that from 300 to 500 actually opposed Colonel Blagrove ; his entire force was under a heavy fire, and there is no doubt the position is still strongly held by the Boers.

I saw numbers of Boers about the trenches at Fort Wylie and kopjes near there, but I did not take my Infantry within rifle range of the river.

My Cavalry scouts were fired at from Colenso, and from the river bank above Colenso.

The Boers’ train steamed rapidly out of Colenso, and the 12-prs. failed to hit it.

My casualties will be reported later. They are, I believe, four men missing, five wounded, including Captain de Rougemont, South African Light Horse, severely wounded, and not yet brought to camp, but an ambulance has gone to fetch him.

The Cingol camp is still occupied, and supplied to-day two Boer contingents to reinforce the Hlangwani force.

G. BARTON, Major-General
Commanding at Chieveley.

P.S.—During the day the Boers did not reply with a gun, but, according to information of my scouts, there is still one on Hlangwani, and several at Colenso, the latter probably of no great value. G.B.